S. Muralee Krishna, J.

1. The respondents in O.A.No.2101 of 2025 on the file of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram (the ‘Tribunal’ for short), have filed this original petition, invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging Ext.P3 interim order dated 19.12.2025 passed by the Tribunal in that original application.

2. The respondent-applicant is included as Sl. No.24 in Annexure A2 ranked list published by the Kerala Public Service Commission for the post of Police Constable (Armed Police Battalion) (KAP V) in Police Department in Idukki District, and was issued with Annexure A3 advice for appointment dated 01.11.2024.

                  2.1. The respondent pleads that he completed the medical examination successfully on 06.12.2024. On the date of the medical examination, a criminal case, as C.C.No.99 of 2018, was pending against the respondent before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Kayamkulam, and the matter was entered by the respondent in the Police Verification Roll, given to the office of the 3rd petitioner, Commandant, Kerala Armed Police 5th Battalion, Kuttikanam, Idukki. Subsequently, the respondent was acquitted in that criminal case on 23.12.2024 by Annexure A5 judgment dated 23.12.2024 of the Court of the Judicial First Class Magistrate-I, Kayamkulam. After the completion of the medical examination and police verification on the antecedents of the candidates included in Annexure A2 ranked list, the 3rd petitioner published Annexure A6 list of eligible candidates dated 21.01.2025, to be appointed as Police Constable recruits, scheduling the date of commencement of training as 27.01.2025. But the name of the respondent was not included in the said list. Contending that Section 86(2) of the Kerala Police Act, 2011, states that a person against whom a criminal case for an offence involving proclivity of violence or moral turpitude pending before a court of law is entitled to appear for recruitment, to get selected and to undergo training, but shall be included for permanent appointment only after being acquitted, the respondent filed O.A.No.200 of 2025 before the Tribunal on 27.01.2025. In that original application, the Tribunal passed Annexure A7 order on 27.01.2025 itself, directing the 3rd petitioner to include the respondent and other applicants in the connected cases, in the training to be commenced with respect to the new recruits, on a provisional basis, subject to the final decision with respect to their suitability for appointment. Based on the said order, the respondent joined as a Police Constable trainee under the 3rd petitioner and completed training on 11.11.2025.

                  2.2. The respondent further states that on 20.11.2025, when he was on duty at the temple at Erumely, Kottayam, as deputed by the 3rd petitioner, in connection with Sabarimala pilgrimage, at about 14.00 hours, the respondent was issued with Annexure A8 passport directing him to report before the AC Adjutant, KAP V, Maniyar, Pathanamthitta. When the respondent reported to KAP V on 20.11.2025, he was retrenched from service by issuing Annexure A9 order dated 19.11.2025 by the 3rd petitioner, stating the reason that till date no suitability report/candidature clearance report has been received from the Government/ADGP Intelligence. Therefore, the respondent approached the Tribunal by filing O.A.No.2101 of 2025, under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking the following reliefs;

                  “i. To call for the records leading to Annexure A9 and quash the same.

                  ii. To direct the 1st and 2nd Respondents to forward the suitability report of the applicant to the 3rd Respondent in a time frame fixed by this Hon'ble Tribunal.

                  iii. To direct the 3rd Respondent to re-admit the applicant for duty with effect from 20.11.2025 FN without service break in a time frame fixed by this Hon'ble Tribunal.”

3. In the original application, along with M.A.No.2241 of 2025, which is marked as Ext.P2 in the original petition, the respondent-applicant has produced Annexures A10 and A11 documents.

4. On 19.12.2025, when the original application along with O.A.No.2164 of 2025 came up for consideration, the Tribunal passed the impugned Ext.P3 interim order, which reads thus;

                  “Admit.

                  Learned Government Pleader takes notice for the respondents. In view of section 86(2) of the Kerala Police Act, 2010, there shall be a direction to the respondents to readmit the applicants to duty within two days. It will be provisional and subject to verification of antecedents and discipline of the applicant.”

5. Being aggrieved, the respondents in the original application approached this Court with this original petition.

6. On 19.01.2026, when this original petition came up for admission, this Court admitted the same on to file, and stayed the impugned order for two months.

