Hiten S. Venegavkar, J.

1. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. With consent of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, the Petition is taken up for final disposal at the stage of admission.

2. The Petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking quashing and setting aside of the appointment order dated 23rd March, 2026 issued by Savitribai Phule Pune University in favour of Respondent No.6, Dr.Manohar Kachuru Sanap, appointing him to the post of Registrar of the University. The Petitioner has further sought a direction to the University to appoint a suitable candidate to the post of Registrar from the list of eligible candidates published on 15th May, 2024 after excluding the name of Respondent No.6 from the said list. The Petition, therefore, though framed as a challenge to the appointment of Respondent No.6, substantially seeks intervention in the recruitment process for the post of Registrar and, indirectly, reopening of the selection made by the University.

3. Facts as stated by the Petitioner in the Petition are as under:

                   (a) The Petitioner is working as Associate Professor and Head of the Department of Chemistry on grant-in-aid basis in Progressive Education Society’s Modern College of Arts, Science and Commerce. He holds B.Sc., M.Sc. and Ph.D. degrees and has qualified the CSIR-UGC Junior Research Fellowship/National Eligibility Test as well as the Maharashtra State Eligibility Test. The Petitioner was originally appointed as Lecturer in Chemistry by order dated 31st December, 2001, and his appointment was approved by the University with effect from 1st January 2002. The Petitioner also states that he was appointed as a member of the Senate of the University under Section 28 of the Maharashtra Public Universities Act, 2016 by communication dated 10th January, 2023.

                   (b) The Petitioner further contended that Savitribai Phule Pune University issued an advertisement dated 1st February, 2024 inviting applications for appointment to the post of Registrar. The Petitioner, after obtaining permission and No Objection from his management, applied for the said post. His application was acknowledged by the University and on 15th May, 2024, the University published a list of eligible and non-eligible candidates in which the Petitioner’s name appeared at serial no.14 in the list of eligible candidates. He was thereafter called for interview by communication dated 20th June, 2024 and appeared for the interview and the required presentation on 11th July, 2024. According to the Petitioner, thereafter no intimation was given to him for a considerable period and he subsequently learnt that Respondent No.6 had been appointed as Registrar by order dated 23rd March, 2026.

                   (c) The principal grievance of the Petitioner is that Respondent No.6 could not have been appointed because disciplinary proceedings had been initiated against him by Respondent No.4, Modern Education Society. The Petitioner relies upon a charge-sheet dated 2ndAugust, 2024 and an Additional charge-sheet dated 13th December, 2024 issued to Respondent No.6. The Petitioner contends that the allegations pertained to complaints made by women teachers and that Respondent No.6 had suppressed material facts from the University. It is further submitted that the appointment order itself required Respondent No.6 to submit a declaration that no vigilance, disciplinary or departmental proceeding was pending or proposed against him. According to the Petitioner, since the charge-sheet had already been issued before the appointment order, Respondent No.6 was disqualified or, at any rate, unsuitable for appointment. Reliance is placed by Petitioner on the judgment in Union of India vs. K.V. Jankiraman ((1991) 4 SCC 109), for the proposition that disciplinary proceedings are treated as having commenced when a charge-sheet is issued. The Petitioner also contends that Respondent No.4 had revoked the No objection certificate earlier granted in favour of Respondent No.6, and therefore, one of the mandatory conditions of the advertisement was not satisfied.

4. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the University, being an instrumentality performing public functions, was bound to act fairly, reasonably and in accordance with the statutory scheme. It was argued that the University was aware of the proceedings against Respondent No.6, particularly because Respondent No.6 had earlier challenged his suspension before this Court in Writ Petition No.11237 of 2024. The Petitioner submits that though the suspension was set aside by judgment dated 20th January, 2025 on the ground of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure, this Court had not interdicted the disciplinary proceedings and had permitted the management to take them to their logical end. It was therefore submitted that the University could not have proceeded to appoint Respondent No.6 despite the pendency of those proceedings. It was further urged that the appointment was made after an unexplained delay of about nineteen months from the date of interview, which, according to the Petitioner, casts doubt on the fairness of the selection process. For all the above reasons and factual circumstances the learned Advocate for the Petitioner submitted that the Petition deserves to be allowed and the appointment of Respondent No.6 is liable to be quashed and set aside with direction to University to appoint other suitable candidate from the eligibility list published by the University during the process of selection.

5. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for Respondent No.6 raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the Petition. He submitted that the Petitioner has no locus standi to file this Petition. It was pointed out that the Petitioner has not sought a Writ of Quo Warranto in proper form, nor has he demonstrated that Respondent No.6 lacked the statutory qualifications prescribed for the post of Registrar. The challenge, according to Respondent No.6, is not founded on any clear statutory prohibition but on disputed allegations, pending disciplinary proceedings and the Petitioner’s dissatisfaction with the selection. It was further submitted that the Petitioner has not prayed for his own appointment and has merely sought a vague direction that some other suitable candidate from the list be appointed after excluding Respondent No.6. Such a prayer, it is submitted, cannot be granted in exercise of writ jurisdiction.

6. Having considered the rival submissions, we are of the view that the Petition must fail at the threshold on the ground of maintainability and locus of the Petitioner. The Petitioner was one of the candidates who participated in the selection process. He was found eligible, was called for interview and was considered for the appointment. His grievance is not that he was excluded from consideration. His grievance is that another candidate, namely Respondent No.6, has been appointed. The Petitioner does not assert any enforceable right to be appointed as Registrar, nor could he do so merely because his name appeared in the list of eligible candidates. It is settled that inclusion in an eligibility list, select list or zone of consideration does not confer an indefeasible right to appointment. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shankarsan Dash vs. Union of India ((1991) 3 SCC 47), held that even a selected candidate does not acquire an indefeasible right to appointment unless the relevant rules create such a right; the State or public authority may, for bonafide reasons, decide not to fill a post or not to appoint a particular candidate. The Petitioner’s case stands on an even weaker footing. He was not even selected. He was only held eligible to participate. Eligibility to compete is not a right to appointment. Once the Petitioner participated in the process, appeared before the selection body and failed to secure appointment, the Court cannot convert his disappointment into a cause of action unless he demonstrates violation of statutory rules, malafides specifically pleaded and substantiated, or denial of equal consideration. No such case is made out. General allegations that the process “smacks of malafides” cannot substitute pleadings of legal malafides, particulars of bias, or proof that the selection authority acted for an extraneous purpose.

7. The relief sought in the prayer clause seeking appointment of a “suitable candidate” from the list of eligible candidates after excluding Respondent No.6 is also legally unsustainable. This Court cannot assume the role of the selection committee. In service and academic appointments, judicial review is concerned with the decision making process and not with comparative assessment of merit. In R.K. Jain vs. Union of India ((1993) 4 SCC 119), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that evaluation of comparative merit in such appointments is not ordinarily justiciable, and the Court cannot sit in appeal over the wisdom of the appointing authority when the selected person possesses the prescribed qualifications. The same principle has been reiterated in subsequent decisions dealing with Writs in Quo Warranto.

8. The Petitioner has attempted to present the Petition as one involving public law illegality. However, in substance, it remains a service selection dispute by an unsuccessful candidate. In Dr.Duryodhan Sahu vs. Jitendra Kumar Mishra ((1998) 7 SCC 273), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that public interest litigations in service matters are not maintainable, save in exceptional cases such as a properly constituted Writ of Quo Warranto. The Petitioner cannot therefore maintain a representative or public interest challenge to the appointment merely because he is a member of the Senate or because he participated in the recruitment process. His legal standing must be founded on an enforceable personal right or on the narrow jurisdiction of Quo Warranto. Neither foundation is available here.

9. The law relating to Quo Warranto is well settled. A Writ of Quo Warranto lies where the holder of a public office is shown to be occupying that office without legal authority, normally because the appointment is contrary to statutory provisions or because the appointee lacks the essential statutory qualifications. In University of Mysore vs. C.D. Govinda Rao (AIR 1965 SC 491), the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained that Quo Warranto is a limited judicial enquiry into the authority by which a person holds a public office and is intended to prevent usurpation of public office contrary to law. In B. Srinivasa Reddy vs. Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board Employees’ Association, (2006) (11 SCC 731 (2)), the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that a Writ of Quo Warranto cannot be issued unless there is a clear violation of law in the appointment.

