1. This application is filed by the applicants who are also plaintiffs in Suit No.642 of 2015 (2015 Suit). The applicant is referred in the present order as “Meteor”.
2. Suit No.2519 of 2008 (2008 Suit) is filed by M/s. Venus Habitat and is referred to as “Venus” in the present order.
3. The present application is filed for consolidation of the above two Suits namely, 2015 Suit and 2008 Suit.
NATURE OF 2008 SUIT
4. 2008 Suit is filed by Venus against various defendants for a declaration of ownership and for handing over possession of suit property at Village Juhu, Taluka Andheri, Mumbai. The present applicants are not the parties to the 2008 Suit. Evidence in 2008 Suit is completed and the suit is listed for hearing. The reason for filing this Suit was that the defendants therein were holding out themselves as owners of the suit property.
NATURE OF 2015 SUIT
5. 2015 Suit is filed by Meteor against various defendants including Venus for a declaration of ownership and possession of same suit property as that of 2008 Suit, namely property at Village Juhu, Taluka Andheri, Mumbai. Except for defendant no.1 in 2015 Suit, all other defendants in 2015 Suit are also parties in 2008 Suit. Plaintiffs in 2008 Suit are defendant nos.4 and 5 /5 (a) in 2015 Suit. Evidence in 2015 Suit has not begun but on 31 January 2019 Suit against all defendants, except defendant nos.4 and 5, is transferred to list of undefended suits.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPLICANT-METEOR
6. Mr. Andhyarujina, learned senior counsel for the applicants submits that the main prayer clause in 2015 Suit filed by Meteor is for a direction that Meteor may be declared as sole and absolute owner of the suit property viz., plot of land bearing Survey No.39, Hissa No.1, C.T.S. No.507, admeasuring 3040 sq. mtr. at Village Juhu, Taluka Andheri, Mumbai and further for a declaration that sale deed dated 23 July 1985 with respect to the said suit property is lawful, valid, subsisting and binding upon the defendants and further for a declaration that Meteor is in lawful possession of the suit property. In the 2015 Suit, Venus has been impleaded as defendant No.4 and Tanveer Merchant as defendant No.5 and 5(a). These defendants are plaintiffs in the 2008 Suit, but present applicants- Meteor is not a party to 2008 Suit, though on 1 April 2015, the proceedings of 2015 Suit were served on Venus.
7. Learned senior counsel thereafter relied upon the prayers in 2008 Suit, which deals with the same property which is described above and interalia for a declaration that the plaintiffs therein be declared as owners of the suit property and further possession be handed over to them.
8. Learned senior counsel, thereafter, relied upon paragraphs 6 to 9 of 2008 Suit and submitted that the cause of action of 2008 Suit deals with the same property which was purchased by Merchant, Doshi and Bafna from Allams by documents dated 10 January 1989, 21 March 1989, 31 March 1989 and 28 March 1989 and thereafter was transferred to the firm “Venus” by Merchant, Doshi and Bafna as partners. There was further reconstitution of the firm on account of retirement and admission of the partners.
9. Learned senior counsel compared the cause of action of 2008 Suit with the cause of action of 2015 Suit and submitted the same is with respect to the same property under a registered document dated 23 July 1985 executed by Allams. He further submitted that applicants are in possession of the suit property. Allams are common parties in all the above documents.
10. Learned senior counsel, thereafter, relied upon the following decisions which lays down the guidelines/parameters for considering the application for consolidation/transfer of suit from one Court to another.
i. Chitivalasa Jute Mills vs. Jaypee Rewa Cement((2004) 3 SCC 85),
ii. Kulwinder Kaur Alias Kulwinder Gurcharan Singh vs. Kandi Friends Education Trust & Ors.((2008) 3 SCC 659)
iii. Prem Lala Nahata and Anr. vs. Chandi Prasad Sikaria,((2007) 2 SCC 551)
iv. Gurdeepsingh s/o Gopalsingh Bagga & Ors. vs. Gurucharansingh s/o Gopalsingh Bagga & Ors.(2014 (3) Mh. L. J. 935)
v. S. C. Jain vs. Bindeshwari Devi,(1997 (42) DRJ 239)
11. On a query raised by this Court, as to why the applicants filed the suit in 2015, learned senior counsel brought to my attention paragraphs 19, 30, 31 of 2015 Suit and contended that it was only after they discovered the fraud and after obtaining certified copies in 2015, that the suit came to be filed.
