K. V. Jayakumar, J.

1. This Criminal Appeal is preferred by the sole accused in S.C. No.731 of 2014 on the files of the Special Court for the Trial of Offences against Women and Children (Additional Sessions Court-I), Thalassery. The appellant stood for trial for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.

2. By the impugned judgment dated 14.03.2018, the learned Additional Sessions Judge found the accused guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC, convicted him, and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of ₹50,000/- with a default clause.

3. The prosecution case concerns the brutal uxoricide of one Subadra @ Subha by Raju, the appellant herein.

The prosecution case

4. The prosecution case, in brief, is that, on 25.03.2014 at about 12.15 p.m., the accused inflicted multiple chop wounds on the vital parts of the victim while they were residing in building No. II/682 of Payam Grama Panchayat. According to the prosecution, the alleged motive for the crime was the suspicion of the accused regarding the chastity of the deceased, Subadra @ Subha.

5. The injured was immediately taken to the Medical College Hospital, Pariyaram. However, on 03.04.2014 she succumbed to the injuries while undergoing treatment in the said hospital.

The Registration of FIR and the Investigation

6. On the basis of Ext.P1 FIS lodged by PW1 (Rajan C.K.), PW13 (Jayan J.E.), the Station House Officer, Iritty Police Station registered Ext.P12 FIR on 25.03.2014 at about 3:30 p.m.

7. PW14 (Manoj V.V.), the Circle Inspector of Police took up the investigation on 26.03.2014.  He proceeded to the place of occurrence at 2.30

p.m. along with tester Inspector of Finger Print Bureau and seized MO1 chopper, after preparing Ext.P4 seizure mahazar. Thereafter, at 3.00 p.m. on that day, he prepared Ext.P5 scene mahazar of the place of occurrence in the presence of the witnesses. He arrested the accused at 5.00 p.m. on the same day itself, after preparing Ext.P13 arrest memo and Ext.P14 inspection memo. He obtained the ownership certificate from the Panchayat Secretary concerned.

8. He produced the accused before the court on 27.03.2014 along with Ext.P15 remand report. On 03.04.2014, he got information that the injured in this case passed away. On 04.04.2014 he conducted the inquest and prepared Ext.P6 inquest report. Thereafter, he submitted Ext.P16 report before the jurisdictional Magistrate, adding Section 302 and deleting Section 307 of the IPC. The body of the deceased was sent for post-mortem examination. He seized a brown packet produced by the forensic surgeon on 26.04.2014 after preparing Ext.P8 mahazar. The articles seized were forwarded to the jurisdictional Magistrate along with property lists. He questioned the material witnesses, completed the investigation and laid the charge sheet.

The proceedings before the trial court

9. The learned Magistrate, after completing the preliminary steps, committed the case to the Court of Sessions, Thalassery. The learned Sessions Judge made over the case to the Special Court for the Trial of Offences against Women and Children (Additional Sessions Court-I), Thalassery. The learned Additional Sessions Judge framed the charge after hearing both sides. When the charge was read over and explained to the accused, he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The accused denied the incriminating circumstances put to him and maintained the stand of innocence.

10. Before the trial court, PWs.1 to 14 were examined and Exts.P1 to P21 were marked. MO1 and MO2 series were identified and marked. After the closure of the prosecution evidence, the accused was examined under Section 313(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

11. On the side of the defence, no evidence was adduced. After a full fledged trial, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, convicted and sentenced the accused to undergo imprisonment for life. Impugning the findings of the learned Sessions Judge, this appeal is preferred by him.

The submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant

12. Sri. Ajivass V. A., the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the impugned judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge is legally unsustainable. The trial court has failed to appreciate the evidence on record in its correct perspective and arrived at findings of guilt, conviction, and sentence.

13. The learned Counsel further submitted that the trial court ought not have believed the testimony of the solitary eye witness (PW2). Her version is not natural and wholly unreliable. The learned counsel would further submit that the accused was a person of unsound mind and that that the same was not considered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. It is further submitted that the prosecution has not established the motive for the crime. The learned counsel pointed out that the material witnesses who are the residents of the locality were not cited and examined by the prosecution.

