1. The present application has been filed for quashing of the Charge Sheet bearing no. 92/2025, filed against the petitioner under Section 106(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for short, “BNS”) with criminal case bearing G.R. Case No. 631 of 2025 and FIR No. 73/25 dated November 02, 2025, P.S. Hut Bay, South Andaman District, pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class-I at Port Blair.

2. The conspectus of the incident, which gave rise to the complaint leading to the FIR and Charge Sheet, is narrated below.

3. On November 05, 2025, the victim M. Bhaskar Rao was working in an Ice Plant of the Fisheries Department located at Ceylon Basti, Hut Bay. While engaged in electrical re-wiring near the ceiling of the Ice Plant, he, along with one K. Haridas, fell from the ceiling and received severe head injury. M. Bhaskar Rao lost consciousness and was taken to the hospital in such critical condition, subsequently succumbing to death due to the injury.

4. The allegation against the petitioner is that he was a Power of Attorney holder of his mother, Smti. Chandra Kanta Dhingra, the registered owner of M/s Navjeevan Enterprise, which was the subcontractor engaged in employing personnel for repair and maintenance of the existing Ice Plant and Cold Storage building at Hut Bay. The said work was allotted by dint of a contract pursuant to a previous tender.

5. As per the Charge Sheet, the accused/petitioner Pankaj Kumar Dhingra appeared in response to a notice under Section 35(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, “BNSS”), and admitted that the work was being executed by his firm, that the deceased was engaged by him and that he had neither visited the work site nor ensured supervision or compliance of safety norms.

6. As per the Charge Sheet, he further admitted that no safety equipment was used and that he relied only on telephonic communication in order to reduce expenses. The Charge Sheet further alleges that he did so despite repeated warnings from the Departmental Officers. On such premise, it was alleged that such admissions clearly demonstrate culpable negligence on the part of the accused, thus bringing him within the fold of Section 106 (1) of the BNS.

7. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contends that the mother of the petitioner was the proprietress of the firm M/s Navjeevan Enterprise, which was acting as sub-contractor. As per the General Power of Attorney given to the petitioner, he was only to do necessary paper work with regard to the firm and was not directly in charge of the work under supervision.

8. It is further contended by the petitioner that the victim M. Bhaskar Rao, on the fateful day, was working at the site and had called his friend K. Haridas, who was not engaged in the work. The two climbed an aluminum ladder to the ceiling and thereafter used wooden planks to reach from one portion of the ceiling to the other, when they accidently slipped and fell down, causing the accident. Learned counsel argues that the accident was unforeseeable and no liability of negligence can be attributed either to the petitioner or the sub-contractor/firm. Moreover, the petitioner was not present at the locale and, such, there was no direct proximity of the petitioner to the crime.

9. Further, there was no negligence on the part of the petitioner, since the deceased had been provided with an aluminum ladder, which is an admitted position, and chose of his own to use wooden planks to go from one part of the ceiling to the other.

10. On the issue of proximity/nexus, learned counsel cites a Division Bench judgment of I. B. Bhalla and others vs. the State, reported at (1989) SCC OnLine Cal 278, where it was held that the mere fact that an accused contravened certain rules and regulations in the doing of an act which caused death of another did not establish that the death was the result of a rash or negligent act or that the person might be guilty under Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (corresponding to the present Section 106 of the BNS). The rash or negligent act, it was held, should be the direct or proximate cause of the death.

11. The Division Bench further held that in the said case, there was no averment that the death of the workmen was a direct result of any rash or negligent act of the accused and it was the causa causana. Accordingly, the criminal proceedings were quashed, as it would be an abuse of the process of Court in the opinion of the Division Bench.

12. Learned counsel next cites Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther and another vs. State of Maharashtra, reported at 2025 SCC OnLine SC 520, where the allegation was that the appellants did not provide any safety equipment like belt, helmet, rubber shoes, etc. to the two deceased employees. In the facts of the said case, the deceased employees were undertaking the work of decoration of the front side of a shop and, as part of the said work, they were working on a signboard, which was approximately at a height of 12 feet from the ground level, for which purpose they were provided with iron ladder. While working on the signboard, they were struck by electricity and got electrocuted, falling down, resulting multiple injuries leading to their death. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it was purely accidental and on those basic facts, no prima facie case could be said to be made out against the appellants for committing an offence under Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code.

13. Learned counsel places reliance on Clause-32 of the Contract between the Executive Engineer, APWD and the contractor, as per which the contractor would be fully responsible for any accident or mishap involving workers engaged by the contractor and the contractor would pay claims made on its part. The contractor, as per the said clause, shall also indemnify the Department from any claims arising out of accidents, disabilities of any nature or death arising out of provisions under law or any other nature in respect of all workers engaged by the contractor. It is submitted that the said clause, at best, would give rise to civil liabilities of damages/compensation and the petitioner could not be held guilty of any criminal offence by dint of the same.

14. Learned counsel next places reliance on the General Power of Attorney executed in favour of the petitioner, in terms of which he was only to do all official works in respect of the sub-contractor firm.

15. Further, from the Schedule of the tender document, learned counsel submits that the only implements which were to be provided by the sub-contract were drill machine, hand blower, chase cutting machine, crimping tool kits, self-supporting ladder, wire drawing machine and LT Megger 500 Volts. Since a self-supporting aluminium ladder was admittedly used by the deceased, it could not be said that the petitioner or the sub-contractor was guilty of negligence due to not providing necessary equipment. From the communication made by the Executive Engineer, E & M Division, APWD to the in-charge of Hut Bay Police Station on November 25, 2025, learned counsel shows that neither the sub-contractor nor the petitioner but only the Departmental Engineer named therein was responsible for monitoring and supervision of the work at site. Hence, there was no liability even as per the contract for the sub-contractor or its agent, the petitioner, to remain present at the site at the relevant point of time.

