1) Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. With the consent of the learned counsel appearing for parties, the Petition is taken up for final disposal.

2) Petitioners/landlords have filed the present Petition challenging the judgment and decree dated 16 March 2022 passed by the District Judge-22, Pune, dismissing Regular Civil Appeal No.371 of 2015 and confirming the judgment and order dated 11 June 2015 passed by the Additional Judge, Small Causes Court, Pune in Civil Suit No.419 of 2007. The Trial Court has dismissed Plaintiff’s Suit seeking eviction of the Respondent-Defendant on the grounds of nuisance /annoyance, bonafide requirement and arrears of rent. Aggrieved by the concurrent findings recorded by the Trial and the Appellate Courts on the issues of nuisance and annoyance, default in payment of rent and bonafide requirement, the Petitioners have filed the present Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

3) The premises on (i) ground floor comprising of three rooms, passage of hall admeasuring 2500 sq.ft. (ii) first floor comprising of eight rooms, one hall, two bathrooms, two water closets admeasuring 3000 sq.ft. and (iii) second floor comprising of 8 big rooms, one large hall, 2 bathrooms and two toilets admeasuring 3,000/- sq.ft. in building located at House No. 1922 at Budhwar Peth, Pune are the ‘suit premises’. The building in which suit premises are located was originally owned by late Fidahusain Kachwala, father of Plaintiff No.1-. Father of Plaintiff No.1 inducted Defendant’s father as monthly tenant in respect of the suit premises. Defendant’s father commenced the business of ‘Shriraj Lodge’ in the suit premises. After death of his father, Plaintiff claimed the status of landlord in respect of the suit premises. After death of his father, Defendant is the tenant in respect of the suit premises, who is operating the business of ‘Shriraj Lodge’. Plaintiffs reside on the fourth floor of the building, in which suit premises are located.

4) Plaintiffs instituted Civil Suit No.419 of 2007 in the Court of Small Causes, Pune, seeking recovery of possession of the suit premises from the Defendant on the ground that acts of the Defendant caused nuisance and annoyance. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant was using the passages in the building for allowing his customers to sleep and that Defendant’s customers used to consume liquor and indulged in frequent quarrels. The Defendant also alleged that the suit premises were being misused by the Defendant for immoral purposes by renting the rooms for two hours. The Plaintiff also alleged default in payment of rent by the Defendant. After issuing notice dated 30 June 2007, Plaintiff instituted the Suit seeking recovery of possession of the suit premises and also demanded arrears of rent of Rs.76,800/-. The Defendant appeared in the Suit and filed written statement contesting the claim of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff amended the Suit by incorporating additional pleadings relating to nuisance/annoyance. The Plaintiff also added the ground of bonafide requirement of his son for commencing hotel, lodging and boarding business. The Defendant filed additional written statement. Based on the pleadings, the Trial Court framed issues inter-alia relating to default in payment of rent, nuisance/annoyance, bonafide requirement, comparative hardship, etc. The mother of Plaintiff No.1 was added as Plaintiff No.2 in the Suit. Parties led evidence in support of their respective claims. Plaintiff No.1-Shabbir examined himself as PW1. Defendant- Purushottam Challwayya Shetti examined himself as DW1 in addition to examining Shriram Govind Vishnuprad as DW2, Ramkrishna Govind Jadhav as DW3 and Dagdu Sulbha Dhokale as DW4.

5) After considering the pleadings, documentary and oral evidence, the Trial Court proceeded to dismiss the Suit by judgment and order dated 11 June 2015 answering the issues of default in payment of rent, nuisance and annoyance and bonafide requirement against the Plaintiff. Petitioners/Plaintiffs filed Regular Civil Appeal No.371 of 2015 in the Court of District Judge, Pune, challenging the decree of the Trial Court. However, by judgment and order dated 16 March 2022, the Appellate Court has proceeded to dismiss the Appeal preferred by the Petitioners. Aggrieved by the decree passed by the Appellate Court confirming the judgment and order of the Trial Court, the Petitioners have filed the present Petition.

6) Mr. Sawant, the learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners would submit that the Trial and the Appellate Courts have grossly erred in dismissing the Plaintiffs’ Suit. He has mainly pressed the grounds of nuisance and annoyance and bonafide requirement for assailing the orders of the Trial and the Appellate Courts. Mr. Sawant would submit that the Plaintiffs had clearly proved cause of nuisance and annoyance by acts of Defendant. That Defendant is operating Lodge in the suit premises and has been permitting the same to be used for illegal and immoral purposes. That rooms in the lodge are proved to be let out for couple of hours for immoral purposes. That police action has been taken in respect of such use on several occasions. He submits that passages in the building are used for sleeping by the customers of the Defendant. That the acts of the Defendant are proved by production of photographs, which are admitted by the Defendant. Mr. Sawant has placed before me relevant photographs, which are admitted by the Defendant. That despite clear demonstration of nuisance /annoyance, the Trial and the Appellate Courts have erroneously rejected the said ground. He relies on judgments of this Court in M/s. Impex (India) Limited V/s. Mr. Dinashah Jal Daruwala and Ors.(Writ Petition No.2748 of 2004, decided on 4 April 2024.) and Gulam Husain Mirza V/s. Laxmidas Premji and Another(1984 Mh.L.J. 215) in support of his contention that indecency and unpleasurable behaviour amounts to nuisance and annoyance. He also relies on judgment of this Court in Mahadevo Murlidhar Ambekar V/s. Smt. Padmini wd/o. Venkatesh Joshi and Ors.(1995 SCC OnLine Bom 468.)

