S. Muralee Krishna, J.

1. The applicant in O.A.(EKM)No.264 of 2026, on the file of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal Additional Bench at Ernakulam (‘the Tribunal’ for short) filed this original petition, invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging Ext.P5 order dated 31.03.2026 passed by the Tribunal in M.A.(EKM)No.389 of 2026 in that original application, whereby Ext.P2 interim order dated 20.02.2026 passed by the Tribunal preventing relieving of the petitioner as well as the respondents 3 and 4 from their respective stations was vacated.

2. The petitioner approached the Tribunal by filing O.A.(EKM)No.264 of 2026 under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking the following reliefs:

                  “1. Call for the records leading to Annexure A2 transfer order dated 19.02.2026.

                  2. Set aside Annexure A2 to the extent it transfers the Applicant from ADCP, Thrissur to Veterinary Dispensary, Anthikad

                  3. Declare that the Applicant is entitled to continue at ADCP, Thrissur.”

3. As per the pleadings in the original petition, the petitioner is a Veterinary Surgeon Grade-I presently working at the Animal Disease Control Project (ADCP), Thrissur. She had been on deputation to the State Museum and Zoo Department from September 2021 till 31.01.2026. Upon cancellation of her deputation by the order dated 22.01.2026, she was reposted to ADCP, Thrissur and she joined duty on 02.02.2026. However, within a short span of 15 days, the petitioner was transferred to Veterinary Dispensary, Anthikad, Thrissur by an order dated 19.02.2026, which was challenged by her before the Tribunal in O.A. (EKM) No. 264 of 2026. The Tribunal, by Ext.P2 interim order dated 20.02.2026, permitted the petitioner to continue at her present station at ADCP, Thrissur. The said interim protection continued in force. Subsequently, the 3rd respondent filed M.A. (EKM) No. 389 of 2026 seeking to vacate the interim order. The case of the 3rd respondent was limited to seeking a posting at Veterinary Dispensary, Korkancherry, pursuant to earlier proceedings and Government Orders. It is pertinent to note that the 3rd respondent never claimed a posting at ADCP, Thrissur, nor sought the displacement of the petitioner from her post. The petitioner, in fact, was not a party to the earlier proceedings relied upon by the 3rd respondent. Despite this, the Tribunal, by Ext.P5 order dated 31.03.2026, vacated the interim protection granted to the petitioner, on the premise that her posting at ADCP, Thrissur, was subject to compliance with earlier Tribunal directions in unrelated proceedings. The petitioner submits that the impugned order is vitiated by arbitrariness, violation of principles of natural justice, procedural impropriety, and jurisdictional error. The order also results in selective prejudice to the petitioner while favouring the 3rd respondent, without any legal basis. No reply statement is filed by the 2nd respondent. Aggrieved by the said Ext.P5 order dated 31.03.2026 passed by the Tribunal, the petitioner has approached this Court invoking its supervisory jurisdiction.

4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Senior Government Pleader. Considering the nature of the reliefs sought in the original petition, issuance of notice to respondents 3 and 4 is dispensed with.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the Tribunal ought not have passed the impugned order without obtaining any response from the 2nd respondent, the Director Animal Husbandry, whose order is under challenge in the original application. The petitioner was posted at ADCP, Thrissur, pursuant to a valid administrative decision taken by the 2nd respondent after cancellation of the deputation. The said posting ought not have been unsettled or nullified indirectly under the guise of compliance with the directions issued in an entirely different proceedings. In the earlier proceedings, the relief sought by the 3rd respondent was only for posting at the veterinary dispensary, Koorkancherry. Therefore, the displacement of the petitioner from ADCP Thrissur is beyond the scope of the reliefs sought and amounts to granting relief affecting third parties, which is impermissible.

6. On the other hand, the learned Senior Government Pleader would submit that the place to which the petitioner is transferred is only at a distance of 18 Kilometres from her present station. It is further pointed out by the learned Senior Government Pleader that the original application filed by the petitioner is bereft of sufficient pleading regarding mala fides in the transfer order, and therefore no interference is needed to the impugned order of the Tribunal.

7. Article 227 of the Constitution of India deals with the power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. Under clause (1) of Article 227 of the Constitution, every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.

8. In Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [(2010) 8 SCC 329] the Apex Court, while analysing the scope and ambit of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, held that the object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court.

9. In Jai Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [(2010) 9 SCC 385], while considering the nature and scope of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court held that, undoubtedly the High Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts, as well as statutory or quasi-judicial tribunals exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with the well established principles of law. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well recognised constraints. It cannot be exercised like a 'bull in a china shop', to correct all errors of the judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice.

10. In K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation [(2015) 12 SCC 39] the Apex Court held that, in exercise of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court can interfere with the order of the court or tribunal only when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunal and courts subordinate to it or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

11. In Sobhana Nair K.N. v. Shaji S.G. Nair [2016 (1) KHC 1] a Division Bench of this Court held that, the law is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court that in proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the lower court or tribunal and the jurisdiction of this Court is only supervisory in nature and not that of an appellate court. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is called for, unless this Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law.

