(Prayer: Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased tomay be pleased to issue a Writ, Order or Direction, more particularly one in the nature of writ of MANDAMUS, declaring the action of the Respondents in interfering with the petitioners tiffin centre under the name and style of Vaishnavi Tiffins situated at Kancharapalem, Visakhapatnam, without issuing any notice and without following due process of law, as illegal, arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Articles 14, 19(1 )(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India, and Consequently, direct the Respondents not to interfere with the petitioners lawful business AND/OR pass such

IA NO: 1 OF 2026

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased may be pleased to direct the Respondents, their officials, subordinates, agents or any person acting on their behalf, from in any manner interfering with, obstructing, demolishing, dispossessing or taking any coercive steps against the petitioners’ tiffin centre being run under the name and style of “Vaishnavi Tiffins” situated at Kancharapalem, Visakhapatnam, without following due process of law and without issuing prior notice AND/OR pass such)

1. Heard Sri Dheera Kanishka, Ld. Counsel for the Writ Petitioners and Sri S. Vijay Kumar, Ld. Counsel representing Sri A.S.C. Bose, Ld. Standing Counsel for the Greater Visakhapatnam Municipal Corporation.

2. This Writ Petition is filed seeking the following relief:

               “For the above mentioned reasons, it is therefore prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue a Writ, Order or Direction, more particularly one in the nature of writ of MANDAMUS, declaring the action of the Respondents in interfering with the petitioners’ tiffin centre under the name and style of “Vaishnavi Tiffins” situated at Kancharapalem, Visakhapatnam, without issuing any notice and without following due process of law, as illegal, arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India, and Consequently, direct the Respondents not to interfere with the petitioners lawful business AND/OR pass such other order or orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.”

3. At the very outset, Sri S. Vijay Kumar, Ld. Counsel representing the Greater Visakhapatnam Municipal Corporation has submitted that the present Writ Petitioners have already filed a Writ Petition bearing W.P.No.27804 of 2025, which stood disposed of on 01.12.2025 by this Court and that the Writ Petitioners have approached this Court with unclean hands inasmuch as the Writ Petitioners did not disclose about the filing of Writ Petition No.27804 of 2025 nor about the facts involved therein or about its outcome on 01.12.2025.

4. Sri S. Vijaya Kumar, Ld. Counsel for the Respondents had supplied a copy of the Final Order dated 01.12.2025 passed by this Court in W.P.No.27804 of 2025. The relevant portion of the said order, which is passed across the table, reads as under:

               “2. The learned Standing Counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 2 and 3 submits that the petitioners were running a mobile tiffin center and that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have initiated a city-wide process to evict unauthorized vendors. In that process, the petitioners were evicted.

               3. The learned Standing Counsel appearing for the 4th respondent submits that the electricity connection was also disconnected as the petitioners were continuing business in an unauthorized manner.

               4. In view of the same, nothing further survives for adjudication in the writ petition.

               5. Accordingly, this writ petition is closed. There shall be no order as to costs.”

5. The above order would indicate that as on the date of passing of the said Order on 01.12.2025, the present Writ Petitioners were already evicted and the electricity connection was also snapped.

6. Sri Dheera Kanishka, Ld. Counsel for the Writ Petitioners was also surprised when he saw the Order of this Court dated 01.12.2025 in W.P.No.27804 of 2025 and he sought a pass over to obtain instructions from the Writ Petitioners. On instructions, Ld. Counsel for the Writ Petitioners has confirmed the position that the Writ Petitioners herein had filed W.P.No.27804 of 2025 which was disposed of by this Court on 01.12.2025, but this fact was not disclosed by the Writ Petitioners to him. This Court has noticed that the Writ Petitioners have not even whispered about these facts in the Affidavit filed in support of this Writ Petition.

7. It appears that after the Writ Petitioners were evicted, the said Writ Petitioners have once again erected the same set-up called as “Vaishnavi Tiffins” and when the Authorities had approached the Writ Petitioners to compel them to vacate once again, the Writ Petitioners have approached this Court seeking interim protection by raising the plea of highhandedness and non-adherence to the Principles of Natural Justice on the part of Respondent Authorities.