7) Mr. Sawant further submits that mere compromise of the previous suit bearing Civil Suit No.502 of 1990 does not mean that the ground of nuisance / annoyance is closed forever for the Plaintiffs. That in respect of acts caused subsequent to compromise of previous suit, fresh suit is maintainable on the ground of annoyance/nuisance. He relies on judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kanahaiya Lal Arya V/s. Md. Ehshan and others(2025 SCC OnLine SC 432) in support of his contention that a compromise decree does not mean that landlord has given up his rights in eviction proceedings in future.

8) So far as the ground of bonafide requirement is concerned, Mr. Sawant submits that the Trial and the Appellate courts have egregiously erred in rejecting the said ground. That mere compromise of Civil Suit No.502 of 1990 by father of Plaintiff No.1 does not mean that the Plaintiffs are debarred from raising the ground of bonafide requirement in future. That the bonafide requirement pleaded in the previous Suit was that of Plaintiff No.1 whereas an altogether different need of son of Plaintiff No.1 was pleaded and demonstrated in the current Suit. He submits that the son of Plaintiff No.1 is desirous of operating a business of hotel, lodging and boarding and there are no other premises available for conducting the said business of his son. He submits that the Trial Court has erroneously rejected the ground of bonafide requirement on account of non-disclosure of possession of residential premises. That the Plaintiffs are not expected to disclose possession of premises, which cannot be put to use for the purpose for which the Suit is filed. He relies on judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Murlidhar Aggarwal (D.) Thr. His LR Atul Kumar Aggarwal V/s. Mahendra Pratap Kakan (D.) Thr. LRs and Ors.(Civil Appeal No.4275 of 2017 decided on 24 April 2025.) in support of his contention that bonafide requirement also covers requirement of family members of landlord. He relies on judgment of this Court in Balwant P. Doshi V/s. Shantaben Dhirajlal Shah and another(2002 SCC OnLine Bom 585) in support of his contention that the landlord need not establish dire necessity and demonstration of some need in respect of the premises is sufficient.

9) Lastly Mr. Sawant relies on judgment of this Court in Bansilal Dattatraya Madiwale V/s. Dhondopant Balkrishana Kulkarni(2005 SCC OnLine Bom 811) in support of his contention that tenant cannot dictate terms to the landlords about management of subject premises. On above broad submissions, Mr. Sawant would pray for setting aside the orders passed by the Trial and the Appellate Courts and for decreeing the Suit.

10) Mr. Chandrachood, the learned counsel appearing for Respondent opposes the Petition submitting that the Trial and the Appellate Courts have concurrently rejected all the three grounds of default in payment of rent, nuisance/annoyance and bonafide requirement. That there is no warrant for interference in concurrent findings recorded by both the Courts. That in exercise of writ jurisdiction, this Court is not expected to re-appreciate the evidence or to arrive at a finding different than the one recorded by the Trial and the Appellate Courts. That there is no perversity in the findings recorded by the two Courts. In support, he relies on judgments of the Apex Court in Babhubhai Raichand Oswal V/s. Laxmikant R. Tarte and Another(AIR 1975 SC 1297) and Ajay Singh V/s. Khacheru and Others((2025) 3 SCC 266)

11) Mr. Chandrachood further submits that the Plaintiffs approached the Court with false case of bonafide requirement. That earlier suit filed in the year 1990 expressing same bonafide requirement has been compromised by father of Plaintiff No.1. That therefore the Plaintiffs are precluded from setting forth the same bonafide requirement of son of Plaintiff No.1. That the Defendant cannot be subjected to multiple suits expressing bonafide requirement of operation of business of son and grandson of original landlord. He submits that the Trial and the Appellate Courts have rightly held that the Plaintiffs are in possession of several other premises, which were deliberately suppressed. That it is Plaintiffs’ duty to disclose possession of all the premises when bonafide need is pleaded. Without prejudice, he submits that the Plaintiffs have secured possession of the entire building at CTS No.186, Budhwar Peth. He relies on possession receipt in respect of premises admeasuring 1500 sq.ft. at CTS No.186 Budhwar Peth. That the said premises are commercial and can be used for operating hotel business. However, instead of commencing the hotel business by Plaintiff’s son, the Plaintiffs have given the units in the said building by executing seven leave and license agreements to third parties showing absence of any bonafide need.

12) So far as the ground of nuisance/annoyance is concerned, Mr. Chandrachood submits that the ground was mischievously raised by the Plaintiffs. That the complaint was not filed with any authorities or with the Defendant in respect of alleged nuisance/annoyance and the ground was directly raised in the Plaint. That the suit premises are being used for the business of running lodge for several years. That the premises are located in one of the busiest areas in Pune city and patrons of the Defendant have not caused any nuisance or annoyance to the Plaintiffs. That same ground of nuisance/annoyance was given up by compromising Suit No.502 of 1990 by father of Plaintiff No.1. That fresh Suit based on same allegations could not have been filed. He submits that mere admission of photographs does not mean that contents thereof are admitted. That in any case, photographs do not indicate cause of any nuisance/annoyance. Mr. Chandrachood accordingly prays for dismissal of the Petition.

