(Prayer: The Civil Suit has been filed under Order IV Rule 1 of Original Side Rules read with Order VII, Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure praying:
[a] for a declaration that the Original Lease Deed dated 08.02.1977 executed by S. Pandurangan, the then Trustee of the Plaintiff Trust with Mrs. Rahija Beevi and the subsequent deed of lease dated 28.02.1986 and registered as Doc. No.758/86, Book I in the office of the Sub-Registrar, West Madras executed by the said S. Pandurangan with the 1st defendant company in respect of the Suit property, more fully described in the schedule are illegal, invalid and non-est in the eyes of law and declare the same as illegal and void ab-initio as the same are in violation of provisions under Section 36 of the Indian Trust Act;
[b] directing the 1st defendant to quit and deliver vacant possession of the Suit premises situated at No.8 (Old No.4), Kennet Lane, Egmore, Chennai-600 008 more fully described in the schedule, to the Plaintiff on day to be fixed by this Court;
[c] for recovery of a sum of Rs.11,83,680/- as damages from the 1st defendant for the use and occupation of the Suit premises, situated at No.8 (Old No.4), Kennet Lane, Egmore, Chennai more fully described in the schedule at the rate of Rs.5,91,840/- per month for the period May 2007 and June 2007 and also for recovery of the future damages as determined by the Court;
[d] for a permanent injunction restraining the 2nd defendant or its officers, subordinates, agents, servants or any other person or persons claiming through it or authorized by it from entertaining or renewing any application for license for running the restaurant-cum-Lodging House at No.8 (Old No.4), Kennet Lane, Egmore, Chennai-600 008 that may be submitted by the 1st defendant pursuant to the termination of lease effected by registered notice dated 08.04.2007 in respect of the Suit premises;
[e] to grant such further or other reliefs; and
[f] costs of the Suit.)
1. The Civil Suit in C.S. No.654 of 2007 has been filed praying [a] for a declaration that the Original Lease Deed dated 08.02.1977 executed by S. Pandurangan, the then Trustee of the Plaintiff Trust with Mrs. Rahija Beevi and the subsequent deed of lease dated 28.02.1986 and registered as Doc. No.758/86, Book I in the office of the Sub-Registrar, West Madras executed by the said S. Pandurangan with the 1st defendant company in respect of the Suit property, more fully described in the schedule are illegal, invalid and non-est in the eyes of law and declare the same as illegal and void ab-initio as the same are in violation of provisions under Section 36 of the Indian Trust Act; [b] directing the 1st defendant to quit and deliver vacant possession of the Suit premises situated at No.8 (Old No.4), Kennet Lane, Egmore, Chennai-600 008 more fully described in the schedule, to the Plaintiff on day to be fixed by this Court; [c] for recovery of a sum of Rs.11,83,680/- as damages from the 1st defendant for the use and occupation of the Suit premises, situated at No.8 (Old No.4), Kennet Lane, Egmore, Chennai more fully described in the schedule at the rate of Rs.5,91,840/- per month for the period May 2007 and June 2007 and also for recovery of the future damages as determined by the Court; [d] for a permanent injunction restraining the 2nd defendant or its officers, subordinates, agents, servants or any other person or persons claiming through it or authorized by it from entertaining or renewing any application for license for running the restaurant-cum-Lodging House at No.8 (Old No.4), Kennet Lane, Egmore, Chennai-600 008 that may be submitted by the 1st defendant pursuant to the termination of lease effected by registered notice dated 08.04.2007 in respect of the Suit premises; and costs of the Suit.
2. The gist of the Plaint averments are as follows:-
The 1st defendant is a Partnership firm carrying on hotel business. The Suit property originally belonged to Sri. N. Rajagopalan, a Barrister at Law and he formed a Public Religious Trust on 16.03.1942 and thereafter he created a Trust Deed dated 16.03.1942 and also he executed a Will dated 01.02.1940 bequeathing the Suit property, in the said Trust Deed. As per the Trust Deed, the rent, profits and income derived from the Suit premises shall be spent for the payment of all taxes and charges of a public nature, one month rent in a year for ordinary repairs, whitewashing and painting of Suit premises, one month rent in a year to be invested and accumulated to defray loss for vacant periods and to meet the expenses of any unexpected or unforeseen major repairs or to make additions and improvements to the property, one half of the net income shall be spent for abishekam and archana of family deity Ayyanar (Sastha) in the Village of Sathanur, Narasinganpet, Tanjore District during the Fridays of the months of Aadi and Thai in every year and in the remaining half, ¾th of income shall be spent on feeding of poor brahmins on the Dwadasi Thidhi of each month or important month and the remaining ¼ of income on feeding poor people of any or all costs on any day, except Dwadasi days. The Trustees, who perform these religious and charitable acts are entitled to take from the rents of the property all sums necessary for travelling and lodging, but not for their personal trouble. While so, the said N. Rajagopalan Charities represented by its previous Trustee S. Pandurangan entered into a Lease Deed dated 08.02.1977 with Mrs. Rahija Beevi in respect of the Suit schedule mentioned property and in and by which, the lease for the Suit property was fixed for a period of 15 years. Subsequently, another Lease Deed dated 28.02.1986 between the said N. Rajagopalan Charities represented by its Trustee, S. Pandurangan and the 1st defendant M/s. Hotel Regent, a Partnership