1. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 29.09.2012 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Sirmaur, District at Nahan (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction dated 10.08.2010 and order of sentence dated 12.08.2010 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.1, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur (learned Trial Court) were set aside. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 338, 304A and 201 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that Matloob Ahmad (since deceased) informed the police on 30.12.2003 at about 9:30 p.m. that a truck had hit him when he was going to his home on a scooter. The police recorded an entry in the daily diary (Ext.PW12/A) and sent HC Dev Raj (PW12), HHC Pawan Kumar, Constable Deepak Kumar and Constable Karamjeet Singh to verify the information. ASI Dev Raj (PW12) went to the spot where Matloob Ahmad revealed that a truck coming from Rampurghat had something projecting outside its body, which had hit him. He was suffering pain in his chest. HC Dev Raj (PW12) sent him to the hospital. HC Dev Raj also found that the truck had hit Rakumdeen. The accident had occurred because of the high speed and negligence of an unknown truck. A Rukka (Ext.PW12/C) was prepared and was sent to the Police Station, where FIR (Ext.PW12/D) was registered. ASI Dev Raj (PW12) investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW12/H) and filed an application for the examination of Matloob Ahmad. Dr Kamal Pasha (PW10) examined Matloob Ahmad and found multiple injuries. The patient expired during the examination. He issued the MLC (Ext.PW10/A). ASI Dev Raj (PW12) conducted the inquest and prepared the report (Ext.PW12/K). The post-mortem examination of Matloob Ahmad was conducted, and it was found that the cause of death was uncontrollable intra abdominal haemorrhage. Report (Mark-X) was issued. An application (Ext.PW12/G) was filed for the medical examination of Rakmudeen. Dr Inderjeet Singh (PW11) found that Rakmudeen had sustained multiple injuries. He issued the MLC (Ext.PW11/A). The scooter bearing registration No. HP-17-7286 was seized along with the documents vide memo (Ext.PW7/A). Jahid Ali (PW4) produced one jacket (Ext.P3) which was seized vide memo (Ext.PW3/B). Ali Hassan (PW1) produced one plank (Ext.P2) which was seized vide memo (Ext.PW3/C). It was found during the investigation that a truck bearing registration No. HP-18-4841, being driven by the accused, had loaded the rice from the Rampurkhad rice sheller. Another truck bearing registration No. HR-58-2428 was also parked for loading rice. The driver of the truck bearing registration No. HR-58-2428 had kept the planks on the ground. Accused Amar Singh picked up one plank and used it to put a tarpaulin over the rice bags. However, he forgot to remove the plank and started the truck with the plank projecting outside the body of the truck. The plank almost hit Chowkidar Garbu, and Garbu shouted that the plank was projecting outside the body of the truck, but the accused did not listen and sped away from the spot. The plank hit Matloob Ahmad and Rakumdeen and fell outside the shop of Fakir Mohammad, who also shouted at the accused to stop the truck and take the plank. However, the accused did not listen and went away from the spot. The accused, Amar Singh, met Ali Hasan (PW1) and confessed that the plank had hit Matloob Ahmad and Rukamdeen. The police arrested the accused and seized the truck bearing registration No. HP-18-4841, along with the documents and the driving licence vide memo (Ext.PW5/A). HC Subhash Chand (PW15) conducted the mechanical examination of the scooter and the truck and found that there was no mechanical defect in them that could have caused the accident. He issued the reports (Ext.PW15/A and Ext.PW15/B). The statements of remaining witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.
3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 338, 304A and 201 of the IPC, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. The prosecution examined 16 witnesses to prove its case. Ali Hasan (PW1) is the driver of the truck bearing registration No. HR-58-2428, whose plank was taken away by the accused. Ranjeet Singh (PW2) was employed in the factory from where the rice was loaded. Dilshad (PW3), Jahid Ali (PW4) and Vijay Kumar (PW5) witnessed the recoveries. Kishan Singh (PW6) is the owner of the truck bearing registration No. HP-18-4841, and proved that he had employed the accused as a driver. Gulsher Ahmad (PW7) took the photographs. Fakir Mohammad (PW8) is the owner of the shop, where the plank had fallen. Darshan Lal (PW9) saw Matloob Ahmad in an injured condition. Doctor, Kamal Pasha (PW10), examined the injured Matloob. Dr Inderjeet Singh (PW11) examined Rukamdeen. ASI Dev Raj (PW12) and Parkash Chand (PW16) investigated the matter. Mohammad Sagir (PW13) sustained injuries from the plank of the truck. Kamlesh Kumar (PW14) proved the entry in the daily diary. HHC Subhash Chand (PW15) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicles.
