(Prayer: Second Appeal fild under Section 100 CPC to set aside the Judgment and decree dated 24.02.2025 passed in the Appeal in A.S.No.2 of 2024 on the file of the Principal District and Sessions Court, Ramanathapuram confirming the Judgment and Decree dated 09.11.2018 passed in the suit in O.S.No.51 of 2009 on the file of the Subordinate Court, Ramanathpuram.)

1. The legal representatives of defendants 3 and 4 are the appellants in the present Second Appeal.

2. One Purusothaman, as the sole plaintiff, filed a suit in O.S. No. 51 of 2009 before the Sub Court, Ramanathapuram, for ejectment from the suit property and to hand over vacant possession. The suit was contested by the defendants, and the trial Court decreed the suit. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court, defendants 3 and 4 alone preferred an appeal before the Principal District and Sessions Court, Ramanathapuram. Both the defendants died, and their legal representatives were brought on record in A.S. No. 2 of 2024. After the conclusion of hearing in the first appeal, the first appellate Court concurred with the findings of the trial Court and dismissed the first appeal. Aggrieved by the concurrent findings, the legal representatives of the deceased 3rd defendant are the appellants in the present Second Appeal.

3. I have heard Mr. J. Bharathan, learned counsel for the appellants, and Mr. S. Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondents.

4. The Second Appeal has not been admitted, and arguments were heard finally.

5. Mr. J. Bharathan, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, would state that the courts below have failed to appreciate Exs.B1 to B3, which establish not only long and continuous possession, but also lawful possession in the hands of the defendants. He would further state that the documents, having been admitted without any objection, should have been looked into, and the courts below were clearly in error in not considering the said documents on the ground that there was no pleading with regard to them. He would also state that the trial Court did not even frame an issue with respect to the ownership of the suit property based on the sale deed marked as Ex. B10, and the first appellate Court also did not take necessary steps to rectify the said defect that had arisen before the trial Court. He would further state that the courts below have erroneously shifted the burden onto the defendants, instead of placing it on the plaintiff, who had approached the Court seeking the relief of recovery of possession. Inviting my attention to the substantial questions of law suggested, Mr.J.Bharathan, learned counsel for the appellants, would submit that the matter deserves a full hearing after admitting the Second Appeal on the said substantial questions of law.

6. Per contra, Mr. S. Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, would submit that the courts below have concurrently found that the plaintiff and also subsequent to his demise, his legal heirs, are entitled to the relief sought in the suit, and that the courts below have appreciated the oral and documentary evidence in a proper perspective. He would further submit that this Court, exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is not required to interfere with such findings as long as the said findings are not perverse, illegal, or improper. He would therefore pray for dismissal of the Second Appeal.

7. The brief facts that are necessary for a decision in the Second Appeal are as follows:

The plaintiff filed a suit for evicting the defendants from the suit property. An alternative prayer was also sought to declare the title of the plaintiff and his siblings, additionally, in the event of the Court not being satisfied with regard to the case of tenancy set up by the plaintiff. The suit was resisted by the defendants, contending that even prior to the filing of the suit, RCOP No. 5 of 2006 had been filed for evicting the defendants as if they were tenants, on the ground of willful default. However, the said RCOP No. 5 of 2006 was dismissed by the Rent Controller, holding that tenancy had not been proved. Thereafter alone, the suit has been filed, and since the order passed in the rent control proceedings has become final, the defendants contend that the suit is not maintainable. The defendants not only denied the tenancy agreement claimed by the plaintiff but also set up a plea of non-joinder of necessary parties and res judicata before the trial Court.

8. Before the trial Court, the plaintiff examined himself as PW-1 and marked Exs.A1 to A23. On the side of the defendants, the third defendant examined himself as DW-1, and one Vanithakumari Kirubabai was examined as DW-2. Ex.B1 to B10 were marked through DW-2. Through DW-2, Ex. C1, a certificate issued by the Commissioner of Ramanathapuram Municipality, was marked as a Court document.

9. On considering the pleadings and the oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court held that, since the order of the Rent Controller had become final, the plaintiff could not persist with the claim of tenancy, and the question of ejectment treating the defendants as tenants was unsustainable. However, taking note of the fact that defendants 3 and 4 were in possession of the property and that they were unable to prove any inherent right, title, or interest in the suit property, the trial Court found that the defendants were liable to vacate and hand over vacant possession to the plaintiff, and granted the alternative relief of declaration in favour of the plaintiff and his siblings, and consequently directed recovery of possession.

10. In the First Appeal, the first appellate Court held that the suit was not barred by res judicata in view of the dismissal of RCOP No. 5 of 2006. The findings of the first appellate Court in this regard are not perverse, and I do not find the said findings to be illegal so as to warrant interference in Second Appeal. The first appellate Court rightly held that when the tenant had denied title, the learned Rent Controller’s jurisdiction was very limited, and hence the dismissal of the RCOP on the ground that a landlord-tenant relationship has not been proved cannot bar for the filing of a regular civil suit for ejectment. The said findings do not call for any interference.

11. While considering the defence set up by the appellants, the first appellate Court further found that the defendants had not even traced title to the suit property by specific pleadings in the written statement. Examining Exs. A3, A5, and A12, the first appellate Court also found that the plaintiff’s father had acquired lawful right to the suit property. From Exs.A13 and A16, which are the judgment and decree in O.S. No. 10 of 1961, the first appellate Court found that a 1/4th share was granted to Kumaran Sethupathi, under whom the defendants claimed, along with his mother, and that it was only in respect of Item Nos. 2 and 20 of the “B” schedule property, and in all other respects the said suit in O.S. No. 10 of 1961 had been dismissed. Therefore, it has already been finally decided that the persons under whom the defendants claimed right themselves did not have any right in the suit property. The defence taken with regard to non-joinder, or that the defendants were in lawful and settled possession, was rightly rejected by the first appellate Court. The first appellate Court also found that one of the co-owners was entitled to seek the suit reliefs, and that it was not necessary for the siblings of the plaintiff to have joined him in filing the suit for declaration and ejectment, especially since the declaration of title was sought not only for the plaintiff but also for his siblings.

12. The first appellate Court also dealt with the additional documents that were filed pending the First Appeal, and rightly held that the said documents did not establish title in the hands of the defendants. In view of the above, I do not see any error committed by the first appellate Court in the appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, or in the findings arrived at based on the pleadings and evidence available on record. Hence, I do not see any scope for interference under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. None of the substantial questions of law suggested by the appellants, therefore, arise for consideration in the Second Appeal as well.

13. In the light of the above, the Second Appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs. However, considering the fact that the appellants are in occupation of a residential property, they are granted time till 30.06.2026 to vacate and hand over possession. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.