16. From the Charge Sheet, it is pointed out that the only involvement of the petitioner alleged therein was not being present at the work site and ensuring supervision and/or compliance with safety norms, none of which are applicable to the petitioner or the sub-contractor.

17. Hence, it is argued that the FIR, Charge Sheet and the consequential criminal proceeding ought to be quashed against the petitioner.

18. Learned counsel submits that no rash and/or negligent act on the part of the petitioner, having direct proximity with the causation, is disclosed in the Charge Sheet or the FIR.

19. Learned Public Prosecutor, appearing for the State, opposes the prayer for quashing and submits that the petitioner is none else but the son of the proprietress of the sub-contractor agency. It is argued that the expression “negligence” featuring in Section 106, BNS includes within its purview any careless act or omission on the part of the sub-contractor. Since the petitioner, who was in charge of supervision of the work on behalf of the sub-contractor agency, was not present, nor was any safety equipment provided, sufficient prima facie case to bring the petitioner within the fold of Section 106 of the BNS has been made out. As such, it is argued that the criminal trial ought not to be halted at this premature stage by quashing the same.

20. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, the Court is of the opinion that no prima facie offence under Section 106 of the BNS has been made out against the petitioner, due to the reasons discussed hereinbelow:

21. Section 106(1) provides that whoever causes death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide shall be punishable under the said provision.

22. The expression “whoever causes death” clearly indicates that there has to be direct nexus between the death and the accused person. Notably, the expression used is “causes death” and not “responsible for the death”.

23. As held in I. B. Bhalla and others (supra)( (1989) SCC OnLine Cal 278), while considering a case under Section 304A of the IPC, which is the predecessor provision of Section 106 of the BNS, the “rash and negligent act” contemplated in the said Section should be direct or proximate cause of the death. Thus, the prosecution had to make out prima facie case in the Charge Sheet, in order to bring the petitioner within the fold of Section 106, that the death was the direct result of any negligent act of the accused/petitioner and it was the ‘causa causana’.

24. In Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther and another (supra)( 2025 SCC onLine SC 520) the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated in the context that when the appellants therein did not provide safety equipment and then the concerned workmen fell from a height of 12 feet from the ground level due to electrocution, it was purely accidental and on the basic facts, no prima facie case could be said to be made out against the appellants therein for committing an offence under Section 304A of the IPC.

25. The allegation against the petitioner in the FIR and the Charge Sheet is insufficient to connect him directly to the death, which is a prerequisite of the offence contemplated under Section 106, BNS.

26. Even from the letter dated November 25, 2025 issued by the APWD, the principal contractor to the police, it is evident that the only person responsible for monitoring and supervision of the work at the site was the Departmental engineer in question. Thus, the allegation that the petitioner was supervising over phone and was not personally present at the site does not have any basis whatsoever. Even from the contract, it is not evident the petitioner or the sub-contractor had to be present at the site round the clock during the commission of the work-in-question.

27. Secondly, as per the communication dated November 25, 2025, the safety compliance was to be as per the terms and conditions in the agreement of the contract.

28. However, Clause 18 of the tender document, which is also a part of the Charge Sheet, provided the specific machinery, tools and plants which were to be deployed by the contractor at the site. The other equipment, apart from self-supporting ladder, had nothing to do with the fall of the deceased victim. It is an admitted position that an aluminum ladder was provided to the victim and was being used by him when he fell. There is no allegation throughout the FIR or the Charge Sheet as to the ladder being defective or being the cause of the fall. Thus, the allegation that proper safety equipment was not provided by the subcontractor or the petitioner could not have been a valid ground at all.

29. Even otherwise, as per Clasue-32 of the contract between the contractor and the sub-contractor agency, the responsibility of the subcontractor for any accident or mishap involving workers was limited to payment of claims of compensation and the indemnity to the Department from any such claims arising out of accidents and deaths arising under any provision of law or of any other nature in respect of workers engaged by the sub-contractor.

30. Such liability is completely civil in nature since the remedy, at best, lies in a monetary claim and cannot be the trigger for a criminal complaint.

31. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that a civil liability cannot be the subject-matter of criminal complaint and if so found, the criminal proceeding is liable to be quashed.

32. That apart, the General Power of Attorney, which is also a part of the Charge Sheet, merely shows that the role of the petitioner under the General Power of Attorney was only to do all official works in respect of the sub-contractor firm, such as tender work, submitting bills, receiving check amounts, signing on MB Book, USR, maintaining register and signing upon proceeds in respect of the firm works and the like.

33. Hence, the Power-of-Attorney did not even empower the petitioner to supervise the work in any manner.

34. Thus, it is crystal-clear that even as per the FIR and Charge Sheet which led to the criminal trial, no case under Section 106(1) of the BNS has been made out against the petitioner even at a prima facie level, to justify continuation of criminal proceeding against the petitioner.

35. Permitting such proceeding to continue and the FIR or the Charge Sheet to be sustained would tantamount to gross abuse of the process of court and unnecessary harassment and stigma to the petitioner, against whom no case under the charging section has even been made out from the FIR or the Charge Sheet.

36. Accordingly, CRR/23/2026 is allowed on contest, thereby setting aside and quashing FIR No. 73/25 dated November 02, 2025 of P.S. Hut Bay, South Andaman District, the resultant Charge Sheet bearing No. 92/2025 filed against the petitioner under Section 106(1) BNS, and the consequential criminal case bearing G.R. Case No. 631 of 2025 pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class-I at Port Blair.

37. Urgent Photostat certified copies of the judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities.