1. The above writ petition is filed seeking the following reliefs:

                  “I. To issue a writ of Certiorari calling for the records pertaining to Exhibit P-10 order passed by the 3rd respondent and quash the same

                  II. To issue a writ of Mandamus directing the respondents 1 to 3 not to insist for owners consent for renewal of License for his Home Stay.

                  III. To dispense with the translation of vernacular documents.

                  IV. Pass such other orders as this Hon’ble court deems fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.”

[SIC]

2. The petitioner, along with one Vikash Sharma, formed a Limited Liability Partnership in the name of "Hospitality Heights" LLP and is conducting a hotel and lodging within the limits of Varkala Municipality, is the submission. The same is conducted in a rented premises owned by the 4th respondent. The petitioner, along with the above-mentioned Sharma, entered into a rental agreement with the 4th respondent on 1/11/2022 for the building bearing No. 28/255, namely "Hillview," situated at Thiruvambadi Road, Varkala. Exhibit P1 is the rent agreement. As per the terms and conditions in Exhibit P1, the petitioner renovated the building by furnishing the rooms to the standards of a five-star facility, is the submission. The petitioner states that he and his partner spent more than 17 lakhs on furnishing the rooms. After the same, the petitioner obtained a license from the Varkala Municipality to conduct hospitality and accommodation services at the said premises, having door number 28/255. Exhibit P2 is the license issued by the Varkala Municipality in favour of the petitioner. As per Ext. P2, the validity of Exhibit P2 is from 8/3/2024 to 7/3/2025.

3. After the expiry of the period of tenancy, the petitioner approached the 4th respondent to renew the rent deed, is the submission. But the 4th respondent refused to renew the rent deed, and hence the petitioner is continuing as a statutory tenant in the said building is the further submission. When the 4th respondent tried to forcibly evict the petitioner, the petitioner, along with his partner, preferred OS No. 352/25 before the Munsiff Court, Varkala, and obtained an injunction order (Exhibit P3) on 25.10.2025. In this regard, the petitioner received a Caveat from respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 7, stating that they are the present owners of the property and that they purchased it from the 4th respondent. Hence, the petitioner filed another suit as OS No. 427/25 before the Munsiff Court, Varkala, against the forceful eviction by respondent Nos. 5 to 7, and an injunction application against the same is also pending in that suit, as submitted.

4. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an application for renewal of the license physically, and the petitioner received Exhibit P5 notice from the Municipality stating that the petitioner had not submitted the consent letter from the owner of the building for renewing the license. On receipt of Ext.P5, the petitioner submitted a renewal application physically for renewal of license again is the submission. But, the petitioner had not produced the consent letter from the owner because the owner of the property is in loggerheads with the petitioner. Subsequently, the petitioner was directed to submit the application through K-Smart, along with the owner's consent, as evidenced by Exhibit P6. On receipt of Ext.P6, the petitioner again submitted the renewal application through K-Smart, and the required fee was also paid. Exhibit P7 is the acknowledgement of the application submitted through K-Smart. Thereafter, the petitioner was directed to appear personally on 1/1/2026, as evident by Exhibit P8 letter. Pursuant to Exhibit P8, the petitioner personally appeared before the Municipality on 1/1/2026. At  that  stage,  the  Municipality  also  insisted  that  the owner's consent is required for the renewal of the license. Hence, the petitioner preferred a suit as OS No. 4/2026 before the Munsiff Court, Varkala, as evident from Ext. P9, the plaint. Pending the suit, the petitioner received a notice from the 3rd respondent stating that his license is cancelled. Exhibit P10 is the notice. Aggrieved by the same, this Writ Petition is filed.

5. Heard Adv. Sri. R. Sunil Kumar, who appeared for the petitioner, Adv. Sri. Siju Kamalasanan, the learned Standing Counsel for the Municipality and Adv. Sri. D. Anil Kumar, who appeared for respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 7.

6. The counsel for the petitioner relied on the judgments of the Apex Court in Sudhakaran v. Corporation of Trivandrum and Another [2016 (3) KHC 803], Marimutthu v. DGP [1999 (3) KLT 662], Tresa v. Joseph [2005 KHC 1493] and Hajira Umma v. Razak [1991 KHC 488]. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the objection raised by the Municipality to the effect that a consent letter is necessary for processing the renewal application for the license will not stand in the light of the dictum laid down by this Court in Sudhakaran’s case (supra).