7. Heard the learned Senior Government Pleader for the petitioners-respondents and the learned counsel for the respondent-applicant.

8. The learned Senior Government Pleader would submit that the respondent is involved in nine criminal cases, which were not disclosed in the declaration submitted by him at the time of selection. A person having such criminal antecedents is not fit to be selected, especially in the police force. The learned Senior Government Pleader relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rajkumar Yadav [2026 KHC OnLine 6176 : AIR 2026 SC 1471] in support of his arguments regarding the non-entitlement of the respondent to be appointed as a Police Constable, even though he was acquitted in some of the criminal cases. By relying on Rule 10(b)(iii) of Part II of Kerala State & Subordinate Service Rules, 1958 (‘KS & SSR’ for short), the learned Senior Government Pleader argued that it is up to the Government to decide the eligibility and suitability of the respondent to the post of Police Constable, considering his character and antecedents. As far as Section 86(2) of the Kerala Police Act, 2011 (the ‘Act’ for short), is concerned, the learned Senior Government Pleader would submit that the said provision is applicable only for provisional admission for training and not for permanent appointment.

9. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent-applicant would submit that the respondent is entitled to be selected and provisionally appointed to the post of Police Constable by virtue of Section 86 (2) of the Act. It is true that he is entitled to get a permanent appointment only after being acquitted in the criminal cases. But the respondent has not raised any claim for permanent appointment in the original application. The learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that, as per Rule 10 (b) (iii) of KS & SSR, it is the Government that has to satisfy the character and antecedents of the respondent. The said decision has not been taken by the Government, and therefore, the retrenchment of the respondent is illegal. The learned Counsel submitted that Annexure A10 show cause notice dated 05.12.2025 was answered by the respondent, by Annexure A11, explanation dated 18.12.2025.

10. We have carefully perused the impugned Ext.P3 interim order of the Tribunal and the materials placed on record. There is no dispute on the point that the respondent is involved in nine criminal cases, which are stated in Annexure A10, show cause notice dated 05.12.2025 issued to the respondent. The details of the said criminal cases are as follows;

                  “1. Crime No.365 of 2015 of Nooranad Police Station registered under Sections 341, 323 and 324 r/w Section 341 of IPC.

                  2. Crime No.1162 of 2015 of Kurathikad Police Station registered under Sections 143, 147, 148, 450, 204(b), 326, 427, 307 r/w 149 IPC.

                  3. Crime No.1246 of 2015 of Vallikunnam Police Station registered under Sections 341, 294(b), 326, 308 r/w 34 IPC.

                  4. Crime No.535 of 2016 of Vallikunnam Police Station registered under Sections 143, 144, 145, 147, 148, 149, 151, 152, 153, 353, 506(ii) IPC and Section 7(a) r/w 27(2) of Arms Act.

                  5. Crime No.406 of 2017 of Nooranad Police Station registered under Sections 279, 337 and 304(A) IPC and Section 134 (a) and (b) r/w 187 of the MV Act.

                  6. Crime No.340 of 2016 of Vallikunnam Police Station registered under Section 107 Cr.P.C.

                  7. Crime No.125 of 2021 of Vallikunnam Police Station registered under Sections 188, 269 IPC and Section 118(e) of the KP Act and Section 4(2)(j) 5 KEDO.

                  8. Crime No.154 of 2024 of Karunagappally Police Station registered under Section 15(c) of Abkari Act.

                  9. Crime No.505 of 2024 of Vallikunnam Police Station registered under Section 118(a) KP Act.”

11. The respondent has no case that these criminal cases are mentioned by him in the declaration submitted at the time of selection, especially when the petitioners specifically contend that the respondent did not disclose these criminal cases in his declaration form. The only pleading in the original application is that the respondent has disclosed one criminal case, i.e., C.C.No.99 of 2018, which arises out of Crime No.535 of 2016 of Vallikunnam Police Station, which was pending at the time of medical examination, and in the said case, the respondent was acquitted on 23.12.2024.

12. At this juncture, it is relevant to note that in Rajkumar Yadav [2026 KHC OnLine 6176], the Apex Court, while considering the entitlement of recruits having criminal antecedents to get appointed in the disciplined Police Force, held thus;

                  “5.2. The concept of "honourably acquitted, often becomes hazy. This court on several occasions observed that the expressions "honourable acquittal", "acquittal of blame",

                  "fully acquitted" are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or the Penal Code, 1860. These phrases are coined in the judicial pronouncements.

