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CDJ 2026 BHC 855 print Preview print print
Court : High Court of Judicature at Bombay
Case No : Writ Petition (L) No. 2334 of 2026
Judges: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R.I. CHAGLA & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ADVAIT M. SETHNA
Parties : Sangita Santosh Chavan Versus Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation through the Municipal Commissioner, BMC Headquarters, Mumbai & Others
Appearing Advocates : For the Petitioner: Rajeshwar G. Panchal, a/w Sarang S. Gundajwar, Bhushan Kedare & Vivekanand G Panchal, Advocates. For the Respondents: Rupali Adhate i/b Komal Punjabi, Padma Chavan, Shweta Dhawade, Advocates.
Date of Judgment : 30-04-2026
Head Note :-
Constitution of India - Article 226 -
Judgment :-

Advait M. Sethna, J.

1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the parties.

2. This Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The substantive prayer in the Petition reads thus:-

                   “(A) This Hon’ble Court be pleased to issue the writ of certiorari, order or direction or any other writ in the nature of certiorari quashing and setting aside Impugned Order dated 15.12.2025 issued by Respondent No. 2 declaring the Petitioner as Surplus on account of reduction of Posts of Senior Estate Inspector (SPI)/Junior Project Officer (JPO), affecting eight employees including the Petitioner and, also quashing and setting aside consequent impugned order dated 15.12.2025 issued by Respondent No. 3 redeploying and posting the Petitioner to the post of Head Clerk in S Ward.”

Fulcrum of the Dispute:-

3. The Petitioner who is a permanent employee serving as a Senior Estate Inspector with the Respondent No.1 – BMC has assailed the order dated 15 December 2025 issued by the second Respondent. Pursuant thereto, the third Respondent has also issued an order/communication of the same date viz. 15 December 2025 forwarding the said order to the competent authority for taking the necessary action in this regard, both of which are assailed in the Petition (hereinafter referred to as the “Impugned Orders”). The neat issue arising for determination in these proceedings is whether the first Respondent – BMC is justified in transferring the Petitioner to the post of Head Clerk, S-Ward from an equivalent post of Senior Estate Inspector. Such redeployment of the Petitioner to another Department of the first Respondent – BMC is pursuant to the Staffing Pattern (Akrutibandha), an administrative/policy decision of the first Respondent - BMC dated 22 January 2025. The Respondents accordingly decided to discontinue 20 posts of Senior Estate Inspector/Junior Project Officer in the Estate Department which the Petitioner would submit led to declaring her as surplus, contrary to law. The correctness/legality of such decision form the subject matter of determination/adjudication in the proceedings before us.

Factual Matrix:-

4. The facts necessary for adjudication of this Petition are summarized below.

5. The Petitioner who joined the first Respondent on 20 July 2006 is a permanent employee serving as Senior Estate Inspector in F-South Ward of the first Respondent - BMC.

6. The Petitioner was promoted to the post of Rent Supervisor (now termed as Senior Estate Inspector) in the Estate Department of the first Respondent on 1 June 2017, with effect from 17 March 2017.

7. The Petitioner on 15 December 2025 was served with the Impugned Order issued by the second Respondent. The Petitioner along with 7 others pursuant to the approval for Akrutibandha of Assistant Commissioner (Estate) Department received from Municipal Commissioner on 15 December 2025 were conveyed that the number of posts of Senior Estate Inspector/Junior Project Officer in the Estate Department were reduced. This was followed by a consequential communication bearing the same date of 15 December 2025, stating that the Impugned Order is being forwarded to the competent authority for further action.

8. On 31 December 2025 the Petitioner made a representation to the Respondents, calling upon them to exclude the name of the Petitioner from the Impugned Orders.

9. The Petitioner has stated that on 2 and 5 January 2026 the Petitioner personally visited the office of the first and second Respondent who refused to consider the representation of the Petitioner. She was verbally informed that the senior staff including the Petitioner were being redeployed pursuant to the restructuring in terms of the Staffing Pattern (supra).

10. The Petitioner has stated that on 6 January 2026 she filed an application under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (“RTI Act”) seeking a copy of the official seniority list.

11. Being aggrieved by the Impugned Orders and the actions of the Respondents as noted above, the Petitioner is before this Court by preferring the present Petition filed on 21 January 2026.

Rival Contentions Submissions of the Petitioner:-

12. Mr. Panchal, learned counsel for the Petitioner has vehemently contended that the Impugned Orders and the actions of the Respondents of declaring the Petitioner as a surplus are illegal and unsustainable.