14. The learned counsel placing reliance on the judgment in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra ((1984) 4 SCC 116) , argued that the chain of circumstantial evidence is not fully established and if two views are possible, the Court should accept the view which would point out the innocence of the accused. Reliance was also placed on the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in Kanda Padayachi v. State of T.N. ( (1971) 2 SCC 641)

The submissions of the learned Public Prosecutor

15. Adv. Neema T.V., the learned Senior Public Prosecutor would submit that the impugned judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge is legally sustainable and no interference from this Court is warranted. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, the testimony of PW2 (Remavathy) is wholly reliable. The prosecution has succeeded in proving the motive for the commission of the crime. Moreover, it is submitted that the plea of insanity was raised by the accused/appellant for the first time before this Court. The accused was represented by a competent legal aid counsel. Even at the appellate stage, no documents were produced to indicate that the accused was an insane person at the time of the commission of the crime or thereafter.

16. The evidence of PW2, the sole eye witness along with the medical evidence would convincingly prove the prosecution case.

The evidence let in by the prosecution

17. PW1 (Rajan C.K.) is a colleague of the accused. He testified that on 25.03.2014, at about 12.30 p.m., he got information from PW2 (Ramavathi) that the accused committed the murder of his wife Subha. At that time, he was working in a red stone quarry situated about 50 metres away from the house of the accused. He rushed to the house of the accused, wherein, he found the deceased Subha lying in a pool of blood with injuries on her neck. He had also seen a chopper near the house.

18. Thereafter, Saji and Manoj (PW3 and PW4) came to the spot. On examination, he found that Subha was alive, and, therefore requested PWs. 3 and 4 to take the injured to the hospital. They placed her body in a lungi and proceeded through the ridges of the paddy field up to the road. She was then taken in an autorickshaw to the hospital. Thereafter, he went to the Police Station and lodged Ext.P1 FIS. According to PW1, the motive for the commission of crime is the suspicion of the accused regarding the chastity of his wife. Later, the injured succumbed to the injuries while undergoing treatment at the Medical College Hospital, Pariyaram, on 03.04.2014. In cross-examination, he would state that the accused never told him that he was suffering from mental illness. PW2 (Ramavathi) told him that the accused had hacked his wife to death.

19. PW2 (Ramavathi) is the sole eye witness of this case. She testified that she is residing near Vilamana Temple and the accused and the deceased were her neighbours. The accused used to pick up quarrel in his house after consuming arrack. The incident leading to the death of Subha was on 25.03.2014. At about 12.15 p.m., on that day, she heard the cries of a lady from the house of the accused and the deceased. Assuming that the accused was beating the deceased, she rushed to their house. When she reached the courtyard of the house, she saw the accused inflicting blows on the back side of the neck of Subha at the doorstep of the house.  She had seen the accused inflicting multiple chop wounds on the deceased. Frightened by the incident, she returned to her house. She then contacted one Vijayan through phone at about 12.30 p.m. and informed the matter. She also contacted PW1(Rajan). The said Vijayan informed the matter to PW3 (Saji) and PW4 (Manoj Chodon) and they took the injured to Pariyaram Medical College Hospital. The injured succumbed to injuries while undergoing treatment in that hospital.

20. PW2 further testified that a week prior to the incident, she had seen the accused chasing the deceased in the courtyard of their house with a chopper. The police had shown MO1 chopper to her. The deceased Subha was known to her for the past 20 years. According to PW2, the accused committed the murder of his wife due to suspicion about her chastity. She further deposed that she gave Ext.P2, 164 statement, before the JFCM Court, Kannur. She identified the accused in the dock. On being cross-examined, she stated that her husband is an active worker of RSS. He is an accused in a murder case and undergoing sentence. She does not know whether the accused has any mental illness. She further stated that the accused used to quarrel with his wife, the deceased, after consuming liquor. She had stated this fact to the Police in her 161 statement.

