1. The appellants are the defendants in O.S. No. 335 of 2013 on the file of the Principal Sub Court, Kottayam. The suit was instituted for declaration and partition. The plaintiff is the granddaughter of Varghese Cherian, who died on 11.05.1995. He had three children, and the plaintiff is the daughter of his eldest son, P.S. Varghese. The daughter of Varghese Cherian, P.C. Sosamma, died a spinster on 19.07.2005, and his second son, T.C. Thomas, died intestate on 10.11.2012, leaving behind his wife, who is the first defendant in the suit.

2. In the year 1970, as per Ext.B1 settlement deed No. 2041/1970 of the Additional Sub Registrar Office, Kottayam, Varghese Cherian conveyed 60 cents of property to the plaintiff and her bridegroom towards her share in his properties. The plaintiff accepted the said property and subsequently alienated it for consideration.

3. The suit was filed, contending that the plaint schedule item No.1 property belonged to P.C. Sosamma, who died intestate on 19.07.2005, leaving behind the plaintiff and T.C. Thomas as her legal heirs. Accordingly, the plaintiff claimed a half share in the plaint schedule Item No.1 property, with the remaining half belonging to T.C. Thomas. It was further contended that, upon the death of T.C.Thomas intestate on 10.11.2012, his half share in the plaint schedule Item No.1 property devolved equally upon the plaintiff and the first defendant, thereby entitling the plaintiff in total to a 3/4 share in the plaint schedule Item No.1 property. The plaintiff further contended that plaint schedule Item No.2 property, belonging to T.C. Thomas, devolved equally upon the plaintiff and the first defendant, entitling them to equal shares therein.

4. The plaintiff also alleged that the first defendant, with the intention of defeating her rights over the plaint schedule item No.2 property, executed sham documents, namely gift deed Nos. 1618/2012 and 1365/2012 of the Additional SRO, Kottayam, in favour of the second defendant, who is the sister of the first defendant. Thereafter, defendants 1 and 2 executed the sale deed Nos. 804/2013 and 805/2013 in favour of defendants 3 and 4. According to the plaintiff, these documents are not binding on her and do not affect her rights over the plaint schedule properties. The learned counsel for the petitioner relies on Gulam Abbas v. Haji Kayyam Ali and Others (1973 KHC 408), Elumalai Venkatesan and Anr. v. M. Kamala and Ors. (2023 Supreme (SC) 75), Sarojini Amma v. Johnson (2000 KHC 101), Nabeeza C.H. v. K.H Abdul Kareem and Others (2016 (1) KHC 303).

5. Defendants 1 and 2 entered an appearance and filed written statements contending, inter alia, that the suit is barred by limitation and that the plaintiff has no subsisting right under the law of inheritance. It was specifically contended that under Ext.B1 settlement deed of 1970, Varghese Cherian had allotted 60 cents of property to the plaintiff towards her share, which she accepted and subsequently sold for consideration. Having accepted the benefit under the settlement and alienated the property, the plaintiff is estopped from claiming any further right over plaint schedule items 1 and 2. It was also contended that the plaintiff had suppressed the said settlement deed No. 2041/1970 and that the suit properties are not liable to be partitioned.

6. The defendants further contended that the trial court failed to consider that the first defendant had disputed the status of the plaintiff as the granddaughter of the deceased. It was also contended that the plaintiff did not produce any legal heirship certificate to establish her claim. Additionally, the defendants relied on a partition deed of 1975, which, according to them, also operated as a final testamentary disposition. It was further contended that a charge had been created over certain properties in favour of T.C. Thomas towards the ‘stridhanam’ amount brought by the first defendant, which remains unpaid, and therefore, item No.2 property is not partible.