12. In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, the High Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a lower court or tribunal. The supervisory jurisdiction cannot be exercised to correct all errors of the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. The correctional jurisdiction under Article 227 can be exercised only in a case where the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal has been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 is called for, unless the High Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

13. The petitioner is challenging Annexure A2 transfer order dated 19.02.2026, to the extent it transfers the petitioner from ADCP, Thrissur, to Veterinary Dispensary, Anthikad. But while going through the pleadings in the original application, we notice that, except for a stray statement as Ground I of the original application that the order of Transfer is vitiated by non-application of mind and amounts to mala fide exercise of administrative power, there is no sufficient pleading in the original application as to how the order became a mala fide exercise of administrative power. It is trite that whether an employee is to be transferred to a different station, etc., is a matter for the employer to consider, depending upon the administrative necessities. The power to transfer an employee in a transferable service is within the prerogative of the employer. It is the employer who knows best where an employee should be deployed for an effective discharge of his or her duties for the establishment. Generally, the Court or Tribunal would not interfere with the orders of transfer of an employee issued by the employer, for administrative reasons, as it would adversely affect the smooth functioning of that institution. The circumstances under which the court can interfere with the orders of transfer are laid down by the Apex Court as well as this Court in several judgments.

14. In Union of India v. S.L Abbas [(1993) 4 SCC 357] the Apex Court held thus:

                  “Who should be transferred where, is a matter for the appropriate authority to decide. Unless the order of transfer is vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provisions, the court cannot interfere with it. While ordering the transfer, there is no doubt, the authority must keep in mind the guidelines issued by the Government on the subject. Similarly, if a person makes any representation with respect to his transfer, the appropriate authority must consider the same having regard to the exigencies of administration.” (emphasis supplied)

15. In National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd v. Shri Bhagwan [(2001) 8 SCC 574], the Apex Court held thus:

                  “It is by now well-settled and often reiterated by this Court that no Government servant or employee of public Undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place since transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable posts from one place to other is not only an incident, but a condition of service, necessary too in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. Unless an order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of mala fide exercise of power or stated to be in violation of statutory provisions prohibiting any such transfer, the Courts or the Tribunals cannot interfere with such orders as a matter of routine, as though they are the Appellate Authorities substituting their own decision for that of the Management, as against such orders passed in the interest of administrative exigencies of the service concerned.” (emphasis supplied)

16. In Pubi Lombi v. State of Arunachal Pradesh and others [2024 SCC Online SC 279], the Apex Court held thus:

                  “15. In view of the foregoing enunciation of law by judicial decisions of this Court, it is clear that in absence of (i) pleadings regarding malafide, (ii) non-joining the person against whom allegations are made, (iii) violation of any statutory provision (iv) the allegation of the transfer being detrimental to the employee who is holding a transferrable post, judicial interference is not warranted. In the sequel of the said settled norms, the scope of judicial review is not permissible by the Courts in exercising of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

17. In Nixy James v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation [2023 (3) KLT 893], this Court held that the law is too well settled that transfer is an incident of service and the employee has no legal right in this behalf. Unless the orders of transfer are vitiated by statutory violations or mala fides, Courts should be loath to interfere with the same.

18. It is true that the petitioner has obtained Ext.P2 interim order from the Tribunal on the date when her original application came up for admission. However, on entering appearance, the third respondent filed Ext.P3 interlocutory application producing therewith Annexure R3(a) to R3(e) documents, to vacate Ext.P2 interim order, pointing out that the third respondent had previously approached the Tribunal by filing O.A.No.687 of 2025 and in compliance with the orders of the Tribunal in that original application, Annexure A3 order was issued after hearing the petitioner as well as the 4th respondent. Considering the aforesaid aspect as well as the filing of a subsequent original application by the 3rd respondent, the Tribunal passed the impugned Ext.P5 order. Paragraphs 2 to 4 and the last paragraph of that order read thus:

                  “2. The 3rd respondent has filed this Miscellaneous Application seeking for vacating the interim order. According to this respondent, he was transferred to Anthikkad as part of general transfer, 2024, this being a station not opted by him. Aggrieved by the same, he had approached this Tribunal through OA No.687 of 2025. In compliance with the orders of this Tribunal in the said Ο.Λ., Annexure A3 order was issued, after hearing the applicant as well as the 4th respondent herein. According to this order, the 2nd respondent was directed to transfer the 4th respondent to ADCP when Dr.Sunitha Karunakaran working in ADCP is promoted and then to post the Miscellaneous Applicant to Koorkkanchery. However, the 2nd respondent failed to implement this direction even after Dr.Sunitha Karunakaran was promoted. Aggrieved by the same, the Miscellaneous Applicant once again approached this Tribunal through OA.No.1667 of 2025. Annexure A3 order was issued when this Original Application was pending. It is also contended that there are several vacancies in Thrissur including the ones at the Veterinary Dispensaries at Arimpur, Perinjanam, Mundathikode and also open vacancies at SLBP, Cherpu and at the Veterinary Poly Clinic, Vadakkanchery.

                  3. The applicant has filed an objection to this Miscellaneous Application. It is contended that the applicant is being transferred out without hearing her and this is violation of her civil rights.

                  4. The applicant in the OA was posted to ADCP Thrissur when Annexure A3 order, which in turn was issued in compliance with the orders of this Tribunal in OA No.687 of 2075, pending implementation.

                  In the light of the contentions raised by the 3rd respondent and the facts of the case presented before us, the Miscellaneous Application is allowed and the interim order is vacated.”

19. Having considered the pleadings and materials on record and the submissions made at the bar, in the light of the judgments referred to supra, we find no ground to hold that the impugned Ext.P5 order passed by the Tribunal whereby Ext.P2 interim order was vacated, is suffering from any illegality or perversity which warrants interference by exercising supervisory jurisdiction. Though we have noted the insufficiency of pleadings regarding mala fides in the original application, we are not expressing anything on the merits of the contentions of the petitioner in the original application, since the same is still pending consideration of the Tribunal.

                  In such circumstances, this original petition is dismissed without expressing anything on the legal and factual contentions that would be taken by the parties in the original application.