21. PW3 (N.M. Saji) would testify that he came to know about the incident when one of his friends contacted him over the phone. He reached the place of occurrence at 12.30 pm on 25.03.2014. At that time, he saw the deceased lying in a pool of blood in the courtyard of her house with cut injuries. He has also noted blood stains in the courtyard, on the desk and on the walls. He had also seen a chopper near the place of occurrence. He took the injured to the Medical College Hospital, Pariyaram. He put his signature in Ext.P3 mahazar whereby, the police seized the blood-stained hair and had also witnessed the seizure of the MO1 chopper by the Police. PW3 denied the suggestion that any Super Specialty Hospital was situated near the place of occurrence. The Medical College Hospital, Pariyaram is about 50 kilometers away from the scene of occurrence.

22. PW4 (Manoj Chodon) is the attestor to Ext.P5 scene mahazar. PW5 (P. Sivadasan) is an attestor to Ext.P6 inquest report.

23. PW6 (Dr. Shanavas K. Moosa), who examined the injured at Medical College Hospital, Pariyaram, has noted the following injuries in Ext.P7 wound certificate.

                  1) Deep incised wound on post aspect of neck (8x4cm) exposing vertebrae.

                  2) Incised wound over posterior aspect of neck right side (2 cmx2cm).

                  3) Incised wound on occipital scalp measuring 1 cm x 1 cm.

                  4) Incised wound over centre of chest over manubrium (4 cmx2cm).

                  5) incised wound over nape of neck measuring 7cmx5cm

                  6) Incised wound on right scapula 5cm x 3 cm.

                  7) Abrasional wound on right shoulder 2 cmx2cm.

                  8) Incised wound on left scapula 7 cm x 4 cm.

                  9) Lacerated wound on right elbow lateral aspect 4 cm x 2 cm x 2cm.

                  10)  Lacerated wound right forearm distal to right elbow 3 cm x 2cm x 2cm.

                  11)  Lacerated wound on right wrist dorsum (exposed and cut extensor tendon) (6cmx4cmx2cm).

                  12)  Lacerated wound on right forearm middle third dorsum (5cm x 3 cm x 2 cm).

                  13)  Lacerated wound over right hand dorsum over medial aspect fracture exposed and cut extensor tendon.

                  14) Incised wound over right index finger (2x1cm) on P1.

                  15) Incised wound on right index finger dorsum on P2.

                  16) Incised wound on right middle finger dorsum (2 cm x 1cm).

                  17) Incised wound on left little finger dorsum (2x1 cm).

                  18) Incised wound on left ring finger (1 cm x 1 cm).

                  19) Incised wound on left middle finger dorsum ( 1 cm x 1 cm).

                  20)  Incised wound on left hand dorsum over 3rd MCP (5 cm x 4 cm x 2 cm).

                  21)  Two lacerated wounds over left wrist dorsum fracture tendon exposed (5 cm x 4 cmx2cm).

                  22) Lacerated wound on left forearm middle 3rd (4cm x 2 cm x 2 cm).

                  23) Lacerated wound on left forearm proximal 3rd (4 cm x 2 cm x 2 cm).

                  24) Stab wound on right shoulder 1 cm x 1 cm.

24. PW7 (N. Pradeepan) is the Sub Inspector of Police, Iritty Police Station, who witnessed the seizure of a brown packet produced by Dr. B.K. Gopalakrishna Pillai, the Forensic Surgeon, who conducted the autopsy. PW8 (M. Annamma) is the Secretary of Payam Grama Panchayat, who produced Ext.P9 ownership certificate.

25. PW9 (G. Sajivakumaran Pillai) is the Village Officer, Vilamana, who prepared Ext.P10 site plan. PW10 (E. Ramachandran) is the attestor to Ext.P3 seizure mahazar, through which samples of blood, hair etc were seized.

26. PW11 (Dr. Gopalakrishna Pillai), Professor of Forensic Medicine, who conducted the autopsy of the deceased, noted the following ante mortem injuries.

                  1) Sutured wound, 4.5 cm long, oblique, across the suprasternal notch area.

                  2) Abraded contusion 11x8 cm on the outer aspect of right upper arm, just below the tip of shoulder (healing).

                  3) Two sutured wounds, 6 cm each in length, close together, on the back of right elbow.

                  4) Sutured wound, 7 cm long, vertical, on the back of right elbow and forearm.