5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C), admitted that he was employed as a driver in the truck bearing registration No. HP 18-4841 by Kishan Singh, the owner of the vehicle. He claimed that one other person was employed as a driver besides him. He denied the rest of the prosecution's case. He tendered the judgment of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Sirmaur, in his defence.
6. The learned Trial Court held that the prosecution's case was based upon the circumstantial evidence. It was duly proved on record that the accused was driving the truck bearing registration No. HP18-4841, and that Ali Hassan (PW1) was a driver of the truck bearing registration No. HR-58-2428. He had removed the planks from his truck and kept them on the ground. The accused had picked up one of the planks and used it for tying the rope around the tarpaulin. The accused forgot to remove the plank and hit Matloob Ahmad, Hukam Deen and Prakash Chand. He had confessed to this fact before Ali Hasan (PW1). Driving a truck with a plank projecting outside its body amounted to negligence. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as follows:
| Under Section 279 of the IPC | To suffer simple imprisonment for three months, pay a fine of ₹500/-, and in default of payment of the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. |
| Under Section 304-A of the IPC | To suffer simple imprisonment for one year, pay a fine of ₹1,000/-, and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for three months. |
| Under Section 201 of the IPC | To suffer simple imprisonment for one month, pay a fine of ₹500/-, and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days. |
| All the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. | |
8. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court, the State has filed the present appeal.
9. I have heard Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/ State and Ms Shashi Kiran Negi, learned counsel for the respondent/accused.
10. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Appellate Court erred in reversing the well-reasoned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court. Ali Hasan (PW1) categorically stated that the accused had taken a plank from his truck. This is also corroborated by the fact that the accident occurred soon after the truck had left the premises. The accused had confessed to the crime to Ali Hassan. Learned Appellate Court ignored these circumstances and wrongly acquitted the accused. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside.
11. Ms Shashi Kiran, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the learned Appellate Court had discussed the evidence led by the prosecution and correctly held that the prosecution's case was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Learned Trial Court failed to notice that the statement made by Ali Hasan regarding the taking of a wooden plank was hearsay in nature and could not have been relied upon. Learned Appellate Court corrected this error, and no interference is required with the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court. Hence, she prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.
12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made to the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
13. The prosecution's case is based upon the circumstantial evidence. The law relating to circumstantial evidence is well settled and was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Raj Kumar Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2013) 5 SCC 722: (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 812: 2013 SCC OnLine SC 435 at page 732:
“23. In Hodge, In re [(1838) 2 Lewin 227: 168 ER 1136] the Court held that before a person is convicted entirely on circumstantial evidence, the court must be satisfied not only that those circumstances were consistent with his having committed the act, but also that the facts were such, so as to be inconsistent with any other rational conclusion other than the one that the accused is the guilty person.
24. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda [Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116: 1984 SCC (Cri) 487: AIR 1984 SC 1622] this Court held as under: (SCC p. 185, para 153)
“153. (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused … they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency,
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(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused, and must show that in all human probability, the act must have been done by the accused.”
A similar view has been reiterated in Krishnan v. State [(2008) 15 SCC 430 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1029], Pawan v. State of Uttaranchal [(2009) 15 SCC 259 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 522] and State of Maharashtra v. Mangilal [(2009) 15 SCC 418 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 554].
25. In M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra [AIR 1963 SC 200 : (1963) 1 Cri LJ 235], this Court held that if the circumstances proved in a case are consistent either with the innocence of the accused or with his guilt, then the accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt. When it is held that a certain fact has been proved, then the question that arises is whether such a fact leads to the inference of guilt on the part of the accused person or not, and in dealing with this aspect of the problem, benefit of doubt must be given to the accused and a final inference of guilt against him must be drawn only if the proved fact is wholly inconsistent with the innocence of the accused, and is entirely consistent with his guilt.