7. Adv. Sri. D. Anil Kumar, who appeared for the party respondents, relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Bhupal Prasad v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1995 KHC 360] and also the judgment of this Court in Valsala v. Sundaram Nadar [1993 KHC 284]. The main contention raised by Adv. Sri. D. Anil Kumar is that the lease period is already over, and respondent Nos. 5 to 7 became the owners of the property on 07.11.2025. He submitted that the license period ended on 07.03.2025. Hence, as of today, the petitioner is conducting business illegally. Adv. D. Anil Kumar submitted that the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in Sudhakaran’s case (supra) is not applicable in this case. The counsel took me through paragraph No.8 of the above decision and contended that the consent of the landlord is not required every time for renewal, if the lease is current, is the dictum laid down in Sudhakaran’s case (supra). In this case, the lease period expired, and hence there is no current lease is the submission.

8. Adv. D. Anil Kumar, submitted that the legal fiction given to a tenant to protect his possession is only for the purpose of not throwing him out of the property. The counsel also submitted that the Civil court orders are only against forcible eviction and nothing more. It is the case of Adv. D. Anil Kumar that the respondents 5 to 7 did not give any consent to the petitioner for the renewal of the license. Therefore, the crux of the contention of Adv. Anil Kumar is that, even though their entry into the property was initially legal because the lease was subsisting, their possession is now illegal because the lease period ended.

9. The learned counsel appearing for the Municipality also supported the contentions raised by Adv. D. Anil Kumar. The counsel submitted that there is nothing to interfere with the impugned orders.

10. This Court considered the contentions of the petitioner and the respondents. There is no dispute to the fact that the petitioner was a tenant based on the Ext.P1 lease agreement. There is no dispute that the lease period, as per Ext.P1, has expired. There is also no dispute that the petitioner is still in the building. It is also an admitted fact that the petitioner obtained a license from the Municipality, as evident by Ext.P2, for the period from 08.03.2024 to 07.03.2025. Thereafter, the petitioner approached the Municipality for renewal, but the same was not entertained because there was no consent from the landlord. The short point to be decided is that, if the lease period under the lease agreement has expired, the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in Sudhakaran’s case (supra) is applicable.

11. The respondents 5 to 7 relied on Paragraph No.8 of the judgment of the Apex Court in Bhupal Prasad’s case (supra). It would be better to extract Paragraph No.8 of the above-mentioned judgment:

                  “Tenant at sufferance is one who comes into possession of land by lawful title, but who holds it by wrong after the termination of the term or expiry of the lease by efflux of time. The tenant at sufferance is, therefore, one who wrongfully continues in possession after the extinction of a lawful title. There is little difference between him and a trespasser. In Mulla's Transfer of Property Act [7th End.] at page 633, the position of tenancy at sufferance has been stated thus: A tenancy at sufferance is merely a fiction to avoid continuance in possession operating as a trespass. It has been described as the least and lowest interest which can subsist in reality. It, therefore, cannot be created by contract and arises only by implication of law when a person who has been in possession under a lawful title continues in possession after that title has been determined, without the consent of the person entitled. A tenancy at sufferance does not create the relationship of landlord and tenant. At page 769, it is stated regarding the right of a tenant holding over thus: The act of holding over after the expiration of the term does not necessarily create a tenancy of any kind. If the lessee remaining in possession after the determination of the term, the common law rule is that he is a tenant on sufferance. The expression "holding over" is used in the sense of retaining possession. A distinction should be drawn between a tenant continuing in possession after the determination of the lease, without the consent of the landlord and a tenant doing so with the landlord's consent. The former is called a tenant by sufferance in the language of the English law and the latter class of tenants is called a tenant holding over or a tenant at will. The lessee holding over with the consent of the lessor is in a better position than a mere tenant at will. The tenancy on sufferance is converted into a tenancy at will by the assent of the landlord, but the relationship of the landlord and tenant is not established until the rent was paid and accepted. The assent of the landlord to the continuance of the tenancy after the determination of the tenancy would create a new tenancy. The possession of a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant is protected by law. Although he may not have a right to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy, his possession is juridical.”

12. The respondents 5 to 7 also relied on Paragraph Nos. 11(A) and 12 of the decision in Valsala’s case (supra). It would be better to extract Paragraph Nos. 11(A) and 12 of the above-mentioned judgment:

                  “11A. A tenant continuing in possession of the leasehold property after the determination of the lease by efflux of time or by the issue of a notice to quit, without the assent of the landlord, is only in the position of a trespasser, unless he is protected by a Statute like the Control enactment. Such a person who is euphemistically termed a tenant at sufferance has no estate or interest in the leasehold property (Devaki v. Alavi, 1979 KLT 67 (FB). See also Mulla, transfer of Property Act, 7th Edition Page 633, where the learned author states with reference to the decisions in Kundan Lal v. Deepchand, AIR 1933 Allahabad 756 and Bansidhar v. Ramcharan, AIR 1940 Oudh 401 that a tenant holding over after the expiraton of his term is a tenant at sufference, which is a term useful to distinguish a possession rightful in its inception but wrongful in its continuance from a trespass which is wrongful both in its inception and in its continuance. The position of such a person is precarious and there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between him and the owner of the property.

