Ramesh Sinha, CJ.

1. The present appeal is listed today for final hearing. Further, learned counsel for the appellants submits that though the appellant is on bail, it is wrongly mentioned in the cause-list that the appellants are on jail. However, considering the fact that counsel for the appellants are ready and willing to argue the matter finally, we proceed to hear the same.

2. The present appeal is filed under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'Cr.P.C.') directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 09.02.2022 passed by learned First Additional Additional Sessions Judge, Rajnandgaon (C.G.) in Sessions Case No.11/2019, whereby the learned trial Court has convicted the appellants for the offence punishable under Sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, 'IPC') and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.10,000/- each, in default of payment of fine amount, additional rigorous imprisonment for six months to each of them.

3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 08.11.2018, the complainant, Lokesh Yadav, lodged a report at Police Station Lalbag stating that at about 9:00 PM on the said date, he and his brother, the deceased Domendra Yadav, had taken dinner together. Thereafter, while the complainant was watching television, the deceased informed his mother, Surajbai, that he was going out to consume gutkha and left the house. It is further alleged that shortly thereafter, one Evan Yadav, a neighbour, came to the complainant and informed him that the deceased was being assaulted. Upon receiving such information, the complainant rushed towards the place of occurrence. On reaching there, he allegedly saw his sister Tulsi Yadav attempting to intervene, while the accused persons, namely Monu Patoti and Deepchandra, were assaulting the deceased. The complainant has further stated that when he attempted to intervene, he too was pushed and knocked down by the accused persons. It is alleged that by the time he reached near the deceased, the accused had already inflicted fatal injuries upon him by means of a stick and a sharp-edged weapon, including a knife, and thereafter fled from the spot. The deceased was found lying on the roadside in an injured condition, bleeding profusely, having sustained injuries behind the left ear, on the waist, and on the back. With the assistance of a passerby, the injured was taken to the District Hospital, Rajnandgaon, where he succumbed to his injuries during treatment.

4. On the basis of the aforesaid information, an inquest proceeding (Ex.P-13) was initiated. Thereafter, First Information Report (Ex.P- 14) was registered at Police Station Lalbag vide Crime No. 436/2018 for the offence punishable under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code.

5. The dead body of the deceased was subjected to postmortem examination and the report thereof (Ex.P-23A) was obtained. During the course of investigation, viscera of the deceased was seized (Ex.P-31). Certain articles, including plain cloth pieces, were seized under seizure memo (Ex.P-32). Blood-stained soil and plain soil were seized from near the place of occurrence at the instance of the complainant (Ex.P-6). A bamboo stick allegedly used in the commission of the offence was seized under seizure memo (Ex.P-8). The accused persons were taken into custody and their memorandum statements (Ex.P-4 and Ex.P-5) were recorded. Pursuant thereto, a bamboo stick allegedly bearing bloodstains was seized at the instance of accused Deepchand (Ex.P-7). Blood-stained clothes allegedly worn by the accused persons at the time of the incident were also seized under seizure memos (Ex.P-8 and Ex.P-9). The seized articles were sent for chemical examination to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur, and reports (Ex.P-37 and Ex.P-38) were obtained. Site maps of the place of occurrence were prepared (Ex.P-15 and Ex.P-23). Statements of witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

6. Upon completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the accused persons for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code before the Court of Sessions, Rajnandgaon.

7. The case, upon committal, was tried by the learned Sessions Court. Charges under Section 302/34 IPC were framed against the accused persons. The contents of the charges were read over and explained to them, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

8. During trial, the prosecution examined its witnesses and exhibited documents in support of its case. The statements of the accused persons were recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, wherein they denied the incriminating circumstances appearing against them.

9. The accused persons did not adduce any evidence in their defence

10. The trial Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 09.02.2022, convicted and sentenced the accused/appellants as mentioned in opening paragraph of this judgment, against which, the present appeall has been preferred by the accused/appellants under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C.

11. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants would submit, in a comprehensive and forceful manner, that the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Court is wholly unsustainable in law as well as on facts, being based on conjectures, surmises, and an erroneous appreciation of evidence on record. It is contended that the entire case of the prosecution rests on circumstantial evidence, yet the essential legal requirement of establishing a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances has not been fulfilled. The so-called "last seen" evidence, which forms the foundation of the prosecution case, is inherently weak and unreliable inasmuch as the key witnesses, namely PW-6 (Tulsi Yadav) and PW-9 (Divya Yadav), have themselves admitted in their cross-examination that they did not witness the actual assault and had left the place of occurrence prior to the alleged infliction of fatal injuries. Their statements, as reflected in the record, do not establish proximity of time or continuity of events so as to rule out the possibility of intervention by a third person. It is further submitted that there exists a clear and unexplained time gap between the alleged "last seen" circumstance and the death of the deceased, thereby creating a serious lacuna in the prosecution story. Learned counsel would further argue that both these witnesses are closely related to the deceased and admittedly on inimical terms with the accused, and in absence of any independent corroboration, their testimonies ought to have been scrutinized with greater caution, which the learned trial Court has failed to do. The contradictions and omissions in their depositions, when juxtaposed with their previous statements recorded during investigation, materially affect their credibility and render their evidence unreliable, incapable of forming the basis of conviction.

12. It is further vehemently contended that the alleged recovery of incriminating articles, including the weapon of offence and blood- stained clothes, is highly doubtful and legally untenable, as the mandatory requirements under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act have not been complied with. In this regard, learned counsel would draw specific attention to the memorandum statements (Ex.P-4 and Ex.P-5) and seizure memos (Ex.P-7, Ex.P-8, and Ex.P-9), which are sought to be relied upon by the prosecution, and submit that the same stand seriously impeached by the testimony of PW-10 (Rupesh Yadav), an independent witness to these proceedings. The said witness has categorically denied that any memorandum statement was recorded in his presence or that any recovery was effected before him, and has further admitted that his signatures on the said exhibits were obtained at the police station without explaining the contents thereof. This renders the alleged discovery and seizure wholly unreliable. It is also pointed out that the seizure of blood-stained soil vide Ex.P-6 and the alleged recovery of articles lack proper evidentiary sanctity in absence of credible independent corroboration. Learned counsel would further submit that though the prosecution has relied upon the Forensic Science Laboratory reports (Ex.P-37 and Ex.P-38), the same do not conclusively connect the appellants with the crime, as there is no evidence on record establishing the blood group of the deceased or correlating it with the stains found on the seized articles. In absence of such serological linkage and in light of the doubtful recovery, the FSL reports lose their probative value. It is further contended that the alleged motive of prior enmity, as sought to be projected by the prosecution, is vague and not substantiated by cogent evidence on record, and in any case, motive alone cannot sustain conviction in absence of reliable substantive evidence. Therefore, it is submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and the appellants are entitled to be acquitted by extending the benefit of doubt.

13. Per contra, learned State counsel would support the impugned judgment and submit that the learned trial Court has rightly appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record in its proper perspective, and no interference is warranted in appellate jurisdiction. It is contended that the prosecution has successfully established a complete chain of circumstances pointing unerringly towards the guilt of the appellants. The "last seen" circumstance stands proved from the consistent testimonies of PW-6 (Tulsi Yadav) and PW-9 (Divya Yadav), who have categorically stated that the deceased was last seen in the company of the accused persons immediately prior to the incident. It is further submitted that the medical evidence, as reflected from the postmortem report (Ex.P-23) and the deposition of PW-12 (Dr. Nitin Barmate), clearly establishes that the death was homicidal in nature and the injuries sustained by the deceased were consistent with the weapons allegedly used in the commission of the offence. Learned State counsel would further contend that the memorandum statements of the accused (Ex.P-4 and Ex.P-5) have led to the recovery of incriminating articles, including the weapon of offence and blood-stained clothes, as evidenced by seizure memos (Ex.P-7, Ex.P-8, and Ex.P-9), which have been duly proved by the investigating officer (PW-16). Merely because one of the witnesses, namely PW-10 (Rupesh Yadav), has not fully supported the prosecution case, the entire recovery cannot be discarded when it stands corroborated by official witnesses and documentary evidence. It is also submitted that the FSL reports (Ex.P-37 and Ex.P-38) confirm the presence of human blood on the seized articles, which lends further corroboration to the prosecution case. The existence of prior enmity between the parties has also been established on record, thereby providing a strong motive for the commission of the offence. It is thus argued that minor contradictions or discrepancies in the testimonies of witnesses are natural and do not go to the root of the matter, and the learned trial Court has rightly recorded conviction upon proper appreciation of evidence, which calls for no interference.

14. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection.

15. The first question for consideration would be, whether death of deceased was homicidal in nature ?

16. The trial Court after appreciating oral as well as documentary evidence available on record, particularly, relying upon the statement of Dr. Nitin Barmate (PW-12), who conducted postmortem over the dead body of the deceased and given its report vide Ex.P/23, has opined that on examination, he has found following injuries over dead body:-

          "A. External Injuries

          1. Scratch mark measuring 2 × 0.6 cm on the right side of the head.

          2. Lacerated wound measuring 1.5 × 0.6 cm, muscle deep, on the right side of the head.

          3. Incised wound measuring 2 × 0.5 cm, muscle deep, over the left eyebrow and left periorbital region (with stitches).

          4. Stitched wound measuring 0.5 cm on the left side of the head.

          5. Incised wound measuring 7 × 0.2 cm, muscle deep.

          6. Lacerated wound measuring 3 × 0.7 cm, muscle deep, with stitches, on the right occipital region.

          7. Lacerated wound measuring 1 × 3 cm, muscle deep, on the right occipital region.

          8. Lacerated wound measuring 1.5 × 0.6 cm on the left occipital region.

          9. Lacerated wound measuring 7 × 0.4 cm, deep to flesh.

          10. Incised wound measuring 7 × 0.4 cm, deep to flesh, below the left ear.

          11. Three abrasions measuring:

          * 7 × 0.3 cm

          * 3 × 0.4 cm

          * 3 × 1.5 cm (all on the left side of the face)

          12. Linear abrasion measuring 6 × 0.1 cm on the right side of the face.

          13. Lacerated wound measuring 1 × 0.5 cm, deep to flesh, on the left maxillary region.

          14. Crescent-shaped abrasion measuring 0.7 × 0.1 cm on the right side of the face.

          15. Abrasion measuring 7 × 4 cm on the right side of the neck.

          16. Linear abrasion measuring 0.2 cm on the neck region.

          17. Stab wound measuring 3 × 0.6 cm, cavity deep, on the left side of the abdomen.

          18. Stab wound measuring 4 × 0.8 cm, with stitches, on the left side of the abdomen.

          19. Incised wound measuring 1.2 × 0.3 cm, muscle deep, with stitches, on the right side of the back.

          20. Abrasion measuring 4 × 3 cm on the right gluteal region.

          21. Abrasion measuring 1.6 × 1 cm on the right elbow.

          22. Abrasion measuring 0.5 × 0.3 cm on the left side of the abdomen.

          B. Internal Injuries

          23. Contusion measuring 5 × 4 cm on the right frontal region of the head (inner scalp).

          24. Contusion measuring 7 × 5 cm on the occipital region of the head (inner scalp).

          25. Subarachnoid haemorrhage present in the brain.

          26. Swelling (edema) in brain tissues.

          27. Stab injury over abdominal membrane and peritoneum.

          28. Approximately 1.5 litres of blood present in the abdominal cavity.

          29. Stab injuries at two places on intestinal membrane and small intestine."

The medical expert has categorically opined that the injuries sustained by the deceased, particularly the head injuries and abdominal stab wounds, were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. He further opined that the cause of death was attributable to the combined effect of head injury and abdominal stab wounds, and that the same were homicidal in nature.

