1. The disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner, who was working as a Senior Manager with the 1st respondent, leading to his ultimate termination from service as confirmed by the appellate authority, is the subject matter of challenge in this writ petition.

2. The petitioner, as stated earlier, was working as the Senior Manager of Kodumon Branch of the 1st respondent. On the basis of an internal audit as regards the loans sanctioned from Kodumon Branch, the disciplinary proceedings were recommended to be initiated pursuant to Ext.P1 report against the petitioner. Ext.P2 memo of charges was also issued on that basis. A similar audit was conducted as regards the Oachira and Chavara Branches, where the petitioner had earlier worked, leading to Ext.P4 report, on the basis of which, Ext.P5 memo of charges was issued to the petitioner. He was also, in the meantime, suspended from service pursuant to Ext.P3 memo dated 14.01.2019. A domestic enquiry is also constituted by appointing an enquiry officer, to whom the petitioner filed Exts.P7 and P7(a) written statements. The enquiry officer submitted Ext.P8 report. The petitioner provided Ext.P9 reply as regards the alleged findings in the enquiry report. However, Ext.P10 memo was issued proposing to remove the petitioner from service, as well as to recover the alleged loss. Though the petitioner submitted Ext.P11 reply, by Ext.P12 memo dated 27.10.2021, he was removed from the service of the 1st respondent with effect from 14.01.2019, on which date he was suspended. The appeal against the afore was rejected, as informed to the petitioner by Ext.P15 communication. The petitioner has filed the captioned writ petition seeking to challenge the domestic enquiry initiated against him, the memo of charges, enquiry report, the memo of removal from service at Ext.P12, and the appellate order at Ext.P15.

3. I have heard Sri.S.Radhakrishnan, the learned counsel for the petitioner, as well as Smt.Pooja Menon, the learned counsel for the respondents he that:

                  i. The entire proceedings were initiated, solely on the basis of the ill will of the Chairman of the respondent Corporation.

                  ii. The memo of charges was issued solely on the basis of the audit reports prepared as demanded by the Chairman. There was no statement of imputation of allegations/list of documents/list of witnesses so as to establish the charges against the petitioner. Therefore, the memo of charges was not “specific” on account of which, the entire proceedings have to be set aside.

                  iii. The petitioner submitted a detailed reply/written statement contending that even the recommendation in the audit reports was to simultaneously proceed against the other officers who were also negligent, including the panel lawyer, who scrutinized the documents on the basis of which advances were given. However, disciplinary proceedings were initiated only against the petitioner.

                  iv. He relied on the additional affidavit dated 31.03.2026 filed by the petitioner to contend that in spite of the specific recommendations, no proceedings whatsoever were taken against the other employees, in total violation of the mandate under the Circular dated 06.01.2018 of the 1st respondent.

                  v. Even as regards the 28 charges, the majority have been settled as highlighted in paragraph 5 of the affidavit dated 31.03.2026. Therefore, there is no basis for the proceedings initiated against the petitioner, especially when in the impugned proceedings, “misappropriation” is also alleged against the petitioner.

                  vi. He relied on

                  a) Man Singh v. State of Haryana [AIR 2008 SC 2481] to contend that the case at hand is one of selectively penalising the petitioner alone.

                  b) Bongaigaon Refinery & P.C.Ltd. v. Girish Chandra Sarmah [AIR 2007 SC 2860] to contend that the pe-titioner is, in fact, made a scapegoat, which is not to be permitted.

                  c) Rajendra Yadav v. State of M.P. and Others [(2013) 3 SCC 73] to contend that the punishment in the case at hand is disproportionate/unequal.

                  d) United Bank of India v. Biswanath Bhattacharjee [(2022) 13 SCC 329] to contend that in a case like the one herein, the writ jurisdiction can be invoked.

                  e) The judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in W.P(C) No.25534 of 2014, to contend that the Kerala Civil Ser-vices (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1960 would apply and since the appellate order at Ext.P15 is a non-speaking one, it is a clear violation of the mandate under Rule 31(2) of the Rules.

5. Per contra, Smt.Pooja Menon, the learned counsel for the respondents, would contend that:

                  i. The entire proceedings against the petitioner were solely on the basis of the charge memos referred to above, and hence there is no requirement for making any reference to the im-putations in the audit reports.

                  ii. There is no requirement to provide for the documents along with the charge memos since, admittedly, the charges were raised with specific reference to certain circulars, and the fact that the same were shown to the petitioner is not in dispute.

                  iii. The petitioner has not been singled out as claimed. Even without initiating any proceedings against the others men-tioned in the audit report, independent proceedings could be initiated against the petitioner, since admittedly he is the Senior Manager in charge of the Branches.

                  iv. It is the Kerala State Financial Enterprises Limited Employ-ees Standing Orders that would apply as regards the domes-tic enquiry against the petitioner.

                  v. She relies on the judgment of the Apex Court in Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K.Chopra [(1999) 1 SCC 759], Management of State Bank of India v. Smita Sharad Deshmukh and Another [(2017) 4 SCC 75], and The State of Rajasthan v. Bhupendra Singh [2024 KHC OnLine 6423] to contend that the scope of judicial review under Article 226 does not extend to reassessment of the entire evidence, and hence, the petitioner is not entitled to succeed.

6. I have considered the rival contentions and connected records.

7. The first issue which requires the attention of this Court is as to whether there is any vagueness in the charge sheets (Exts.P2 and P5), as contended by the petitioner. In Anant R. Kulkarni v. Y.P.Educational Society and Others [AIR 2013 SC 2098], the Apex Court considered the question as to whether an enquiry on the basis of memo of charges/statement of allegations which are not specific could be vitiated. The findings of the Apex Court are as follows:

                  “10. Where the charge-sheet is accompanied by the statement of facts and the allegations are not specific in the charge-sheet, but are crystal clear from the statement of facts, in such a situation, as both constitute the same document, it cannot be held that as the charges were not specific, definite and clear, the enquiry stood vitiated. Thus, nowhere should a delinquent be served a charge-sheet, without providing to him, a clear, specific and definite description of the charge against him. When statement of allegations are not served with the charge-sheet, the enquiry stands vitiated, as having been conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice. Evidence adduced should not be perfunctory, even if the delinquent does not take the defence of, or make a protest against that the charges are vague, that does not save the enquiry from being vitiated, for the reason that there must be fair-play in action, particularly in respect of an order involving adverse or penal consequences. What is required to be examined is whether the delinquent knew the nature of accusation. The charges should be specific, definite and giving details of the incident which formed the basis of charges and no enquiry can be sustained on vague charges.”

                  (Underlining supplied)

To the same effect is the judgment of the Apex Court in Govt. of A.P. and Others v. A.Venkata Raidu [(2007) 1 SCC 338],

                  wherein it is held as under:

                  “9. We respectfully agree with the view taken by the High Court. It is a settled principle of natural justice that if any material is sought to be used in an enquiry, then copies of that material should be supplied to the party against whom such enquiry is held. In Charge 1, what is mentioned is that the respondent violated the orders issued by the Government. However, no details of these orders have been mentioned in Charge 1. It is well settled that a charge-sheet should not be vague but should be specific. The authority should have mentioned the date of the GO which is said to have been violated by the respondent, the number of that GO, etc. but that was not done. Copies of the said GOs or directions of the Government were not even placed before the enquiry officer. Hence, Charge 1 was not specific and hence no finding of guilt can be fixed on the basis of that charge. Moreover, as the High Court has found, the respondent only renewed the deposit already made by his predecessors. Hence, we are of the opinion that the respondent cannot be found guilty for the offence charged.”

                  (Underlining supplied)

                  Again, in Surath Chandra Chakrabarty v. State of West Bengal [(1970) 3 SCC 548], the Apex Court has found as under:

                  “6. Now in the present case each charge was so bare that it was not capable of being intelligently understood and was not sufficiently definite to furnish materials to the appellant to defend himself. It is precisely for this reason that Fundamental Rule 55 provides, as stated before, that the charge should be accompanied by a statement of allegations. The whole object of furnishing the statement of allegations is to give all the necessary particulars and details which would satisfy the requirement of giving a reasonable opportunity to put up defence. …… The entire proceedings show a complete disregard of Fundamental Rule 55 in so far as it lays down in almost mandatory terms that the charges must be accompanied by a statement of allegations. We have no manner of doubt that the appellant was denied a proper and reasonable opportunity of defending himself by reason of the charges being altogether vague and indefinite, and the statement of allegations containing the material facts and particulars not having been supplied to him. In this situation, for the above reason alone, the Trial Judge was fully justified in decreeing the suit.”

                  (Underlining supplied)

                  Therefore, with reference to the principles laid down in the afore judgments, there cannot be any doubt about the requirement of a delinquent to be informed about the imputations against him with clarity. It is with reference to the afore principles, the question arising for consideration as above requires to be analysed.