13) Rival contentions urged on behalf of the parties now fall for my consideration.

14) The Plaintiffs instituted Suit for recovery of possession of the suit premises from Defendant on three grounds of default in payment of rent, nuisance/annoyance and bonafide requirement. All the three grounds are concurrently rejected by the Trial and the Appellate Courts. Mr. Sawant has not canvassed any submissions with regard to the rejection of ground of default in payment of rent. His criticism to the findings recorded by the Trial and the Appellate Courts essentially revolve around the grounds of bonafide requirement and nuisance/annoyance. I accordingly proceed to examine the challenge raised by the Petitioners to the concurrent findings recorded by the Trial and the Appellate Courts on the grounds of bonafide requirement and nuisance/annoyance.

15) So far as the ground of bonafide requirement is concerned, the same was not originally raised when the Suit was filed in the year 2007. The ground of bonafide requirement was added by amending the Plaint. After amending the Plaint, the Plaintiff No.1 pleaded that his son Mohammed Shabbir Kachwala was studying in 12th standard and was desirous of commencing hotel, lodging and boarding business after securing education in Hotel Management. It appears that father of Plaintiff No.1 had also filed Suit No.502 of 1990 seeking eviction of father of the Defendant. At that time bonafide requirement of the Plaintiff No.1 was pleaded by stating that Plaintiff No. 1 was desirous of conducting lodging business in the suit premises. However, Civil Suit No.502 of 1990 was compromised thereby giving up the ground of bonafide requirement of the Plaintiff No.1 to conduct lodging business in the suit premises. However, merely because Civil Suit No.502 of 1990 was compromised, such compromise did not prevent the Plaintiff from setting up an altogether different need of his son to conduct business in the suit premises. However, it appears that the Plaintiff No.1 did not examine his son for proving son’s bonafide requirement. The Trial Court has accused Plaintiffs of withholding the best evidence in the form of deposition of the person, who needed the premises for bonafide requirement. It also appears that no evidence was produced to prove that the son of Plaintiff No.1 secured degree in Hotel Management. In the Plaint it was vaguely pleaded that son of Plaintiff No.1 was in the 12th standard and was desirous of securing degree in Hotel Management.

16) It is well settled position that bonafide requirement of Plaintiff must continue throughout currency of proceedings. The Respondent/Defendant has brought on record possession receipt dated 5 February 2026 executed by Hitendra and Shailesh Prataprai Mehta, who are proprietors of M/s. P.D. Brothers and who have surrendered possession of shop admeasuring 1500 sq.ft. at CTS No.186 Budhwar Peth to the Plaintiffs. It appears that the Plaintiffs had filed Suit No.289 of 2007 against M/s. P.D. Brothers for recovery of possession of the said premises. M/s. P.D. Brothers lost upto this Court and thereafter gave up possession of the premises on 5 February 2026. Mr. Sawant has not disputed the fact that possession of the premises of M/s. P.D. Brothers is secured by the Plaintiffs. Mr. Chandrachood has also placed on record copies of Leave and License Agreements executed by the Plaintiffs by which smaller portions of recovered premises from M/s. P.D. Brothers are granted on leave and license by the Plaintiffs. Here again, Mr. Sawant fairly does not dispute the position that Plaintiffs had granted licenses in respect of the premises secured from M/s. P.D. Brothers. Thus, the son of Plaintiff No.1 had an opportunity of commencing lodging business in the premises recovered from M/s. P.D. Brothers. However, instead of doing so, Plaintiffs have granted licenses in respect of the said recovered premises, showing absence of any real need for his son’s business.

17) Considering the above position, it does not appear that there is any genuine need of the Plaintiffs in respect of the suit premises. What is expressed in the Plaint is a mere fanciful wish or a mere ipse dixit. I am therefore, not inclined to interfere in the concurrent findings relating to issue of bonafide requirement and comparative hardship.

18) Coming to the ground of nuisance/annoyance, it is seen that this was the main ground raised by the Plaintiffs in the Suit right since inception. The Plaintiffs reside on the fourth floor of the building in which Defendant conducts lodging business on ground, first and second floors. The Plaintiffs specifically pleaded the case of availability of only one staircase to lead to their residence and how acts of the Defendant and his patrons caused obstruction, nuisance and annoyance to the Plaintiffs and his family members. The Plaintiffs also pleaded that Defendant is permitting his patrons to occupy passage area and other common spaces in the building for sleeping in the night. They also complained of several illegal and immoral activities by the patrons of the Defendant. They pleaded that Defendant’s patrons used to bring girls in the rooms, which are let out on two hourly basis. They also pleaded that Defendant’s patrons consumed liquor in the common passages, played cards and quarreled in loud noise. Plaintiffs complained that the mother, wife and unmarried daughter reside in the suit premises and that they face inconvenience, nuisance/annoyance on account of conduct of the Defendant and his patrons. By amending the Suit, the Plaintiffs added several other facets of nuisance /annoyance caused by the Defendant and his patrons. The Plaintiff No.1 examined himself and led evidence about acts of the Defendant and his patrons. Additionally, he produced photographs in respect of the suit premises and the building. Though he did not examine the photographer, the Defendant admitted that the photographs are of the suit premises. Thus, ample evidence was available before the Trial Court for examining the ground of nuisance / annoyance.