firm, for a period of 60 years commencing from 01.01.1986 to 31.12.2045. The Lessee had paid a sum of Rs.1 lakh towards advance and had agreed to pay rents for the first 15 years i.e., from 01.01.1986 to 31.12.2000, a sum of Rs.3,000/- per month, for the next five years, a sum of Rs.3,500/- per month from 01.01.2001 to 31.12.2005, for the next five years, a sum of Rs.4,000/- from 01.01.2006 to 31.12.2010, for the next five years, a sum of Rs.4,500/- from 01.01.2011 to 31.12.2015, for the next five years, a sum of Rs.5,000/- from 01.01.2016 to 31.12.2020, for the next five years, a sum of Rs.6,000/- from 01.01.2021 to 31.12.2025, for the next five years, a sum of 7,000/- from 01.01.2026 to 31.12.2030, for the next five years, a sum of Rs.8,000/- from 01.01.2031 to 31.12.2035, for the next five years, a sum of Rs.9,000/- from 01.01.2036 to 31.12.2040 and for the next five years, a sum of Rs.10,000/- from 01.01.2041 to 31.12.2045. Apart from this, there are number of clauses incorporated by imposing conditions. One of the main conditions is that the failure of lessee to pay any of the rentals, rates and charges they have undertaken to pay under the provisions of these presents or any of the other sums in the manner and time hereinafter provided or to keep fulfill or perform any of the terms, provisions, agreement, covenant and conditions herein on their part to be kept, fulfilled and performed, time being the essential thereof, shall likewise constitute a breach of this lease at the option of the lessor herein, so as to terminate all rights, privileges and interest of the lessee herein. Further, in the event of the breach of the lease herein, if the lessee herein allows such breach to continue for a period of 30 days, then after expiration of such period, it shall be lawful for the lessor herein at its option to declare the terms of the lease ended, to re-enter the demised premises or any part thereof and repossess the same including the reconstructions.
2.1. Since the Plaintiff Trust, being a Religious Charitable Trust, no permission has been obtained from the competent Court before the Deed of Lease dated 28.02.1986 executed in favour of the 1st defendant. As per Section 36 of the Indian Trust Act, permission of Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction to be obtained as a condition-precedent before any deed of lease exceeding a period of 21 years is entered into. The deed of lease which the 1st defendant had obtained in his favour for a period of 60 years commencing from 01.01.1986 to 31.12.2045 is in gross violation of Section 36 of the Indian Trust Act. Though the Lease Deed is void ab initio, nevertheless the lease has been granted in favour of the 1st defendant detrimental to the interests of the Trust. The objects for which the Trust was established are unable to be accomplished on account of the meager return which the property fetches due to injudicious act. The Trust property situated in a prized locality, at the time, when the Deed of Lease was entered into between the Plaintiff Trust and the 1st defendant and the Trustee ought to have exercised utmost care as a man of ordinary prudence would deal with such property if it were his own. The Suit property which has been in the use and occupation of the 1st defendant, would easily fetch a fair rent of Rs.5,91,840/- if it is fixed by any competent Court, having regard to the prevailing market value of the property. The said S. Pandurangan, who was the erstwhile Trustee of the Plaintiff Trust, passed away on 22.09.2006 and now the present Trustee namely P. Venkataraman has been managing the day-to-day affairs of the aforesaid Trust. As per the terms of the lease, the 1st defendant is liable to pay rent at the rate of Rs.4,000/- per month from 01.01.2006 to 31.12.2010 for the Suit premises. However, the 1st defendant has defaulted in payment of the monthly rents for the months of May 2007 and June 2007, thereby committing breach to the terms and conditions of the Lease Deed dated 28.02.1986. After the demise of the erstwhile Trustee Mr. S. Pandurangan, the present Trustee Mr. P. Venkataraman has been receiving innumberable complaints that with the Lease Deed dated 28.02.1986 executed by the Trust acting through the then Trustee, Late S. Pandurangan.
2.2. The 1st defendant herein has been acting detrimental to the interest of the Trust in as much as it gives an unfair advantage to the 1st defendant in terms of value of the property and the said lease deed having been executed without a valid permission from any competent Court, it shall not be binding upon the Trust and accordingly, the Plaintiff Trust is advised to take necessary effective steps to have the said Lease Deed duly rescinded and possession of the property retrieved, so that the property belonging to the Trust can be re-possessed and the income derived therefrom could be put to effective use as stipulated in the Trust Deed dated 16.03.1942, which would fulfill the desires and wishes of Late N. Rajagopalan, who has formed the aforesaid Trust during his lifetime, as set out in his Will dated 01.02.1940. Further, the author of the Trust, being a true vegetarian, it has been specifically stated that the 1st defendant should run only a vegetarian hotel – cum – Lodging house in the Suit premises. However, contrary to the terms of the said alleged Lease Deed, the 1st defendant is allowing guests, who are not only permitted to consume alcohol, but also being served non-vegetarian food items, thereby violated terms of the Lease Deed. Therefore, the Plaintiff issued a Notice dated 08.04.2007 calling upon the 1st defendant to quit and delivery the vacant possession of the Suit property by 1st week of May 2007 and claimed refund of Rs.1 lakh paid by the 1st defendant as Advancce-cum-Security Deposit as per the Lease Deed.