                  5) Sutured wound 7 cm long, oblique, on the back of right palm, near the wrist from its lower end, another sutured wound, 3 cm long, was seen extending downward. The ends of a surgical 'K wire' were protruding out, one at the root of little finger and another on the back of wrist.

                  6) Sutured wound, 4 cm long, on the inner aspect and back of right palm, in the  hypothenar eminence.

                  7) Superficial cut, 3 cm long on the back of right forefinger at its root, with a fracture underneath.

                  8) Healing cut injury, 1.5 cm long, on the back of right forefinger, at its middle.

                  9) Superficial healing cut, 1.2 cm long, on the back of right middle finger, at its root.

                  10) Superficial small cuts on the back of ring and little fingers.

                  11) Three small contusion 1 - 1.5 cm apart on the outer aspect of left upper arm, at its middle (greenish black in colour).

                  12) Sutured wound 1.5 cm long on the back of left elbow.

                  13)  Sutured wound 5 cm long oblique on the back of left forearm, 8 cm below the elbow. There was an extension of sutured wound 4 cm long, from the upper inner end, directed upwards and another extension of sutured wound, 3.5 cm long, from the lower outer end, directed downwards. Purulent discharge was coming out through the injury.

                  14)  Sutured wound, 2 cm long, 2 cm above injury No.13, on the outer aspect of forearm.

                  15)  Sutured wound 4.5 cm long on the back of left forearm, at its middle.

                  16) Sutured wound 5.5 cm long, on the back of left wrist and forearm.

                  17)  Sutured wound 4 cm long on the back of left palm, the lower end being in between the roots of ring finger and middle finger.

                  18)  Sutured wound 1 cm long on the back of left little finger, at its middle.

                  19)  Sutured wound 0.5 cm long on the back of left middle finger at its middle.

                  20)  Sutured wound 4 cm long extending from the thenar eminence of left palm, to the inner aspect of thumb.

                  21)  Sutured wound 3 cm long, on the back of head, 5 cm behind the right ear.

                  22) Sutured wound 2 cm long, 4 cm above injury No.21.

                  23)  Sutured wound 7 cm long, horizontal, on the back of neck, 2 cm below the hairline. Another sutured wound, 4 cm long, was seen 1 cm below and parallel to it. Underneath, the soft tissues up to the spine were found destroyed.

                  24)  Sutured wound 9 cm long on the back of neck, 3 cm below and parallel to injury No.23.

                  25)  Sutured wound 3 cm long, oblique, on the back of chest across the midline 3 cm below injury No.24.

                  26) Sutured wound 3 cm long over the left shoulder blade.

                  27)  Sutured wound 8.5 cm long, oblique, on the back aspect of top of right shoulder, the inner lower end being 3 cm to the right of midline and 4 cm below injury No.23.

                  28) Sutured wound 5 cm long on the right side of root of neck.

                  29)  Sutured wound 5.5 cm long on the left side of root of neck; the back end was touching injury No.24.

                  30)  Sutured wound 2 cm long on the left side of neck, 8 cm below the ear.

                  Underneath injuries 23 to 30, the muscles of the neck up to the spine were found missing. The spinous process of C7 vertebra was found cut away and was seen still attached to the soft tissues. Seropurulent fluid was coming out of the sutured wounds.

                  31)  Contusion 7 x 3.5 cm at the back aspect of left occipital lobe of brain.

                  32) Contusion 6x 3 cm on the right cerebellar hemisphere of the brain.

27. He opined that injuries 23 to 30 were fatal injuries that could have been caused by a weapon like MO1. In cross examination he stated that injuries were already sutured. He did not notice any negligence in suturing the wounds.

Judicial Evaluation

28. Now, we shall proceed to evaluate the evidence let in by the prosecution, in view of the submissions advanced by the learned counsels. The first submission advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the evidence of the sole eye witness, PW2 is wholly unreliable and therefore, the conviction cannot be sustained on her solitary evidence.

29. In Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras (AIR 1957 SC 614)  the Apex Court observed that it is a sound and well established rule of law that the court is concerned with the quality and not with the quantity of the evidence necessary for proving or disproving a fact. Generally speaking, oral testimony in this context may be classified into three categories, namely:

                  (1) Wholly reliable.