12. Learned senior counsel, thereafter, submitted that issues in 2008 Suit were framed on 7 February 2014. Affidavit in evidence of PW-1 was filed on 13 August 2014. Documents in the 2008 Suit were marked on 13 October 2014, consent terms between the plaintiffs and defendant No.3 and defendant No.11 were filed on 28 November 2016 (which was after the 2015 Suit was served on Venus on 1 April 2015). The evidence-in-chief of PW-1 was closed on 27 January 2020 and consent terms between defendant no.1 and plaintiffs in 2008 Suit was filed on 25 September 2025. He submitted that 2008 Suit is a collusive suit filed by the parties based on the above dates and events.
13. Learned counsel submitted that insofar as 2015 Suit is concerned, defendant Nos.4 and 5 are also plaintiffs in 2008 Suit and these are the only parties who are contesting in 2015 Suit and therefore, the suit is substantially between the same parties.
14. He further, fairly, admits that there is a delay of around 10 years after the suit having been filed in 2015 in taking out the present consolidation application and for which the Court can put the applicants to terms and conditions and no justification is pleaded for such a delay in the present application.
15. Learned senior counsel further submitted that the Court can direct the applicants and plaintiffs in 2015 Suit for expediting the framing of issues, evidence etc. so that both the suits can be heard together. He further submitted that Venus should have taken appropriate steps for making Meteor a party in 2008 Suit after the suit was served on Venus on 1 April 2015.
16. In view of above, he submitted that since the contesting parties are substantially same, the suit properties are same and final and effective order in 2008 Suit cannot be passed without there being consolidation of 2015 Suit, therefore, by relying upon the above decisions he prayed that the Interim Application be allowed.
SUBMISSIONS OF RESPONDENT NOS.4 AND 5 “VENUS”
17. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Shah submitted that cause of action in 2008 Suit and 2015 Suit are different and even the transactions are different. In 2008 Suit, the cause of action arises out of impersonification by defendants therein claiming to be the owner of the property, whereas the cause of action in 2015 is the allegation of being collusive. The learned senior counsel further submitted that the test of “mirror image” relevant for the purpose of consolidation fails in the present case.
18. Learned senior counsel, further submitted that discretion under Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 should not be exercised in the present case, since the application has been filed after a delay of 10 years from the date of filing the suit without any explanation for the delay. This conduct deprives the applicants for seeking any relief from this Court.
19. The learned senior counsel, thereafter, distinguished the judgments relied upon by the applicants on the ground that in those cases the applications were filed within less than three years and the transactions were same or interlinked. He submitted that the facts in the 2008 Suit and 2015 Suit are different and the application has been filed after 10 years and therefore these judgments are not applicable.
20. Learned senior counsel, has also taken me through various dates and events of 2008 Suit to contend that the cause of action and the transaction in both the suits are different.
21. Learned senior counsel, therefore, vehemently opposed and prayed for dismissal of the Interim Application.
SUBMISSIONS OF DEFENDANT NO.2-KIRAN MISHRA
22. Mr. Kumar, learned counsel submitted that though by order dated 31 January 2019, suit against defendant No.2 is transferred to the list of undefended suits, since the present proceedings have been served on him he should be entitled to make his submissions.
23. Learned counsel submits that the applicants did not make any application for impleadment in 2008 Suit and, therefore, to overcome limitation the present suit and the interim application have been filed. He further submitted that the cause of action is different in both the suits. Evidence, issues, documents etc. will be different in both the suits and, therefore, the order of consolidation should not be passed. He further submitted that a decree binds the parties to the proceedings and not to third party and in the instant case, the applicants are not parties to 2008 Suit and therefore any decree passed therein will not bind the applicants in 2015 Suit. In any case, the applicants can always challenge the order passed in 2008 Suit in appeal by taking leave of the Court to challenge the same on the ground that they were not parties. He, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the interim application.
REJOINDER OF THE APPLICANT-METEOR
24. Mr. Andhyarujina, learned senior counsel submits that cause of action is a bundle of events and in this case Allams are common persons in both the suits from whom the respective plaintiffs have purchased the property. He further submitted that the case as pleaded in 2015 Suit is collusion amongst the defendants, whereas it is the case of the plaintiffs in 2008 Suit that the documents of the plaintiffs in 2015 Suit are fabricated. He, therefore, submitted that in that sense both the suits are interlinked.
