Oral Judgment

1. RULE, returnable forthwith. Learned APP Mr.Tirthraj Pandya waives service of notice of rule for and on behalf of the respondent - State.

2. By way of preferring the present application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the petitioner (party-in-person) has prayed for the following reliefs :

          "a. That the Hon'ble Court be pleased to quash and set aside the FIR No.11196008210285 dated 10.05.2021 registered at JP Road Police Station, annexed as Annexure:P/6

          b. That the Hon'ble Court be pleased to quash and set aside the Complaint No.CPRG 42/2021 and DGP application number 12/2021 registered at JP Road Police Station, annexed as Annexure:P/5 registered at JP Road Police station.

          c. That this Hon'ble Court may direct Respondent PSI-S.S.Jasani to pay FIFTY LACS rupees as compensation to petitioner as per provisions of Section 151 CrPC for wrongful detention without food, water and medicine, Arresting, Beating, Strangulating, filing a false FIR, threatening petitioner to withdraw his complaint of Video recording his minor daughter and circulating.

          d. An FIR be lodged against PSI - S.S.Jasani under Sections 167, 192, 195A, 409 of IPC and other sections deemed appropriate by this court with time bound completion of investigation in 60 days.

          e. That this Hon'ble Court may kindly order Judicial probe on RESPONDENT PSI - S.S.JASANI RECORDING PETITIONER'S DAUGHTER AND CIRCULATING THAT VIDEO."

3. Heard Mr.Abhishek Kumar Mishra appearing in person and learned APP Mr.Tirthraj Pandya Patel appearing for the respondent-State.

4. As per the case of the complainant, who is a police officer, he had received applications being C.P.R. No.42/2021 dated 14.03.2021, D.G.P. No.12/2021 dated 16.04.2021 and C.P.R. No.93 of 2021 dated 04.05.2021 filed by the wife of the present petitioner, making allegations of harassment, dowry demand and domestic violence against her husband (i.e. the present petitioner) and in-laws. It is submitted that during the investigation of the applications filed by the wife of the present petitioner, the complainant had, on 10.04.2021, called the petitioner and his parents for recording of their statement; however, they had not cooperated in the inquiry and left the police station without recording the statement. Thereafter, again on 10.05.2021, the petitioner and his father were called at the police station for recording of their statement. At that time, the petitioner misbehaved with the complainant and told him to immediately record his father's statement as they are running short of time, and while denying giving his statement, he told that he will submit his statement in writing against him. Therefore, the complainant was constrained to file the impugned FIR against the present petitioner for the offences punishable under Sections 186 and 189 of the Indian Penal Code.

5. Mr.Abhishek Kumar Mishra appears in person and has submitted that the allegations made against him in the impugned FIR are baseless. He has submitted that even if the allegations made in the FIR are considered at its face value and accepted in its entirety, the same do not constitute any offence or make out a case against him. He has, therefore, submitted that continuing further with the criminal proceedings pursuant to the impugned FIR against him would be nothing but a sheer abuse of process of law.

6. He has further submitted that the allegations levelled in the FIR, even if they are considered as it is, the elements of Sections 186 and 189 of the Indian Penal Code are not attracted. It is submitted that admittedly the prosecution has registered the FIR for the offences punishable under Sections 186 and 189 of the Indian Penal Code, however, considering the provisions of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the court cannot take cognizance of the said offence, except on the complaint in writing by a public servant concerned. Admittedly, the complaint refers to a complaint in writing to a Magistrate with a view to taking action under the Indian Penal Code, that is, 'a private complaint'.

7. Lastly, the party-in-person Mr.Abhishek Kumar Mishra has submitted that considering the aforesaid, the present petition deserves consideration and the same is required to be allowed by quashing and setting aside the impugned FIR.

8. Learned APP Mr.Tirthraj Pandya appearing for the respondent - State has submitted that considering the seriousness and gravamen of the offence, the present petition may not be entertained and the same may be rejected. He has further submitted that the considering the contents of the FIR, it appears that the petitioner (party-in- person) has committed not only the offence punishable under Section 186, but also committed the offence punishable under Section 189 of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, the petitioner (party-in-person) cannot take the benefit of the provisions of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

9. Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants. The same reads thus :-

          "195. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence.