19) The Trial Court has recorded contradictory findings about the photographs produced by the Plaintiffs. In paragraph 70 of the judgment, the Trial Court has held that except his oral testimony, there was no evidence to prove that photographs were taken by the Plaintiff through his own device and or that they are of the suit premises. It is held in paragraph 70 as under:

                   70] The plaintiff though filed the photographs (Exh. 172 to 197 and Exh. 121 to 125), still he has not proved the same, (Exh. 172 to 197) as per the provisions of the Evidence Act. He though deposed that, he himself has drawn that photographs, still except his oral testimony, there is nothing on record, to prove that, the same were drawn by him, by his own devise and they are of the suit premises. Moreover, during his cross-examination, the plaintiff Shabbir has candidly admitted that, from the photographs filed below list Exh. 161, it is difficult to say that, the said photographs are of which place. He though voluntarily stated that, they are the photographs of suit premises, but there is nothing on record to support his said version, and there is also no pleadings in this respect.

20) However, in paragraph 72 of the judgment, the Trial Court has recorded finding about the Defendant not only admitting the photographs but also the fact that they pertain to the suit premises. It is held in paragraph 74 as under:-

                   74) The Defendant though admitted the photographs (Exh.121 to 125), and stated that, they are of the suit premises, still after going through the said photographs also, it is crystal clear that, they nowhere disclosed any fact of obstruction or nuisance, on the part of the defendant. Therefore, they are also not helpful to the plaintiff, though they are admitted one.

21) Mr. Sawant has placed before me the concerned photographs, which were produced during the course of trial. Photographs indicate persons sleeping in the passages. The photographs also indicate cots being placed in the common areas. Photographs also indicate large volume of litter being thrown in various portions of common spaces. There are disturbing photographs of persons lying/sleeping in the toilets. Photographs depict the manner in which the suit premises are used by the Defendant and his patrons. That the suit premises are supposed to be used for operation of lodge. One photograph shows at least 7 persons sleeping on mattresses in an extremely narrow space.

22) It is shocking that despite inviting attention of the Trial Court to those photographs, it has proceeded to record a finding that the photographs by themselves do not prove any act of obstruction or nuisance on the part of the Defendant. More shocking are the findings recorded by the Trial Court in paragraph 66 of the judgment, in which the Trial Court has held that once the suit premises are let out for operation of lodge, the Plaintiffs must bear the acts of Defendant’s patrons. It is held in paragraph 66 of the judgment as under:-

                   66. It is necessary to mention here that, the father of the plaintiff had given the suit premises on rent, to the father of defendant, for doing the business of lodging. It means that, the father of plaintiff was well aware, about the future consequences if any to be happened, in the lodge, still he let out the suit premises for the said purpose, and thereafter also made compromise, with him in the suit, by enhancing the rent. Therefore this fact itself speak volumes, about the intention of the father of the plaintiff, so also the present plaintiff, and therefore, I do not find any substance, in the evidence adduced by the plaintiff, in this respect.

23) The Trial and the Appellate Courts ought to have appreciated that any act of the Defendant or his patrons, which generates an unpleasant feeling for Plaintiffs or their family members would constitute nuisance or annoyance. In M/s. Impex (India) Limited (supra) this Court has discussed ratio of several judgments on the issue of nuisance and annoyance. In that case, even the act of constructing a wall in the open land behind tenanted premises thereby blocking access of Plaintiff therein and enjoyment of open land was treated as nuisance and annoyance. By relying on judgment of this Court in Gulam Husain Mirza (supra) this Court held that any material interference with the ordinary comfort of existence would constitute nuisance and the act that disturbs the reasonable peace of ordinary person and leads to unpleasurable feeling would be annoyance. This Court held in paragraphs 92(iv) and 93 as under:

                   92)

                   iv. Mr. Khambata has relied on judgment of this Court in Gulam Husain Mirza (supra), in which a Single Judge of this Court has dealt with validity of eviction decree passed against the tenant under Section 13(1)(c) of the Bombay Rent Act. The landlords in that case were occupants of second floor premises in the same building and the tenant occupied three rooms on the third floor and one room called the terrace room on the top floor. The landlord complained of the tenant trespassing on the entire terrace on the top floor of the building and alleged that the tenant was using the entire terrace as a part of his exclusive property by putting stones, mud, flowering plants etc. The question before the Single Judge of this Court was whether such conduct was covered by the words “nuisance” or “annoyance”. This Court held in paras-13, 14, 16 and 19 as under :