                  12. A tenant continuing in possession after the determination of his tenancy, without the assent of the landlord being thus only in the position of a trespasser, necessarily the rule relating to suits against trespassers by a co-owner must apply that is a co-owner can in his own right sue for recovery of possession from such a person without arraying the other co-owners as parties to the suit.”

13. I am of the considered opinion that respondents 5 to 7 will not succeed in the case based on the above two judgments, in the light of the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in Sudhakaran’s case (supra). The facts in Sudhakaran’s case (supra) are similar to this case. In Paragraph No.3 of the judgment in Sudhakaran’s case (supra), the facts are narrated. The Appellant in that case was a tenant, and he was originally issued a license with the landlord's consent, but his application for renewal was rejected on the ground that he did not produce the landlord's consent. The same was rejected by the Tribunal for  Local-Self Government Institutions, Thiruvananthapuram (for short ‘Tribunal’), and the order of the Tribunal is extracted in Paragraph No.3 of Sudhakaran’s case (supra). A reading of the extracted portion of the Tribunal's order shows that the lease period in that case was also over, and the petitioner  was a statutory tenant or a tenant holding over. The Tribunal observed that the Corporation cannot insist that such a tenant produce a written consent from the landlord for the issuance of the license. The Tribunal observed that a statutory tenant can be evicted from the leased premises only in accordance with the provisions of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short, the Act, 1965). The above order of the Tribunal was challenged before this Court, and the learned Single Judge of this Court confirmed the order of the Tribunal, and the relevant portion of the order of the learned Single Judge is extracted in Paragraph No. 4 of Sudhakaran’s case (supra). Thereafter, an appeal was filed before the Division Bench of this Court, and the Division Bench took a contrary view, holding that, on expiry of the existing license, the tenant has to seek a fresh license, for which a fresh consent of the landlord is required. The validity of the earlier license expired on 31.03.2008. Later renewal was sought only on 25.05.2009. Therefore, the Division Bench observed that the same cannot be treated as a proper application for renewal. It is also observed that the earlier license expires on 31.03.2008. In the absence of making a renewal application within 30 days before the expiry of the existing license, the tenant cannot avail of the benefit of renewal of the license; it has to be only a fresh license, is the observation of the Division Bench. The above judgment was taken up before the Apex Court, which delivered the judgment in Sudhakaran’s case (supra). It would be better to extract Paragraph No.8 onward of Sudhakaran’s case (supra):

                  8. After due consideration of the issues involved, we find merit in the submission made on behalf of the appellant. The statutory provision already quoted above shows that the requirement of consent of landlord is applicable only when a person intends to obtain a licence for the first time. Renewal or subsequent application for obtaining licence on expiry of the period of the existing licence, during the currency of the tenancy, is not applicable for obtaining licence. Even in the case of application for obtaining licence for the first time, the tenant cannot be deprived of running lawful business merely because the landlord withheld the consent. Valid tenancy itself has implied authority of the landlord for legitimate use of the premises by the tenant.

                  9. In Marimuthu & Ors. (supra), the Division Bench of the High Court observed :

                  “16. A statutory tenant under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act can be evicted only as per the provisions of the said Act, on the grounds enumerated therein. Since the possession of the tenant is lawful, the landlord is not entitled to withhold his consent for the conduct of the business for which the premises were given on rent. In the instant case, we are satisfied that the landlord is purposefully and with malafide intention withholding consent inspite of the directions from this court. Under such circumstances, the Corporation also cannot insist upon production of written consent from the landlord for the purpose of issuance of licence for the conduct of business in the premises in question. For carrying on business in readymade dresses a licence issued under Sec.492 of the Kerala Municipality Act is necessary. As on date, the petitioner is not having any licence to carry on such business. A person in occupation can be allowed to carry on a trade or business which requires a licence, only after obtaining such licence. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case as above, we direct the Corporation of Thiruvananthapuram to consider Ext.P7 application for licence without insisting upon the production of a written consent of the owner of the premises and pass appropriate orders after giving an opportunity to the petitioners or their representative or their advocate, within two weeks from today. The petitioners are at liberty to file any further documents, if need be, before the Corporation authorities. The Corporation shall pass a reasoned order after hearing the necessary parties and communicate the same to the petitioners within two weeks from today. We make it clear that till such time the petitioners shall not conduct the textile business in the premises in question. Ext.P8 order of the Corporation of Thiruvananthapuram is set aside and Ext.P7 is restored to file for fresh consideration as directed above.”

                  10. Thus, the view taken by the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge is the correct understanding of the import of Section 492 (3) of the Kerala Municipalities Act, 1994 (supra). The Division Bench erred in interfering with the said view.

