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CDJ 2026 MHC 3647 print Preview print print
Court : High Court of Judicature at Madras
Case No : Crl. O.P. No. 22800 of 2023 & Crl. M.P. No. 15956 of 2023
Judges: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE G.K. ILANTHIRAIYAN
Parties : Arunraj Versus State Rep.By Inspector of Police, Morappur Police Station, Dharmapuri & Another
Appearing Advocates : For the Petitioner: J. Pradeep, Advocate. For the Respondents: R1, A. Gopinath, Government Advocate (Crl.Side), R2, C. Munusamy, Advocate.
Date of Judgment : 29-04-2026
Head Note :-
Criminal Procedure Code - Section 482 -

Comparative Citation:
2026 (1) TLNJ 469,
Judgment :-

(Prayer: Criminal Original Petition is filed under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code, to call for the records relating to the FIR in Crime No.179/2023 pending on the file of the Morappur Police Station, Dharmapuri District and quash the Same.)

1. This Criminal Original Petition has been filed seeking to quash the FIR registered in Crime No.179 of 2023 on the file of the first respondent.

2. Heard the learned counsel appearing on either side and perused the materials available on record.

3. The case of the prosecution is that the defacto complainant intended to construct a marriage hall in his ancestral property measuring about 1.84 acres and for that purpose, sought financial assistance to the tune of Rs.2 Crores. Through one acquittance, the defacto complainant was introduced to A1/Arulmozhi, who represented himself as a financier and agreed to arrange a loan of Rs.1 Crore on payment of exorbitant interest. It is the further case of the prosecution that A1 insisted that the defacto complainant execute a registered sale deed in respect of the subject property in his favour as a security for the proposed loan transaction. A1 assured the defacto complainant that immediately after transfer of the revenue records in his name, the loan amount would be disbursed. Believing the representations and assurance made by A1, the defacto complainant executed a sale deed on 27.01.2022 in favour of A1. According to the prosecution, after obtaining title over the property, A1 failed to disburse the promised loan amount and on the contrary, started demanding vacant physical possession of the property from the defacto complainant.

4. It is further alleged that though a civil suit seeking cancellation of the said sale deed was pending, A1, with an intention to defeat the rights and interests of the defacto complainant, alienated the property in favour of the third party, viz., Arunraj. The prosecution further alleged that A1, along with his associates, criminally intimidated the defacto complainant by issuing life threats and continuously harassed him with intention to forcibly evict him from the property. Therefore, according to the prosecution, A1 had dishonest and fraudulent intention right from the inception of the transaction and under the guise of arranging a loan, dishonestly induced the defacto complainant to execute the sale deed and thereafter unlawfully dealt with the property for wrongful gain. Based on the complaint, the first respondent registered an FIR in Crime No.179 of 2023 for the offences under Sections 420, 294(b) and 506(i) of IPC.

5. A perusal of the records and the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on either side reveals that the property was originally belonged by the second respondent, comprised in Survey No.47/3A2, to an extent of 1.84 acres, situated at Kurumpatti Village, Harur Taluk, Dharmapuri District. According to the second respondent, in order to avail loan, he executed a sale deed in favour of the first accused. Thereafter, the first accused failed to disbursed the promised loan amount of Rs.1 crore. Therefore, the second respondent filed a suit in O.S.No.43 of 2022 on the file of the Sub Court, Harur, seeking to set aside the sale deed and the same is pending for adjudication. The first accused executed a sale deed in favour of the petitioner/A2 in respect of the subject property. Therefore, the second respondent also filed a suit against the petitioner/A2. Even assuming that the sale deed was execute during the pendency of the suit, the same would only attract the doctrine of lis pendens. Therefore, no offence is made out as against the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 294(b) and 506(i) of IPC. No prudent person would execute a sale deed without receiving any sale consideration that too an extent of 1.84 acres of land.

6. Insofar as the offences under Section 294(b) of IPC is concerned, there must be an uttering of words to affect the person who lodged the complaint. In this regard it is relevant to extract the Section 294(b) of IPC, as follows :-

                   "294. Obscene acts and songs —Whoever, to the annoyance of others— (a) does any obscene act in any public place, or (b) sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine, or with both."