26. Similarly, in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda [Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116: 1984 SCC (Cri) 487: AIR 1984 SC 1622] this Court held as under : (SCC pp. 127-28)
The graver the crime, the greater should be the standard of proof. An accused may appear to be guilty on the basis of suspicion, but that cannot amount to legal proof. When, on the evidence, two possibilities are available or open, one which goes in favour of the prosecution and the other benefits an accused, the accused is undoubtedly entitled to the benefit of the doubt. The principle has special relevance where the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence.
27. In an Essay on the Principles of Circumstantial Evidence by William Wills, by T. & J.W. Johnson & Co., 1872, it has been explained as under:
“In matters of direct testimony, if credence be given to the relators, the act of hearing and the act of belief, though really not so, seem to be contemporaneous. But the case is very different when we have to determine upon circumstantial evidence, the judgment in respect of which is essentially inferential. There is no apparent necessary connection between the facts and the inference; the facts may be true, and the inference erroneous, and it is only by comparison with the results of observation in similar or analogous circumstances that we acquire confidence in the accuracy of our conclusions.
The term ‘presumptive’ is frequently used as synonymous with circumstantial evidence, but it is not so used with strict accuracy. The word ‘presumption’, ex vi termini, imports an inference from facts; and the adjunct ‘presumptive’, as applied to evidentiary facts, implies the certainty of some relation between the facts and the inference. Circumstances generally, but not necessarily, lead to particular inferences; for the facts may be indisputable, and yet their relation to the principal fact may be only apparent, and not real; and even when the connection is real, the deduction may be erroneous. Circumstantial and presumptive evidence differ, therefore, as genus and species.
The force and effect of circumstantial evidence depend upon its incompatibility with, and incapability of, explanation or solution upon any other supposition than that of the truth of the fact which it is adduced to prove; the mode of argument resembling the method of demonstration by the reductio ad absurdum.”
28. Thus, in view of the above, the court must consider a case of circumstantial evidence in light of the aforesaid settled legal propositions. In a case of circumstantial evidence, the judgment remains essentially inferential. The inference is drawn from the facts as the circumstances lead to particular inferences. The court has to draw an inference with respect to whether the chain of circumstances is complete, and when the circumstances therein are collectively considered, the same must lead only to the irresistible conclusion that the accused alone is the perpetrator of the crime in question. All the circumstances so established must be of a conclusive nature and consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused.
14. This position was reiterated in Raja Naykar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2024) 3 SCC 481, as under:
“16. Undoubtedly, the prosecution's case rests on circumstantial evidence. The law with regard to conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence has very well been crystalised in the judgment of this Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra [Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116: 1984 SCC (Cri) 487: 1984 INSC 121], wherein this Court held thus : (SCC pp. 184-85, paras 152-54)
“152. Before discussing the cases relied upon by the High Court, we would like to cite a few decisions on the nature, character and essential proof required in a criminal case which rests on circumstantial evidence alone. The most fundamental and basic decision of this Court is Hanumant v. State of M.P. [Hanumant v. State of M.P., (1952) 2 SCC 71: AIR 1952 SC 343: 1952 SCR 1091] This case has been uniformly followed and applied by this Court in a large number of later decisions up-to-date, for instance, the cases of Tufail v. State of U.P. [Tufail v. State of U.P., (1969) 3 SCC 198: 1970 SCC (Cri) 55] and Ram Gopal v. State of Maharashtra [Ram Gopal v. State of Maharashtra, (1972) 4 SCC 625]. It may be useful to extract what Mahajan, J. has laid down in Hanumant case [Hanumant v. State of M.P., (1952) 2 SCC 71: AIR 1952 SC 343: 1952 SCR 1091]: (Hanumant case [Hanumant v. State of M.P., (1952) 2 SCC 71: AIR 1952 SC 343: 1952 SCR 1091], SCC pp. 76-77, para 12)
‘12. It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is circumstantial, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should, in the first instance, be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be conclusive and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused, and it must be such as to show that within all human probability, the act must have been done by the accused.’
153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “maybe” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033] where the observations were made : (SCC p. 807, para 19)
‘19. … Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict, and the mental distance between “maybe” and “must be” is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.’
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused, and must show that, in all human probability, the act must have been done by the accused.
154. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence.” (emphasis in original)
17. It can thus clearly be seen that it is necessary for the prosecution that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The Court holds that it is a primary principle that the accused “must be” and not merely “may be” proved guilty before a court can convict the accused. It has been held that there is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved”. It has been held that the facts so established should be consistent only with the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. It has further been held that the circumstances should be such that they exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. It has been held that there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused, and must show that, in all human probabilities, the act must have been done by the accused.
18. It is settled law that the suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. An accused cannot be convicted on the ground of suspicion, no matter how strong it is. An accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
15. A similar view was taken in Abdul Nassar v. State of Kerala, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 111, wherein it was observed:
153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established:
(1) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033: 1973 Cri LJ 1783] where the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047]
“Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict, and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.”
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused, and must show that, in all human probability, the act must have been done by the accused.
154. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence.”
16. The present case has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
17. Ali Hassan (PW1) stated that he had removed the four planks from his truck and kept them on the ground. The truck bearing registration No. HP-18-4841 was also being loaded in the factory premises. The accused was the driver of the truck. The accused left. He also left. He parked his truck near Naina Tikker and slept. When he woke up in the morning, he found that only three planks were affixed to the truck. He enquired from conductor Laddi about the fourth plank, who revealed that it was handed over to the truck driver of HP-18-4841 because he had to tie the rope to the Tarpaulin.
18. Learned Appellate Court had rightly held that the statement of this witness was hearsay in nature. He was deposing about the fact which was revealed to him by Laddi, and the purpose of his statement was to prove the truth of the statement made by Laddi. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in J.D. Jain v. State Bank of India, (1982) 1 SCC 143, that the statement of a witness made to a person who is not called as a witness is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It was observed:
“20. The next question is, is the evidence in the domestic enquiry really hearsay, as held by the Tribunal?
21. The word 'hearsay' is used in various senses. Sometimes it means whatever a person is heard to say; sometimes it means whatever a person declares on the information given by someone else. (See Stephen on Law of Evidence).
22. The Privy Council in the case of Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor, (1956) 1 WLR 965 observed:
"Evidence of a statement made to a witness who is not himself called as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement, but the fact that it was made. The fact that it was made quite apart from its truth is frequently relevant in considering the mental state and conduct thereafter of the witness or some other persons in whose presence these statements are made."
19. It was held in Kalyan Kumar Gogoi v. Ashutosh Agnihotri, (2011) 2 SCC 532: 2011 SCC OnLine SC 200 that hearsay evidence is inadmissible. It was observed at page 545:
37. Here comes the rule of appreciation of hearsay evidence. Hearsay evidence is excluded on the ground that it is always desirable, in the interest of justice, to get the person whose statement is relied upon into court for his examination in the regular way, in order that many possible sources of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness can be brought to light and exposed, if they exist, by the test of cross-examination. The phrase “hearsay evidence” is not used in the Evidence Act because it is inaccurate and vague. It is a fundamental rule of evidence under Indian law that hearsay evidence is inadmissible. A statement, oral or written, made otherwise than by a witness in giving evidence and a statement contained or recorded in any book, document or record whatsoever, proof of which is not admitted on other grounds, are deemed to be irrelevant for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter stated. An assertion other than one made by a person while giving oral evidence in the proceedings is inadmissible as evidence of any fact asserted. That this species of evidence cannot be tested by cross examination and that, in many cases, it supposes some better testimony which ought to be offered in a particular case, are not the sole grounds for its exclusion. Its tendency to protract legal investigations to an embarrassing and dangerous length, its intrinsic weakness, its incompetence to satisfy the mind of a judge about the existence of a fact, and the fraud which may be practised with impunity, under its cover, combine to support the rule that hearsay evidence is inadmissible.
38. The reasons why hearsay evidence is not received as relevant evidence are:
(a) the person giving such evidence does not feel any responsibility. The law requires all evidence to be given under personal responsibility, i.e. every witness must give his testimony, under such circumstances as expose him to all the penalties of falsehood. If the person giving hearsay evidence is cornered, he has a line of escape by saying, “I do not know, but so and so told me”
(b) truth is diluted and diminished with each repetition, and
(c) if permitted, it gives ample scope for playing fraud by saying “someone told me that…”. It would be attaching importance to false rumour flying from one foul lip to another. Thus, statements of witnesses based on information received from others are inadmissible.”
20. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court had rightly excluded the statement of Ali Hassan (PW1) being hearsay.