8. Ld. Counsel for the Writ Petitioners has placed reliance on the Order passed by the Ld. Single Judge of this Court in J. Lakshmana Raju v. State of A.P., : 2023 SCC OnLine AP 18 (W.P.No.790 of 2023 decided on 06.01.2023). Ld. Counsel for the Writ Petitioners would submit that the Writ Petitioners are entitled for a Notice under Sub-Section (2) of Section 192 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1965.

9. Ld. Single Judge has interpreted Sub-Section (2) of Section 192 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1965 to mean that if the encroachment or obstruction has been caused for a period that is sufficient under Law of Limitation to give any person prescriptive right, an opportunity of hearing would become mandatory. In the opinion of this Court, the Judgment of this Court, which is relied on by the Ld. Counsel for the Writ Petitioners, would not apply in the facts and circumstances of the case inasmuch as the Writ Petitioners have re-encroached the same area by putting up the same set-up after having been evicted once, which is evident from the Order of this Hon’ble Court dated 01.12.2025 in W.P.No.27804/2025. In any case, this Court can safely assume that such re-encroachment would have logically been done by the Writ Petitioners only after the disposal of W.P.No.27804 of 2025 on 01.12.2025.

10. The Writ Petitioners herein are not entitled for the relief sought for, for two reasons. Firstly, the Writ Petitioners have approached this Court with unclean hands by concealing the factum of approaching this Court earlier by filing W.P.No.27804 of 2025 (Suppressio veri, suggestio falsi; please see Bhaskar Laxman Jadhav v. Karamveer Kakasaheb Wagh Education Society : (2013) 11 SCC 531, Para Nos.44 to 47 (2) Kusha Duruka v. State of Odisha : (2024) 4 SCC 432, Para Nos.2 to 7 (3) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India and Others : (2024) 5 SCC 481, Para No.141). Secondly, since the Writ Petitioners have re-erected “Vaishnavi Tiffins”, thereby, committing repeated illegality with impunity, they would not be entitled for issuance of any notice and also would not be consequently entitled for any indulgence much less even interim protection from this Court.

11. The law in this regard is well settled that adherence of Principles of Natural Justice in every case is not a “rule of thumb” and that the adherence to the Principles of Natural Justice is neither inflexible nor rigid.

12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had explained as to under what circumstances the Authorities are required to adhere to the Principles of Natural Justice and under what circumstances the Authorities are entitled to dispense with such procedure in the cases of illegal encroachment followed by evictions. In Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn. v. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan : (1997) 11 SCC 121, the Hon’ble Apex Court held in Para Nos.8 and 10 as under:

               “8. It is for the court to decide in exercise of its constitutional power of judicial review whether the deprivation of life or personal liberty in a given case is by procedure which is reasonable, fair and just or it is otherwise. Footpath, street or pavement are public property which are intended to serve the convenience of the general public. They are not laid for private use and indeed, their use for a private purpose frustrates the very object for which they are carved out from portions of public roads. The main reason for laying out pavements is to ensure that the pedestrians are able to go about their daily affairs with a reasonable measure of safety and security. That facility, which has matured into a right of the pedestrians, cannot be set at naught by allowing encroachments to be made on the pavements. The claim of the pavement-dwellers to construct huts on the pavement or road is a permanent obstruction to free passage of traffic and pedestrians' safety and security. Therefore, it would be impermissible to permit or to make use of the pavement for private purpose. They should allow passing and repassing by the pedestrians. No one has a right to make use of a public property for their private purpose without the requisite authorisation from the competent authority. It would, therefore, be but the duty of the competent authority to remove encroachments on the pavement or footpath of the public street obstructing free flow of traffic or passing or repassing by the pedestrians.