7. Admittedly, there is absolutely no words uttered by the petitioner as such to constitute the offence under Section 294(b) of IPC, there is no averments and allegations. Further the charges do not show that on hearing the obscene words, which were allegedly uttered by the petitioner, the witnesses felt annoyed. No one has spoken about the obscene words, they felt annoyed and in the absence of legal evidence to show that the words uttered by the petitioner annoyed others, it cannot be said that the ingredients of the offence under Section 294(b) of IPC is made out. It is relevant to rely upon the judgment reported in 1996(1) CTC 470 in the case of K.Jeyaramanuju Vs. Janakaraj & anr., which held as follows :-

                   "To prove the offence under Section 294 of IPC mere utterance of obscence words are not sufficient but there must be a further proof to establish that it was to the annoyance of others, which is lacking in the case."

The above judgment is squarely applicable to the present case and therefore, the offence under Section 294(b) of IPC is not at all attracted as against the petitioner.

8. Insofar as the offence under Section 506(i) of I.P.C is concerned, to attract the offence, threat and intention to cause an alarm are main ingredients. The third ingredient is that the intention must be to cause any person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, subsequent to the main ingredients. Whereas in the case on hand, even according to the case of the prosecution, the alleged threats issued by the petitioner were only empty threats and they had no effect on the complainant.

9. In this regard, It is relevant to rely upon the judgment of this Court made in Crl.O.P.(MD)No.11030 of 2014 in the case of Abdul Agis Vs. State through the Inspector of Police, which reads as follows:-

                   “7.It is seen from the statements recorded under Section 161(3) of Cr.P.C. of the second respondent/ defacto complainant that it does not contain any obscene words, which were uttered by the petitioner herein and the entire allegations are very simple in nature. It is also seen from the statement of one Uthami, that the petitioner threatened the defacto complainant with dire consequences when he dashed the defacto complainant. The entire allegations are trivial in nature. Further, to attract the offence under Section 506(i) of I.P.C., there was a threatening only by words. As pointed by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, the threat should be a real one and not just a mere word when the petition uttering does not exactly mean what he says and also when the person to whom threat is launched does not feel threatened actually. Therefore, the offences under Sections 294(b) and 506(i) of I.P.C. are not made out as against the petitioner herein and also the entire criminal proceedings is clear an abuse of process of Court. Therefore, this Court is inclined to quash the entire proceedings.”

10. In this regard, it is relevant to extract the judgement reported in (1992) SCC Crl. 426 in the case of Bajanlal v. State of Haryana, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has listed out the following category of case in which the criminal proceedings can be quashed using the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.:

                   "102..........

                   ...................

                   7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and/or where the proceedings is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wrecking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

11. Insofar as the offence under Section 420 of IPC is concerned, it is relevant to rely upon the judgment made by the Honourable Supreme Court of India in the case of M/s. Indian Oil Corporation Vs. NEPC India Limited and others [(2006) 6 SCC 736], held that the civil liability cannot be converted into criminal liability and it is necessary to take notice of a growing tendency in business circle to convert purely civil dispute in criminal case. This is obviously on account of prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interest of lender/creditors. Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes also, leading to irretrievable breakdown of marriages/families. There is also an impression that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claim which do not involve any criminal offence by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and dishonoured.

12. In the case of G.Sagar Suri Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh [2000 (2) SCC 636], the Honourable Supreme Court of India held as follows:-

                   “It is to be seen if a matter, which is essentially of civil nature, has been given a cloak of criminal offence, criminal proceedings are not a short cut of other remedies available in law. Before issuing process a criminal Court has to exercise a great deal of caution. For the accused it is a serious matter. This Court has laid certain principles on the basis of which High Court is to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. Jurisdiction under this Section has to be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”

Therefore, the impugned complaint is nothing but clear abuse of process of law and it cannot be sustained as against all the accused

13. In view of the above, the impugned FIR cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed. Accordingly, the FIR registered in Crime No.179 of 2023 on the file of the first respondent, is hereby quashed as against all the accused.

14. In the result, this Criminal Original Petition stands allowed. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous petition is closed.

 
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