1. NC/IA/14528/2025 has been moved for converting this compilation filed as a revision petition in an appeal under Section 51 (2) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019.
2. The background in which the present appeal has been preferred is that the complainant had under a bonafide belief made certain bank transactions through RTGS/ NEFT for the purpose of obtaining an LPG Indane Gas Agency under the Pradhan Mantri Ujwala Yojana. The complainant alleged that these payments were made to the appropriate bank accounts as referred to in the advertisement on the IFSC number that was given for carrying out bank transactions. When the complainant did not receive any response, he made enquiries and then he came to know that all these transactions were carried out through mule accounts and were siphoned off to Bihar. It is in this background that a legal notice was issued to the Bank and then the complaint CC/220/2022 was filed alleging deficiency of service and praying the refund of Rs.20,90,000/- together with 18% interest as also the other ancillary reliefs.
3. The complaint was after contest allowed by the DCDRC, Delhi (East) vide order dated 16.01.2025, directing refund of the said amount with 7% interest and costs as well as compensation.
4. It is informed that the Bank has assailed the said order in appeal FA/60/2025 before the SCDRC, Delhi.
5. The complainant was aggrieved by the lower rate of interest awarded by the District Commission as also the date from which it was granted and he also preferred an appeal FA/223/2025. The appeal filed by the complainant has been dismissed on 30.05.2025 on account of a reported delay of 82 days and the State Commission has further found that even if the explanation is accepted then also there is a delay of 59 days in the filing of the appeal. Paragraph 15 of the impugned order is extracted herein under:
"15. It is submitted in para 4 of the application that the appellant has received the certified copy of the impugned order on 24.01.2025. Even if we assume that the same was received by the appellant on 24.01.2025, in this circumstance also, the appellant was expected to file the appeal within the limitation period i.e. by 10.03.2025. Still there is a delay of 59 days in filing the appeal."
6. Learned counsel submits that the present appeal ought to have been heard and disposed off with the appeal filed by the Bank itself and the delay should have been condoned exercising discretion keeping in view the various decisions of the Apex Court that hold that the length of delay is not material in the event there is any merit in the case. The submission is that the award of 7% interest and also the date from which the interest is payable that is from the date of complaint is erroneous, in as much, the rate of interest as ordinarily available in such matters is nowhere less than 9%, but in the present case, since the money belonged to the appellant, who is a senior citizen, a higher rate of interest was warranted. The second contention is that the interest ought to have been awarded from the date on which the money was siphoned off and not from the date of the filing of the complaint. We have considered the submissions raised and we find that the delay ought to have been considered in the light of the latest four judgments where the Apex Court has rendered its opinion once again on the issue of limitation.
7. Reference be had to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Satish Chand Shivhare & Bros. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2151. The aforesaid judgment was delivered in a case where the delay was being prayed to be condoned in a matter of arbitration where the State of UP had filed an appeal that was dismissed on the ground of limitation. The explanation given was the usual administrative rigmarole and then the Court considered the other judgments on the issue relating to sufficient cause to hold that it should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, provided there is no lack of bonafides.
8. It is undoubtedly true that the law of limitation has a harsh effect if applied strictly but at the same time, Courts and Tribunals should not ignore the explanation given. However, the Court further went on to observe that when a matter on merits is pitted against the rejection of a meritorious claim, due to delay, then the delay deserves to be condoned. Paragraphs 21 and 22 of the said judgment are extracted hereunder:
"21. The questions of law purported to be raised in this Special Leave Petition are misconceived. The right of appeal is a statutory right, subject to the laws of limitation. The law of limitation is valid substantive law, which extinguishes the right to sue, and/or the right to appeal. Once an appeal is found to be barred by limitation, there can be no question of any obligation of the Court to consider the merits of the case of the Appellant.
22. When consideration of an appeal on merits is pitted against the rejection of a meritorious claim on the technical ground of the bar of limitation, the Courts lean towards consideration on merits by adopting a liberal approach towards 'sufficient cause' to condone the delay. The Court considering an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act may also look into the prima facie merits of an appeal. However, in this case, the Petitioners failed to make out a strong prima facie case for appeal. Furthermore, a liberal approach, may adopted when some plausible cause for delay is shown. Liberal approach does not mean that an appeal should be allowed even if the cause for delay shown is glimsy. The Court should not waive limitation for all practical purposes by condoning inordinate delay caused by a tardy lackadaisical negligent manner of functioning."