               10. The Constitution does not put an absolute embargo on the deprivation of life or personal liberty but such a deprivation must be according to the procedure, in the given circumstances, fair and reasonable. To become fair, just and reasonable, it would not be enough that the procedure prescribed in law is a formality. It must be pragmatic and realistic to meet the given fact-situation. No inflexible rule of hearing and due application of mind can be insisted upon in every or all cases. Each case depends upon its own backdrop. The removal of encroachment needs urgent action. But in this behalf what requires to be done by the competent authority is to ensure constant vigil on encroachment of the public places. Sooner the encroachment is removed when sighted, better would be the facilities or convenience for passing or repassing of the pedestrians on the pavements or footpaths facilitating free flow of regulated traffic on the road or use of public places. On the contrary, the longer the delay, the greater will be the danger of permitting the encroachers claiming semblance of right to obstruct removal of the encroachment. If the encroachment is of a recent origin the need to follow the procedure of principle of natural justice could be obviated in that no one has a right to encroach upon the public property and claim the procedure of opportunity of hearing which would be a tedious and time- consuming process leading to putting a premium for high-handed and unauthorised acts of encroachment and unlawful squatting. On the other hand, if the Corporation allows settlement of encroachers for a long time for reasons best known to them, and reasons are not far to seek, then necessarily a modicum of reasonable notice for removal, say two weeks or 10 days, and personal service on the encroachers or substituted service by fixing notice on the property is necessary. If the encroachment is not removed within the specified time, the competent authority would be at liberty to have it removed. That would meet the fairness of procedure and principle of giving opportunity to remove the encroachment voluntarily by the encroachers. On their resistance, necessarily appropriate and reasonable force can be used to have the encroachment removed. Thus considered, we hold that the action taken by the appellant-Corporation is not violative of the principle of natural justice.”

               (Emphasis supplied)

13. In Mandal Revenue Officer v. Goundla Venkaia : (2010) 2 SCC 461, the Hon’ble Apex Court held in Para No.47 as under:

               “47. In this context, it is necessary to remember that it is well-nigh impossible for the State and its instrumentalities including the local authorities to keep everyday vigilance/watch over vast tracts of open land owned by them or of which they are the public trustees. No amount of vigil can stop encroachments and unauthorised occupation of public land by unscrupulous elements, who act like vultures to grab such land, raise illegal constructions and, at times, succeeded in manipulating the State apparatus for getting their occupation/possession and construction regularised. It is our considered view that where an encroacher, illegal occupant or land grabber of public property raises a plea that he has perfected title by adverse possession, the court is duty-bound to act with greater seriousness, care and circumspection. Any laxity in this regard may result in destruction of right/title of the State to immovable property and give an upper hand to the encroachers, unauthorised occupants or land grabbers.”

14. In Hari Ram v. Jyoti Prasad : (2011) 2 SCC 682, the Hon’ble Apex Court held in Para No.16 as under:

               “16. Any act of encroachment is a wrong committed by the doer. Such an encroachment when made to a public property like encroachment to public road would be a graver wrong, as such wrong prejudicially affects a number of people and therefore is a public wrong. So long any obstruction or obstacle is created to free and unhindered access and movement in the road, the wrongful act continues thereby preventing the persons to use the public road freely and unhindered. Therefore, that being a continuing source of wrong and injury, cause of action is created as long as such injury continues and as long as the doer is responsible for causing such injury.”

15. The dictum of the Hon’ble Apex Court, extracted above, would make it amply clear that in the present case the Writ Petitioners are not entitled either for Show Cause Notice or for hearing because “Vaishnavi Tiffins” that was run by the Writ Petitioners herein was evicted even before 01.12.2025 and that the said Writ Petitioners have re-erected the business establishment in a recidivistic manner. In other words, the Writ Petitioners are the persons who have resorted to a repeated illegal act.

16. In this view of the matter, the present Writ Petition is devoid of any merit besides being an abuse of process due to non-disclosure of the material fact of filing of W.P.No.27804 of 2025, which stood disposed of by this Court on 01.12.2025.

17. Accordingly, this Writ Petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.

18. Before parting with this case, basing on the facts emanating herein above and also in several similarly situated cases which are coming before this Court in large number, this Court intends to deal with a very important lacuna in the statute, which is, probably, the root cause boldly encouraging the illegal encroachers to re-occupy the public spaces several times with absolute impunity.