                  (2) Wholly unreliable

                  (3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable.

30. At this juncture, it would be useful to quote paragraphs 14 and 15 of Vadivelu Thevar (supra).

                  “14. In view of these considerations, we have no hesitation in holding that the contention that in a murder case, the court should insist upon plurality of witnesses, is much too broadly stated. S.134 of the Indian Evidence Act has categorically laid it down that "no particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact." The legislature determined, as long ago as 1872, presumably after due consideration of the pros and cons, that it shall not be necessary for proof or disproof of a fact, to call any particular number of witnesses. In England, both before and after the passing of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, there have been a number of statutes as set out in Sarkar's 'Law of Evidence' - 9th Edition, at pp. 1100 and 1101, forbidding convictions on the testimony of a single witness. The Indian Legislature has not insisted on laying down any such exceptions to the general rule recognized in S.134 quoted above. The section enshrines the well recognized maxim that "Evidence has to be weighed and not counted". Our Legislature had given statutory recognition to the fact that administration of justice may be hampered if a particular number of witnesses were to be insisted upon. It is not seldom that a crime had been committed in the presence of only one witness, leaving aside those cases which are not of uncommon occurrence, where determination of guilt depends entirely on circumstantial evidence. If the Legislature were to insist upon plurality of witnesses, cases where the testimony of a single witness only could be available in proof of the crime, would go unpunished. It is here that the discretion of the presiding judge comes into play. The matter thus must depend upon the circumstances of each case and the quality of the evidence of the single witness whose testimony has to be either accepted or rejected. If such a testimony is found by the court to be entirely reliable, there is no legal impediment to the conviction of the accused person on such proof. Even as the guilt of an accused person may be proved by the testimony of a single witness, the innocence of an accused person may be established on the testimony of a single witness, even though a considerable number of witnesses may be forthcoming to testify to the truth of the case for the prosecution. Hence, in our opinion, it is a sound and well established rule of law that the court is concerned with the quality and not with the quantity of the evidence necessary for proving or disproving a fact. Generally speaking, oral testimony in this context may be classified into three categories, namely:

                  (1) Wholly reliable.

                  (2) Wholly unreliable.

                  (3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable.

                  15. In the first category of proof, the court should have no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either way - it may convict or may acquit on the testimony of a single witness, if it is found to be above reproach or suspicion of interestedness, incompetence or subornation. In the second category, the court, equally has no difficulty in coming to its conclusion. It is in the third category of cases, that the court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial. There is another danger in insisting on plurality of witnesses. Irrespective of the quality of the oral evidence of a single witness, if courts were to insist on plurality of witnesses in proof of any fact, they will be indirectly encouraging subornation of witnesses. Situations may arise and do arise where only a single person is available to give evidence in support of a disputed fact. The court naturally has to weigh carefully such a testimony and if it is satisfied that the evidence is reliable and free from all taints which tend to render oral testimony open to suspicion, it becomes its duty to act upon such testimony. The law reports contain many precedents where the court had to depend and act upon the testimony of a single witness in support of the prosecution. There are exceptions to this rule, for example, in cases of sexual offences or of the testimony of an approver; both these are cases in which the oral testimony is, by its very nature, suspect, being that of a participator in crime. But, where there are no such exceptional reasons operating, it becomes the duty of the court to convict, if it is satisfied that the testimony of a single witness is entirely reliable. We have, therefore, no reasons to refuse to act upon the testimony of the first witness, which is the only reliable evidence in support of the prosecution.”

31. In Mitesh @ T. V. Vaghela v. State of Gujarat (2026 KHC OnLine 7246) , the Apex Court placing reliance on Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra ((2007) 14 SCC 150)) , reiterated that it is the quality and not the quantity of evidence which is determinative. Indian law does not insist on plurality of witnesses. If the testimony of a solitary witness found to be wholly reliable and of sterling quality, is sufficient to base a conviction.

32. We have carefully evaluated the evidence of PW2 (Ramavathy) in the light of the law laid down in Vadivelu Thevar (supra) and Mitesh @ T. V. Vaghela (supra). The version of PW2 is wholly reliable, natural and consistent. Therefore, we are of the view that the trial court is justified in accepting the oral testimony of the solitary testimony of PW2 to sustain the conviction.