8. As already noticed, the memo of charges was issued alleging serious “misconduct” against the petitioner. Under the Standing Orders of the 1st respondent, “the habitual breach of any of the regulations or any law or rule applicable to the company or its employees” would amount to a case of misconduct as provided under Order 35(i). Here, Ext.P2 memo has been issued touching as many as eight instances where credit facilities were extended by Kodumon Branch, of which the petitioner was the Senior Manager. For ease of reference, the 1st paragraph of the memo is extracted as under:

                  “This is to inform you, Sri.Abdul Khalam E.(1526), Senior Manager, Kodumon Branch that serious irregularities, lapses, negligence and violation of Company Circulars were reported vide reference cited, while sanctioning the payment of Chitty and Loans, while you were working as the Unit Head of the Kodumon Branch. The lapses, negligence and dereliction of duty occurred on your part are as follows.”

                  (Underlining supplied)

                  It is after making the afore allegation with respect to the violation of the company circular, etc., as reported through Ext.P1 enquiry report, eight instances are pointed out. However, except under serial No.4, which is the rule/circular that is allegedly violated by the petitioner has not been referred to. Even as regards Serial No.4, a copy of the circular is not enclosed or handed over. It is also not in dispute that the memo of charges was not accompanied by a statement of allegations. It is coupled with the afore, that the allegations raised in the writ petition that the entire proceedings have been taken on the basis of the instigation by the Chairman and with reference to the loans sanctioned hardly 3/4 months back, requires to be appreciated. Again, the contention raised by the petitioner that substantial portion has already been cleared by the customers also requires to be taken note of. This is especially so, since the respondents have not filed any counter affidavit controverting the afore averments in the writ petition.

The position is the same as regards Ext.P5 charge memo also.

9. In the light of the afore, I am of the opinion that the entire proceedings on the basis of a non-specific memo of charges not accompanied by the statement of allegations does not require to be sustained.

10. Since elaborate submissions were made by Smt.Pooja Menon solely relying on the memo of charges, contending that there is no requirement even to make reference to the audit reports or to issue a statement of allegations, this Court also proceeds to consider the allegations contained in the memo of charges.

11. A reading of the charge memos in the case at hand would show that the proceedings were taken solely alleging “procedural violations”. The charge memo as regards the Kodumon Branch (Ext.P2) was issued on 14.11.2018. As regards the Oachira and Chavara Branches, the charge memo was issued on 29.07.2019. As regards Ext.P2 charge memo, as many as eight allegations with reference to the credit facilities extended are referred. With reference to the audit report at Ext.P1, it is to be noticed that all these instances were with reference to the loans sanctioned/disbursed during the months of May, August, 2018, etc. The audit report specifically refers to the role of Assistant Managers (3 in number) as well as the panel advocate whose role in extending credit facility has been clearly recorded therein. But, the second charge memo at Ext.P5 is with reference to as many as six instances at the Oachira Branch and 14 instances at the Chavara Branch. As regards Ext.P2 charge memo with respect to Kodumon Branch, there is an allegation to the effect that certain documents were also not available. However, these documents have been produced by the petitioner, as seen from Ext.P7(a) written statement. However, the documents produced by the petitioner have not been verified or acted upon while finalising the enquiry report at Ext.P8, leading to the punishment noticed as above. To be read along with, is the stand taken by the petitioner at Exts.P13 and P14, to the effect that the majority of the credit facilities extended as above were closed, and there is no loss for the 1st respondent. However, this is also not mentioned anywhere or considered while imposing the punishment or while considering the appeal filed by the petitioner.

12. It is in the afore background that the additional affidavit filed by the petitioner dated 31.03.2026 gains significance. In paragraphs 2 and 3 of the said affidavit, it is averred as under:

                  “2. This matter was heard by this Hon'ble Court in detail on 24.03.2026. During the course of hearing, this Hon'ble Court raised a doubt as to whether disciplinary proceedings had been initiated against the 17 others including the Assistants and Assistant Managers of Ochira and Chavara branches, 2 Assistants and 1 Assistant Manager of Kodumon branch. It was specifically recommended in Ext.PI and P4 Audit reports to initiate proceedings against these officers also.

                  3. It is submitted that till date, no proceedings have been initiated against any of these employees by the KSFE. It is also submitted that among these 20 persons, 5 persons have retired from service with all service benefits and the other 15 are continuing in service without any adverse effect. Therefore, it is evident that the disciplinary proceedings were intended against the petitioner only.”

13. However, even after filing such an affidavit, the 1st respondent has not come on record as regards the averments contained therein. Smt.Pooja Menon, the learned counsel, would only contend that, merely for the reason that no steps were taken against others, the 1st respondent is not incompetent to proceed against the petitioner herein. According to her, the petitioner is the Senior Manager, and hence, he is in a more responsible position, on account of which, he requires to be proceeded against. At the same time, this Court notices the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Man Singh (supra), considering the punishment imposed on the appellant therein, while exonerating another person who was also involved, finding as under:

                  “18. In view of the factual backdrop and the above-stated statement of HC Vijay Pal, we are of the opinion that the respondents cannot be permitted to resort to selective treatment to the appellant and HC Vijay Pal, who was involved in criminal case besides departmental proceedings. HC Vijay Pal has been exonerated by the appellate authority mainly on the ground of his acquittal in the criminal case, whereas in departmental proceedings he has been found guilty by the disciplinary authority and was awarded punishment for serious misconduct committed by him as police personnel.”

                  To the same effect is the principles laid down in Bongaigaon Refinery (supra), wherein the Apex Court considered the question when pursuant to a land purchase deal, only one among the members of the committee who arrived at the price for the purchase of the property was penalised, finding as under:

                  “After going through the report and the finding recorded by the Division Bench of the High Court, we are of opinion that in fact the Division Bench correctly assessed the situation that the respondent alone was made a scapegoat whereas the decision by all three committees was unanimous decision by all these members participating in the negotiations, and the price was finalized accordingly. It is not the respondent alone can be held responsible when the decision was taken by the committees. If the decision of the Committee stinks, it cannot be said that the respondent was alone stink, it will be arbitrary. If all fish stink, pick one and say it stinks only is unfair in the matter of unanimous decision of the Committee.”

                  To the same effect is the judgment of the Apex Court in Rajendra Yadav (supra).

14. In the light of the afore, I am of the opinion that since there is no dispute about the fact that various employees were found responsible, including the petitioner, the respondents were not justified in proceeding against the petitioner herein alone. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the allegation to the effect that the petitioner was proceeded against solely on the basis of the directives of the Chairman requires to be countenanced.

15. This is all the more so, since in the appellate decision of the Board, produced by the learned counsel for the respondents along with a memo, this Court notices that a different treatment has been extended with reference to an appeal filed by another employee. The Board of Directors was considering the appeals filed against the disciplinary proceedings initiated as against six employees, including the petitioner. With respect to an appeal filed by one Baburaj, the findings are as under:

                  “Adv.UP Joseph, further apprised the board that Hon'ble High Court had given a mandate in the matter of Mr Baburaj K to hear and dispose of the appeal of in one months time. Accordingly, committee had perused all flies based on his hearing given to the board and representation made to the Chairman. He apprised that committee had observed that even though the charges levelled against him were proved, he had not looted any money from the company. All the charges levelled against him were either violation of policy or procedural lapses. He pointed out that punitive action was not taken on the initial charge memo issued to him, which was a serious lapse from the side of the Company. He further informed that even though there is a mention about misappropriation/corruption the same was not proved in the enquiry. He further apprised that in the matter of accepting salary certificate, the company has not enquired with the concerned surety on marking lien on his certificate. He apprised that court will take a lenient view in such cases where there were only procedural lapses and committee was of the opinion that the same may not stand in court. He further apprised the recommendation of the committee to revoke the punishment awarded to Mr K Baburaj (2651) and to reinstate him in service. Board after discussion resolved as follows.”

                  (Underlining supplied)

                  Thus, the Board had taken the view that since the afore officer had not looted any money from the Company and all the charges levelled against him were either violation of policy or procedural lapses, the punishment requires to be revoked, and the employee to be reinstated in service.

16. Here, the allegation against the petitioner is regarding “procedural lapses”. Admittedly, there is no “misappropriation” proved against the petitioner. Therefore, the issue that arises for consideration is whether a different treatment was extended to the aforesaid employee, Sri.K.Baburaj, while the petitioner was dismissed from service, which requires appreciation in light of the allegations noted above, particularly with reference to the involvement of the then Chairman. The contention of the petitioner that substantial amounts have been repaid by the debtors also gains significance, particularly in view of the fact that the aforesaid allegations have not been refuted by the respondents herein.

                  Therefore, I am of the opinion that the petitioner is entitled to succeed in this writ petition. Hence, this writ petition would stand allowed as under:

                  i. The proceedings at Exts.P12 and P15 are set aside.

                  ii. Since the petitioner would have superannuated on 30.05.2026, the respondent is directed to ensure that the petitioner is reinstated in service with effect from the date on which he was originally suspended, for the calculation of his service benefits.

                  iii. Since, admittedly, the petitioner had not worked from 14.01.2019, there will be a further direction to pay 1/4th of his salary from the afore date till his superannuation.

                  iv. The petitioner would also be entitled to all consequential benefits on account of his reinstatement as above.