7. The trial court considered the oral evidence of PW1 and marked Exts. A1 to A10 on the side of the plaintiff, and examined DW1 and marked Exts. B1 to B4 on the side of the defendants. The trial court found that there was no dispute regarding Ext.B1 settlement deed, including the transfer of property and the extinguishment of rights in the estate of Varghese Cherian. However, the court held that the principle of estoppel would apply only if the plaintiff claimed as an heir of Varghese Cherian.

8. The trial court further held that in the present case, the plaintiff was not claiming as an heir of Varghese Cherian, but as a legal heir of P.C. Sosamma and T.C. Thomas. It was found that upon the death of P.C. Sosamma in 2005, plaint schedule item No.1 devolved upon the plaintiff and T.C. Thomas in equal shares. Upon the death of T.C. Thomas intestate, his share devolved upon the plaintiff and the first defendant, resulting in the plaintiff being entitled to a 3/4 share in item No.1 property. Similarly, the trial court held that plaint schedule item No.2 property devolved upon the plaintiff and the first defendant in equal shares under Section 33(b) of the Indian Succession Act.

9. The trial court also held that the gift deeds and subsequent sale deeds executed by defendants 1 and 2 in favour of defendants 3 and 4 are not binding on the plaintiff. The court rejected the judgments relied upon by the defendants, including Sarojini Amma v. Johnson (supra) and Nabeeza C.H. v. K.H. Abdul Kareem (supra), on the ground that the present case was distinguishable, since the plaintiff was not claiming through Varghese Cherian but through subsequent holders. Accordingly, the trial court decreed the suit, granting the plaintiff partition and declaration as prayed for.

10. Heard learned Senior Counsel Sri. V.V. Asokan, instructed by Sri. Abraham Samson, for the appellants and Sri. K.K. John for the respondent.

11. The only question that arises for consideration is, whether in the light of Ext.B1 settlement deed of 1970, by which the plaintiff accepted 60 cents of property towards her share and expressly relinquished all future rights in the properties of Varghese Cherian, the plaintiff is estopped from claiming partition of plaint schedule items 1 and 2, even though the present claim is projected as one through subsequent devolution from P.C. Sosamma and T.C. Thomas.

12. On facts, there is no dispute that as per Ext.B1, Varghese Cherian had settled 60 cents of property in favour of the plaintiff and her bridegroom towards her share in the family properties. The recitals in Ext.B1, particularly the clause in Malayalam, unequivocally state that all rights of the plaintiff in the remaining properties stood extinguished. It is also admitted that the plaintiff accepted the said property and alienated the same for consideration. Thus, Ext.B1 is not a mere gratuitous arrangement but a transaction supported by consideration, accepted and acted upon.

13. The trial court had also found that Ext.B1 evidences the extinguishment of rights, but declined to apply the doctrine of estoppel on the reasoning that the plaintiff is not claiming as a legal heir of Varghese Cherian but through P.C. Sosamma and T.C. Thomas. This reasoning is legally unsustainable, for the reasons to follow.

14. The legal position governing such transactions is no longer res integra. The Supreme Court in Gulam Abbas (supra) held that though a relinquishment of a spes successionis (mere expectation of inheritance) is void as a transfer under Section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, such a transaction, when supported by consideration and forming part of a course of conduct, can give rise to an equitable estoppel under Section 115 of the Evidence Act. The Court clarified that the rule invalidating transfer of expectancy is not a prohibition but only a declaration of non- transferability, and does not exclude the operation of estoppel. The real enquiry is whether the conduct of the party, including receipt of consideration and representation of relinquishment, has created a bar against assertion of rights when they subsequently vest.

15. This principle has been reaffirmed and applied in the context of Hindu Law in Elumalai Venkatesan (supra), where the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that even though a release of future inheritance is void as a transfer, the executant, having received consideration and induced the other party to act on such representation, is estopped from asserting inheritance rights. Significantly, it was further held that such estoppel binds not only the executant but also persons claiming through him, and that even statutory rights of succession cannot be enforced in the face of such estoppel.