2.3. After receipt of the notice, the 1st defendant has not chosen to send any reply. However, the Managing Partner and the husband of the co-partner of the 1st defendant firm met the Plaintiff’s counsel and informed him that they will be interested for an amicable settlement to resolve the entire controversy with a view to give quietus to the dispute that has arisen between the Plaintiff and the 1st defendant. Pursuant to the termination of lease by the Plaintiff by issuance of a registered notice dated 08.04.2007, the 1st defendant has no manner of right to carry on the business of hotel and Lodging in the Suit premises. The 2nd defendant is not liable to entertain any application for grant or renewal of lodging license to the 1st defendant in view of the fact that the Deed of Lease dated 28.02.1986 has been validly terminated and the 1st defendant has no locus standi to continue legal possession in the Suit premises. The 1st defendant is not entitled to claim any compensation for the superstructure that has been put up over the Suit property. The superstructure has been erected in the Suit property without the prior sanction in writing from the Plaintiff Trust. In any event, as per Clause 26 of the Deed of Lease, if any breach to the terms and conditions of the Lease is committed by the lessee, the lease itself is terminated, and under such circumstances, all the buildings, improvements, fixtures and appurtenances thereon shall belong absolutely to the lessor. Therefore, the lessee shall not be entitled to any compensation. Compensation becomes payable to the lessee under Clause 27 of the Deed of Lease, only if the lessee scrupulously complies with all the terms, conditions and covenants contained in the lease and the lease itself comes to an end by efflux of time. The 1st defendant has forfeited its rights to continue in possession of the Suit premises in view of the breach of terms of Lease deed for the default in payment of rents for the months of May 2007 and June 2007. Despite termination of lease effected through a Legal Notice dated 08.04.2007 by the Plaintiff’s counsel, the 1st defendant is liable to pay damages for the use and occupation of the property, which has been quantified at the rate of Rs.5,91,840/- per month and the Plaintiff is claiming damages for the months of May 2007 and June 2007 amounting to Rs.11,83,680/- and also the future damages at the rate of Rs.5,91,840/- per month. The 2nd defendant cannot mechanically renew the alleged lease granted to the 1st defendant without reference to the tenable objections raised by the Plaintiff as contemplated and thereby, seeking perpetual injunction as against the 2nd defendant from renewing or entertaining any application for renewal of license. Therefore, he filed the Suit.
3. Brief averments of the Written Statement filed by the 1 s t defendant are as follows:-
The Suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts. The present Trustee of the Plaintiff Charities cannot maintain the Suit. He cannot style himself as a Trustee as per the terms of the Original Deed of Trust executed by Late Sri. N. Rajagopalan. The said P. Venkataraman is only a landlord empowered to collect the rents as per the Lease Deed dated 28.02.1986 executed by the Trustee Mr. S. Pandurangan. The defendant denied the allegations made in the Plaint. The Plaintiff Trust is bound by the lease executed by the previous Trustee Mr. Pandurangan. The Original Trust Deed contains Clause No.6 making it very clear that the Trustee is not liable to produce account to anybody for rents or for the management of the property or performance of the Trust and also stated that after the death of the Founder Trustee, the succeeding Trustees are not similarly accountable to anybody if they spend not less than Rs.200/- per year. By virtue of the said clause, the Management of the Trust by Mr. Pandurangan cannot question anybody. The erstwhile Trustee who had granted lease for 60 years, the present Trustee is not correctly represented by a lawful Trustee and previous actions of the former Trustees cannot be re-opened or questioned by anyone. The Indian Trust Act is not applicable to Public Religious Charitable Trust and as per Section 1 of the Trust Act, it is the foundation for filing the above Suit and the said Section is not applicable to the Plaintiff’s Trust. Once the Trust Act is not applicable, the Plaintiff cannot maintain the Suit and the Suit is liable to be rejected. The terms of the lease entered into between the parties are very fair and both the parties were fully convinced that they have made best bargain.