                   13. In Walter v. Gelfe, 20 LJ Ch 435, Knight-Bruce V.C. observed that the nuisance is an inconvenience materially interfering with the ordinary comfort physically of human existence, not merely according to elegant or dainty modes and habits of living, but according to plain and sober simple notions among the English people. This test was approved in the case of Tod-Heatley v. Benham, 40 Ch.D. 80, Talbot, J. in Gunard and Wife v. Antifyre Ltd., (1933) 1 KB 555 observed that private nuisance could be confined to that which is injurious to property. In Read v. Lyons & Co. Ltd., (1945) KB 216, Winfield's proposition that the nuisance is the unlawful interference with a person's use of enjoyment of land, or some right over or in connection with it was cited with approval and was further affirmed in other cases, such as Howard v. Walker, (1947) 2 All ER 197, and Newcastle- under Lyne Corporation v. Wolstanton Ltd., (1947) Ch. 92. In Buller v. Standard Telephones and Cables Ltd., (1940) 1 KB 399 injurious encroachment by the roots of a tree going underneath a house was treated to be an actionable nuisance. In Harrison v. Good, LR 11 Eq. 338 Becon V.C. observed that unless the nuisance complained of is one for which an indictment would lie, or an action could be maintained, it is no nuisance within the terms of the convenient which was being considered and further found that the establishment of a national school with playground for boys in the vicinity of a residential property would not be a nuisance, though it would be an annoyance. Lindley L.J. in Tod-Heatley v. Benham referring to those cases thought that the term appeared to be restrictively interrupted while Bowen L.J. doubted the correctness of the interpreted. The decision of the learned Lord Justice in Tod-Heatley v. Benhman, goes to show that the term "annoyance" is also of very side amplitude. Cotton, Lord Justice asked now what is the meaning of annoyance? The meaning is that which annoys, that which raises objection after and unpleasant feeling. Anything which raises an objection, in the minds of reasonable men may be an annoyance within the meaning of the covenant, while Bowen Lord Justice observed that it implies more, as it seems, then nuisance and further stated that it was clear that if annoyance and nuisance were put together in a convenient of the kind which was being considered, it should mean something different from each other. The learned Lord Justice further observed :

                   "Any material interference with the ordinary comfort of existence; that would be a nuisance... "Annoyance" is a wider term than nuisance, and if you find a thing which reasonably troubles the mind and pleasure, not of a fanciful person or of a skilled person who knows the truth, but of the ordinary sensible English inhabitant of a house-if you find there is anything which disturbs his reasonable peace of mind, that seems to me to be annoyance although it may not appear to amount to physical detriment to comfort."

                   14. Therefore, whatever causes material interference with the ordinary comfort of existence would be nuisance and anything that disturbs the reasonable peace of ordinary person and leads to unpleasurable feeling, would be annoyance. Jessel M.R. In Watson v. Loasington College, 25 SJ 30, said that it might perhaps be difficult to appreciate the difference between "nuisance" and "annoyance", but as both words were used, "annoyance," evidently meant something less than "nuisance", while Tod-Heatley v. Benham (supra), "annoyance" was treated to have a wider meaning than "nuisance".

                   16. Thus, the legal comprehension that encompasses these terms appears to be well-settled. Though the terms are of very wide amplitude covering variety of circumstances and cannot be fenced by any definite meaning, whatever causes material interference with the ordinary comfort of human existence would, surely be the nuisance, while that which annoys, irritates or is offensive and has tendency that would evoke reasonable injection and leading to unpleasant feeling amongst persons, would be annoyance.

                   19. As the section itself shows, it is the conduct that thereunder comes in issue. While considering nuisance and annoyance, that conduct on behaviour complained of will have to be objectively appreciated. It may have relation either to the rights and enjoyment of the property or other rights and entitlements of persons who, as ordinary men, are entitled to have peaceful, trouble free and ordinarily comfortable situation. These entitlements are basic in human society. These are to be judged by the given standard or norms available in such society, a given conduct adversely affects such entitlement or encroaches there upon, then the conduct would be within the mischief of the clause. One must hasten to add that the phrase employed by the statute being of wider amplitude, there is always a possibility of overstraining the meaning so as to

                   include even the trifle and trivial matters. That is why every conduct should be judged in the context, and fairly. Without being elaborate and exhaustive, it can safely be said that all that conduct which is offensive, quarrelsome or violent, unethical in just a position of peaceful, civil and by ordinary standard unethical would be within the mischief. Matters of physical assaults by one against other would attract squarely the clause so also to other types of subtle assaults that offend human senses. Such acts may affect the peace and interfere with the pleasurable enjoyment of the property and, consequently, be within them mischief. Similarly, cases where property is trespassed upon and appropriated to one's own use to the exclusion of others' entitlement would be within the mischief of nuisance. Whenever question arises under the clause, first the conduct or behaviour that is in issue should be fairly and objectively ascertained and then, secondly, its effect in relation either to the property or the persons occupying the property should be taken into account All this should be done in keeping with the social background of the given society, having norms of reasonable peace, comfort and enjoyment as well as in the light of the entitlements of the occupiers regarding the specific property. Having considered all these three aspect, if the conclusion is reached that the conduct was such which affected or tended to affect the reasonable entitlements of ordinary normal expectations of life, then all that this clause intends would be clearly answered.

                   Thus in Gulam Husain Mirza, this Court by referring to various English cases held that the term “nuisance” is of wide amplitude. This Court therefore held that whatever causes material interference with the ordinary comfort of human existence would be nuisance and acts that disturbs the reasonable peace of ordinary person and leads to unpleasant feeling, would be annoyance. This Court further held that cases where property is trespassed upon and appropriated to one’s own use to the exclusion of others’ entitlement, would be within the mischief of nuisance. This Court therefore held that the conduct of tenant in trespassing on the entire boundaries and putting the same to his exclusive use caused nuisance and annoyance to the landlord.

                   93) Thus, from various judgments cited on the issue of nuisance and annoyance, it can be inferred that every act of tenant which interferes with landlord’s right to use or occupy his property would amount to actionable nuisance. In Gulam Husain Mirza this Court has gone to the extent of holding that every act of a tenant which disturbs the reasonable peace of ordinary person and which leads to unpleasurable feeling would constitute nuisance or annoyance. No doubt in Awabai Muncharji Cama the Single Judge of this Court (S.K. Desai, J.) has struck a sort of discordant note qua the observations in Gulam Husain Mirza, but the learned Judge himself has clarified that his observations are obiter. It therefore cannot be contended that in Awabai Mansarji Cama, S.K. Desai, J. disagreed with the view taken by Masodkar, J. in Gulam Husain Mirza. Infact, A.M. Khanwilkar, J. has subsequently followed Gulam Husain Mirza’s decision in D.V. Panse. I am therefore of the view that every act of tenant which seeks to interfere with landlord’s peaceful use and occupation of his property would constitute nuisance and annoyance, especially when the landlords property adjoins that of tenanted premises. A tenant cannot trespass upon landlord’s property, obstruct him from using his own property and then contend that the same does not constitute nuisance or annoyance. A tenant has no business to interfere with landlord’s use and enjoyment of his own property and if he does so, his act would be covered in the mischief of nuisance and annoyance.

                   (emphasis added)

24) The judgment in Impex (India) Limited is followed by this Court in Jayprakash Dnyaydeo Narkar V/s. Damji Ramji Shah and Ors.(Civil Revision Application No.224 of 2024, decided on 23 July 2024.) in which this Court has held that even the act of tenant organising demonstrations/morcha would constitute acts of nuisance and annoyance. This Court held in paragraph 23 of the judgment as under:

                   23) Thus, in Gulam Husain Mirza, D.V. Panse (Major) and another V/s. Laxminarayan Khar and another,((2002) 4Mah LJ 190) and Impex India Ltd. a view has been taken that every act of tenant, which seeks to interfere with the landlord’s peaceful use and occupation of the property would constitute nuisance and annoyance. In the present case, the first Defendant has admittedly organized morchas, demonstrations and protests in front of shop of the Plaintiffs. He has thus, interfered with landlord’s peaceful use and occupation of his property. Therefore, the acts of the first Defendant do constitute nuisance and annoyance. I therefore, do not find any palpable error in the concurrent findings of facts recorded by the Small Causes Court and the Appellate Bench on the issue of nuisance and annoyance.

25) In the present case, the Plaintiffs have proved by production of cogent evidence that the Defendant and his patrons have caused nuisance and annoyance to the Plaintiffs and to their family members. The Trial and the Appellate Courts have committed gross errors in turning a blind eye to the voluminous evidence on record and have erroneously expected the Plaintiffs to examine supporting or independent witnesses. If nuisance is suffered by the Plaintiff No. 1 himself, why he should produce any ‘independent’ witness is incomprehensible. Deposition of Plaintiff No. 1 about acts of nuisance and annoyance would be direct evidence.

26) In their pleadings and evidence, the Plaintiffs have given following instances of nuisance and annoyance and had relied on documents in support, which are recorded in paragraphs 53 to 55 of the Trial Court’s order:

                   53] He further stated that, the defendant used to give the rooms to the customers, for two hours for immoral purpose, and has kept the counter and water tank, in the way of his house, and has created obstruction. The lodgers used to wander in the lodge, in few clothes on their person, which has caused nuisance to him and his family members. Therefore he is suffering great mental agony and is unable to find the match for his daughter to fix her marriage. He has drawn the photographs of the articles, and the lodgers, by his own mobile phone. The act of the defendant is constant source of nuisance and annoyance to him, and his family members.

                   54] To support his testimony, he also filed on record the certified copy of arrest panchanama (Exh. 73, 74), copy of chargesheet (Exh.75), photographs (Exh. 121 to 125 and 172 to 197), news item (Exh. 210), complaint made to commissioner (Exh. 167 and 170), acknowledgment (Exh. 168), under posting certificate (Exh. 169), information received from information officer – Article 32 to 37. Notice issued by Corporation to defendant (Exh. 201) etc.

                   55] The Learned counsel for the plaintiff also argued that, the defendant is allowing the lodgers to do immoral activities, in the lodge. The lodgers used to gamble in the lodge and used to make hue and cry. They also wanders with less clothes on their person, and used to keep the bottles of liquor in the passage. The defendant has also kept his counter and the dustbin in the passage, and caused obstruction and inconvenience to the plaintiff and his family members, in using the staircase. All these acts on the part of the defendant are nuisance and annoyance. The plaintiff himself has snapped the photographs of the same, and has proved the same. Therefore, it is duly proved that, the defendant has caused nuisance and annoyance to the plaintiff, and his family members.