9. The Apex Court once again had the occasion to deal with a delay condonation application in a contest of land acquisition where the delay of around 479 days had been condoned in favour of the Union of India. The aggrieved persons came up to challenge the same and after consideration of the entire law on the subject, the Court in the case of Sheo Raj Singh & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Anr., (2023) 10 SCC 531, analyzed the approach that has been explained in paragraphs 30 to 32 as follows:
"30. Considering the aforementioned decisions, there cannot be any quarrel that this Court has stepped in to ensure that substantive rights of private parties and the State are not defeated at the threshold simply due to technical considerations of delay. However, these decisions notwithstanding, we reiterate that condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the length of delay being immaterial.
31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an "explanation" and an "excuse". An "explanation" is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an "explanation" from an "excuse". Although people tend to see "explanation" and "excuse" as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real.
32. An "excuse" is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an "excuse" would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication."
10. In our opinion, an excuse is to free oneself from some blame or seek pardon or any apology but as enunciated by the Apex Court, it can be a pretended reason, and therefore it should be distinguished carefully from a bonafide and genuine explanation. An explanation brings transparency or makes things look plain and simplified signifying truthfulness as against something bewildering or confusing. It tends to give a clear meaning to the underlying motive of the expression.
11. Subsequently, in the case of Mool Chandra Vs. Union of India & Anr. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1878 the Apex Court held that the length of delay may not be that material if the cause of delay is sufficiently explained. The observations of the Apex Court in paragraph 20 of the said judgment is extracted hereunder:
"20. Be that as it may. On account of liberty having been granted to the appellant to pursue his remedy in accordance with law, yet another O.A. No. 2066 of 2020 along with an application for condonation of delay came to be filed. The delay was not condoned by the Tribunal on the ground that it was filed more than one year after the impugned order came to be passed. No litigant stands to benefit in approaching the courts belatedly. It is not the length of delay that would be required to be considered while examining the plea for condonation of delay, it is the cause for delay which has been propounded will have to be examined. If the cause for delay would fall within the four corners of "sufficient cause", irrespective of the length of delay same deserves to be condoned. However, if the cause shown is insufficient, irrespective of the period of delay, same would not be condoned."
12. Recently the Apex Court in the case of Inder Singh Vs. State of M.P., 2025 SCC Online SC 600 has reiterated the opinion expressed in the case of Sheo Raj Singh (Supra).
13. The explanation given by the appellant that has been stated in the delay condonation application filed along with the appeal does indicate sufficient cause, which also indicates the time spent in engaging the counsel and seeking legal advice. The applicant has relied on certain email communications between his counsel and himself to explain the delay. The impugned order nowhere reflects as to why the said explanation given by the complainant/ appellant was not sufficient. Paragraph 14 and 15 of the impugned order do indicate a discussion of these facts, but we do not find any cogent reason rejecting the said explanation which in our opinion does give an explanation of sufficient cause. The delay condonation application ought to have been allowed and since the rejection of the appeal on the ground of delay defeats the substantial right of the respondent/ complainant, the same requires consideration. We accordingly allow this application and treat this compilation to be one under Section 51 (2) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 and direct the Office to register the same as an appeal under Section 51 (2) and give it a regular number.
14. The appeal raises broadly two substantial questions:
a. Whether the State Commission was justified in not condoning the delay in the filing of the appeal in view of the recent pronouncements of the Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Satish Chand Shivhare (Supra), Sheo Raj Singh & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Anr.(Supra) and other decisions following the same?
b. Whether the State Commission was justified in dealing with this appeal separately when the appeal filed by the Bank against the same impugned order remains pending and had been listed for final hearing?
15. As already stated above the delay condonation application ought to have been allowed keeping in view the nature of relief prayed for which may require consideration on merits. In the background when the appeal filed against the very same impugned order by the Bank is still pending consideration before the same State Commission, it would have been appropriate to dispose of both the appeals simultaneously. We therefore allow this appeal and set aside the impugned order dated 30.05.2025.
16. We may point out that the notices had been issued on 09.12.2025 on this appeal and the office report dated 13.04.2026 records that the same has been served on the respondent Bank on 31.12.2025. Accordingly service is deemed to be complete on the Bank and we are therefore proceeding to dispose off the matter finally. Even otherwise disposal of this appeal would not cause any prejudice to the Bank, which can still contest the issue relating to the rate of interest and the date from which the interest can be awarded as we have not expressed any opinion on the same. We have only condoned the delay in the filing of the appeal and have restored it back on its regular number before the State Commission.
17. With the aforesaid observations and directions this appeal is allowed and FA/223/2025 stands restored before the State Commission and shall be connected along with FA/60/2025. It is informed that the next date fixed is 11.05.2026 before the State Commission. A copy of this order may be placed before the State Commission within a week for notice to the Bank for the hearing of the appeals on the next date fixed.
18. Learned counsel for the appellant shall also serve a copy of this order on the respondent Bank for its information.