13. Mr. Panchal would submit that the Impugned Orders are violative of the Department of Personnel and Training, Office Memorandum (“DoPT OM”) dated 26 March 2002 as well as the prevailing policy of the State of Maharashtra on surplus staff redeployment vide circular/letter dated 10 June 2016, issued by Director of Education, Maharashtra State.

14. Mr. Panchal would contend that the Respondents through the Impugned Orders have failed to follow the mandate in the said DoPT OM and the circular dated 10 June 2016 (supra). This is inasmuch as there is failure to follow the reverse order of seniority (Last Come First Go); failure to invite voluntary options from senior employees; declaration of Petitioner as surplus when she is not the junior most; failure to prepare and publish proper seniority list.

15. According to Mr. Panchal, the actions of the Respondents are clearly indicative of ‘pick and choose’ approach which is frowned upon by law as it creates hostile discrimination against the Petitioner. The redeployment and posting of the Petitioner as Head Clerk in S-Ward of the BMC violates the Petitioner’s right to equality in public employment. It amounts to colorable exercise of power causing prejudice to the service conditions of the Petitioner without any reasonable basis and/or justification.

16. Mr. Panchal would submit that the actions of the Respondents are vitiated by malice in law and malice in fact as the intent is to accommodate some favoured individuals including juniors, at convenient posts. The dislodgement of the Petitioner from the last post of Senior Estate Inspector that she holds would cause irreparable loss and hardship to the Petitioner as the Impugned Orders are completely arbitrary and discriminatory.

17. Mr. Panchal would urge that the Respondents by its actions and the Impugned Orders have violated the Petitioner’s fundamental right under Article 16 of the Constitution of India. By declaring the Petitioner as surplus and her consequent redeployment, while juniors have remained untouched is a classic example of arbitrariness and hence violative of Article 14. He would invoke the decision of the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi to infer violation of her fundamental rights under Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

18. Mr. Panchal has relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Meena Narayan Gaddewar & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors(Writ Petition No. 2395 of 2017 dated 14 February 2018). to contend that the action of the Zilla Parishad in declaring the Petitioners, in that case, as surplus and directing them to work in primary/middle schools bad in law and liable to be set aside. Similarly, reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in T.S.R. Subramanian & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors(2013 11 SCR 991) to buttress his submission.

19. For all of the above reasons Mr. Panchal has urged that if the Impugned Orders are upheld it would lead to a situation of anarchy as the Respondents would use this as a lever to support its decision on surplus and redeployment, which is legally untenable.

Submission of the Respondents:-

20. Ms. Adhate, learned counsel for the Respondents has duly supported the Impugned Orders and the actions taken by the Respondents. She has placed due reliance on the Affidavit-in-Reply dated 26 February 2026 of Dr. Prithviraj Chatursing Chauhan working as Assistant Commissioner in the Estate Department.

21. Ms. Adhate would submit that the employees working with the first Respondent – BMC are governed by the Bombay Municipal Corporation (Service) Regulations, 1989 (“said Regulations” for short) under the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act. As stated in the Reply Affidavit, from the post of Clerk cum Typist which is the entry level post, the employees are promoted further as Head Clerk, Senior Estate Inspector, Complaint Officer, Meter Supervisor etc. by the third Respondent. Thereafter they are further promoted as Administrative Officers posted in different departments of the first Respondent - BMC. The Reply Affidavit would specifically state that the said post of Senior Estate Inspector is equivalent to the post Head Clerk. They act on the same grade/pay, same pay scale and their seniority is maintained commonly by the third Respondent. In view thereof, merely transferring them from one department to another department within the jurisdiction of the first Respondent - BMC does not affect the pay scale, grade pay, and/or seniority of the employee/the Petitioner, much less cause any prejudice to her.

22. Ms. Adhate would submit that the concept of “Akrutibandha” – the Staffing Pattern/policy of the first Respondent - BMC is in the form of circular bearing No. MPM/2/4110 dated 22 January 2025 which was issued in respect of forming and revising the staff pattern. This for the fact that the staff which was in excess was required to be identified from all departments of the Corporation and accordingly the said surplus staff were required to be transferred to the other departments where the Respondents were facing heavy workload issues due to insufficient staff.

23. Ms. Adhate would submit that the transfer of the Petitioner from the post of Senior Estate Inspector to Head Clerk was purely on administrative grounds, duly necessitated by revision of staff pattern and reduction of posts. There is no monetary loss to the Petitioner as her pay scale, grade pay and service benefits remain intact. Moreover, the seniority is maintained by the third Respondent on a common cadre basis and is not affected by the transfer, which is done as per the transfer policy of the first Respondent - BMC, which clearly in this case is declaration of surplus strictly as per the Akrutibandha (Staffing Pattern).