16. This Court has also consistently applied the same principle. In Sarojini Amma v. Johnson (supra), it was held that a person who accepts a benefit under a document containing a stipulation relinquishing future rights cannot subsequently turn around and claim a share, the doctrine of approbate and reprobate squarely applying. Similarly, it has been held that Section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 115 of the Evidence Act operate in different fields and there is no conflict between them; a relinquishment of expectancy, though void as a transfer, can still give rise to estoppel.

17. The principle of estoppel has been explained in Nabeeza C.H. v. K.H. Abdul Kareem (supra) as a rule of evidence preventing a party from denying a representation which has been acted upon by another to his detriment. While that case turned on the absence of inducement and detriment, the present case stands on a completely different footing, as Ext.B1 was acted upon, consideration passed, and the plaintiff altered her position by accepting and alienating the property.

18.    Applying the above principles, it is clear that, at the time of Ext.B1, the plaintiff had only a spes successionis in the properties of Varghese Cherian and could not have effected a valid transfer of future rights. However, Ext.B1 is not a mere effective transfer, but a transaction involving express relinquishment of all rights, receipt of substantial consideration (60 cents of land), acceptance and subsequent alienation of the property based on the rights so obtained. This constitutes a clear representation that the plaintiff would not claim any further share in the family properties. Acting on this representation, the family arrangement stood concluded, and the parties proceeded on the footing that the plaintiff’s branch stood excluded from further claims.

19. In such circumstances, the doctrine of equitable estoppel squarely applies and bars the plaintiff from asserting any right in the properties left by Varghese Cherian.

20. The plaintiff's attempt to circumvent estoppel by tracing title through P.C. Sosamma and T.C. Thomas cannot be accepted. The title to the properties in question is traceable to Varghese Cherian. The rights of P.C. Sosamma and T.C. Thomas themselves flow from the same estate. Once the plaintiff is estopped from claiming any share in that estate, she cannot indirectly achieve the same result by projecting a derivative claim through intermediate heirs. As held in Elumalai Venkatesan (supra), estoppel attaches to the root of the title and binds claims made through the same lineage.

21. The trial court has erred in holding that estoppel would apply only if the plaintiff claims directly as an heir of Varghese Cherian. Such a narrow view defeats the very object of estoppel and ignores the binding precedents. The court below has also failed to rely on any legal authority for carving out such an exception. On the contrary, the settled law is that estoppel operates to prevent assertion of rights “which may otherwise exist”, irrespective of the form in which such rights are projected.

22. Further, the finding of the trial court that the nature of the property changed into exclusive property in the hands of subsequent holders to obliterate estoppel is wholly unsupported by any legal principle. No authority has been cited for the proposition that estoppel attached to a source of title is extinguished by subsequent devolution. Such a view is directly contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court.

23. In the light of the above, I hold that the plaintiff, having accepted Ext.B1 settlement and the benefit thereunder, and having relinquished all rights in the remaining properties of Varghese Cherian, is estopped from claiming partition of the plaint schedule items 1 and 2. Consequently, the challenge against the subsequent transactions executed by defendants 1 and 2 also cannot survive.

                  In the result, the judgment and decree of the trial court will stand set aside to the extent it directed the partition of 3/4 share of plaint schedule Item Nos. 1 and partition of 1/2 share of Item No.2 property in favour of the plaintiff. The declaration that the gift deed Nos. 1618/2012 and 1365/2012, and the subsequent sale deed Nos. 804/2013 and 805/2013, as not binding on the plaintiff, is also set aside. The suit shall stand dismissed in respect of the said reliefs. However, the decree of the trial court insofar as it relates to partition of the 15 cents covered by Ext.A8 and the 35 cents covered by Ext.A9 in plaint schedule Item No.1 property, which are admitted to be the self-acquired properties of P.C. Sosamma and in respect of which partition is conceded by the appellants, shall stand confirmed.

                  `The Appeal is allowed as above.