                  Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the Division Bench and restore the order of the Tribunal as affirmed by the learned Single Judge.”

14. In Sudhakaran's case (supra), this Court relied on the judgment of Marimuthu's case (supra). In Marimuthu's case (supra), which is extracted in para 9 of Sudhakaran's case (supra), it is clearly stated that a statutory tenant under the Act, 1965, can be evicted only as per the provisions of the said Act, on the grounds enumerated therein. Since the possession of the tenant is lawful, the landlord is not entitled to withhold his consent for the conduct of the business for which the premises were given on rent. This court also observed that the Corporation cannot insist upon the production of written consent from the landlord for the issuance of a license to conduct the business on the premises in question in Marimuthu's case (supra). In paragraph 10 of the Sudhakaran's case (supra), the view taken by the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions, which is extracted in paragraph 3 of that judgment and the judgment of the learned Single Judge, which is extracted in paragraph 4 of the judgment is confirmed and the finding of the Division Bench, which is extracted in paragraph 5 of the Sudhakaran's case (supra) is set aside. The Apex Court also relied on and in principle approved the dictum laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Marimuthu's case (supra). If that is the case, the respondents' contention, based on the decisions in Bhupal Prasad's case (supra) and Valsala's case (supra), will not stand. Moreover, in Tresa's case (supra), a Division Bench of this Court observed that the Act of 1965 is a special statute governing and regulating tenancy, and its provisions supersede the general law of tenancy and sub- tenancy. In Hajira Umma v. Razak [1991 KHC 488], a single Judge of this Court observed like this :

                  5. “The short question that arises for consideration is whether the civil court has got jurisdiction to pass an order of eviction against the defendant. Admittedly the building is situated within the area where the Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act is made applicable. The plaintiff filed rent control O.P. 196/76 for evicting the defendant by invoking S.11(2) of the Act. This petition was dismissed by Ext.A20 order, as the defendant contended that she has been in possession of the building by virtue of the agreement. However, it is important to note that even though Ext.B1 agreement was entered into between the parties, the plaintiff has no case that the tenancy in favour of the defendant had come to an end. The plaintiff issued a notice terminating the tenancy and after the termination of the tenancy the defendant continued as a statutory tenant. A person remaining in occupation of the premises let out to him after the determination or expiry of the period of tenancy is, commonly though in, law not accurately, called a statutory tenant. He cannot be turned out as he in entitled to the protection of the statute. This Court in Vasu v. Kallianikutty Amma (1982 KLT 53 =1982 KLJ 36) explained as to what is a statutory tenant. It was held: "The expression "statutory tenancy" is something coined by the courts to explain the position of a tenant who continues to be in possession of the building during the pendency of Rent Control proceedings. Tenancy is strictly a matter of contract. If it is for a term it expires at the end of the term. If there is no agreed term, it can be terminated by due notice. When the tenancy is terminated either by efflux of time or by notice, the landlord - tenant relationship ceases to be there. But still the tenant cannot be turned out of the building except under the provisions of the Rent Control Act where that applies. S.2(6) of Act 2 of 1965 defines a tenant so as to include a person containing in possession after the termination of his tenancy. That is, even after the termination of the contractual tenancy, he continues to be a tenant for the purpose of the Act. He will have all the rights and obligations of a tenant as defined in the Act, inspite of the termination of his tenancy. It is this peculiar position of his under the provisions of the statute that is denoted by the expression "statutory tenancy".

                  Under the scheme of the enactment of Act 2 of 1965, a person in occupation continues to be a tenant even if the tenancy is validly terminated and he is still entitled to the protection of the Act.”

15. In the light of the above dictum laid down in Sudhakaran's case (supra) and Marimuthu's case (supra) and the other decisions relied on by the petitioner, I am of the considered opinion that even if the period of lease is over and the license period is also over, the renewal application cannot be rejected for the non production of the consent letter from the Landlord, if the tenant is continuing based on the original tenancy as a statutory tenant. Hence, the impugned order in this case is to be set aside. The petitioner can be allowed to file a fresh application for renewal of the license, and the Corporation authority can be directed to consider the same and pass appropriate orders in it, without insisting on a consent letter from the landlord.

                  Therefore, this writ petition is disposed of with the following directions :

                  1) Ext.P10 is set aside.

                  2) The petitioner is allowed to submit an application for renewal of the license before the competent authority among the 1st and 2nd respondents within two weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment.

                  3) Once such an application is received, the competent authority among respondent Nos. 1 and 2 will consider and allow the renewal application, if otherwise in order, without insisting on a consent letter from the landlord of the building.

                  4) Necessary orders shall be passed by the competent authority among respondent Nos. 1 and 2 as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within 30 days from the date of receipt of the application for renewal of license.

                  5) The status quo will continue until final orders are passed on the renewal application, as directed above.