24. Ms. Adhate as stated in the Affidavit-in-Reply would submit that due to a redevelopment policy, several properties under the Estate Department have already been developed and rent collection of tenements is undertaken by an online system, resulting in substantial reduction in manual work. Considering the change in the nature of work certain posts in the Establishment Section of the Estate Department were no longer required. Accordingly, a revised structure was proposed reducing 156 posts in various cadres including 6 posts of Senior Estate Inspector and 2 being that of Junior Project Officer, which were found surplus. Such revised structure of the Estate Department was duly approved by the Standing Committee vide Resolution No.1765 dated 15 December 2025.

25. Ms. Adhate would contend that the Petitioner along with all the employees working for the first Respondent - BMC are governed by circulars dated 5 August 2019, 10 August 2021 in respect of transfer of the employees from one department to the other within the limits of first Respondent - BMC, after completion of three years of service on the same post.

26. Ms. Adhate would urge that transfer is a part and incidence of service. The Petitioner therefore has no vested right to remain posted at a particular Ward or Department. For such reasons the Impugned Orders and actions of the Respondents to transfer the Petitioner only to another department within the Corporation, that too in Mumbai, is effected in a transparent, rational and policy driven manner, which can neither be termed as arbitrary nor discriminatory.

27. Ms. Adhate would in light of the submissions advanced urge that the Petition is devoid of merit and ought to be dismissed.

Analysis:-

28. We have considered the rival submissions and with the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties, we have perused the record.

29. Firstly, we may observe that by the Impugned Orders the Petitioner has been relocated/redeployed to the post of Head Clerk in S-Ward of the first Respondent - BMC, within Mumbai, from her post of Senior Estate Inspector in the Estate Department. Such decision appears to be a policy decision taken in accordance and compliance with the Staffing Pattern/Akrutibandha by circular dated 22 January 2025 issued by the General Administration Department of the Respondent No.1-BMC.

30. A bare perusal of the said policy decision reveals that the first Respondent - BMC has factored in a situation where posts no longer required in the establishment are not being reduced, and the work of other cadres is being carried out by employees working in unnecessary posts. New cadres are not being created as required which is ultimately leading to the shortage of posts. It is found that though the designation of employees working in the wards/departments are different, they are engaged in the same work. It is accordingly necessary to consolidate the positions, depending upon the administrative exigencies.

31. Apropos the above, detailed guidelines are laid down in the said policy decision implemented by the said circular dated 22 January 2025. Said guidelines provide that the concerned department/ward shall consider the nature and scope of their work in the current situation and prepare a new staff structure, including the existing staff, eliminating unnecessary posts as well as creating necessary new posts. Also it contemplates, creation of a uniform cadre of posts with equal qualification, giving similar designation to posts doing the same type of work by reducing the number of designations.

32. We find that the Respondents in these proceedings have duly adhered to such policy decision as referred to above. As far as reduction of posts is concerned it is a policy decision taken on the ground of administrative exigency. This has a clear justification in the Reply Affidavit of the Respondents as noted above. We find merit in the submission of Ms. Adhate that as a part of the redevelopment policy several properties under the Estate Department of the first Respondent - BMC have been already developed and rent collection of tenements is carried out through the online system, resulting in substantial reduction of manual work. It is for such reasons and in the said backdrop that the Respondents adhering to its policy decision in the form of Staffing Pattern/Akrutibandha by circular dated 22 January 2025 has revised the structure of the Estate Department. The said revision was duly approved by the Standing Committee of the Respondent - BMC vide Resolution No.1765 dated 15 December 2025, which fact is not controverted.

33. We find that the Petitioner has not filed any Rejoinder to the Affidavit-in-Reply of the Respondents. Moreover, the Petitioner has not challenged the said policy decision/Akrutibandha vide circular dated 22 January 2025 along with the other Circulars relied on by the Respondents. The Respondents through their Affidavit-in-Reply have placed on record a Circular dated 5 August 2019 which bears reference to several earlier Circulars, commencing from Circular dated 17 July 1985. Even otherwise, proceeding on the basis of the Petitioner’s denial, we find that a cumulative reading of the policy decision vide Staffing Pattern read with all the said Circulars categorically provides that all heads of the Departments/Assistant Commissioners should ensure that no employee/officer remains in the same sub-division for more than three years. Further that, internal transfers of such employees should be made and a copy thereof should be sent to the office of the Chief Personnel Officer.