25. Learned counsel further submitted that in both the suits there is a prayer of respective plaintiffs to be declared as owners with respect to the same property and since the findings on ownership would be in rem, it would be in the interest of justice that the consolidation application should be allowed.
26. Learned senior counsel, further submitted that the possibility of contradictory decrees being passed in both the suits, if the consolidation is not allowed, cannot be ruled out. He further submitted that the test of mirror image is not a straight jacket formula and there could be various other factors which the Court can consider for consolidation or for laying down any procedure by which the suits can be heard together to avoid any conflicting decrees.
27. Learned senior counsel, further, submitted that if according to the plaintiff in 2008 Suit, the cause of action was that of an impersonator then when 2015 Suit was served whereby the applicants were claiming ownership rights then it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs in 2008 Suit to make an appropriate application to implead the present applicant, which they have failed to do.
28. Learned counsel, therefore, submitted that the applicants can be put to terms so that the evidence can be completed within reasonable time and both the suits can be heard together to avoid any conflict.
29. I have heard Mr. Andhyarujina, learned senior counsel for the applicant, Mr. Shailesh Shah, learned senior counsel for respondent Nos.4 and 5 and Mr. Kumar, learned counsel for defendant No.2.
30. At the outset, the parties agree that this Court will have to look at 2008 Suit papers and proceedings for adjudicating the present application taken out in 2015 Suit though Suit of 2008 does not pertain to the roster of the present Court.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS:
31. At the outset, the applicants filed 2015 Suit for a prayer to be declared as owners with respect to the suit property in the year 2015. Thereafter, no steps were taken for consolidation of the 2015 Suit with 2008 Suit, though they were aware of the same. In the application also, there is no reason given for the delay of more than 10 years in filing the present application. The applicant is a company engaged in the business of development of real estate and ought to have been vigilant and should have taken steps quickly after filing the 2015 Suit for either impleadment in the 2008 Suit or should have filed the present application in 2015 itself. This conduct of the applicant cannot be approved. There is no justification for such a long delay of 10 years, irrespective of whether there is any time limit, for filing such an application, provided under the Limitation Act or not. Even if there is no time limit, it has to be within reasonable time and this belated application does not pass the test of having been filed within reasonable time and moreso without any explanation for such a long delay. A litigant requesting the Court to exercise its inherent powers should have conducted itself in a more vigilant manner, than the conduct which is evident from the facts of the present application.
32. The 2015 Suit was served on the plaintiffs of 2008 Suit (defendant nos.4 and 5/5(a) in 2015 Suit) on 1 April 2015. The 2015 Suit specifically prayed for a declaration of ownership with regard to same suit property as that of 2008 Suit. If it is the case made out in 2008 Suit that the suit was filed for restraining impersonators who were claiming to be owners, then the plaintiffs in 2008 Suit (defendant nos.4 and 5/5(a) in 2015 Suit) should have also been more vigilant and should have taken immediate steps for impleading the present applicants as a party defendant in 2008 Suit. There is no reason given by the plaintiffs of 2008 Suit as to why they did not take out any appropriate application for impleadment of the present applicants, when the applicants had served the 2015 Suit claiming ownership rights of the same suit property. It is important to note that post service of 2015 Suit i.e. on 1 April 2015, 2008 Suit had come up on the board on various occasions, when the consent terms were filed, evidence-in-chief was tendered, evidence was led etc., but the plaintiffs in 2008 Suit did not inform the Court about the 2015 Suit having been served on them wherein a claim is made by the applicants herein to be declared as owners with respect to the same property which was the subject suit property of 2008 Suit. On a query being raised, learned senior counsel, Mr. Shah fairly admitted that this was never pointed out to the Court. In my view, the plaintiffs in 2008 Suit should have been fair and were duty bound to the Court and should have brought to the notice of the Court that the applicants have filed 2015 Suit for an identical relief. Therefore, in my view, even the conduct of the plaintiffs in 2008 Suit (defendant nos.4 and 5/5(a) in 2015 Suit) is not appreciable.
33. Both the contesting parties i.e. respective plaintiffs in 2008 Suit and 2015 Suit have not conducted themselves fairly before the Court. Having commented upon the conduct of both the parties, I now propose to analyse whether 2008 Suit and 2015 Suit can be consolidated or can be heard together.