17. In view of the consistent, cogent, and reliable medical evidence, duly corroborated by documentary evidence on record, this Court finds no infirmity in the finding recorded by the learned trial Court that the death of the deceased Domendra Yadav was homicidal in nature.

18. The next question for consideration is whether the prosecution has been able to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the accused persons are the authors of the crime and shared common intention in causing the death of the deceased?

19. Keeping the aforesaid factual matrix in view, this Court considers it appropriate to examine the present case on the touchstone of settled principles governing cases based on circumstantial evidence, namely, whether the chain of circumstances relied upon by the prosecution is so complete and cogent that it unerringly points towards the guilt of the accused and rules out every hypothesis consistent with their innocence.

20. The circumstances relied upon by the prosecution may broadly be classified as follows:

          (i) The deceased was allegedly last seen in the company of the accused.

          (ii) The deceased was thereafter found in an injured condition and later succumbed to injuries.

          (iii) Recovery of weapons and blood-stained articles, allegedly at the instance of the accused.

          (iv) Existence of motive on account of prior enmity.

21. It is, therefore, incumbent upon this Court to examine whether each of the aforesaid circumstances has been proved beyond reasonable doubt and whether they form a complete chain pointing only towards the guilt of the accused.

22. The prosecution has attempted to establish the "last seen" theory primarily through the testimonies of PW-6 i.e., Tulsi Yadav and PW-9 i.e., Divya Yadav, projecting them as eyewitnesses to the incident.

23. Tulsi Yadav (PW-6), who is the sister of the deceased, in her examination-in-chief, has stated that on the date of the incident, she saw the accused persons dragging her brother towards the roadside and pushing him. She further deposed that when she attempted to intervene, she was prevented by the accused persons and sustained an injury.

24. However, when her testimony is subjected to careful scrutiny, particularly in light of her cross-examination, it becomes evident that her version does not inspire confidence. She has categorically admitted that she did not witness the actual assault upon the deceased. She has further stated that she only saw the deceased being dragged and thrown to the ground.

25. It is also admitted by this witness that after witnessing the said act, she immediately left the spot to call her mother and brother, and when she returned, the accused persons were no longer present at the place of occurrence. This admission clearly establishes that she was not present at the time when the fatal injuries were allegedly inflicted.

26. More importantly, PW-6 has unequivocally admitted that she did not see how the deceased sustained injuries, nor did the deceased disclose to her the identity of the assailants. Such admissions go to the root of the prosecution case and materially weaken her credibility as an eyewitness.

27. It is further noteworthy that the place of occurrence was a public area where, as per her own admission, several persons were present. However, no independent witness from the locality has been examined to corroborate her version, which casts an additional doubt on the prosecution story.

28. Thus, the testimony of PW-6, when read in its entirety, falls short of establishing the direct involvement of the accused in causing the fatal injuries to the deceased. At best, her evidence creates a suspicion, but it is well-settled that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof.

29. Divya Yadav (PW-9) has also been projected as an eyewitness by the prosecution. In her examination-in-chief, she has attempted to support the prosecution case by stating that the accused persons dragged the deceased and assaulted him with a knife and stick.

30. However, her testimony suffers from serious infirmities when tested on the anvil of cross-examination. She has admitted that when she reached the place of occurrence, the deceased was already lying in an injured condition and the accused persons were not present there.

31. She has further admitted that she did not actually witness the assault being committed upon the deceased. She has also stated that she does not know what transpired between the time the deceased left his house and when he was found injured, thereby creating a significant gap in the prosecution case.

32. The witness has also admitted that she was informed by the police regarding the involvement of the accused persons, which raises a serious doubt as to whether her testimony is based on her own observation or influenced by external inputs.

33. Additionally, this witness has candidly admitted that her family does not share cordial relations with the accused persons and that she desires punishment for them. Such admissions clearly indicate the possibility of bias and interested testimony, which requires careful scrutiny and corroboration.