10. Tested on this principle, the Petitioner has not shown that Respondent No.6 lacked the statutory educational qualifications or experience prescribed for the post of Registrar. The challenge is founded mainly on the pendency of disciplinary proceedings, allegations contained in charge-sheets, newspaper reports, complaints and the alleged suppression of facts. These matters may be relevant for the employer or appointing authority to consider in accordance with the applicable service conditions. They do not, by themselves, establish that Respondent No.6 is a usurper of a public office. A pending charge-sheet is not the same as a finding of guilt. The Court cannot, in a collateral petition filed by an unsuccessful candidate, adjudicate upon the truth of the allegations forming part of disciplinary proceedings pending between Respondent No.6 and his employer.

11. The reliance placed on K.V. Jankiraman does not advance the Petitioner’s case beyond a limited point. That decision explains when disciplinary proceedings are treated as pending for purposes of sealed cover procedure and service benefits. It does not lay down an absolute rule that a person against whom a charge-sheet has been issued is rendered ineligible for every public appointment. Whether pendency of disciplinary proceedings operates as a bar depends upon the governing statute, recruitment rules, advertisement conditions and the nature of the appointment. The Petitioner has not pointed out any statutory provision under the Maharashtra Public Universities Act, 2016 or any binding statute which declares that mere pendency of disciplinary proceedings by a previous employer automatically disqualifies a candidate from appointment as Registrar. The condition in the appointment order requiring a declaration is a condition to be complied with by the appointee and to be examined by the appointing authority. It cannot be converted by another unsuccessful candidate into an independent right to seek appointment of someone else.

12. The contention based on revocation of the No objection certificate also does not create locus in favour of the Petitioner. Whether the No objection certificate was validly revoked, whether such revocation was communicated in time, whether it was required at the stage of application or at the stage of joining, and what consequence must follow are matters between the University, Respondent No.6 and the previous employer. These questions may arise in an appropriate proceeding by a person directly affected or by the appointing authority itself. They cannot be used by the Petitioner to secure a roving enquiry into the appointment process when he has not demonstrated any personal legal right to the post.

13. We also cannot ignore the reliefs claimed in the Petition. The Petitioner does not seek his own appointment. He does not pray before the Court to declare that he was next in merit or that he alone was entitled to be appointed. He asks the Court to exclude Respondent No.6 and direct appointment of a suitable candidate from the eligible list. Such a prayer is inherently vague and incapable of enforcement. Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not permit the Court to direct a public university to appoint an unspecified person from a list merely because the Petitioner objects to the selected candidate. The Court cannot substitute the statutory authority’s choice with its own or compel a fresh comparative assessment without a demonstrated breach of statutory prescription.

14. Another Submission of the Petitioner that the delay between the interview and issuance of the appointment order also needs to be consider. This delay may appear unusual, but delay by itself does not establish illegality. In the absence of a statutory time limit shown to have been violated, and in the absence of pleadings establishing prejudice to a legal right of the Petitioner, the Court cannot quash the appointment merely because it was made after a considerable period. Administrative delay may call for explanation in an appropriate case, but it does not confer any right upon every unsuccessful candidate to reopen a completed selection process.

15. We are also conscious that Respondent No.6 has separately instituted proceedings challenging certain conditions in the appointment order in this Court and we have heard the same before hearing the present Petition. The existence of that proceeding does not improve the Petitioner’s locus. If Respondent No.6 is aggrieved by conditions imposed on him, he may or he has pursued his remedies. If the University is of the view that any declaration is false or that any condition is breached, it is open to the University to act in accordance with law. If the disciplinary authority concludes the proceedings against Respondent No.6 and such conclusion has legal consequences, those consequences may follow under the relevant rules. We express no opinion on those issues. Our conclusion is confined to the maintainability of the present Petition at the instance of the Petitioner.

16. For these reasons, we hold that the Petitioner has failed to establish locus standi to maintain the present Petition. The Petition is substantially a service selection challenge by an unsuccessful candidate who has no indefeasible right to appointment and who seeks a vague direction for appointment of some other candidate. Such a Petition cannot be entertained under Article 226 of the Constitution.

17. The Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed.

18. Rule is discharged.

19. There shall be no order as to costs. Nothing stated in this judgment, nor shall any observation herein be treated as an expression on the merits of the disciplinary proceedings pending against Respondent No.6 or upon the Writ Petition filed and pending before this Court and both shall be decided on its own merits.