19. The facts in the above case depicts a classic example of lawlessness on the part of the Writ Petitioners in re-encroaching upon the same public space again and again and approaching this Court crying foul against the Official Respondents of highhandedness and non-adherence to the Principles of Natural Justice; thereby, attempting to take undue advantage of the protection that could be given by law to the citizens who are likely to be visited with adverse consequences. The Writ Petitioners, who are generally the street- vendors, from their side, may want to justify by projecting a compelling reason of eking out their livelihood for the purpose of survival by any means. Such street-vendors are in large numbers in any given Municipal Corporation, Nagar Panchayat or Grama Panchayat. However, it is a settled law that any compelling individual necessity cannot override the public interest. (Please see: STO V. Shree Durga Oil Mills : (1998) 1 SCC 573, Para-21 (2) Friends Colony Development Committee V. State of Orissa : (2004) 8 SCC 733, Para-22 (3) Maharashtra Ekta Hawkers Union and another V. Municipal Corporation, Greater Mumbai and others : 2014 (1) SCC 490 (4) Sayyed Ratanbhai Sayeed v. Shirdi Nagar Panchayat : (2016) 4 SCC 631, Para-58 and 59 (5) YEIDA v. Shakuntla Education & Welfare Society, (2022) 20 SCC 698, Para-74).

20. If this Court is to reason-out the causative factor as to why the evicted illegal encroachers resort to recidivistic activity of re-occupying either the same public space or any other public space, it is because the governing statutes are virtually teeth-less, soft and tender when it comes to dealing with the illegal encroachers committing repeated offences/illegalities.

21. On a cursory look of the statutes (Andhra Pradesh Municipal Corporations Act, 1955 and Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1965 and the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1994), it appears to this Court that so long as the statute does not weaponize the Civic Bodies with deterrent laws for imposing stringent punishments for repeated illegal encroachments or offences, an evicted encroacher, being emboldened by the ineffective laws, would always be on the prowl to re-establishes his/her street-vend either in the same public place or any other suitable public place. The law is required to be enacted to weaponize the Civic Bodies to seize the structure, equipment and merchandize and return the same by imposing such amount of fine that would be a deterrent for the first violation and also by taking an undertaking that he/she would not re-occupy public space or repeat the same illegality or offence. Every repetition of the illegality should be visited with severely enhanced fines and further repetition should enable the Civic Authorities to destroy the structure, the equipment and the merchandize without returning such things to the offenders. The Civil Authorities can even withdraw the Trade Licenses, either provisionally or permanently, commensurate with the nature of delinquency and or recidivism. In most extreme cases, the law should weaponize the Civic Authorities to bring the offenders to book and to prosecute them.

22. The opinion expressed by this Court, as regards the need to weaponize the Civic Authorities through suitable legislation is spelt out in the words of Justice Benjamin Franklin which is extracted in Deputy Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation and Another Vs. Aashu Engineering Works : 2026 SCC OnLine Bom 1266 as under:

               14. Benjamin Franklin said that “laws too gentle are seldom obeyed; too severe, seldom executed”. Thus, when a low penalty is prescribed it creates a perception that one can get away with anything and everything. Fear of law can be deterrent for immoral behaviour but true virtue involves obeying in law out of principle rather than just fear of punishment of law. A law is valuable not just because it is law, but because there is right in it.

23. The same principle is exemplified in the words of an eminent thinker and author Sophocles that: “laws can never be enforced unless fear supports them.”

24. Jeremy Bentham in his treatise titled: “An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation”, while noting the requirement of deterrent legislation for habitual offenders, has proposed as Rule-9 as under:

               “Rule 9. Where the act conclusively indicates a habit, the punishment of it must be increased enough for it to outweigh the profit not only of the individual offence but of other similar offences that the offender is likely to have committed and not been punished for.”

25. In this regard, the Principal Secretary, Municipal Administration and Urban Development shall bestow his attention on these aspects and suggest measures to Government to weaponize the Civic Bodies to prevent encroaches from committing repeated offences. If the Government intends to be serious with regard to these by treating the public convenience and public interest as the paramount obligation of the State, the Government should seriously contemplate bringing in necessary amendments in the relevant statutes to weaponize the Civic Bodies in the manner described herein above.

26. The Government Pleader for Municipal Administration and Urban Development and the Registrar (Judicial) are directed to forward copies of this Judgment to the Principal Secretary, Municipal Administration and Urban Development.

27. Interlocutory Applications, if any, stand closed in terms of this order.