34. There are also material contradictions between her police statement and her deposition before the Court, particularly with regard to the place of occurrence and the manner of incident, which further erodes her credibility.

35. A comparative analysis of the testimonies of PW-6 and PW-9 reveals that both witnesses are inconsistent not only with each other but also within their own statements on material particulars.

36. While both have attempted to implicate the accused in their examination-in-chief, their cross-examination clearly establishes that neither of them has witnessed the actual infliction of injuries upon the deceased.

37. Both witnesses admit that they left the spot and returned later, by which time the accused persons were no longer present. This creates a crucial break in the chain of events and renders the prosecution version incomplete.

38. Furthermore, the existence of prior enmity and strained relations between the families of the witnesses and the accused introduces the possibility of false implication, which cannot be ruled out in the absence of independent corroboration.

39. In a case resting primarily on ocular evidence, such material inconsistencies and admissions assume great significance and make it unsafe to rely upon such testimonies for recording a conviction.

40. Thus, at best, the prosecution has been able to show that the accused were allegedly seen with the deceased at some point prior to the incident. However, it is well settled that "last seen" evidence by itself is a weak piece of evidence, unless the time gap between the last seen and the death is so small that the possibility of intervention by a third person is completely ruled out.

41. In the present case, there exists a clear gap in the chain of events, as neither witness has seen the actual occurrence of assault, nor has the prosecution been able to establish the exact time when the fatal injuries were inflicted.

42. In absence of a complete and continuous chain, the "last seen" circumstance cannot be treated as conclusive proof of guilt.

43. The prosecution has further relied upon the recovery of a bamboo stick and alleged blood-stained clothes of the accused pursuant to their memorandum statements.

44. Though the investigating officer (PW-16) has supported the recovery, it is significant to note that the prosecution has examined Rupesh Yadav (PW-10) as a witness to the memorandum statements and seizure proceedings, with a view to lend corroboration to the alleged recovery of incriminating articles at the instance of the accused persons.

45. In his examination-in-chief, this witness has attempted to support the prosecution case to a limited extent by stating that certain seizures, including that of a knife and other articles, took place in his presence. However, a closer scrutiny of his testimony reveals that such support is illusory and not substantive in nature.

46. At the outset, it is significant to note that this witness has categorically stated that he had no direct knowledge of the incident, and that he had merely "heard" about the alleged murder of the deceased. Thus, his testimony is not relevant insofar as the occurrence of the incident is concerned.

47. More importantly, this witness has made material admissions in his cross-examination, which strike at the very root of the prosecution case relating to recovery and memorandum:

          (i) He has unequivocally admitted that no incident took place in his presence.

          (ii) He has further stated that he was called by his father and thereafter taken by the police, indicating that he was not an independent witness voluntarily present at the scene.

          (iii) He has clearly admitted that he signed all documents at the instance of the police.

          (iv) He has candidly stated that he did not read the documents and that the police did not explain their contents to him.

          (v) He has admitted that no memorandum statement of the accused was recorded in his presence.

          (vi) He has further admitted that no seizure of clothes of the accused was effected in his presence.

          (vii) He has also stated that the alleged knife was produced by a juvenile (Oman Padauti) and not by the present accused persons.

48. These admissions are of crucial importance as they completely demolish the evidentiary value of the alleged memorandum and seizure proceedings. The very foundation of recovery under Section 27 of the Evidence Act requires that the discovery be made pursuant to information given by the accused in the presence of witnesses. In the present case, PW-10 has specifically denied the recording of such memorandum in his presence, thereby rendering the recovery highly doubtful.

49. Furthermore, the witness has admitted that sticks are commonly available in every household and are lying scattered in the village, thereby weakening the prosecution's attempt to link the seized bamboo stick exclusively with the offence.

50. The conduct of this witness, as reflected from his testimony, indicates that he was merely a formal witness to documents prepared by the police, without having any real participation in or knowledge of the alleged recovery process.