                  5.2.1. An honourable acquittal may be one where court comes to a definitive conclusion at the end of the trial upon full - fledged appreciation of evidence that the accused had not committed an offence for which he was charged. This would stand in sharp contrast against arriving at a finding that because of some lacuna in the prosecution case or in the leading the evidence or on account of non - availability of credible evidence, the offender is not convicted by giving him the benefit of doubt. In such eventualities, the yardstick known to the criminal jurisprudence is applied namely that the offence has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

                  5.2.2. A simple example would explain the nicety of the distinction between an honourable acquittal and the acquittal other than honourable. In a given case, say a person is charged for committing misappropriation of money. After trying the accused for the offence, if the court comes to a clear conclusion that the person has not committed misappropriation and has not defalcated money, it amounts to a clean chit in respect to the offence. It is suggestive of the factum that the misappropriation was not done. However, if the court holds that charge of misappropriation is not proved on the account of weak prosecution case or weak evidence and therefore it is not possible to conclusively record finding about the commission of offence, the acquittal which may follow in such circumstances cannot be said to be an honourable acquittal.

                  5.2.3. The acquittal founded on benefit of doubt is an acquittal based on technical ground. Giving benefit of doubt and thus not convicting the offender is a technical consideration applied. The acquittal for the respondent was governed by such criteria.

                  5.3. In Commissioner of Police, New Delhi v. Mehar Singh, [(2013) 7 SCC 685] this court had on occasion to consider the question whether the candidature of the respondents who had revealed of their involvement in a criminal case by mentioning such fact in their application / attestation form while applying for a post of constable in Delhi Police, who were provisionally selected subject to verification of their antecedents and who were subsequently acquitted / discharged in the criminal case, could be cancelled by the screening committee of the Delhi Police on the ground that they were not found suitable for appointment to the post of constable.

                  5.3.1. This Court observed that the screening committee was within its right to cancel the candidature of a candidate even if the candidate was acquitted of the criminal charges, by taking into account the nature of acquittal. It was observed that persons involved in grave cases of moral turpitude could be properly kept out of police force even if they are acquitted or discharged.

                  xxxx xxxx xxxx

                  5.3.3. It was emphasised that satisfactory character antecedent has to be insisted for, when a person wishes to join the disciplined force,

                  'The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders the great responsibility of maintaining law and order and public order in the society. People repose great faith and confidence in it. It must be worthy of that confidence. A candidate wishing to join the police force must be a person of utmost rectitude. He must have impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category.' (Para 35)

                  5.4. The purpose and utility of verification of a character and antecedents to judge the suitability of a person to the post need not be overemphasized. In Avtar Singh v. Union of India [(2016) 8 SCC 471]. It was observed that it is one of the important criteria which is necessary to be fulfilled before appointment is made and that an incumbent should not have antecedents of such a nature which may adjudge him unsuitable for the post.

                  xxxx xxxx xxxx

                  5.5. In Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration & Ors. v. Pradeep Kumar [(2018) 1 SCC 797] the respondents were declared successful in the recruitment for the post of constable in Chandigarh Police after clearing the physical efficiency test, physical measurement test, written test and interview. The respondents were prosecuted in criminal trial for the offences under S.323, S.506 read with S.34, Indian Penal Code, 1860 and were acquitted by the trial court. When the matter was referred to the screening committee as per the recruitment guidelines, the screening committee found that the respondents were not suitable for appointment as constables.

                  5.5.1. The Tribunal set aside the order of the screening committee and directed the authorities to consider the case of the respondents for appointment to the said post. The High Court refused to interfere with the order of the tribunal. This Court however did not approve the view taken by the tribunal and the High Court and restored the order of the screening committee.

                  5.5.2. The following principles came to enunciated by this court,

                  (a) The acquittal in a criminal case is not conclusive of the suitability of the candidates in respect of the post concerned. Even if a person is acquitted or discharged, it cannot always been inferred that he was falsely involved or he had no criminal antecedents.