33. Yet another contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the motive for the commission of the alleged offence has not been established by the prosecution. PW2 (Ramavathi) gave categoric evidence to the tune that the accused had doubts regarding the chastity of his wife and he used to quarrel with the deceased on that issue. Moreover, the proof of motive is insignificant in a case of this nature where there is direct evidence to prove the fact and issue. Therefore, we are not persuaded by this argument.

34. The learned counsel for the appellant would further submit that the accused was of unsound mind at the time of the alleged commission of the crime and was not aware of the nature and quality of his act. At this juncture, it would be useful to extract Section 84 of IPC and the law laid down on this point.

                  84. Act of a person of unsound mind.—

                  “Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law.”

35. Section 84 of the IPC, which recognises the defence of insanity, has its origin in the principles evolved under the English common law. The provision is largely based on the decision of the House of Lords in R. v. Daniel McNaughten (1843 RR 59 : 8 ER 718 (HL)) , wherein the well-known “McNaughten Rules” were formulated on the basis of five questions referred to them concerning the defence of insanity.

                  The answers so rendered ultimately became the foundation for Section 84 of IPC. It was held that every person is presumed sane unless proven otherwise. To claim insanity as a defence, it must be clearly shown that, due to a disease of the mind, the accused either did not understand the nature and quality of the act or did not know that the act was wrong.

36. In Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat (1964 SCC OnLine SC 20)  had occasion to consider the scope and ambit of the defence of insanity under Section 84 IPC and the extent of the burden resting upon an accused who raises the plea of insanity. The relevant Paragraphs of Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar (Supra) are extracted hereunder:

                  “5 ………………. It is a fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent and, therefore, the burden lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution, therefore, in a case of homicide shall prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused caused death with the requisite intention described in Section 299 of the Indian Penal Code. This general burden never shifts and it always rests on the prosecution. But, as Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code provides that nothing is an offence if the accused at the time of doing that act, by reason of unsoundness of mind was incapable of knowing the nature of his act or what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. This being an exception, under Section 105 of the Evidence Act the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within the said exception lies on the accused; and the court shall presume the absence of such circumstances. Under Section 105 of the Evidence Act, read with the definition of “shall presume” in Section 4 thereof, the court shall regard the absence of such circumstances as proved unless, after considering the matters before it, it believes that said circumstances existed or their existence was so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that they did exist. To put it in other words, the accused will have to rebut the presumption that such circumstances did not exist, by placing material before the court sufficient to make it consider the existence of the said circumstances so probable that a prudent man would act upon them. The accused has to satisfy the standard of a “prudent man”. If the material placed before the court such, as, oral and documentary evidence, presumptions, admissions or even the prosecution evidence, satisfies the test of “prudent man”, the accused will have discharged his burden. The evidence so placed may not be sufficient to discharge the burden under Section 105 of the Evidence Act, but it may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of a judge as regards one or other of the necessary ingredients of the offence itself. It may, for instance, raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the judge whether the accused had the requisite intention laid down in Section 299 of the Indian Penal Code. If the judge has such reasonable doubt, he has to acquit the accused, for in that event the prosecution will have failed to prove conclusively the guilt of the accused. There is no conflict between the general burden, which is always on the prosecution and which never shifts, and the special burden that rests on the accused to make out his defence of insanity.

                  7. The doctrine of burden of proof in the context of the plea of insanity may be stated in the following propositions : (1) The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had committed the offence with the requisite mens rea, and the burden of proving that always rests on the prosecution from the beginning to the end of the trial. (2) There is a rebuttable presumption that the accused was not insane, when he committed the crime, in the sense laid down by Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code : the accused may rebut it by placing before the court all the relevant evidence oral, documentary or circumstantial, but the burden of proof upon him is no higher than that rests upon a party to civil proceedings. (3) Even if the accused was not able to establish conclusively that he was insane at the time he committed the offence, the evidence placed before the court by the accused or by the prosecution may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as regards one or more of the ingredients of the offence, including mens rea of the accused and in that case the court would be entitled to acquit the accused on the ground that the general burden of proof resting on the prosecution was not discharged.