3.1. Even after the death of Mr. Pandurangan in September 2005 as representative of the Trust namely P. Venkataraman was receiving the rent at the same rate without any objections. The rents have been regularly paid without any default. It is false to state that the defendant has not paid the rent for the months of May and June 2007. The defendant is having a Lodging House only and there is no question of supplying food to the customers and the defendant has been using the premises only for the purpose mentioned in the Lease Deed. The Plaintiff issued notice with false allegations and thereafter, the defendant approached the Counsel of the Plaintiff and fully explained about the real facts. The superstructure has been erected in the Suit property with express and implied consent from the Plaintiff Trust. The Lease Deed itself recognises that the superstructure has been put up by the defendant. All the buildings, improvements and fixtures and appurtenances belong to the defendant. As per Clause 27 of the Lease Deed, the lessor is entitled to claim compensation. There is no question of 2nd defendant being prevented to entertain any application for grant of renewal of lodging license. The Plaintiff has no right to seek relief of permanent injunction as against the 2nd defendant. The defendants have not forfeited the rights to continue in possession of the Suit premises. There is no breach of terms of lease dated 28.02.1986. The Deed of Lease dated 28.02.1986 is legal, valid and binding on the Plaintiff. The defendants are not liable to pay damages for the use and occupation.
3.2. The Suit is bad for mis-joinder of parties and there is no cause of action. The 1st defendant had never committed default in payment of rents. The Trust being alleged as a Charitable Trust, the Suit if any could be launched only by recourse to Section 92 of Code of Civil Procedure and the same could be launched by ‘leave of Court’. Therefore, the Suit is not maintainable. The previous Trustee is none other than the father of the present Trustee. On the death of Mr. Pandurangan, the then Trustee, the present alleged Trustee who succeeded to the Trusteeship has been receiving rent without any demur and he has been receiving the rent remitted by the 1st defendant at the Trust’s account in the bank and the Plaintiff Trust has been drawing the account. The Plaintiff is estopped from instituting any Suit till the duration of the lease subject to other terms of the lease. The grant of lease was only virtually for a vacant site and the building belongs to the 1st defendant, so the fair rent made against the 1st defendant has been fixed in the Lease Deed. Therefore, the Suit itself is not maintainable and the same is liable to be dismissed.
4. Based on the above pleadings, after hearing both sides and after perusing the entire records, this Court has framed the following issues on 26.04.2010:
1. Whether the Suit, as filed by the Plaintiff, is maintainable, in view of Section 1 of the Indian Trust Act?
2. Whether Mr. P. Venkataraman is entitled to represent the Plaintiff Trust.
3. Whether the non-joining of other Trustees, if there are any, makes the Suit not maintainable?
4. Whether the Suit is bad in view of Section 92 of Code of Civil Procedure?
5. Whether the Lease Deeds dated 08.02.1977 and 28.02.1986 are legal, valid and binding in the light of Section 36 of the Indian Trust Act?
6. Whether Mr. Venkataraman is estopped from disputing the rights of the defendant?
7. Whether the 2nd defendant is a necessary party to the Suit?
8. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to a permanent injunction as against the 2nd defendant as prayed for?
9. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to a sum of Rs.11,83,680/- towards damages for use and occupation and at the rate of Rs.5,91,840/- per month from May 2007 to June 2007 and also future damages for use and occupation and if so, at what rate?
10. Whether the 1st defendant has forfeited its rights to be in possession of the property?
11. Whether the Plaintiff can assail the lease deed as invalid and yet seek to enforce the terms of the lease?
12. To what reliefs, the Plaintiff is entitled to?
5. In order to prove the case of the Plaintiff, on the side of the Plaintiff, PW1 was examined and Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.6 were marked. On the side of defendant, DW1 was examined and marked Ex.D.1 to Ex.D.5.
6. During the pendency of the Suit, the defendants have filed applications in A. No.5566 and 5567 of 2025 to condone delay of 170 days in re-presenting the applications filed for re-opening the Plaintiff’s case and to recall the Plaintiff side witnesses and the same were dismissed by this Court through an order dated 14.11.2025. Thereafter, this Court posted the case for arguments, but the learned counsel appearing for the defendants was not ready to argue the matter, since they preferred an appeal as against the order passed by this Court. Thereafter, the case had been periodically adjourned on several occasions, but the defendants failed to get orders from the Appellate Court as against the order passed by this Court and thereafter, this Court fixed the date for arguments. The Plaintiff’s side Counsel argued the matter and the defendants’ side counsel failed to argue the matter. Thereafter, he filed memos one after the other stating about the pendency of appeal. However, this court considering the attitude of the defendants in delaying the proceedings, that too by making allegations as against the Judges, who are all dealing with the case previously and presently, did not accept the defendants’ request for adjournments. Thereafter, in order to give fair chance to the defendants, frequently adjourned the case for hearing the defendants, but they failed to argue the matter. Hence this Court, in order to meet the ends of justice and to maintain decorum of the Court, inclined to pass orders even without hearing the defendants and reserved the case for ‘pronouncing judgment’. Even after the case was reserved for Judgment, the defendants are unable to get any favourable orders in their favour from the Appellate Forum. Therefore, there is no other go, except to pronounce judgment on merits. Already both sides have examined the witnesses and cross examination of PW1 was also closed on 04.07.2013 and on the side of the defendants, DW1 was examined and their side evidence was closed on 22.01.2015. Even after granting such a long time, as the defendants are not ready to conduct their case, this Court had declined to grant time to the defendants, who failed to argue the matter. Therefore, this Court is inclined to pronounce judgment on merits.