                  (Para 10)

                  (b) Acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle a candidate for appointment to the post. Still, it is open to the employer to consider the antecedents and examine whether the person is suitable for appointment to the post. (Para 13)

                  (c) In a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider antecedents and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate.

                  (Para 12)

                  5.5.3. It was reiterated that police service requires candidate with good character, integrity and clean antecedents, 'Police service requires candidates of good character, integrity and clean antecedents. The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders the great responsibility of maintaining law and order and public order in the society. People repose great faith and confidence in it. It must be worthy of that confidence. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged in the criminal case, that acquittal or discharge order will have to be examined to see whether he has been completely exonerated in the case because even a possibility of his taking to the life of crimes poses a threat to the discipline of the police force.' (Para 11, 13)”

                  [Underline supplied]

13. In Rajkumar Yadav [2026 KHC OnLine 6176], the Apex Court further held thus;

                  “6.1. In service law jurisprudence, mere involvement of a person in an offence or in a conduct amounting to moral turpitude without anything else may become relevant consideration to judge his fitness to the post and to assess credentials for allowing such a person into the employment.

                  7. The necessary conclusion from the parameters and principles summarised above, is that whether it is a question of recruiting a person into the service or continuing him in service or extending an employee some service benefit, his criminal antecedents, involvement in criminal activity, the conduct amounting to moral turpitude, registration of a criminal case as well as nature of his acquittal in a criminal case are all germane considerations to be applied. The employer who would be acting through a screening committee to sift such cases, has fairly a large realm of freedom to act, though without becoming arbitrary.

                  7.1. The area of discretion vested with the screening committee in this regard is wide enough to permit it to exclude a candidate or reject him for the purpose of giving appointment. In a given case where the facts are stark, mere involvement of a person in an alleged offence or in the act of moral turpitude may become sufficient enough to apply it as debilitating factor for such candidate to be offered employment. Antecedents of a candidate play an important role in the decision - making process by the screening committee. This dictum would operate with greater rigour when it comes to the recruitment and appointment to the disciplined force like police.

                  xxxx xxxx xxxx

                  7.3. The domain of considering the fitness and suitability of a candidate for the purpose of taking him in service belongs to the employer. A host of relevant consideration would legitimately find a place in the process of such consideration by the employer to decide whether it is feasible and advisable to offer employment to an aspirant. Where the employer or the screening committee of the employer has acted to discard, exclude or reject the candidature by applying relevant considerations and has not acted arbitrarily or whimsically, the courts have no role to interpose. Of course, a demonstrably mala fide approach by the employer would give room to the courts to exercise the power of judicial review.

                  xxxx xxxx xxxx

                  9. But for the above limited considerations namely arbitrariness, unreasonableness, whimsicalness or mala fide approach, the scope of judicial review on this score is extremely limited. The courts are not expected to override the wisdom of the employer in judging the suitability of a candidate and in considering the relevance of the antecedents of the candidate and would not substitute its own view.

                  9.1. Reverting back to the facts of the instant case, the screening committee of the appellant rejected the candidature of the respondent for the post of constable (driver) in police force as per the decision dated 16.06.2017. What weighed with the screening committee was that the respondent was found to be involved in the serious offences such as kidnapping and abducting a minor girl and raping her, which was a conduct undoubtedly amounting to moral turpitude. The respondent, though acquitted in the criminal case, was exonerated only on the ground of benefit of doubt.

                  9.2. Learned Single Judge was justified in dismissing the petition upholding the decision of the screening committee. The judgment and order of learned Single Judge of the High Court, which was eminently just and legal, came to be reversed by the Division Bench of the High Court for not good reason, directing that the acquittal ought to have been treated as an honourable acquittal and required the appellant - employer to consider the respondent for appointment to the post. The Division Bench of the High Court thereby intruded into the functional realm of the screening committee and trampled upon its discretion which was validly exercised by the Committee to treat the respondent unsuitable to be employed in the police force.”

                  [Underline supplied]

14. A reading of the aforesaid observations in the judgment of the Apex Court would make it clear that the antecedents of a candidate for selection to the Police force play an important role in the decision-making process of the screening committee. In the instant case, the 3rd petitioner retrenched the respondent, stating the reason that he had not received Police clearance before completion of the training and issued Annexure A10, show cause notice stating that he did not disclose the criminal cases pending against him. No final decision has been taken in the matter till date by the petitioners.