34. The main prayer in 2008 Suit and 2015 Suit of the respective plaintiffs is for a declaration to declare themselves respectively as owners of the suit property. There is no dispute between both the parties that the suit property in both the suits is same. The contention of Mr. Shah that 2008 Suit is claiming ownership only qua the impersonator is not correct. The legal right of ownership is a right-in-rem and, therefore, when the prayer clause (a) in 2008 Suit is not qualified for a declaration of ownership qua only the impersonator, then it cannot be accepted that the prayer for ownership is restricted only qua the impersonator. The prayer as set out is a general prayer to be declared as owners of the suit property, which declaration would be a declaration in rem though applicants herein may not be a party to the 2008 Suit.
35. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sushil Kumar Agarwal versus Meenakshi Sadhu & Ors.((2019) 2 SCC 241), in paragraph 19 has observed that ownership consist of a complex rights, all of which are rights in rem, being enforceable against the world and not merely against specific persons. Therefore, in both the present suits where the declaration of ownership is prayed, it will amount to determination by the Court of rights in rem of the respective plaintiffs.
36. The contention of Mr. Shah that the cause of action for filing 2008 Suit was impersonation by the defendants therein and when 2015 Suit was served on them and in that suit the applicants herein made a prayer for a declaration of ownership with respect to the same property, then it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs in 2008 Suit to make the applicants herein as a party defendants in 2008 Suit since as per 2015 Suit, the applicants were also claiming ownership with respect to the same property. Therefore, though it is upon the plaintiff to decide whom he wants to make party to the suit, but if a claim of ownership is made in rem as observed by me above and 2015 Suit has been served then, in my view, it was necessary for the plaintiffs in 2008 Suit to make the applicants, a proper party, if not a necessary party. In the instant case as observed by me, plaintiffs in 2008 suit have not even informed the Court about 2015 Suit at any point of time.
37. The defendants in 2015 Suit are same as defendants as that in 2008 Suit except that in 2008 Suit, the applicants herein are not made party defendants, but the plaintiffs in 2008 Suit have been made defendant nos.4 and 5 in 2015 Suit. Also, defendant no.1 in 2015 Suit is not a party in 2008 Suit. As observed above, the suit property of which a declaration is sought of ownership by both the plaintiffs in their respective suit is of the same plot of land bearing Survey No.39, Hissa No.1, C.T.S. No.507, admeasuring 3040 square meters at village Juhu, Taluka Andheri, Mumbai and contesting parties in both the suits are substantially same. Therefore, to this extent certainly there is commonality between the two suits.
38. Both the plaintiffs in their respective suits have claimed that they have purchased the suit property from Allams and both the plaintiffs have pleaded that their respective agreements are registered though at different points of time. Therefore, for deciding the ownership of the plaintiffs in their respective suits, Allams are a common link between the two suits.
39. The real contesting parties as of now, at this stage is Meteor and Venus only qua the suit property.
40. Evidence in 2008 Suit is completed and the matter is ripe for final hearing. However, evidence in 2015 Suit has not yet commenced. Even the issues have not been framed. In my view and looking at the plaint of both the suits, the documents and the evidence would not be identical, though there may be to some extent some overlapping. Furthermore, 2008 Suit is based on allegation of impersonification whereas, 2015 Suit is based on collusion between the plaintiffs and defendants in 2008 Suit. Therefore, in my view, it would not be proper to consolidate these two suits on these facts.
41. The plaintiffs in 2008 Suit have also claimed possession of the suit property whereas, the plaintiffs in 2015 Suit have sought for a declaration that they are in legal and lawful possession of the suit property. If relief of possession in 2008 Suit is to be granted, then certainly prayer made in 2015 Suit that the plaintiffs therein are in valid possession will have to be considered. Therefore, 2008 Suit cannot be effectively decided without hearing 2015 Suit along with 2008 Suit. To that extent, certainly there would be interlinkage between the two suits.
42. In both the suits, respective plaintiffs have claimed a declaration of ownership with respect to the same suit property. Such a declaration in 2008 Suit is not qua impersonators only. The declaration of ownership would be a right in rem. There is every possibility that if both the suits are not heard together, then there could be contradictory decrees. It is possible that the Court may grant decree in terms of prayer clause (a) in 2008 Suit which deals with ownership and it is also possible that another Court while hearing 2015 Suit also may grant prayer clause (a) of 2015 Suit which deals with ownership. If such decrees are passed, then it would lead to a situation that with respect to the same property, two different Courts have declared two different persons as owners. It would, thereafter, be difficult to reconcile these two contradictory decrees. It is also possible that if 2008 Suit is decreed in terms of prayer clause (a), third party interest may be created by the plaintiffs in 2008 Suit and thereafter, 2015 Suit is decreed again in terms of prayer clause (a), then the repercussion would be multiplicity of future proceedings arising out of conflicting decrees involving various innocent parties and this Court do face multiple sale instances of same property day in and day out.