                  9. When a plea of legal insanity is set up, the court has to consider whether at the time of commission of the offence the accused, by reason of unsoundness of mind, was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that he was doing what was either wrong or contrary to law. The crucial point of time for ascertaining the state of mind of the accused is the time when the offence was committed. Whether the accused was in such a state of mind as to be entitled to the benefit of Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code can only be established from the circumstances which preceded, attended and followed the crime. “

37. In a recent decision in Rupesh Manger v. State of Sikkim ((2023) 9 SCC 739) , the Apex Court placing reliance on Surendra Mishra v. State of Jharkhand ( (2011) 11 SCC 495) , Hari Singh Gond v. State of M.P. ( (2008) 16 SCC 109)  and Bapu v. State of Rajasthan ((2007) 8 SCC 66) , reiterated the principles of burden of proof  in the context of the plea of insanity which can be summarised as follows:

                  “The doctrine of burden of proof in the context of the plea of insanity may thus be summarised as follows:

                  (1) The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had committed the offence with the requisite mens rea; and the burden of proving that always rests on the prosecution from the beginning to the end of the trial.

                  (2) There is a rebuttable presumption that the accused was not insane, when he committed the crime, in the sense laid down by Section 84 of the Penal Code: the accused may rebut it by placing before the court all the relevant evidence-oral, documentary or circumstantial, but the burden of proof upon him is no higher than that rests upon a party to civil proceedings.

                  (3) Even if the accused was not able to establish conclusively that he was insane at the time he committed the offence, the evidence placed before the court by the accused or by the prosecution may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as regards one or more of the ingredients of the offence, including mens rea of the accused and in that case the court would be entitled to acquit the accused on the ground that the general burden of proof resting on the prosecution was not discharged.”

38. We have carefully evaluated the evidence and materials placed on record in this matter, in view of the settled proposition of law discussed above.

39. In the case on hand, the appellant has not raised the plea of insanity before the trial court. No documents were produced in support of his plea either before the trial court or before this Court. The appellant herein was represented by a competent legal aid counsel. No plea was taken before the trial court that due to unsoundness of mind the accused was unable to take his defence. Therefore, we are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that he was suffering from legal insanity either at the time of the alleged commission of the crime or thereafter.

40. The next submission by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the deceased died due to infection and not due to the injuries sustained by her. The evidence of PW11 (Dr. Gopalakrishna Pillai) would indicate that the injured sustained 32 ante-mortem injuries. Due to the injuries sustained, she developed infection which ultimately resulted in her death. It is clear from the evidence of PW11 that the proximate cause for the death is the infliction of the injuries on various parts of her body.

41. The learned counsel has also argued that, had she been given proper medical care, her life could have been saved. Explanation 2 of Section 299 of IPC clearly states that, where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes such bodily injury shall be deemed to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper remedies and skilful treatment, the death might have been prevented. In view of the clear statutory provision, the accused is precluded from taking such a defence in a trial for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Penal Code.

42. Yet another argument advanced by the counsel for the appellant is that some of the material witnesses including the son of the accused (CW9) was not examined to prove the prosecution case. We are unable to accept the said contention also. The selection of witnesses to be examined by the prosecution, is the choice of the prosecution. It is the trite law that the non-examination of some of the witnesses, by itself, is not a reason to reject the entire prosecution story.

43 The dictum relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) and Kanda Padayachi (supra) are not applicable to the case on hand, since this is a case based on direct evidence.

Conclusion

 44. We have carefully evaluated the evidence on record, both oral and documentary. Despite a careful re-assessment of evidence, facts, circumstances of the case and the submissions of the counsel made in the Court, we do not find any illegality in the impugned judgment. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, after a meticulous evaluation of evidence, has arrived at a proper conclusion, in our view. The Criminal appeal fails and it is liable to be dismissed, in our considered opinion.

                  In the result,

                  i. Criminal Appeal No. 610/2024 is dismissed.

                  ii. The impugned judgment of the Special Court for the Trial of Offences against Women and Children (Additional Sessions Court-I), Thalassery in S.C. No.731 of 2014 is confirmed.