15. Section 86(2) of the Kerala Police Act, 2011, relied by the Tribunal while passing Ext.P3 impugned interim order is concerned, the said section reads thus;

                  “Section 86(2) - A person against whom a criminal case for an offence involving proclivity of violence or moral turpitude is pending before a Court of law shall be entitled to appear for recruitment, to get selected and to undergo training, but shall be entitled for permanent appointment only after being acquitted.”

16. The reading of Section 86(2) of the Act shows that the entitlement of a selected candidate involved in criminal cases having violence or moral turpitude is to appear provisionally for recruitment, to get selected, and to undergo training and not for permanent appointment. It was without considering this aspect the Tribunal passed Ext.P3 interim order directing the petitioners to readmit him to duty. Even then, while reading Ext.P3 interim order, we notice that the aforesaid direction of the Tribunal was provisional, subject to verification of antecedents and discipline of the respondent.

17. Rule 10 (b) (iii) of Part II of KS & SSR, which is relied upon by the learned Senior Government Pleader, reads thus;

                  “Rule 10 Qualifications – (a) xxxxxxx

                  (b) No person shall be eligible for appointment to any service by direct recruitment, unless –

                  xxxxxxxx

                  (iii) the State Government are satisfied that his character and antecedents are such as to qualify him for such service: Provided that, before the Government are satisfied of the character and antecedents of a person selected/advised for appointment by direct recruitment, the Appointing Authority may appoint him/her temporarily under clause (i) of sub-rule (a) of rule 9 of these rules subject to the condition that his/her appointment shall be terminated without notice if Government are not satisfied of his/her character and antecedents on subsequent verification and that he/she shall be eligible for appointment in regular service in accordance with the Rules only if his/her character and antecedents are found satisfactory on subsequent verification.

                  Note.  (1) A person appointed under this proviso shall not be treated as a member of the service to which he has been so appointed unless he/she is appointed in regular service in accordance with the rules. In case it is found that his/her character and antecedents are satisfactory, his/her temporary appointment shall be treated as appointment in regular service from the date to his/her temporary appointment to the service.

                  (2) The Appointing Authorities shall get the necessary details for verification of character and antecedents of the candidates advised by the Commission from the candidates themselves before they are allowed to join duty, and the appointing authorities shall obtain the reports on the verification of character and antecedents of the candidates so advised within a period not exceeding six months from the date of joining duty of the candidates.”

                  [Underline supplied]

18. The aforementioned provision in the KS & SSR would show that no person shall be eligible for appointment to a regular service unless his or her antecedents are found satisfactory on verification by the Government. The said verification is not yet completed in the present case.

19. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the respondent would point out that in a similar situation as that of the present case, in State of Kerala v. Durgadas [2023

                  (6) KHC 339], this Court held thus;