21. The prosecution did not examine Laddi, who was the best witness to depose whether he had handed over the plank to the accused for tying the rope. Hence, this circumstance was not proved.
22. The prosecution further asserted that the plank was about to hit Garbu, who shouted at the accused to stop. However, Garbu was also not examined, and it was not proved that the plank was projecting outside the truck being driven by the accused.
23. The prosecution further stated that the truck with the plank projecting outside its body had hit Rukamdeen. However, Rukadeen was not examined, and it is not proved that the truck bearing registration No. HP-18-4841 had hit him.
24. Mohammad Sagir (PW13) stated that a truck came from Rampur Khad at high speed, and the plank was projecting outside the body. The plank hit the handle of his cycle. He fell and sustained injuries. The truck had also hit a pedestrian. He could not notice the registration number of the truck. His testimony also does not establish that the truck bearing registration No. HP-18 4841 had a plank projecting outside its body, and the prosecution cannot derive any advantage from his testimony.
25. Darshan Lal (PW9) stated that he heard a noise and came outside. He saw that Matloob Ahmad had sustained an injury, who disclosed that a truck with a plank projecting outside the body had hit him. He has not mentioned the truck number, and his testimony does not identify the truck.
26. Fakir Mohammad (PW8) stated that he saw a truck coming from Rampurghat. A plank fell out of the truck. He shouted for the driver to stop the truck, but the driver sped away from the spot. His testimony also does not mention the registration number of the truck and does not establish that the truck bearing registration No. HP18-4841 was being driven with the plank projecting outside its body.
27. Ranjeet Singh (PW2) stated that he was posted as a Security Guard in Shri Ram Foods Sheller, Rampurghat. He was directed to get the rice loaded in his presence. He found that rice bags were loaded in the truck bearing registration No. HP-18-4841, and the truck left for Solan. Prabhu opened the gate when the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-18-4841 had left the premises.
28. His testimony does not mention that the truck bearing registration No. HP18-4841 had a plank projecting outside its body. He had seen the truck when it had left the premises of the factory. Thus, the omission to state that a plank was projecting outside the body of the truck will make the prosecution’s case doubtful.
29. Ali Hassan (PW1) stated that he had met the accused at Solan the next day and enquired as to what the accused had done the previous night. The accused revealed that the plank had hit the scooter, the cycle and two persons and fallen near Devi Nagar. He admitted in his cross-examination that he had not told the police about the extrajudicial confession made by the accused that the plank had hit the scooter, cycle and two persons and fallen near Devi Nagar. Learned Appellate Court had rightly held that since the statement was not made to the Police, it was an improvement and could not have been relied upon by the Court. It was held in Gopal v. Subhash, (2004) 13 SCC 174: 2004 SCC OnLine SC 113 that omission to state important facts to the police amounts to contradiction. It was observed at page 178:
“19. From the records, it appears that PW 1, PW 5 and PW 10 did not make any allegation as regards the alleged exhortation on the part of all the accused. It further appears that PW 3, PW 4 and PW 8 stated before the police that there had been such exhortations by the respondents herein. Such omission on the part of PW 3, PW 4 and PW 8, [sic PW 1, PW 5 and PW 10] in the facts and circumstances of the case, being very material, would amount to contradiction.
30. Learned Trial Court held that the statement made before the police was brief and the omission was not material. The conclusion of the learned Trial Court is not sustainable. The confession made by the accused was an important piece of evidence, and the omission to state this fact to the police shows that the witness has improved upon his earlier version, and his statement to this extent cannot be relied upon.
31. The prosecution has not assigned any reason as to why the accused should make an extrajudicial confession to Ali Hassan. He is not a person of confidence. He could not have helped the accused, and it is highly improbable that the accused would make an extra-judicial confession to him (Sunny Kapoor v. State (UT of Chandigarh), (2006) 10 SCC 182). Hence, the learned Appellate Court had rightly discarded the statement of this witness regarding the extrajudicial confession.
32. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court had rightly held that the chain of circumstances was not complete to lead to an irresistible conclusion that the vehicle driven by the accused had a plank projecting outside its body and the plank had caused the accident. Learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view, even if another view is possible.
33. No other point was urged
34. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.
35. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
36. Records be sent back to the learned Trial Court forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment.