Gadi Praveen Kumar, J.

1. Heard Mr.Amaragani Malsoor Goud, learned counsel representing Mr.Karunakar Reddy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr.S.Pradeep Kumar, learned Government Pleader attached to the Office of the Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents.

2. The present Writ Petition is filed to direct respondent No.3 to produce the alleged detenu and order for his release after declaring the impugned detention order dated 26.05.2025 passed by respondent No.2 classifying the alleged detenu as a ‘land grabber’ as defined under Section 2(j) of the Telangana Prevention Of Dangerous Activities of Boot-Leggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders Land-Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertiliser Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document Offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders And White Collar Or Financial Offenders Act, 1986 (for short ‘the Act, 1986) as confirmed by respondent No.1 vide G.O.Rt.No.901 General Administration (Spl. (Law and Order) Department) dated 07.07.2025 as arbitrary.

3. The brief facts of the case are that the husband of the petitioner/alleged detenu was engaged in a real estate business mediating transactions between land owners and prospective purchasers, earning commission, and at times entering into agreements and registered sale deeds for subsequent sale. During the course of such business, several disputes arose and gradually the persons, who are inimical towards the alleged detenu foisted false cases against him with an intention to gain advantage in land disputes.

4. It is further the case of the petitioner that the detenu was earlier implicated in a false murder case in Crime No.90 of 2005 of Khammam II-Town Police Station, wherein he was sentenced to undergo life imprisonment but was subsequently acquitted from the said case, on merits. After his release in 2016, the same inimical persons, under the apprehension of retaliation, again foisted false cases, including six offences in the year 2024, in which the detenu was granted bail and released on 07.02.2025.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned detention order dated 26.05.2025 has been initiated alleging that the activities of the detenu are prejudicial to the public order and tranquility in the locality, referring to the six (6) incidents wherein the detenu was shown as accused, which are alleged to have taken place in the year, 2024. It is contended that there is absolutely no material evidence to establish the direct involvement of the alleged detenu in the said crimes and the detaining authority failed to verify the records which may be construed that the detaining authorities have not applied the mind while passing the impugned detention order.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the grounds of detention are still under investigation, no charge sheets have been filed, and reliance is placed on alleged confessions, which are inadmissible in law. It is further contended that the detention order was passed without any real incident affecting public order, and merely to invoke preventive detention, thereby infringing the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution.

7. It is further submitted that there is no proximity or live nexus between the alleged incidents of 2024 and the impugned order of detention, and that the authorities failed to pursue ordinary legal remedies such as opposing or seeking cancellation of bail. It was contended that the cases, at best, pertain to law and order issues and not public order, therefore, the competent criminal courts are sufficient to deal with the same. The allegations that the alleged detenu’s release caused panic in society are denied as baseless.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that detention order is based on vague, stale and remote incidents and was passed mechanically without proper scrutiny of records. Relevant material was neither placed before the detaining authority nor furnished to the alleged detenu, impairing his right to make an effective representation. The classification of the alleged detenu as a “land grabber” under Section 2(j) of the Act is without basis, and the reliance on police confessions further evidences non-application of mind. The cases which are referred under the grounds can be curable by way of regular mechanism and not under the special enactments.

9. Learned counsel for the petitioner further states that Section 3(2) of the Act, 1986 empowers the Government to pass a detention order in respect of boot-legger, dacoit, drug-offender, goonda, immoral traffic offender or land grabber with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

10. It is contended that even if the Government intends to detain a person for the maximum permissible period of twelve (12) months, the statutory scheme mandates an initial detention order for three (3) months followed by successive extension orders, each not exceeding three (3) months. Such requirement of periodic review and extension has a clear legislative purpose and cannot be dispensed with.

11. Therefore, it is argued that the Government cannot, in one stroke, direct or extend the detention up to the maximum period of twelve (12) months, ignoring the mandatory procedural safeguard embedded in the statute. On this ground alone, the impugned detention order is liable to be set aside.

12. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contends that the alleged detenu has been released on bail in all four (4) crimes referred to by respondent No.2 in the impugned detention order and no applications for cancellation of bail have been filed. Therefore, it is contended that the release of the alleged detenu does not affect public order in a manner that warrants detention under the impugned order.

13. Learned counsel for the petitioner, regarding the period of detention, relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Cherukuri Mani v. Chief Secretary Government of A.P (2014 (3) ALT (CRI) (SC) 257 (D.B.)) wherein it was held that the Legislature has specifically provided the mechanism “Advisory Board” to review the detention of a person. Passing a detention order for a period of twelve months at a stretch, without proper review, is deterrent to the rights of the detenue.

14. On the other hand, Sri S.Pradeep Kumar, learned Government Pleader appearing for respondents submitted that the Act, 1986 empowers the detaining authority to pass an order of detention upon subjective satisfaction that such person is acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The impugned detention order was duly confirmed by the Government under Section 12 of the Act after obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Board, thereby complying with all statutory requirements. Therefore, unless declared illegal by a competent Court, the action of the 2nd respondent cannot be found fault with.

15. The learned counsel submits that the detenu was in fact convicted in a murder case in S.C. No. 209/2006 arising out of Crime No. 90/2005 and sentenced to life imprisonment, and was later released in 2016 on amnesty, and not acquitted as alleged. It is further contended that the detenu has a long criminal history, having been involved in 25 offences prior to 2024 and convicted in more than one case, and thereafter continued to indulge in unlawful activities including extortion of money from landowners by intimidation.