                  “8. The Kerala Subordinate Service Rules are general provisions governing members of the State Subordinate Services. The Kerala Police Act is a Special Statute related to the Police force in the State. Under S.86(2) of the Kerala Police Act, there is no bar even for a person against whom criminal cases are pending for an offence involving proclivity of violence or moral turpitude, to get appointment temporarily. The permanent appointment will be only after being acquitted. Thus, the provisions of the Kerala Police Act do not bar Durga Das claiming for selection and permanent appointment in the light of his acquittal. But that does not mean on such acquittal, the candidate will have free walk to the post. The question then falls is whether the character and antecedent do required to be adverted for appointment in public service, even after the acquittal, we must say yes if law desires so, if such appointment requires character verification. The criminal case or such other proceedings are all relevant factors for objective enquiry not the factor itself. It is to be noted that KS&SSR is a general provision and still would govern the candidates aspiring as a member of the State and subordinate services. The allegations in the criminal case can be considered independently to assess the character and integrity of a person. The acquittal in a criminal case will not automatically entail him for qualifying in public service. This is the perplexed question in this matter which requires clarification on the law. In an enquiry related to character and integrity, what matters for the Government, is the point to be considered by us. The Government, objectively is enquiring character and antecedents to find whether such a person can be appointed in any post in such service. In that process, the criminal case records including civil cases may be relevant, if it reflects the character and antecedents of such a person. The scope of enquiry in such a situation is to find out whether the allegations and materials would qualify him to occupy the office in the service or not. It is not the final outcome of such a case that is decisive but the relevant finding in such cases is material. We have fashioned through judicial language; the phrase, 'honourable acquittal', to denote that the findings in that are material or relevant in an assessment of the character and antecedents. In a criminal case, there may be findings reflecting character but may be short of a criminal offence for want of elements constituting the offence. Still that may be valid or relevant in assessing the character of a person concerned though the ultimate outcome might have resulted in acquittal. In that process of enquiry, what concerns the Government is whether the findings disclosed in the criminal investigation or any other dispute are having a ramification on the character of the persons concerned. In that process, the Government being an employer, is not looking at the final outcome. No doubt, in the final outcome, process results in conviction, without much labour the character can be assessed. But in a case, where the person concerned is acquitted for want of evidence the Government has to conduct an enquiry as to whether the materials as such (not the allegations alone) reflect upon the character and antecedents of the person. If the materials including allegations as such do not disclose anything tainted as to the character of persons concerned, based on the mere allegations in the prosecution case, the Government cannot hold that the character would disqualify him in the service. In such a situation, the Government will have to conduct an independent enquiry to assess the character and antecedents of the person concerned with reference to the incident which was the subject matter of the criminal case. The Government cannot merely restate the allegations in the prosecution and hold that the character is bad to make him unsuitable for the post. Thus, we make it clear that in criminal cases where the prosecution cases end up in acquittal if the Government cannot form an opinion based on the prosecution allegations and other materials including the finding entered by the criminal court as to the character of the person, the Government is bound to conduct separate enquiry as to the character antecedents of the person. Thus, mere registration of the criminal case will not enable the Government to disqualify such a person from becoming a member of service.”

                  [Underline supplied]

20. The candidate in Durgadas [2023 (6) KHC 339] was acquitted in the criminal case. Moreover, the said criminal case happened to be registered due to matrimonial issues with his wife. Even then, it was held by this Court that allegations in the criminal case can be considered independently to assess the character and integrity of a person and the acquittal in a criminal case will not automatically entitle him to qualify for public service. In that judgment, the Division Bench of this Court further held that the Government is bound to conduct a separate enquiry about the character and antecedents of the person.

21. While coming to the case in our hand, one of the criminal cases is even now pending against the respondent, which did not end in acquittal as in the case of Durgadas [2023 (6) KHC 339]. Moreover, in the present case, as already noted above, the respondent is involved in nine criminal cases, some of them are serious in nature. Therefore, the judgment in Durgadas [2023 (6) KHC 339] does not apply to the case of the respondent.

22. While considering the rival submissions made at the Bar, in the light of the materials placed on record as discussed above, we are of the considered opinion that Ext.P3 impugned interim order passed by the Tribunal is one passed without considering the merits of the contentions raised by the petitioners. In such circumstances, the aforesaid interim order passed by the Tribunal is liable to be set aside. Though we have briefly stated the law on the point, since the issue is not finally decided by the Tribunal on merits, and the order under challenge is only an interim order, we are not entering into the entitlement of the respondent to get a permanent appointment as Police Constable, the post to which he was provisionally selected and was permitted to complete the training on the strength of the interim order of the Tribunal. Though we have not interfered with a similar order as that of the impugned order herein passed by the Tribunal in O.A.No.2164 of 2025, and by a separate judgment, dismissed the original petition bearing O.P.(KAT)No.17 of 2026, the said case stands in a different footing. The respondent therein is involved in one criminal case as a co-accused, and he disclosed the pendency of the criminal case in the declaration form.

                  In the result, without expressing anything on the legal and factual contentions raised by the parties regarding the entitlement of the respondent to get permanent appointment as Police Constable, the post to which he was selected by virtue of Annexure A2 ranked list, this original petition is disposed of by setting aside Ext.P3 interim order dated 19.12.2025 and the Tribunal is directed to consider the original application itself on merits taking into consideration of the statutory provisions and the judgments referred to in this judgment.