6.1. After dismissal of the applications in A. Nos.5566 and 5567 of 2025 by declining to reopen the case, the defendants filed an application in A. No.6201 of 2025 to reopen the evidence of the 1st defendant for receiving the documents, A. No6202 of 2025 to recall the 1st defendant for receiving the documents and A. No.6203 of 2025 to grant leave to file photocopy of the additional documents viz., Sale Agreement, Water Tax receipt and Property Tax Receipt etc., In all the above applications, the contention of the applicant is that the previous Trustee namely Pandurangan entered into a Lease Deed for a period of 60 years commencing from 01.01.1986 and Rs.1 lakh was paid as advance and monthly rents were paid without any default as per the terms and conditions of the Lease Deed. Municipal taxes and Metro Water and Sewerage taxes were also paid and the son of the said Pandurangan has filed the present Suit. Thereafter, he filed a Suit in C.S. No.29 of 2024 for sale of the property without impleading the defendant as party to the Suit. Now he filed a petition to implead him and thereby, to prove his case, documents viz, Sale Agreement dated 11.03.2019, Metro Water Tax receipt and Property Tax receipts are essential to decide the case, thereby he filed the petition. The present Suit is for the relief of declaration in respect of Lease Deed and for permanent injunction and to vacate the 1st defendant from the Suit property and permanent injunction as against the 2nd defendant not to renew the license, thereby the above said documents are no way relevant to decide the case. As already stated, both parties have filed documents and adduced oral evidence and their evidence have also been completed long back i.e., 10 years back. Therefore, the documents filed along with the present petition are noway helpful to decide the case between the parties and already sufficient documents were marked and oral evidences were also adduced, thereby the aforesaid documents are not relevant to decide the real issue between the parties. Therefore, the said applications cannot be entertained and the said applications filed by the respective applicants are only to delay the proceedings and therefore, those applications are liable to be dismissed.
6.2. It is true that the applications filed by the applicant / 1st defendant for reopening the case have to be disposed of speedily and thereafter, the main Suit has to be heard. However, in this case, from the evidences and records, and the attitude of the defendants in conducting the case clearly establishes that only to delay the proceedings, they have filed these applications and also filed memos one after another by abusing the process of Court and thereby, this Court is inclined to dispose of all the applications along with this main Suit.
7. The learned counsel appearing for the Plaintiff would submit that the Plaintiff Trust was formed by one Sri. N. Rajagopalan through a Trust Deed dated 16.03.1942. Thereafter, the said Trust property was managed by the original Trustee namely Sri. N. Rajagopalan and after his demise, the Trustee namely S. Pandurangan leased out the property to one Mrs. Rahija Beevi through a Lease Deed dated 08.02.1977 initially for a period of 15 years and subsequently, on 28.02.1986, a registered Lease Deed was entered into between the Trustee of the Plaintiff Trust and the 1st defendant for a period of 60 years commencing from 01.01.1986 to 31.12.2045 for a meager amount of Rs.3000/- per month and thereafter, once in 5 years, a sum of Rs.500/- was increased. The 1st defendant has breached the terms and conditions and has not paid the rent for the months of May 2007 and June 2007 and also breached the conditions by allowing the customers to have non-vegetarian food items and consume liquor and entering into a Lease for a period of 60 years is against Section 36 of Indian Trust Act. Since the Plaintiff Trust is a Religious Charitable Endowment, Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure would not attract and the 1st defendant breached the conditions and thereby he is liable to vacate the premises and the Lease Deed itself is void ab initio and the 2nd defendant cannot renew the license and thereby, he filed the Suit. In order to prove the case of the Plaintiff, PW1 was examined and Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.6 were marked. On the side of the defendants, DW1 was examined and Ex.D.1 to Ex.D.5 were marked. The Plaintiff’s side evidences clearly showed the breach of terms of lease agreement by the 1st defendant and thereby he is liable to be vacated. However, he is refusing to vacate the premises, thereby, the Plaintiff has issued a Legal Notice dated 08.04.2007. The erstwhile Trustee of the Plaintiff Trust, in contrary to the interest of the Trust, had leased out the premises for a period of 60 years as against the provisions of law and thereby, the Lease Deed itself is void ab initio. Moreover, the 1st defendant has breached the terms and conditions of the Lease Deed, thereby he is liable to vacate the premises, but even after the receipt of the notice issued by the Plaintiff, the 1st defendant failed to vacate the premises. The fair rent of the premises is Rs.5,91,840/- and for the months of May 2007 and June 2007, the 1st defendant failed to pay rent and thereby, he is entitled to pay rent at Rs.11,83,680/- as damages and for use and occupation. Therefore, the Suit is liable to be decreed.
8. Since the learned counsel appearing for the defendants has not argued the case, despite sufficient opportunities given to him, this Court is inclined to pronounce Judgment based on the available records and the arguments of the Plaintiff. However no issue has been framed in respect of prayer of declaration of lease deeds, thereby this Court framed the additional issue as follows:-
Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the relief of Declaration of Lease deed dated 28.02.1986 between Pandurangan and the 1st defendant as illegal and invalid?