16. It is submitted that during the year 2024, the alleged detenu committed a series of six (06) offences involving criminal trespass, land encroachment, causing grievous hurt, criminal intimidation, and property damage. Out of these, four cases were taken as grounds for detention and two as antecedents. The learned counsel has placed reliance on FIRs, witness statements, confession statements, remand case diary, bail proceedings, and official records including municipal notices, to establish the involvement of the detenu.

17. The learned counsel further submits that in each of the four (04) ground cases, which were committed in a gap of approximately 3 and half months, the detenu indulged in acts of illegal land grabbing, violent attacks, intimidation, and obstruction of lawful activities. His conduct included assaulting public servants with iron rods, threatening landowners with death, forcibly encroaching lands, damaging property, and acting in an organized manner with accomplices, thereby creating fear, insecurity, and disturbance to public peace and tranquility in the locality.

18. It is further contended that the detenu is a habitual offender whose activities fall within the definition of “land grabber” under the Act, 1986 and his actions are not mere law and order issues but have a direct bearing on public order, affecting the community at large. The learned counsel asserts that ordinary criminal law proved ineffective in deterring his conduct, and despite bail being opposed by the prosecution, the detenu was released, restoring the detenu’s operational freedom and capacity to act upon the well-established pattern of coercive land control through organized violence, creating an imminent possibility of repetition of offences, thereby necessitating preventive detention.

19. Learned Government Pleader submits that all procedural safeguards were duly followed, relevant material was placed before and considered by the detaining authority, and the detenu was furnished with the grounds of detention and informed of his right to representation. It is contended that the detention is based on proximate and relevant incidents of 2024, with a clear nexus to the order, and is neither vague nor stale.

20. Learned Government Pleader relying upon the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India and others ((1991) 1 SCC 128) and Banka Sneha Sheela v. State of Telangana and others ((2021) 9 SCC 415), contended that preventive detention is a precautionary measure distinct from prosecution, and can be invoked even during pendency of criminal cases. It is thus submitted that the detention order is legal, valid, and passed with due application of mind, and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

21. We have given our earnest consideration to the pleaders submitted on either side.

22. Upon careful consideration of the material placed on record, this court finds that though the respondents contend that the detention order has been passed upon due subjective satisfaction under the Act, 1986 and confirmed by the Government after obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Board, such satisfaction must necessarily be founded upon cogent material demonstrating that the activities of the alleged detenu are prejudicial to the maintenance of “public order”. The mere existence of criminal cases, by itself, would not justify invocation of preventive detention unless the threshold of public order is clearly met.

23. Insofar as the contention of the respondents regarding the criminal antecedents of the alleged detenu and his involvement in multiple cases is concerned, it is to be noted that the alleged detenu was already enlarged on bail in the said cases and are pending before the concerned courts. Further, no material is placed to show that the prosecution sought cancellation of bail or that the ordinary criminal law remedies were found inadequate after being duly exhausted. The failure to pursue such remedies assumes significance, as preventive detention is not intended to supplant the ordinary criminal process but to be invoked only when such process proves ineffective.

24. The distinction between “law and order” and “public order” assumes crucial importance in the present case. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Nenavathi Bujji and others ((2024) 17 SCC 294) while referring to the case in Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal((1969) 1 SCC 10) held as under:

               “The contravention of any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. In this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which will affect public order comes within the scope of the Act.”

               Therefore, mere contravention of law affecting specific individuals does not ipso facto amount to disturbance of public order unless it affects the community or public at large. The incidents relied upon by the respondents, even if accepted, predominantly arise out of land disputes and individual grievances, and do not convincingly demonstrate a pervasive impact on society so as to warrant classification under “public order”.

25. The reliance placed by the respondents on various materials such as FIRs, witness statements, and alleged confessional statements does not, in the considered opinion of this Court, sufficiently establish a live and proximate link between the alleged acts and disturbance of public order. The contention of the petitioner that such materials were either not properly considered or not effectively furnished for making a meaningful representation cannot be brushed aside lightly, as it touches upon the procedural safeguards guaranteed under the Constitution.

26. With regard to the contention relating to the period of detention, this Court takes note of the following legal position laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Pesala Nookaraju v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh ((2023) 14 SCC 641), wherein it was held :

               “when the State Government passes a confirmatory order under Section 12 of the Act after receipt of the report from the Advisory Board then, such a confirmatory order need not be restricted to a period of three months only. It can be beyond a period of three months from the date of initial order of detention, but up to a maximum period of twelve months from the date of detention.”

               Therefore, the extension of detention up to twelve months, in itself, cannot be faulted and does not vitiate the impugned order.

27. The submission of the respondents that the detenu is a habitual offender and falls within the definition of “land grabber” under the Act also does not, on the material available, conclusively satisfy the statutory requirements. The allegations appear to stem from localized disputes, which are amenable to adjudication under ordinary law. Preventive detention, being an exceptional measure, cannot be invoked as a substitute for regular criminal proceedings.

28. This Court also notes that while a counter affidavit and supporting material have been placed on record by the respondents, the matter does not appear to have been presented with the degree of clarity and assistance expected in cases involving deprivation of personal liberty. Mere production of records, without effectively establishing their nexus to the statutory requirements, would not suffice to sustain an order of detention.

29. Accordingly, in view of the fact that the detention period is due to expire on 26.05.2026, this Court is of the considered opinion that the continued detention of the alleged detenu cannot be sustained. It is always open to the respondents to pursue the pending criminal cases before the competent courts in accordance with law. However, it is needless to observe that the alleged detenu should be vigilant and careful in future.

30. Accordingly, the impugned detention order is set aside, and the Writ Petition is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.

Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall also stand closed.