Sanjeev Prakash Sharma, C. J.

1. Leave to appeal is granted.

2. Applications under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for the condonation of delay have been filed. For reasons stated in the applications, delay in filing the review petitions is condoned.

3. The defects, as pointed out by the Registry, have been removed.

4. The present review petitions have been filed by the petitioners inter alia praying that the judgment of this Court dated 20.01.2026 whereby e- auctions commenced with regard to 93 mining leases for minor mineral Bajri from March, 2024 were quashed, be reviewed. The review petitions primarily contend that the petitioners were not impleaded as necessary parties in the writ proceedings. On this basis, they seek a review of the judgment dated 20.01.2026.

5. At the outset, the Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Amit Sibbal appearing for Review petition no. 57/2026 along with the other learned counsels for the review petitioners squarely state that the review petitioners did not possess any knowledge about the said writ petition and were prevented from bringing material facts to the knowledge of this Court. It was an undisputed position that the review petitioners were successful bidders to whom Letters of Intent (LOIs) were awarded in favour of by the respondent authorities thereby making the review petitioners undoubtedly a necessary and/or a proper party to the writ petition in this Court.

6. It is submitted that while deciding the writ petition, this Court failed to consider that the auctions were conducted strictly in accordance with the Standard Operating Procedure dated 07.10.2023 issued by the State Government, which remained unchallenged by the writ petitioner, which also stood approved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 20.08.2025. It is also submitted that the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as the recommendation under Paragraph 11(iii) of the CEC Report were not applicable in the present case owing to the smaller size of the leases.

7. He also submits that, the Hon’ble Supreme Court by order dated 11.11.2021 approved the recommendations of the CEC, save and except recommendation “J”. The procedure contemplated under Paragraph 11(iii) was not binding at the auction stage, as it was applicable only to Letter of Intent (LoI) holders at the relevant stage. Therefore, the impugned judgment suffers from a fundamental error and deserves to be reviewed.

8. He further submits that the factum of issuance of LoIs was not brought to the notice of this Court, and consequently, the Court was not apprised that such LoIs were subject to approval of mining plans and grant of environmental clearance by competent authorities.

9. He also submits that this Court erred in not considering the Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2017, as amended on 03.01.2025. The amended Rule 11 clearly lays down a staged compliance mechanism post issuance of LoIs. Mining operations are expressly prohibited until completion of these stages. Thus, the writ petition itself was premature, as no mining activity had commenced at the relevant time.

10. He further contends that this Court failed to appreciate that Paragraph 11(iii)(f), (g), and (h) of the CEC Report are to be read conjointly. Clause (f) cannot be read in isolation. A harmonious reading shows that:

                  * No sand is to be extracted from already mined blocks within five years;

                  * Annual replenishment studies are to be conducted;

                  * Results of such studies are to be used to update District Survey Reports ( DSRs) and determine permissible limits.

11. He contends that this Court misapplied Paragraph 11(iii)(f) by treating it as an absolute prohibition at the auction stage, thereby conflating auction-stage requirements with operational compliance obligations. This amounts to judicial legislation by introducing a rigid demarcation requirement not contemplated by the CEC Report.

12. It is further submitted that the rights of existing LoI holders were recognized and preserved under the CEC Report, subject to compliance at the operational stage, and this Court ought to have issued directions consistent with the same rather than annulling the entire process.

13. It is further submitted that the decision to conduct e- auctions is an economic and administrative decision of the State, and such decisions are not amenable to challenge in PIL at the instance of a stranger, particularly in absence of mala fides or statutory violation. The Learned Counsel submits that the writ petition was not a bona fide public interest litigation but was filed with ulterior motives, suppressing material facts and seeking to unjustly interfere with lawful administrative action.

14. We have heard the contentions of the Review Petitioners at length. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions raised, it is apposite to reiterate the limited scope of review jurisdiction. It is well settled that the power of review is not an inherent power and must be exercised within the confines prescribed under law. The review jurisdiction is extremely limited and can be invoked only on the grounds of discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, despite due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the petitioner, or could not be produced at the time of passing of the judgment, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason analogous thereto.