9. This Court has framed appropriate issues. As far as the additional issue is concerned, already the parties are aware about the pleadings and adduced evidence and no additional evidence is required as the available evidence is sufficient to decide the additional issue.
As far as the issues that (i) Whether the Suit, as filed by the Plaintiff, is maintainable, in view of Section 1 of the Indian Trust Act?, 2. Whether Mr. P. Venkataraman is entitled to represent the Plaintiff Trust, 3. Whether the nonjoining of other Trustees, if there are any, makes the Suit not maintainable?, 4. Whether the Suit is bad in view of Section 92 of Code of Civil Procedure? and 5. Whether the Lease Deeds dated 08.02.1977 and 28.02.1986 are legal, valid and binding in the light of Section 36 of the Indian Trust Act? Are concerned, all the said issues are inter-linked, hence all the said issues have been taken up for answering together.
9.1. In this case, the Plaintiff, who is said to be the Trustee of the Plaintiff Trust has filed the Suit for the reliefs of declaration declaring the Lease Deed entered into between the previous Trustee and the 1st defendant as null and void, for permanent injunction and to direct the 1st defendant to deliver the possession of the property to the Plaintiff and for recovery of damages and permanent injunction against the 2nd defendant from renewing the license to the 1st defendant. The defendants have not disputed the fact that the property belonged to the Trust and the Trust was created by one Mr. N. Rajagopalan and the property belongs to the Trust. After the demise of the founder of the Trust namely N. Rajagopalan, the Trust was managed by the Trustee namely S. Pandurangan. The said Pandurangan entered into a lease with the 1st defendant, initially for a period of 15 years through a Lease dated 08.02.1977 and thereafter, entered into a Lease Deed dated 28.02.1986 for a period of 60 years with the 1st defendant and his partners for the hotel business from 01.01.1986 to 31.12.2045. The said Deed has been acted upon and thereafter, the said deceased S. Pandurangan had received the monthly rent amount without any protest. After the death of the said Pandurangan in the year 2006, the Plaintiff, who is the present Trustee of the Plaintiff Trust also received the money without any protest till filing of the Suit. In the meantime, due to misunderstanding between the parties, dispute arose between them. Now, the Plaintiff filed the Suit alleging that yhe Lease Deed itself is not valid in the eye of law.
9.2. According to the Plaintiff, as per the Section 36 of the Indian Trusts Act, for the lease for the period of more than 21 years, the permission of the Court has to be obtained, but in this case, no such permission has been obtained by the parties and thereby, the lease itself is not valid. The main defense raised by the 1st defendant is that as per Section 1 of Indian Trust Act, the Suit is not maintainable as it is a Religious Charitable Trust.
Section 1 in The Indian Trusts Act, 1882 reads as follows:-
1. Short title, commencement.
- This Act may be called The Indian Trusts Act, 1882 , and it shall come into force on the first day of March, 1882.Local extent. Savings. - [It extends to [the whole of India [[***] [Substituted by A.O.1948, for the first sentence.]] and] the Andaman and Nicobar Islands [* * *] [The words "and Panth Piploda" omitted by A.O.1950.]; but the Central Government may, from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, extend it to [the Andaman and Nicobar Islands] [Substituted by A.O.1950, for "either or both of the said Provinces," .] or to any part thereof.]But nothing herein contained affects the rules of Muhammadan Law as to waqf, or the mutual relations of the members of an undivided family as determined by any customary or personal law, or applies to public or private religious or charitable endowments, or to trusts to distribute prizes taken in war among the captors; and nothing in the Second Chapter of this Act applies to trusts created before the said day.
10. On a careful reading of the Section 1 of the Indian Trusts Act, it is clear that the Indian Trust Act will not be applicable to public or private religious or charitable endowments or to Trusts to distribute prizes taken in war among the captors and nothing in the Second Chapter of the Act applies to Trusts created before the said day. It means the Act applies to the private Trusts only, other than the Religious or Charitable Endowments. The main fundamental distinction between the private and the public Trusts depends upon the character of the person for whose benefit they are created. The essential difference is that in the private Trusts, the beneficiaries are defined and ascertained individuals or within the definite time can be definitely ascertained, but in the Public Trusts the beneficial interest vested with an uncertain fluctuating body of persons, which can include the public at large or a specific group of individuals or for some considerable period answering to a particular description. In the case on hand also, it is clear that the Trust was created for Religious Charitable Endowments and thereby, the Indian Trusts Act is not applicable to this case, as per Section 1 of the Indian Trusts Act. Once the Trusts Act is not applicable, the contention of the learned counsel for the Plaintiff that bar under Section 36 of the Indian Trusts Act in leasing out the property for more than 60 years will not arise at all.
11. This Court also perused the Trust Deed and it shows that the Plaintiff Trust is the Religious Trust. According to the defendant, the Trust is a Public Trust and thereby the Plaintiff ought to have obtained permission or leave of the Court under Section 92 of Code of Civil Procedure.
Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as follows:-
Section 92 – Public charities
1. In the case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, or where the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust, the Advocate-General, or two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having obtained the leave of the Court may institute a suit, whether contentious or not, in the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or in any other Court empowered in that behalf by the State Government within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the trust is situate to obtain a decree
a. removing any trustee;
b. appointing a new trustee;
c. vesting any property in a trustee;
cc. directing a trustee who has bee removed or a person who has ceased to be a trustee, to deliver possession of any trust property in his possession to the person entitled to the possession of such property;
d. directing accounts and inquires;
e. declaring what proportion of the trust property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust;
f. authorizing the whole or any part of the trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged;
g. settling a scheme; or
h. granting such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require.
2. Save as provided by the Religious Endowments Act, 1863 (20 of 1863) or by any corresponding law in force in the territories which, immediately before the 1st November, 1956, were comprised in Part B States, no suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in subsection (1) shall be instituted in respect of any such trust as is therein referred to except in conformity with provisions of that sub-section.
3. The Court may alter the original purposes of an express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature and allow the property or income of such trust or any portion thereof to be applied cy press in one or more the following circumstances, namely-
a. where the original purposes of the trust, in whole or in part-
1. have been, as far as may be, fulfilled; or
2. cannot be carried out at all, or cannot be carried out according to the directions given in the instrument creating the trust or, where there is no such instrument, according to the spirit of the trust;
b. where the original purposes of the trust provide a use for a part only of the property available by virtue of the trust; or
c. where the property available by virtue of the trust and other property applicable for similar purposes can be more effectively used in conjunction with, and to that end can suitably be made applicable to any other purpose, regard being had to the spirit of the trust and its applicability to common purposes; or
d. –
(I) where the original purposes, in whole or in part, were laid down by reference to an area which then was, but has since ceased to be, a unit for such purposes; or
(ii) ceased, as being useless or harmful to the community, or
(iii) ceased to be, in law, charitable, or
(iv) ceased in any other way to provide a suitable and effective method of using the property available by virtue of the trust, regard being had to the spirit of the trust
12. In this case, the Suit is filed only by the Trustee of the Plaintiff Trust for declaration of lease deed and to delivery the possession of the property and for permanent injunction. According to the 1st defendant, the framing of the Suit itself is not maintainable and the Plaintiff ought to have filed the Suit by invoking provisions of Section 92 of Code of Civil Procedure and the mandatory procedures in filing the Suit under Section 92 of Code of Civil Procedure have not been followed and thereby, the framing of Suit itself is not maintainable. The main contention of the Plaintiff is that as per Section 36 of Indian Trusts Act, if any lease for more than 21 years, the leave of the Court has to be obtained and thereby, it is violation of Section 36 of the Indian Trusts Act.
13. Though both the parties are claiming applicability of two different Acts, after enactment of Indian Trust Act, the Government has enacted another Act in respect of Charitable and Religious Trusts namely ‘The Charitable and Religious Trust Act 1920. There are no pleadings about the applicability of the Charitable and Religious Trust Act and both the parties have not pointed out about the said act and only pleaded about the Indian Trust Act and Section 92 of Code of Civil Procedure. The Charitable and Religious Trust Act has been enacted specially for providing facility for obtaining information regarding Trusts created for Public purposes of a Charitable or religious nature and to enable the Trustees of such Trusts to obtain direction of a Court on certain matters and to make special provisions for the payment of the expenditure incurred in certain Suits against the Trustees of such Trusts. In view of the same, the parties can approach the Courts as per the said special Act. However, Section 1 of the Indian Trusts Act is not applicable to the present facts of the case. In view of the same, any question of applicability of Section 36 of the Indian Trusts Act would not attract, thereby the Plaintiff cannot question the Lease Deed, which was created on 28.02.1986 and moreover, it was acted upon and after 21 years, the present Suit has been filed. By this time, the said Deed has been acted upon. Thereby, the Plaintiff cannot maintain the Suit on the ground that it is against Section 36 of Indian Trust Act, however, if any other breach of conditions, the Suit is maintainable on that ground. As far as Section 92 of Code of Civil Procedure is concerned, this Suit is only to declare the Lease Deed as null and void and to deliver the possession of the property and no issue of administration of Trust is involved in this case, thereby Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure will not be applicable in this case, thereby question of joining of Trustees to file the Suit will not arise. Thus the issues 1 to 5 are answered.