27) Instead of examining whether there is an element of truth in the allegations levelled by the Plaintiffs, the Trial Court essentially looked into the allegations through the prism of the act of father of Plaintiff No.1 in filing Civil Suit No. 502 of 1990 and compromising the same. The act of father of Plaintiff No.1 compromising the Civil Suit No. 502 of 1990 is considered as the main ground for not accepting the allegations of nuisance and annoyance. This is clear from following findings of the Trial Court in paragraphs 64 and 65:

                   64] Therefore considering the document (Exh. 93) filed on record, which is also admitted to the plaintiff, it is crystal clear that, the father of the plaintiff, though had alleged the act of nuisance and annoyance, against the father of defendant, still had relinquished his claim of possession, on the count of enhancement of rent. Therefore it is clear that, the earlier suit was filed only with intent to get more rent from the defendant's father, and infact there was no instance of nuisance and annoyance. If really, there was such nuisance and annoyance, then certainly, on the count of enhancement of rent only, the father of the defendant, would not have withdrawn that suit. Therefore, it is clear that, the pleadings in respect of nuisance and annoyance were made, only for the sake of making ground for eviction of the father of the defendant.

                   65] As in the present suit also, same instances have been repeated in verbatim, therefore it is crystal clear that, the ground of nuisance and annoyance has been pleaded by the plaintiff, only to create ground, for filing the present suit for eviction, and nothing more than that. Therefore this fact itself is sufficient, to accept the defence and the evidence, put forth by the defendant.

28) Civil Suit No. 502 of 1990 was compromised on 16 August 1994 whereas Civil Suit No.419 of 2007 was filed 13 yrs later on 21 July 2007. Mere withdrawal of the earlier suit raising the ground of nuisance / annoyance cannot be a reason enough for inferring that the ground of nuisance/annoyance is given up forever. Civil Suit No. 419 of 2007 has been filed in respect of acts of nuisance and annoyance committed after compromise of the earlier Suit. In that view of the matter, the Trial Court could not have laid emphasis on the factum of father of Plaintiff No.1 filing previous Suit and compromising the same on 16 August 1994. It is another matter that the parties to the said Suit were also entirely different. That suit was filed by father of Plaintiff No.1 against Defendant’s father and accordingly the acts of nuisance/annoyance upto the period of 1990 were relatable to Defendant’s father. As against this, Civil Suit No. 419 of 2007 is filed against Defendant in respect of acts committed by him and his patrons after compromise of Civil Suit No. 502 of 1990. Thus, the entire approach of the Trial Court in dealing with the ground of nuisance and annoyance is totally faulty.

29) There is a jurisdictional error committed by the Trial Court in not deciding the grounds of nuisance and annoyance purely on the basis of evidence appearing before it and by rejecting the same only on the count of compromise of the previous suit by father of Plaintiff No.1 in the year 1994. It was the duty of the Trial Court to decide the ground of nuisance and annoyance only on the basis of evidence produced before it and exercise of jurisdiction by the Trial Court is clearly with material irregularity. Instead of correcting the error committed by the Trial Court, the Appellate Court has decided the Appeal relating to the ground of nuisance and annoyance in a perfunctory manner. It expected the Plaintiffs to examine other witnesses (apart from the Plaintiff No. 1) to prove the ground of nuisance. This expectation by the Appellate Court (and by the Trial Court as well) is misplaced when Plaintiff No. 1 himself has suffered nuisance and annoyance. Under Section 16(1)(c) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (MRC Act) the tenant attracts ground for eviction if he is held guilty of conduct which is nuisance or annoyance to the adjoining or neighbouring occupiers. Section 16(1) (c) of the MRC Act provides thus:-

                    16. When landlord may recover possession.

                   (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act but subject to the provisions of section 25, a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the court is satisfied

                   xxx

                   (c) that the tenant, his agent, servant, persons inducted by tenant or claiming under the tenant or, any person residing with the tenant has been guilty of conduct which is a nuisance or annoyance to the adjoining or neighboring occupier, or has been convicted of using the premises or allowing the premises to be used for immoral or illegal purposes or that the tenant has in respect of the premises been convicted of an offence of contravention of any of the provisions of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 394 or of section 394A of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, or of subsection (1) or of section 376 or of section 376A of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949, or of section 229 of the City of Nagpur Municipal Corporation Act, 1948; or of section 280 or of section 281 of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965; or

30) It is well settled position that the expression ‘adjoining or neighboring occupier’ used in Section 16(1)(c) includes even the landlord if he is occupying the neighbouring or adjoining premises. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgment of this Court in Sorab Jamshed Irani and Ors. V/s. Hiraji C. Mistry and Others(MANU/MH/0611/1981). In fact, in Impex (India) Ltd. (supra), this Court has held that even if landlord holding adjoining property, though not physically residing in the adjoining property, he can complain of nuisance and annoyance caused by the tenant. In the present case, Plaintiffs are residents of fourth floor of the building in which the suit premises are situated. The building is mainly occupied by the Defendant-tenant as the suit premises are spread across ground, first and second floors of the building. The acts of nuisance/annoyance described above are also suffered by Plaintiffs themselves. Therefore, no corroboration is necessary in respect of sufferance of nuisance and annoyance by the Plaintiffs themselves.

31) The Appellate Court has also erroneously discarded the photographs on the ground that the photographer is not examined, which finding goes against the position that the Defendant has admitted that the photographs pertain to the suit premises. This is how despite availability of direct evidence in the form of testimony of the Petitioner supported by the photographs, the Trial and the Appellate Courts have turned a blind eye to the same and are swayed by the factum of Defendant operating lodge in the suit premises for 50 years and father of Plaintiff No.1 withdrawing the previous Suit filed against Defendant’s father.