15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Karnail Singh v State of Haryana and others ((2024) 14 SCC 1) has held that a review petition cannot be treated as an appeal in disguise, and rehearing of the matter on merits is impermissible. An error which is not self-evident and requires elaborate arguments to be established cannot be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Thus, unless the review petitioner is able to demonstrate a patent error or bring on record new material falling within the permissible parameters, the judgment sought to be reviewed cannot be interfered with. The Court observed as under-

                  “ 19. At the outset, we must reiterate that the scope of review by this Court is very limited. The scope of review jurisdiction has been delineated by this Court in a catena of judgments. We would not like to burden the present judgment by reproducing all those judgments. This Court in Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati [Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati, (2013) 8 SCC 320 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 782 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 265 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 96] , after surveying the earlier law laid down by this Court has summarised the principles thus: (SCC pp. 333-34, para 20)

                  “Summary of the principles

                  20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:

                  20.1. When the review will be maintainable:

                  (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;

                  (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;

                  (iii) Any other sufficient reason.

                  The words “any other sufficient reason” have been interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki [Chhajju Ram v. Neki, 1922 SCC OnLine PC 11 : (1921-22) 49 IA 144 : (1922) 16 LW 37 : AIR 1922 PC 112] and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius [Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, (1954) 2 SCC 42] to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. [Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd., (2013) 8 SCC 337 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 797]

                  20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:

                  (i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.

                  (ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.

                  (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.

                  (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.

                  (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error.

                  (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.

                  (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.

                  (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.

                  (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.”

16. It is thus settled that the review would be permissible only if there is a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or any other sufficient reason is made out. We are also of the view that the review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. The review of the judgment would be permissible only if a material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. Such an error should be an error apparent on the face of the record and should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.

17. For being a necessary party, the twin test as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Moreshar Yadaorao Mahajan v. Vyankatesh Sitaram Bhedi (D) (2022 SCC OnLine SC 1307) , has to be satisfied. The first one is that there must be a right to some relief against such a party in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings. The second one is that no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such a party.

18. In the present case, the said mining leases as well as the LoIs or the subsequent administrative approvals were issued in contravention to the orders passed by this Court. All such actions are in contravention to the CEC guidelines issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Therefore, no rights can be said to have been created in favour of the review petitioners by acts which have been done in violation of the orders passed by this Court, the CEC guidelines as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court. We, therefore, hold that the contention of the review-petitioner to be declared a necessary party to the writ proceedings, is not tenable in the eyes of law.

19. The contention of the learned counsel that the concerned parties had no notice of the pendency of the writ petitions is wholly untenable. The material on record indicates that the proceedings were widely publicised through both digital and print media. In such circumstances, the mining engineers or similarly placed stakeholders were very well aware of the pending proceedings. The parties, therefore, cannot plead absence of knowledge. Hence the plea of lack of notice, therefore, does not inspire confidence and is liable to be rejected as the proceedings were greatly publicised.

20. It is also settled law that a party cannot claim any vested right on the basis of participation in auction proceedings, issuance of letters of intent or subsequent administrative approvals being issued in their favour. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of H.P. v. OASYS Cybernatics (P) Ltd. ((2026) 3 SCC 348) , observed as under:

                  “35. In Dresser Rand [Dresser Rand S.A. v. Bindal Agro Chem Ltd., (2006) 1 SCC 751 : (2006) 131 Comp Cas 805] , it was re-stated with clarity that “a letter of intent merely indicates a party's intention to enter into a contract with the other party in future. A letter of intent is not intended to bind either party ultimately to enter into any contract”. The same principle animated Rajasthan Coop. Dairy Federation[Rajasthan Coop. Dairy Federation Ltd. v. Maha Laxmi Mingrate Mktg. Service (P) Ltd., (1996) 10 SCC 405] , wherein this Court observed that until the offer is accepted unconditionally and the preconditions are satisfied, “no binding legal relationship” comes into existence. The rationale is thus simple but fundamental: the law of contract distinguishes between a promise to make a promise and a promise performed. The former is not legally binding until its contingencies are fulfilled.

                  36. These authorities collectively articulate a coherent doctrine: an LoI creates no vested right until it passes the threshold of final and unconditional acceptance. It is but a “promise in embryo”, capable of maturing into a contract only upon the satisfaction of stipulated preconditions or upon the issue of an LoI. A bidder's expectation that such a contract will follow may be commercially genuine, but it is not a juridical entitlement. To hold otherwise would be to bind the State in contract before it has consciously chosen to be bound—a proposition foreign to both contract law and public administration.

                  ………

                  39. The cumulative effect of the foregoing analysis is that the LoI was no more than a provisional communication signifying the appellant State's intent to enter into a formal arrangement upon fulfilment of certain technical and procedural conditions. The acceptance of tender and the consequential formation of a binding contract were contingent upon satisfaction of these prerequisites. The respondent company's reliance upon the LoI as a source of vested contractual rights is, therefore, wholly misplaced.”