14. As far as the Issue No.6 that Whether Mr. Venkataraman is estopped from disputing the rights of the defendant? is concerned, this Court in the previous issues, decided that the framing of the Suit itself is not maintainable in respect of applicability of Indian Trust Act, however the said Lease Deed has been acted upon. The previous Trustee of the Trust had entered into a Lease Agreement for 60 years and for the past 21 years, without any protest, the lease amount was received by the erstwhile Trustee and the Plaintiff and thereafter only, dispute arose between the parties. Once the parties entered into lease deed and the same has been acted upon and without any protest, the parties also accepted the lease agreement and received the lease amount, now the Plaintiff cannot deny the same and he is estopped from disputing the rights of the defendant. The erstwhile Trustee is none other than the father of the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff filed this Suit as a Trustee of the Plaintiff Trust. The Lease Deed was entered on 28.02.1986 for 60 years and the erstwhile Trustee had received advance of Rs.1 lakh and also received monthly lease money and the said Trustee who originally entered into the lease on 08.02.1977 and thereafter again leased out the property for 60 years. After the demise of the original Lessor, the Plaintiff, being a Trustee of the Plaintiff Trust, received the lease amount from the defendant by accepting the lease deed. After some time, due to misunderstanding between the parties, the present Trustee sent a notice to vacate the premises. After accepting the lease between defendant and the erstwhile Trustee and after came into force of the Lease Deed, the Plaintiff cannot dispute the rights of the defendant. Thus, issue no.6 is answered.
15. As far as Issue No.7 that Whether the 2nd defendant is a necessary party to the Suit? is concerned, the Lease Deed has been executed for a period of 60 years and it is valid till 2045. As long as the lease is in existence, the defendant can run the business, without breaching the conditions of the Lease Deed. Therefore, the 2nd defendant, who is the Corporation, is liable to act as per the procedures established under law, if any application is filed by the 1st defendant. Therefore, the 2nd defendant is not a necessary party to the proceedings. Thus, the issue No.7 is answered.
16. As far as Issue Nos.8 and 9 that Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to a permanent injunction as against the 2nd defendant as prayed for? and Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to a sum of Rs.11,83,680/- towards damages for use and occupation and at the rate of Rs.5,91,840/- per month from May 2007 to June 2007 and also future damages for use and occupation and if so, at what rate? are concerned, since already this Court in the previous issues decided that framing of the Suit itself is not in accordance with law and as long as the Lease Deed is in force, the 1st defendant is entitled to run the business and subject to the rules and regulations, he is entitled to get renewal of license and thereby permanent injunction against the 2nd defendant is not maintainable and the Plaintiff is not entitled to permanent injunction as against the 2nd defendant. As far as the claim towards damages is concerned, the Plaintiff failed to prove that there is a due in payment of lease amount and as per the Agreement of Lease, the amount for 2017 is Rs.4000/- per month, but the Plaintiff claimed Rs.5,91,840/- without any basis and the Plaintiff failed to prove that he is entitled to such a huge amount of lease money. Once the Plaintiff admitted the execution of Lease Deed, he is bound by the terms and conditions of the Lease Deed. Even according to the Plaintiff’s side evidence, there is no evidence to prove that there are dues for the months of May 2007 and June 2007. Therefore, the Plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of damages. Thus, the issue nos.8 and 9 are answered.
17. As far as issue no.10 that Whether the 1st defendant has forfeited its rights to be in possession of the property? is concerned, there is no evidence that the 1st defendant has breached the terms and conditions of the Lease Deed and the forfeiture is not automatic and the Plaintiff has to establish the breach of terms and conditions. As per Clause 27 of the Lease Deed, if any breach continues for more than 30 days, then after expiration of such period, the lesser had option to declare the terms of the lease ended. The evidence of PW1 does not reveal anything with respect to breach of terms and conditions of the Lease Deed. Therefore, the Plaintiff failed to prove that there is a violation of terms and conditions of the Lease Deed.
18. As far as issue no.11 that Whether the Plaintiff can assail the lease deed as invalid and yet seek to enforce the terms of the lease? is concerned, the Plaintiff in one place admitted the execution of the Lease Deed and claiming that the terms and conditions of the Lease Deed have been breached and thereby sought for relief. In another place, he stated that the execution of Deed itself is invalid. Therefore, the Plaintiff cannot assail the Lease Deed as invalid, once he seek enforcement of the terms and conditions of the Lease Deed. Thus, the issue is answered.
19. As far as the additional issue that Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the relief of Declaration of Lease deed dated 28.02.1986 between Pandurangan and the 1st defendant as illegal and invalid? is concerned, this Court in Issue Nos.1 to 5, decided that the Provisions of the Indian Trust Act are not applicable and the Lease Deed has been acted upon and there is no evidence to prove the breach of terms and conditions of the Lease Deed, thereby the Plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of declaration in respect of Lease Deed dated 28.02.1986. As far as the Lease Deed dated 08.02.1977 is concerned, it was acted upon and the period of Lease was over, thereby the prayer is not maintainable.
20. As far as the issue no.12 that to what reliefs, the Plaintiff is entitled to? is concerned, this Court in previous issues 1 to 11, decided that the framing of the Suit itself is not in accordance with law and the Plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. Thereby, the Suit is liable to be dismissed.
21. In view of the above discussions, this Court is of the opinion that the Plaintiff is not entitled to any reliefs through this Suit and the Suit is liable to be dismissed.
22. In the result, Civil Suit in C.S. No.654 of 2007 is dismissed and the applications in A. Nos.6201 of 2025, 6202 of 2025 and 6203 of 2025 are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous applications are closed. The Plaintiff is at liberty to file a fresh Suit by seeking appropriate remedies in accordance with law.
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