43. In my view, therefore, it would be in the interest of justice to avoid such contradictory decrees being passed and to prevent multiplicity of proceedings that 2015 Suit must be heard alongside 2008 Suit.
44. While deciding the above course of action, I have kept in my mind, the provisions of section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It is a procedural provision which enables a party to have the proceedings of a pending suit so conducted in a manner that is consistent with justice and equity. The Court under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure may adopt any procedure to attain justice, unless the same is expressly prohibited. In the instant case, though consolidation of suit cannot be granted, but certainly for ensuring consistency, equity, justice and avoiding future multiplicity of litigation, the most appropriate course of action would be to hear both the suits together.
45. It would also be in the interest of the plaintiffs in 2008 Suit (defendant nos.4 and 5/5(a) in 2015 Suit) that both the suits be heard together since even if they succeed in 2008 Suit, their titles to the ownership of the suit property will still be subject to the outcome of 2015 Suit wherein they are parties and in which the prayer sought by plaintiffs in 2015 Suit again relates to the ownership. Also, plaintiffs in 2008 Suit have prayed for possession which as per plaintiffs in 2015 Suit is with them. Therefore even from this angle, it would be in the interest of justice that these two suits should be heard together.
46. The evidence in 2008 Suit is complete whereas in 2015 Suit, the evidence has still not commenced but the evidence and other proceedings of 2015 Suit can be expedited so as to match and reach the stage at which 2008 Suit stands today. In my view, if certain directions are given to frame the issues and complete the evidence within certain reasonable period, then both the suits can reach at the same stage within reasonable time and after which they can be heard together without consolidation. This may delay the hearing of 2008 Suit, which is presently listed for hearing but could not be taken up as the matter had not reached. However, no prejudice would be caused and has been shown by Venus if 2015 Suit proceedings can be expedited to bring it to the same stage as that of the 2008 Suit and both Suits are heard together. There are many suits filed even before 2008 Suit which are ripped for hearing. On the contrary, if this course of action is adopted, then there would be effective disposal of both the suits as observed by me above.
47. To achieve this objective, the parties of 2015 Suit should cooperate with each other so that within a short period of time, the evidence can be completed and closed. Applicants have rested for 10 years and therefore should work on a war footing to match the level of 2008 Suit. I am not providing for consequences of non-completion of evidence by 31 December 2026 since I am confident that both the parties would respect the present order in letter and spirit.
48. The decisions relied upon by the applicants are not being discussed in the present order since the facts of the present case are different than that of the facts before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the High Court. The guidelines laid down by these judgments do not strictly apply in all respects to the present facts. Therefore, these judgments are not being discussed.
49. Based on the above analysis, I am of the view that though the application for consolidation of both the suits on the facts of the present case cannot be considered, however for the reasons mentioned above, 2015 Suit should be heard alongwith 2008 Suit.
50. Before parting, in this case, certainly and rightly the "mirror test” propounded by Mr. Shah, learned Senior counsel is not satisfied in the facts of the present case. However, the court cannot ignore the fact that there is only one mirror and two persons want to stand in front of that one mirror. Therefore, this Court, is of the view that in the interest of justice and equity, the Court should hear both the persons in succession so that the Court can decide who is the right person to stand in front of the mirror. The appropriate course of action would therefore be to permit the hearing of 2015 Suit alongside 2008 Suit. This course of action would be the most effective way of passing decree in both the suits.
51. I, therefore, propose to pass the following order :-
(i) Prayer for consolidation of the suit is rejected;
(ii) Proceedings of 2015 Suit relating to framing of issues, documents and evidence etc. to be expedited and completed on or before 31 December 2026. All the parties in the 2015 Suit should cooperate to achieve the said deadline;
(iii) After achieving the above deadline, 2015 Suit can be heard with 2008 Suit.
52. It is made clear that I have not expressed any views on the merits of both the suits and have discussed both the suits for the limited purpose of deciding the present application only.
53. Interim Application (L) No.8592 of 2026 is disposed of in above terms.