32) Plaintiffs are the owners of the suit premises and are residents of the same building. When the landlord residing in the same building approaches the Court with the complaint that the acts of the Defendant have caused nuisance/annoyance and that the Plaintiff is a sufferer of such acts, the Courts need to lean in favour of the Plaintiff once there is some evidence to support the allegations. Sufferance of nuisance/annoyance by a person is a state of mind. Everything that affects the ordinary comfort of a person would be nuisance. Every act of tenant which interferes with landlord’s right to use or occupy his property would amount to actionable nuisance and every act of a tenant which disturbs the reasonable peace of ordinary person and which leads to unpleasurable feeling would constitute nuisance or annoyance. A particular act may be acceptable for one person but may cause inconvenience or unpleasant feeling for another. In the present case, Plaintiffs have been continuously suffering the acts attributable to the Defendant and his patrons where they are found to be sleeping in the corridors, obstructing passages/staircases, consuming liquor in the common corridors, playing cards, indulging in immoral activities etc. Merely because Defendant has been operating the lodge for 50 years, the same cannot be a justification for insisting that Plaintiffs must continue to suffer the acts of the Defendant. Plaintiffs ultimately are the owners of the suit premises. On account of rent control protection, Defendant is able to occupy substantially large premises on payment of paltry rent of Rs.2350/- inclusive of property taxes. Defendant is thus profiteering by operating a lodge and by renting out suit premises to outsiders at the cost of the Plaintiffs. He may be entitled in law to do so. But the least that is expected of the Defendant is to strictly observe the terms and conditions of tenancy. If in the process of his profit-making activities, Defendant causes nuisance and annoyance to the Plaintiff, he must be directed to vacate possession of the premises. In the present case, the acts of the Defendant undoubtedly constitute a continuous source of nuisance and mental disturbance for the Plaintiffs and for their family members. Despite clearly establishing the acts of nuisance/annoyance on the part of the Defendant, the Trial and Appellate Courts have erroneously rejected the same bv exercising their jurisdiction with material irregularity.

33) Mr. Chandrachood has attempted to impress upon this Court that concurrent findings cannot be disturbed in exercise of writ jurisdiction and has relied on judgment of the Apex Court in Ajay Singh (supra) and Babhubhai Raichand Oswal (supra). However, in the present case, the findings of the Trial and Appellate Courts on the issue of nuisance/annoyance are not being reversed by this Court by undertaking the exercise of re-appreciation of evidence. This Court has arrived at the conclusion that exercise of jurisdiction by both the Courts is faulty. The findings recorded by them are such that no fair-minded person would ever record the same. The findings recorded are not plausible findings. Despite being presented with voluminous evidence of Defendant and his patrons continuously committing the acts of nuisance and annoyance, both the Courts have ignored the vital evidence on record and have recorded perverse findings. The photographs indicate the manner in which the lodge is operated by the Defendant. The photographs indicate that Defendant and his patrons sleep in the corridor/staircase, throw litter in the common areas, etc which acts constitute nuisance and annoyance to the Plaintiffs and family members residing on fourth floor of the same building. Therefore, for arriving at the finding of establishment of ground of nuisance/annoyance, exercise of reappreciation of evidence is not necessary. The manner in which the enquiry is conducted by both the Courts is faulty and therefore this Court would be justified in interfering in perverse and implausible findings recorded by the Trial and the Appellate Courts on the issue of nuisance/annoyance.

34) Mr. Chandrachood has relied on judgment of Gujarat High Court in Gaurishankar Vs. Bhikhalal Chhaganlal and others (AIR 1978 Gujarat 72) in which it is held that quarrels between wives of tenants did not amount to nuisance or annoyance. The judgment has no application to the facts of the present case where nuisance and annoyance is caused by the Defendant and his customers by various acts of sleeping in the corridors/staircase, throwing litter in common spaces, indulging in consumption of liquor, playing cards and other immoral activities both inside and outside the lodge as well as in the common areas.

35) Considering the overall conspectus of the case I am of the view that the concurrent findings recorded by the Trial and the Appellate Courts on the issue of default in payment of rent and bonafide requirement do not warrant interference. However, the findings recorded by the both the Courts on the issue of nuisance/annoyance clearly warrants interference by this Court. The ground of nuisance/annoyance is clearly established for the purpose of decreeing the Suit of the Plaintiffs. To that extent, the judgments and orders passed by the Trial and the Appellate Court need to be set aside.

36) I accordingly proceed to pass the following order:

                   (i) Judgment and order dated 11 June 2015 passed by Additional Judge, Small Causes Court, Pune in Civil Suit No.419 of 2007 and judgment and order dated 16 March 2022 passed by the District Judge-22, Pune, in Regular Civil Appeal No.371 of 2015 are set aside.

                   (ii) Civil Suit No. 419 of 2007 is decreed on the ground of nuisance and annoyance under Section 16(1)(c) of the MRC Act.

                   (iii) Defendant/Respondent shall accordingly handover possession of the suit premises to the Plaintiffs within a period of 3 months.

37) With the above direction, the Writ Petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no orders as to costs.