21. The contention that the recommendations contained in clauses (a) to (l), including clause (f), are confined only to persons holding valid LoIs or to lessees at the stage of mining operations, and are inapplicable to the State at the stage of auction or grant of lease, is untenable. If the State were permitted to disregard these conditions at the stage of auction or grant, and apply them only subsequently during mining operations, it would lead to uncertainty, arbitrariness, and a lack of transparency in the allocation process. Such an approach would also prejudice bidders, who participate in the auction based on a legitimate expectation that the governing conditions remain consistent and predictable throughout the lifecycle of the lease.

22. It is, therefore, imperative that the conditions and recommendations applicable at the stage of mining operations be treated as integral to, and binding upon, the earlier stages of auction and grant of lease as well. The State cannot alter, dilute, or defer the applicability of such conditions midway through the process. Continuity and uniformity of conditions are essential to uphold the principles of fairness, legal certainty, and administrative propriety. Accordingly, this Court holds that the recommendations in clauses (a) to (l), including clause (f), are applicable not only at the stage of mining operations but also at the stage of auction and grant of lease, and must be adhered to in their entirety throughout.

23. This Court has also noticed that the Respondent-State has shown utter disregard to this Court and had continued not only the auctions but of LOIs and Environmental clearance without having any clearance, as mandated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court. The State authorities in utter disregard to the unambiguous and clear directions by this Court continued to conduct auction proceedings and proceeded further in such auction proceedings by continuously granting LOIs and Environmental Clearances, thereby intentionally creating Third Party Interest. The authorities granted sanction for Mining Leases even in the midnight of 20.01.2026 despite the fact that the judgment was to be pronounced the following day, which shows that the said act of respondents was contemptuous.

24. Moreover, during the pendency of proceedings, LoIs had been issued, environmental clearances granted in several cases, and substantial investments made, all of which were expressly subject to the final outcome of the writ proceedings. In such circumstances, the well-settled doctrine of lis pendens, embodied in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, squarely applies. The said principle mandates that any rights created during the pendency of litigation are subservient to the ultimate adjudication and cannot prejudice the rights of the parties to the lis. The doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and to ensure that the outcome of litigation is not rendered nugatory by acts of parties during its pendency. Any auction, allotment, or issuance of LOI undertaken during the pendency of the writ petition cannot confer indefeasible or independent rights upon the successful and such rights remain contingent upon and subordinate to the final judgment of the Court. In this view, the quashing and setting aside of such Bajri mining auctions cannot be said to be legally untenable, as the same were always subject to the doctrine of lis pendens, and this Court was fully justified in annulling the said process upon adjudication of the writ petition.

25. The contention that the recommendation under Clause 11(iii) (f) is inapplicable since the plots are of a smaller size, that is, less than 100 hectares, is misleading and legally untenable. Such a position is erroneous. We had also observed the same in the judgment dated 20.01.2026 that even if the entire area was to be of 100 hectares, then too the exercise was required to be conducted for dividing the said area of 100 hectares into 5 equal blocks and each block was required to be kept separately for the purpose of replenishment. Thus, while mining activity could be done in one block for one year, the same was required to be thereafter left for replenishment for 5 years and the second block was required to be then acted upon.

26. The contention lacks substance since the very purpose of the CEC report would sought to be undermined by holding that because the plots are of smaller area, therefore, the recommendations of 11 (iii) (f) would not be applicable. This would allow sand mining in the entire lease area without providing for the necessary replenishment process.

27. The order passed by this Court was clear and unambiguous and not capable of more than one interpretation. There can be no laxity in such a situation because otherwise the court orders would become the subject of mockery. The adamant approach of the Officers of the State reflects that they have no respect to the Court's orders and they have tried to create a ploy to overreach the process of Court which is strongly deprecated by this Court. This shows a glaring example of contemptuous act by the Respondents. We, therefore, direct the State to initiate Disciplinary Proceedings against the concerned officials. Initiation of proceedings for non- compliance of this Court’s orders is indeed a drastic step and normally such action should not be taken, however, it is not only the power but the duty of the Court to uphold and maintain the dignity of Courts and majesty of law which may call for such an extreme step. If for proper administration of justice and to ensure due compliance with the orders passed by this court, it is required to take a strict view, we should not hesitate in exercising the same.

28. Thus, in the light of the aforementioned observations and the precedents cited, we hold that the present Review petitions are devoid of any substance and do not warrant any interference of this Court.

29. Accordingly, all the Review Petitions are dismissed.

30. All pending applications stand disposed of.