1. Heard Mr.H.Venugopal, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. Dandi Shaila. Despite due service of notice to respondent Nos.1 to 3, None appearance for respondents.

2.1. Briefly stated, the relevant facts are that the petitioner/plaintiff instituted O.S. No. 358 of 2022 on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Huzurabad, seeking a declaration of title and consequential relief of perpetual injunction in respect of the suit schedule property.

               2.2. During the pendency of the said suit, the petitioner/plaintiff filed I.A. No. 1119 of 2024 under Order VI Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, “CPC”), seeking amendment of paragraphs 9 and 12 of the plaint on the ground that certain typographical errors had crept into the pleadings relating to possession and the cause of action. The trial Court, by the impugned order dated 20.01.2025, dismissed the said application. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has preferred the present Civil Revision Petition.

3.1. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner contended that the trial Court failed to apply the settled principles governing amendment of pleadings under Order VI Rule 17 CPC. It is submitted that the proposed amendment was necessitated solely to rectify an inadvertent typographical error whereby the suit was mistakenly described as one for “declaration and recovery of possession” instead of “declaration of title and perpetual injunction.”

               3.2. It is further contended that the proposed amendment does not alter the nature or foundation of the cause of action and ought to have been allowed in a liberal manner in furtherance of justice.

               3.3. The learned counsel also submitted that the plaintiff had already paid the requisite court fee under Section 24(b) of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1956, which is applicable to suits for declaration of title with consequential injunction. This, according to the petitioner, clearly demonstrates the true nature of the suit from its inception.

               3.4. It is further argued that the finding of the trial Court that the amendment amounts to withdrawal of an admission regarding dispossession is erroneous, as the amendment merely seeks to correct an inadvertent error and does not introduce any inconsistent or new plea.

               3.5. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of A.P. v. Pioneer Builders, (2006) 12 SCC 119, wherein it was held that the power to allow amendment is wide and should be exercised liberally in the interest of justice, particularly where no prejudice is caused to the opposite party and the amendment avoids multiplicity of proceedings.

               3.6. Further reliance is placed on Revajeetu Builders & Developers v. Narayanaswamy & Sons, (2009) 10 SCC 84, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down guiding factors for deciding amendment applications, emphasizing that amendments necessary for proper adjudication and which do not fundamentally change the nature of the case should ordinarily be allowed.

4. Despite service of notice, there is no representation on behalf of the respondent.

5. I have considered the submissions advanced and perused the material available on record.

6. The trial Court, in the impugned order, observed that in the original plaint the plaintiff had categorically pleaded dispossession from the suit schedule property on 22.11.2022. However, by way of the present application, the plaintiff seeks to substitute the said plea with an assertion that he continues to be in possession and that such possession is merely being interfered with by the defendants.

7. On that, the trial Court held that such an amendment amounts to withdrawal of a clear and unequivocal admission made in the plaint. It further observed that the proposed amendment alters the nature of the suit from one for declaration of title and recovery of possession to one for declaration of title and perpetual injunction, which is impermissible in law.

8. Additionally, the trial Court noted that the application was filed after the filing of the written statement and after a considerable lapse of nearly two years, without any satisfactory explanation demonstrating due diligence. Consequently, it concluded that the amendment was not bona fide, would materially change the nature of the case, and would prejudice the defendants.

9. In this position, the central issue that arises for consideration is whether the proposed amendment is merely clarificatory in nature or whether it fundamentally alters the nature and character of the suit, including withdrawal of a material admission.

10. It is well settled that under Order VI Rule 17 CPC, amendments of pleadings should ordinarily be allowed if they are necessary for determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. However, the proviso to Order VI Rule 17, introduced by the Amendment Act of 2002, restricts such power after commencement of trial unless the party demonstrates that, despite due diligence, the matter could not have been raised earlier.

11. In Pioneer Builders (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that the power to allow amendment is wide and must be exercised to advance the cause of justice, unless serious prejudice or irreparable loss is caused to the opposite party. Similarly, in Revajeetu Builders (supra), the Court enumerated factors such as (i) whether the amendment is necessary for proper adjudication, (ii) whether it introduces a new or inconsistent case, (iii) whether it prejudices the other side, and (iv) whether it is bona fide.

12. Applying the above principles to the present case, the following aspects emerge firstly; the original plaint contains a categorical averment of dispossession, whereas the proposed amendment seeks to substitute it with a plea of continued possession and interference. This is not a mere clerical correction but a substantial change in the factual foundation of the case, particularly with respect to possession, which is central to the relief claimed. Secondly, a suit for declaration and recovery of possession is materially distinct from a suit for declaration and injunction. The nature of relief, cause of action, and evidentiary requirements differ significantly. Therefore, the proposed amendment prima facie alters the nature and character of the suit. Thirdly, admissions made in pleadings are substantive evidence and cannot ordinarily be permitted to be withdrawn by way of amendment, especially where such withdrawal would prejudice the opposite party. The plea of dispossession, being categorical, constitutes a material admission. Fourthly, the amendment application was filed after considerable delay and subsequent to the filing of the written statement. There is no convincing explanation demonstrating due diligence, as required under the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC. Fifthly, although the petitioner relies on payment of court fee under Section 24(b) of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Court Fees Act to indicate the intended nature of the suit, such a factor alone cannot override a clear and deliberate pleading regarding dispossession.

13. In light of the above analysis, the proposed amendment cannot be treated as a mere typographical correction. Rather, it seeks to withdraw a material admission and fundamentally alter the nature of the suit. The delay in filing the application and the absence of due diligence further disentitle the petitioner from relief.

14. Accordingly, the trial Court was justified in rejecting the amendment application, and the impugned order does not suffer from any jurisdictional error warranting interference under revisional jurisdiction.

15. For the foregoing reasons, the Civil Revision Petition is devoid of merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.

Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.