51. In such circumstances, the evidentiary value of seizure memos (Ex.P-7, Ex.P-8, Ex.P-9) and memorandum statements (Ex.P-4, Ex.P-5) stands seriously impaired, as one of the key witnesses to these documents has not supported the prosecution in material particulars.

52. It is a settled principle of law that when independent witnesses to recovery turn hostile or fail to support the prosecution, the Court must exercise greater caution in relying upon such evidence, especially when the case is otherwise based on circumstantial evidence.

53. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to provide any satisfactory explanation for such serious contradictions in the testimony of PW-10, nor has it produced any other reliable independent evidence to conclusively prove the recovery.

54. In view of the aforesaid analysis, this Court finds that the alleged recovery of weapons and blood-stained articles at the instance of the accused persons is not proved in a reliable and convincing manner.

55. So far as the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report (Ex.P-37 and Ex.P-38) is concerned, the prosecution has sought to rely upon the same to establish that human blood was found on the alleged weapons of offence and on the clothes of the accused persons.

56. A careful perusal of the FSL report indicates that although human blood has been detected on certain seized articles, including the knife, bamboo stick, and clothes allegedly belonging to the accused, the report does not conclusively establish a direct nexus between the said blood stains and the deceased.

57. It is significant to note that the prosecution has failed to establish the blood group of the deceased and to correlate the same with the blood stains found on the seized articles. In absence of such serological matching, the presence of human blood, by itself, cannot be treated as conclusive proof connecting the accused with the crime.

58. Furthermore, the evidentiary value of the FSL report is rendered doubtful in view of the serious infirmities in the seizure and recovery process, as discussed hereinabove, particularly in light of the testimony of PW-10, who has not supported the prosecution case regarding memorandum and seizure in material particulars.

59. The possibility of tampering, contamination, or improper handling of samples cannot be ruled out, especially when the prosecution has failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody from the time of seizure till examination by the FSL.

60. It is also pertinent to observe that the articles allegedly seized, such as sticks and clothes, are of a common nature and easily accessible, and in absence of specific identification marks or conclusive forensic linkage, the mere presence of blood stains cannot be attributed exclusively to the offence in question.

61. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently held that FSL evidence is corroborative in nature and cannot, in isolation, form the basis of conviction unless it is supported by reliable and cogent primary evidence.

62. In the present case, where the ocular evidence itself is unreliable and the recovery evidence is doubtful, the FSL report, lacking conclusive linkage, cannot cure the inherent defects in the prosecution case.

63. Thus, this Court is of the considered opinion that the FSL evidence, as placed on record, does not conclusively connect the accused persons with the commission of the offence, and at best raises a suspicion, which falls short of the standard of proof required in criminal law.

64. Accordingly, the circumstance relating to FSL evidence cannot be said to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt and fails to complete the chain of circumstances sought to be established by the prosecution.

65. At this stage, pertinent decision of the Supreme Court on this point in the matter of Balwan Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh and another (2019) 7 SCC 781 may be noticed herein, in which the Supreme Court has summarized the law on this point after taking into the decision of the Supreme Court (Constitution Bench) in the matter of Raghav Prapanna Tripathi v. State of U.P. AIR 1963 SC 74. In Raghav Prapanna Tripathi (supra), the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has held that in case the prosecution needed to prove that the bloodstains found on the earth or the weapons were of a human origin and were of the same blood group as that of the accused.

66. The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court i.e. Raghav Prapanna Tripathi (supra) was followed in Balwan Singh (supra) in which it was observed as under:-

          "23. From the aforementioned discussion, we can summarise that if the recovery of bloodstained articles is proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution, and if the investigation was not found to be tainted, then it may be sufficient if the prosecution shows that the blood found on the articles is of human origin though, even though the blood group is not proved because of disintegration of blood. The court will have to come to the conclusion based on the facts and circumstances of each case, and there cannot be any fixed formula that the prosecution has to prove, or need not prove, that the blood groups match."