          (1) No Court shall take cognizance---

          (a) (i) of any offence punishable under sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), or

          (ii) of any abetment of, attempt to commit, such offence, or

          (iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit such offence, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate;"

10. A bare perusal of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, makes it abundantly clear that for any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 of the Indian Penal Code, the court cannot take cognizance, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned.

11. Admittedly, the prosecution has registered the impugned FIR for the offences punishable under Sections 186 and 189 of the Indian Penal Code; however, considering the provisions of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, it appears that the court cannot take cognizance of the said offence, except on the complaint in writing by a public servant concerned. Indisputably, the complaint refers to a complaint in writing to a Magistrate with a view to taking action under the Indian Penal Code, that is, 'a private complaint', which, in the instant case, has not been done.

12. In the case of Devendra Kumar vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and another, reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 1753, the Supreme Court has held that Section 195(1)(a)(i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure bars the court from taking cognizance of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 of the Indian Penal Code unless there is a written complaint by the public servant concerned or his administrative superior, for voluntarily obstructing the public servant from discharging his public functions, and without a complaint from the said person, the court would lack competence to take cognizance in certain types of offences enumerated therein.

13. The relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment read thus :-

          "59. We may summarize our final conclusion as under :-

          (i) Section 195(1)(a)(i) of the Cr.P.C. bars the court from taking cognizance of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 respectively of the I.P.C., unless there is a written complaint by the public servant concerned or his administrative superior, for voluntarily obstructing the public servant from discharge of his public functions.

          Without a complaint from the said persons, the court would lack competence to take cognizance in certain types of offences enumerated therein.

          (ii) If in truth and substance, an offence falls in the category of Section 195(1)(a)(i), it is not open to the court to undertake the exercise of splitting them up and proceeding further against the accused for the other distinct offences disclosed in the same set of facts. However, it also cannot be laid down as a straitjacket formula that the Court, under all circumstances, cannot undertake the exercise of splitting up. It would depend upon the facts of each case, the nature of allegations and the materials on record.

          (iii) Severance of distinct offences is not permissible when it would effectively circumvent the protection afforded by Section 195(1)(a)(i) of the Cr.P.C., which requires a complaint by a public servant for certain offences against public justice. This means that if the core of the offence falls under the purview of Section 195(1)(a)(i), it cannot be prosecuted by simply filing a general complaint for a different, but related, offence. The focus should be on whether the facts, in substance, constitute an offence requiring a public servant's complaint.

          (iv) In the aforesaid context, the courts must apply twin tests. First, the courts must ascertain having regard to the nature of the allegations made in the complaint/FIR and other materials on record whether the other distinct offences not covered by Section 195(1)(a)(i) have been invoked only with a view to evade the mandatory bar of Section 195 of the I.P.C. and secondly, whether the facts primarily and essentially disclose an offence for which a complaint of the court or a public servant is required.

          (v) Where an accused is alleged to have committed some offences which are separate and distinct from those contained in Section 195, Section 195 will affect only the offences mentioned therein. However, the courts should ascertain whether such offences form an integral part and are so intrinsically connected so as to amount to offences committed as a part of the same transaction, in which case the other offences also would fall within the ambit of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. This would all depend on the facts of each case.

          (vi) Sections 195(1)(b)(i)(ii) & (iii) and 340 of the Cr.P.C. respectively do not control or circumscribe the power of the police to investigate, under the Criminal Procedure Code. Once investigation is completed then the embargo in Section 195 would come into play and the Court would not be competent to take cognizance. However, that Court could then file a complaint for the offence on the basis of the FIR and the material collected during investigation, provided the procedure laid down in Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. is followed.

          60. In view of the aforesaid, we dispose of this petition leaving it open to the petitioner to raise the contention as regards the bar of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. before the trial court if at all, at the end of the investigation, chargesheet is filed for the offences enumerated above in the FIR."

14. This Court has considered the argument canvassed by learned APP Mr.Tirthraj Pandya appearing for the respondent - State that since the petitioner-accused has also committed the offence punishable under Section 189 of the Indian Penal Code, he cannot take the benefit of the provisions of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. After giving thoughtful consideration regarding the same and considering the FIR in its entirety, it appears that all the acts of the petitioner-accused are of the same transaction and, therefore, it cannot be separated.