34. In the above context, the record bears out that the Petitioner has completed approximately 8 years of service on the same post in the Estate Department. In view of her length of service exceeding the prescribed tenure of three years her name along with seven others were recommended for redeployment/transfer from Estate Department to the other Department of the first Respondent- BMC.

35. We have duly noted the principal grievance of the Petitioner, which relates to declaring the Petitioner as surplus over and above her juniors, thereby discriminating her. On a perusal of the record, this allegation of the Petitioner does not appear to be legally sound and/or well-founded. Firstly, the decision to reduce 156 posts which included discontinuation of 20 posts of Senior Estate Inspector/Junior Project Officer, 8 of whom were transferred as Head Clerk, premised on the policy decision i.e. Akrutibandha Staffing Pattern of the Respondents, implemented through Circular dated 22 January 2025. Pertinently by such policy decision of the Respondents 8 persons working as Senior Estate Inspectors/Junior Project Officers have been relocated/redeployed. The Petitioner has been transferred/redeployed to the equivalent post of Head Clerk in another Department i.e. S-Ward that too within Mumbai.

36. It is not disputed by the Petitioner that such inter departmental transfer within Mumbai carries the same grade/grade pay, pay scale. The seniority of the Petitioner is intact on a common cadre basis which is not affected by such redeployment of the Petitioner. Moreover, one of the employees who has been redeployed to the other Department along with the Petitioner is clearly senior to the Petitioner which is evident from their dates of appointment as that officer was appointed on 1 December 2016 in the Estate Department, as against the Petitioner who was appointed on 1 April 2017. The Petitioner has not disputed such factual position.

37. Mr. Panchal has placed due reliance on the DoPT OM dated 26 March 2002 issued by the Government of India. As far as the present case is concerned, the employees working with the first Respondent - BMC are governed by the said Regulations, which does not appear to be disputed. The transfers and/or redeployment/relocation to different departments take place as per the transfer policy of the BMC which in the present case is the Akrutibandha i.e. Staffing Pattern through Circular dated 22 January 2025. This is not assailed by the Petitioner in the proceedings. Further, there is a Circular once again in the form of policy decision of the Respondents dated 5 August 2019 which clearly provides that no employee shall work on a particular post or in the same sub-division for more than three years. In view thereof, it is such policy decision which will be applicable in the given factual complexion and not the DoPT OM dated 26 March 2002. The said DoPT OM would apply in the case of the Individual Ministries/Departments listed under the CCS (Redeployment of Surplus Staff) Rules, 1990 which would not be of relevance in the given factual matrix.

38. Mr. Panchal’s reliance on the Circular dated 10 June 2016 issued by the Director of Education - Secondary and Higher Secondary for the State of Maharashtra is also misplaced. This is inasmuch as this Circular as clear from its Subject applies to ‘Declaration of Surplus Teaching and Non-Teaching Staff’. We do not see how this would have any bearing on the given factual matrix, given that the first Respondent – BMC and its employees are clearly governed by its own Regulations and the Staffing Pattern/Akrutibandha, a policy decision, which provides for declaration of surplus in certain administrative exigencies/contingencies as discussed above.

39. For the above reasons, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Panchal that the declaration of surplus and redeployment of the Petitioner to another Department of the first Respondent - BMC is illegal being de hors any policy and/or Rules/statutory framework.

40. We have noted the decision relied on by Mr. Panchal in Meena Narayan Gaddewar & Ors. (supra). The said decision of this Court was in the context of a GR dated 12 May 2011 and its applicability only to primary teachers of the Zilla Parishad as against the High School teachers where the junior most teachers are liable to declared as surplus in terms of such GR. It is in those facts that the Court held that declaration of those Petitioners as surplus is bad in law. The said decision could not apply to the given facts and is clearly distinguishable. This for the reason that in the present case it is clear that the Respondents have taken a policy decision manifesting in the Staffing Pattern/Akrutibandha and other Circulars (supra) which remains unassailed. These support the actions taken by the Respondents, purely in the interest of running its administration and working.

41. On a specific query put to the learned counsel for the Petitioner to cite a decision which would support her case on her being treated as surplus illegally, Mr. Panchal specifically cited the decision of the Supreme Court in T.S.R. Subramanian & Ors. (supra). A bare perusal of the said decision clearly reveals that those Petitions were filed by retired civil servants highlighting the necessity of various reforms for preservation of integrity, fearlessness and independence at both Centre and State levels in the country. In that regard, certain directions were issued to the Central and State Government to constitute Civil Service Board inter alia for fixation of tenure of civil servants. We do not see how the said decision would assist the Petitioner or take her case any further.

