1. This Criminal Petition is filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “Cr.P.C.”), challenging the order dated 22.03.2024 passed in Crl.M.P. No. 200 of 2023 in S.C. No. 198 of 2022 on the file of the I Additional District and Sessions Judge, Gadwal, Jogulamba Gadwal District, whereby the learned trial Court dismissed the petitioner’s application for discharge filed under Section 227 of Cr.P.C.

2. Heard Mr. T. Bala Mohan Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. M. Vivekananda Reddy, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1-State.

3. The prosecution case, as set out in the charge sheet, is that the 2nd respondent/defacto complainant alleged that the petitioner, on a false promise of marriage, developed a physical relationship with her from the year 2017 onwards and subsequently refused to marry her. Based on the report lodged by respondent No.2, a case was registered against the petitioner for the offences punishable under Sections 417 and 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code. Upon completion of investigation, a charge sheet was filed.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner pleads that the relationship between himself and respondent No.2 was purely consensual and did not attract the ingredients of the alleged offences, filed an application seeking discharge. However, the trial Court, without proper appreciation of the legal position and the material on record, dismissed the said application, which is now under challenge in the present proceedings. He further contends that the allegations made in the complaint, even if taken at face value, do not constitute the offences alleged. It is submitted that the relationship between the petitioner and respondent No.2 was purely consensual and continued over a considerable period between two adults, thereby negating any element of coercion or misconception of fact. It is averred that there was no false promise of marriage from the inception of the relationship so as to attract the offence of rape on the ground of vitiated consent. The petitioner asserts that there is no independent or medical evidence to substantiate the allegations and that the charge sheet is based solely on the interested version of the complainant, amounting to a mere reiteration of the complaint without any corroborative material. On these grounds, the petitioner seeks quashing of the proceedings.

5. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 contends that the allegations against the petitioner clearly make out a prima facie case. It is submitted that the petitioner, by expressing love and promising marriage, induced the complainant and engaged in sexual relations with her on multiple occasions. It is further contended that even after securing Government employment, the petitioner abruptly changed his stand and chose to marry another woman for dowry, thereby prima facie establishing exploitation under deception. It is argued that quashing the proceedings at this stage would seriously prejudice the interests of respondent No.2. Accordingly, dismissal of the petition is sought.

6. The learned Assistant Public Prosecutor reiterates the stand taken by the de facto complainant and submits that, in view of the existence of a prima facie case warranting trial, the petition is liable to be dismissed.

7. I have perused the material on record and carefully considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel.

8. A perusal of the complaint/FIR, statements of witnesses, panchanama, and charge sheet reveals that the prosecution case is founded on the allegation that the complainant and the accused were schoolmates who reconnected in the year 2016 and subsequently developed a close relationship. It is consistently asserted by the complainant that the accused expressed his love for her and promised to marry her. Acting upon such representation, she is stated to have entered into a physical relationship with him from the year 2017 till January 2022, at various places, including the residence of the accused.

9. The statements of the complainant’s parents indicate that they were aware of the relationship and had approached the accused with a proposal to solemnize the marriage; however, the accused allegedly refused and is further stated to have threatened them. The Headmaster of the school has corroborated the fact that the complainant and the accused were classmates during their school days. The charge sheet further reflects that the statement of the victim was recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C., and call data records were collected, which prima facie indicate communication between the parties over a period of time.

10. The medical examination report and the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report do not disclose any evidence of recent sexual activity, though they do not conclusively rule out past physical relations. It is also evident from the panchanama/mediator’s report that the accused is alleged to have admitted acquaintance with the complainant, the existence of a relationship, physical intimacy over a period of time, and his subsequent refusal to marry her. The seizure of the mobile phone used for communication and the statements of witnesses primarily support the version of the complainant that the accused induced her into a prolonged intimate relationship on the promise of marriage and later failed to fulfil the same.

11. Upon a careful analysis of the aforesaid material, the core allegation against the petitioner is that the physical relationship was induced by a promise of marriage which was subsequently not honoured. The pivotal question that arises for consideration is whether such promise was false from the very inception, thereby vitiating consent under Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code and attracting the offence under Section 376(2)(n) IPC, or whether the relationship was a consensual one between two adults which subsequently failed.

12. The legal position on this issue is well-settled. In Uday v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 46, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a promise to marry, which is not false at the inception but is subsequently not fulfilled due to supervening circumstances, would not amount to a “misconception of fact” within the meaning of Section 90 IPC. This principle was reiterated and further clarified in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608, wherein it was held that, to attract the offence of rape on the ground of vitiated consent, it must be established that the promise of marriage was false from the inception and was made with no intention of being fulfilled, but solely to obtain the consent of the woman for a sexual relationship.

13. In the instant case, the material on record, including the version of the complainant and the contents of the charge sheet, indicates that the relationship between the petitioner and respondent No.2 continued over a substantial period, i.e., from 2017 to 2022. It is not in dispute that both parties were adults and maintained regular contact during this period. Significantly, there is no specific material to demonstrate that the alleged promise of marriage was false at the inception. On the contrary, the prolonged duration of the relationship, including its continuation even after the accused secured employment, prima facie suggests the existence of a subsisting consensual relationship rather than one immediately tainted by deceit.

14. Further, in Sonu @ Subhash Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2021 SC 1405, and Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated that a consensual relationship between adults, even if it subsequently results in a refusal to marry, cannot ipso facto be construed as rape unless there is clear and cogent evidence establishing that the consent was obtained by a fraudulent or dishonest promise made at the inception.

15. With regard to the offence under Section 417 IPC, which is predicated upon the definition of “cheating” under Section 415 IPC, the essential ingredient is the existence of a dishonest or fraudulent intention at the time of making the promise. The material on record, including the prolonged relationship between the parties and the absence of independent corroborative evidence, does not prima facie establish such initial dishonest intention on the part of the accused.

16. It is also pertinent to note that the medical and FSL reports do not indicate recent sexual activity, and the prosecution case substantially rests upon the statement of the complainant, supported by the statements of her parents and the alleged admission of the accused before mediators.

17. In the context of discharge under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C., the Court is required to determine whether there exists sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The standard to be applied is whether the material on record discloses a strong suspicion of the commission of an offence. If such material is lacking, the accused is entitled to be discharged. In P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that where the materials are insufficient to make out a prima facie case, the Court must discharge the accused and should not proceed to trial on the basis of mere conjectures or weak suspicion.

18. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, it appears that even if the allegations are accepted in their entirety, they predominantly indicate a consensual relationship between two adults. There is no material to prima facie establish that the promise of marriage was false from the inception. Consequently, the essential ingredients of the offences alleged are not made out to the degree required for framing of charges.

19. In view of the settled legal position and the material available on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that the continuance of criminal proceedings against the petitioner would amount to an abuse of the process of law, as the foundational ingredients of the alleged offences are not prima facie satisfied.

20. Accordingly, the Criminal Petition is allowed. The impugned order dismissing the discharge application is set aside, and the petitioner is discharged under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. Consequently, all further proceedings in S.C. No. 198 of 2022 on the file of the I Additional District and Sessions Judge, Gadwal, Jogulamba Gadwal District, against the petitioner/accused stand quashed.

Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, .shall stand closed.