15. In the case of Ramji Bhikha Koli and others vs. State of Gujarat, reported in 1999 CriLJ 1244, a Coordinate Bench of this Court, while considering the similar aspect, held in paragraph-8 as under :

          "8. It is undisputed that allegations made in the complaint against present petitioners include allegations in respect to offence made punishable under Section 186 of IPC. It is true that petitioners are also charged with other offences like offences made punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 149, 332, 333 and 307 of IPC, which are not covered under Section 195. However, it is well accepted proposition of law that where an accused commits some offences which are separate and distinct from those contained in Section 195; Section 195 will affect only the offences mentioned therein unless such other offences form an integral part of the same so as to amount to offences committed as a part of the same transaction. That in such case the other offences would also fall within the ambit of Section 195 of the Code. That in the instant case if the complaint recorded as FIR is read as a whole the petitioners have formed unlawful assembly with an object to resist a prohibition raid carried out by PSI O.M. Raval and his squad by using force with deadly weapons and causing rioting and even making an attempt on life of PSI O. M. Raval, in prosecution of the common object to prevent the raiding party to enter into the house of petitioner No. 1 and to carry out the raid in due discharge of their duty. That thereby entire prosecution of voluntary causing obstruction to the public servant by forming unlawful assembly with an object to resist the same and using deadly weapon to cause riot and even to make an attempt on life of the PSI who led the raiding party is a single transaction and integral part of the offence constituting and made punishable under Section 186 of IPC. In other words, the offences charged against the petitioners under Sections 143, 147, 148, 149, 332, 333 and 307 of IPC, cannot be split from the complaint for a separate offence in the facts and circumstances of the present case, and thereby cognizance in respect to said offences are also barred under Section 195(1)(a)(i) of the Code, as held by Supreme Court in the case reported vide AIR 1984 SC 1108."

16. A similar view was taken by another Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Mohammadfirdosh Ismailbhai Khilji vs. State of Gujarat and others, reported in 2019 SCC Online Guj 5280, wherein it has been observed in paragraph-7 as under :

          "7. Having considered the provisions of Section 186 of IPC as also Section 195 of the Code along with allegations levelled in the FIR and the papers of investigation, it is clear that after conclusion of investigation and submission of charge sheet, the concerned Magistrate is not able to take cognizance of an offence under Section 186 of IPC. If that is so, continuing investigation into an FIR registered for an offence under Section 186 of IPC, is nothing but sheer abuse of process of law in a given case. Since offence under Section 186 is made cognizable, police is empowered to register the same. Merely because they can register an offence under Section 186 of IPC, they may not resort to it because ultimately, on conclusion of investigation, there is nothing to happen but to satisfy their ego that they have registered an offence and arrested the accused, who is alleged to have obstructed them. Uptill now, it has never seen that for such offence alone when FIR is registered and investigation is concluded, any complaint as required under Section 195 of Code is ever filed."

17. In the case of Devendra Kumar (supra) also, the Supreme Court has specifically held that, if in truth and substance, an offence falls in the category of Section 195(1) (a)(i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is not open to the court to undertake the exercise of splitting them up and proceeding further against the accused for other distinct offences disclosed in the same set of facts. However, it also cannot be laid down as a straitjacket formula that the court, under all circumstances, cannot undertake the exercise of splitting up. It would depend upon the facts of each case, the nature of allegations and the materials on record.

18. Considering the aforesaid as well as considering the facts narrated in the FIR in its entirety, this Court is of the opinion that all the allegations levelled in the FIR form part of the same transaction and, therefore, the offences punishable under Sections 186 and 189 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be considered separately.

19. Further, considering the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court as well as considering the contents of the FIR as it is, it clearly appears that all the acts committed by the petitioner-accused form part of the same transaction and, therefore, it cannot be split out.

20. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case as well as taking into consideration the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petition deserves consideration and the same is hereby allowed.

21. The First Information Report bearing No.11196008210285 dated 10.05.2021 registered at the J.P. Road Police Station, for the offences punishable under Sections 186 and 189 of the Indian Penal Code, is hereby ordered to be quashed and set-aside. All consequential proceedings arising pursuant thereto also stand terminated.

22. Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Direct service is permitted.