1. The present challenge has been preferred against an order whereby both the courts below have granted preemption to the opposite parties/preemptors on the ground of co-sharership as well as contiguous ownership.

2. Learned counsel appearing for the preemptee/petitioner submits that there is a foundational flaw in the impugned judgments inasmuch as no boundary of the subject property was provided in the schedule of the preemption application itself, which raises a question as to the identity of the property. More importantly, it is contended that there is some discrepancy in the boundary of the plot purchased by the preemptors/opposite parties, as depicted in the title deed produced by the preemptor.

3. Learned counsel contends that in the absence of any adjudicaion as to whether the preemptor is a contiguous owner with the longest common boundary, the courts below could not have granted preemption on the ground of contiguous ownership.

4. It is next argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that sufficient material was produced in the courts below to establish that the preemptors/opposite parties were present in a meeting where there was an amicable discussion in respect of the subject property. Thus, it is submitted that the preemptors were estopped from subsequently resiling from such position, arrived at in the meeting, and seeking preemption.

5. Learned counsel for the preemptors/opposite parties controverts the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner and argues that it was never established that the preemptors were present in the concerned meeting. Even otherwise, it is submitted that sufficient materials were before the Court to grant preemption.

6. For the time being, even assuming that the preemptors could not establish that they are contiguous owners with the longest common boundary, in the absence of any competing claim of preemption by any other contiguous owner, the said issue loses relevance. Even otherwise, since the preemption was granted also on the ground of co-sharership, it would suffice if the preemptors could establish the same.

7. From the title deed of the preemptors, a photocopy of which is annexed to the present revisional application, it is evident that irrespective of there being certain issues regarding the boundary, fact remains that the preemptors purchased a portion of the subject plot, which is Plot No. 161. The same logic applies to the Schedule of the preemption application as well, since the same, despite not mentioning the boundaries of the plots specifically, mentions that the relevant plot sought to be preempted is Plot No. 161.

8. Thus, the preemptors have established the foundational fact of being a co-sharer in respect of the subject plot, being Plot No. 161, which was sufficient for grant of preemption on the ground of co-sharership under Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955.

9. Insofar as the other contention of the petitioner is concerned, it is well-settled that in order to constitute waiver, there has to be a conscious relinquishment of a legal right by the concerned persons. In the present case, there was no clear proof of such conscious relinquishment of the right to preempt on the part of the preemptors/opposite parties. Since the burden of such proof lay on the person asserting it, that is, the preemptee/present revisionist petitioner, in the absence of discharge of such burden, it cannot be said that the preemptors lost the right to preempt even if it is taken for argument’s sake that they were present in the meeting-in-question.

10. In any event, since the presence of the preemptors in the meeting is also a disputed question of fact, it is beyond the pale of the Court, sitting in superintending jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, to reassess the evidence and enter into the merits of such mixed question of fact and law.

11. Thus, the revisional application fails.

12. Accordingly, CO 160 of 2025 is dismissed on contest against the preemptors/opposite parties, thereby affirming the impugned judgment dated May 21, 2025 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Dinhata, Cooch Behar in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 01 of 2024, thereby affirming the judgment and order dated December 15, 2023 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) at Dinhata in Miscellaneous (Preemption) Case No. 04 of 2010.

13. There will be no order as to costs.

14. Urgent photostat certified copies of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance of all formalities.