42. In our considered view, though the Petitioner has referred to mala fides in the decision of the Respondents, we find that it is only a bald averment without any evidence or supporting material to even remotely establish such mala fides. The transfer/redeployment of the Petitioner to another Department is not punitive nor does it involve any adverse consequences like demotion or reduction in pay. The Petitioner continues in the equivalent post and grade which also does not affect her seniority.

43. The Petitioner merely on the basis of dissatisfaction or hardship cannot claim as a matter of right to remain in the current place of posting. This is particularly when she is already holding since the past 8 years as against the period of three years as set out in the circular dated 5 August 2019 (supra). Therefore, this again cannot be a ground for judicial review. The promotional post for both cases i.e. Senior Estate Inspector (prior to transfer) and that of Head Clerk would be Administrative Officer which is also the same. Therefore, this would not lend any credence to the allegation by the Petitioner, inter alia, of malice or mala fide against the Respondents.

44. It is apposite to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Shilpi Bose (Mrs.) & Ors. VS. State of Bihar & Ors(1991 Supp (2) SCC 659). The Supreme Court had the occasion to deal with a situation where the transfer of the Petitioners who were primary school teachers, in the State of Bihar, was challenged. In such context the Supreme Court made some telling observations. It held that the Courts should not interfere with the transfer order which is made in public interest or for administrative reasons unless it is in violation of a mandatory statutory rule or on the ground of mala fides. A Government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or the other. Even if transfer orders are passed in violation of executive instructions or orders, the Courts ordinarily should not interfere with the order. If the Courts continue to interfere with day to day transfer orders issued by the Government and its subordinate authorities, there will be complete chaos in the administration which would not be conducive to public interest.

45. In our view the above observations wholly and squarely apply to the given case as the transfer/redeployment order of the Petitioner is not vitiated on the grounds of mala fides and the Petitioner has no vested right to remain on one position for more than three years as discussed (supra).

46. At this juncture it would be pertinent to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in E. P. Royappa Vs. State of Tamilnadu & Ors((1974) 4 SCC 3). The Supreme Court had observed that transfer is an implied condition of service and the appointing authority has wide discretion in the matter. The Government is the best judge to decide how to distribute and utilize the services of its employees. Frequent transfers without sufficient reasons to justify such transfers, cannot, but be held has mala fide.

47. The reasons discussed (supra), would sufficiently answer the allegations of mala fides made by the Petitioner. Further, considering the decision of the Supreme Court in E. P. Royappa (supra), the allegations of mala fides in the present case, cuts no ice.

48. A division Bench of this Court had the occasion to deal with a similar situation as that which has arisen in the given facts, viz in the case of The Maharashtra Rajya Padvidhar Prathamik Shikshak Va Kendrapramukh Sabha & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra(Writ Petition No.5456 of 2025 decided on 14 November 2025). This Court referred to the settled legal principles as in E. P. Royappa (supra) as stated above. It observed that it is not correct to state that a teacher or a school gets unfettered right under a previous Staffing Pattern and can claim that only a particular Staffing Pattern ought to be adhered to. The transfer of a Government employee being an incidence of service, the decision thereto is a matter within the domain of the departmental authority and the guidelines issued in that regard are not legally enforceable. The High Court in exercise of jurisdiction of Article 226 of the Constitution of India shall interfere with an order of transfer where it is vitiated by mala fide or is found to be in complete violation of the statutory provisions for transfer. However, we do not find any of such exceptional situations arising in the present case which would support the submissions canvassed by the Petitioner against the Impugned Orders.

49. Before concluding, we may observe that the contention of the Petitioner on the aspect of the declaration of surplus cannot be overstretched, as if that they would lose their statutory right to remain in a particular department or a particular post, that too of a Senior Estate Inspector. This would militate against the policy as clearly reflected in the Akrutibandha/Staffing Pattern read with the clear Circulars referred to and analyzed (supra). In our considered view, such sound and well reasoned policy decisions of the State ought not to be subject to judicial review, as in the given case. Any interference by the Court, in the given factual complexion, may not be conducive to the administrative functioning of the Respondents, which approach we cannot countenance, also in larger public interest.

50. We pass the following order:-

ORDER

a) Writ Petition is Dismissed. Rule is Discharged.

b) No order as to costs.

 
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