67. Thereafter, the Supreme Court in Balwan Singh (supra) relying upon the fact that the prosecution has failed to prove that the blood was of human origin declined to rely upon the aspect of recovery of the weapons from the accused therein. It was observed as under:-

          "24. In the instant case, then, we could have placed some reliance on the recovery, had the prosecution at least proved that the blood was of human origin. As observed supra, while discussing the evidence of PWs 9 and 16, the prosecution has tried to concoct the case from stage to stage. Hence, in the absence of positive material indicating that the stained blood was of human origin and of the same blood group as that of the accused, it would be difficult for the Court to rely upon the aspect of recovery of the weapons and tabbal, and such recovery does not help the case of the prosecution."

68. In the present case, the first circumstance sought to be established by the prosecution is the "last seen" theory. However, as discussed hereinabove, the testimonies of PW-6 (Tulsi Yadav) and PW-9 (Divya Yadav), on which this circumstance is founded, do not inspire confidence. Both the witnesses have categorically admitted in their cross-examination that they did not witness the actual assault upon the deceased. Their presence at the scene is intermittent, and there exists a clear gap between the point when the deceased was allegedly seen with the accused and the time when he was found injured. In absence of proximity of time and continuity of events, the "last seen" theory loses its evidentiary significance and cannot be treated as a conclusive circumstance.

69. The second circumstance relates to the recovery of alleged weapons of offence and blood-stained clothes at the instance of the accused. As already discussed, the prosecution has failed to prove the memorandum and seizure proceedings in accordance with law. The independent witness to such recovery, PW-10 (Rupesh Yadav), has not supported the prosecution case and has made categorical admissions that no memorandum was recorded in his presence and that he had signed documents at the instance of the police without knowledge of their contents. Such evidence renders the recovery doubtful and unsafe to rely upon.

70. The third circumstance pertains to the FSL report. Though human blood has been detected on certain seized articles, the prosecution has failed to establish the blood group of the deceased and correlate the same with the stains found on the alleged articles. In absence of such scientific linkage and in view of doubtful recovery, the FSL report does not conclusively connect the accused with the crime.

71. The prosecution has also attempted to establish motive on the basis of alleged prior enmity. However, the evidence in this regard is vague, inconsistent, and not of such a nature as to conclusively establish a strong motive sufficient to drive the accused to commit the alleged offence. In any case, motive alone, in absence of reliable substantive evidence, cannot sustain a conviction.

72. It is a settled principle of criminal law that in a case based on circumstantial evidence, each circumstance must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, and all such circumstances must form a chain so complete that it leaves no reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused. If any link in the chain is found to be missing or doubtful, the benefit thereof must go to the accused.

70. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to establish:

          (i) a reliable "last seen" circumstance,

          (ii) a trustworthy recovery of incriminating articles,

          (iii) a conclusive forensic link, and

          (iv) a cogent and compelling motive.

73. Thus, the chain of circumstances is not only incomplete but also suffers from serious infirmities, contradictions, and gaps.

74. The learned trial Court, while recording conviction, appears to have proceeded on assumptions and presumptions not supported by reliable evidence. It has failed to properly appreciate the material contradictions in the testimonies of key witnesses and has overlooked the legal requirements governing cases based on circumstantial evidence. The findings recorded by the trial Court, therefore, cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.

75. It is trite that suspicion, however grave, cannot take the place of proof. The prosecution is required to stand on its own legs and prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The benefit of every reasonable doubt must necessarily go in favour of the accused.

76. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove the charge under Section 302/34 IPC against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. The appellants are, therefore, entitled to the benefit of doubt.

77. Consequently, the appeal deserves to be and is hereby allowed.

78. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 09.02.2022 passed by the learned Sessions Court in Sessions Case No. 11/2019 is hereby set aside.

79. The appellants are acquitted of the charges under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code.

80. The appellants are reported to be on bail. They need not surrender, however, keeping in view of the provisions of Section 437-A CrPC (now Section 481 of BNSS), their bail bonds are not discharged at this stage and shall remain effective for a period of six months from today along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellants on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

81. The trial Court record alongwith the copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action.