M.S. Jawalkar, J.
1. Heard.
2. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties.
3. Above all the petitions are filed by the petitioners for seeking direction to the respondents to release their salary, which was stopped since March, 2025 without any notice or without there being any fault on their part. At the time of issuance of notice in petitions, as there was no show cause notice and salary was stopped since March, 2025, considering this aspect and also considering the fact that the respondents are exacting the duties from the petitioners as a teacher, the schools are being run, even election duties, census duties are directed to be carried out by these employee-teachers, by way of interim relief, the respondents were directed to release their salary.
4. It appears that there was no reply filed till February, 2026, except in one of the matters. However, it appears that the Hon’ble Apex Court recorded that since pleadings have been completed, this Court was requested to decide Writ Petition No.5647 of 2025 along with all other similarly placed writ petitions, which are stated to be 86 in numbers finally one way or the other within a period of four weeks. It appears that factually incorrect statement was made that pleadings have been completed. In fact in Writ Petition No.5647 of 2025, respondent No.1 filed its reply on 11/02/2026 and respondent No.2 filed its reply on 23/03/2026 after disposing of the Special Leave Petition. As such, in that petition also pleadings were not complete. In fact, in most of the matters pleadings were not complete and after passing of order by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the respondents itself filed their reply. Prior to that, there was no reply nor any application for modification of order or challenging the interim order. In spite of the order of Hon’ble Apex Court, the time was granted to the respondents to complete their pleadings and matters are taken up in group for decision.
5. The petitioners in Writ Petition No.7441 of 2025 are the teachers as well as headmasters of the respective schools and management of the respective institution. Their names, respective designation, date of appointments, date of approvals, date of permanent appointments on grant-in-aid basis, date of approval to permanent appointments were mentioned in Annexure-1 (Pg.-35). From this chart, it can be seen that mostly their appointments are of the years 2013 and 2014, whereas appointments of non-teaching staff is of the year 2010. Their approval on no grant basis are of the years 2013 and 2014. Their appointments on grant basis appears to be of the years 2015, 2016 and 2017. The date of approval to most of the permanent appointments on grant basis are also of the years 2015 and 2016. In respect of Swati Vijay Bharadwaj (Clerk) and Sunil Panjabrao Pawar (Peon), they were appointed on grant basis on 01/07/2010 and their approval on grant basis issued on 16/09/2013. Their appointment and approval orders are annexed with the petition.
5.1. It is contention of the petitioners that on 07/11/2012, the respondent No.1 issued GR, thereby framing a scheme for disbursal of salary and allowances to teaching and non-teaching staff working in zilla parishad schools, municipal and municipality schools and aided/ partially aided posts of private primary, secondary and higher secondary schools in Maharashtra. Vide this scheme, the details of the teaching and non-teaching staff are fed into the computer system and the Shalarth ID gets assigned to the teaching and non-teaching staff. Specifically in terms of procedure prescribed under this GR, the headmasters of appointing schools were responsible only for data entry of their employees’ information. The responsibility for (i) verification and certification of submitted information and (ii) generating and allocating Shalarth ID to the employees lay exclusively with the Education Officer (Primary/Secondary) of that district. Pursuant to the scheme provided in the GR dated 07/11/2012, the details of the petitioners were uploaded on the Shalart Portal. Except for uploading these details, the school management had no role to play in issuance of Shalarth ID and there is no control of school whatsoever when the details are submitted. Accordingly, the Authorities have duly verified the proposal submitted to the Shalarth Portal and granted Shalarth ID.
5.2. On 18/11/2016, the respondent No.2-Commissioner (Education), Maharashtra State issued a letter conferring authority for granting Shalarth ID on the respondent No.3 i.e. the Director of Education (Primary). However, considering the large backlog of verification and granting of Shalarth ID by the respondent No.3, the respondent No.1 vide GR dated 28/02/2018 constituted a Special Action Committee for granting Shalarth ID to its employees and the duty to allow Shalarth ID was conferred on different authorities. The petitioner Nos.1 to 20 who were legally appointed and satisfied the eligibility requirements, they were receiving regular salary till February, 2025, after which the respondents suddenly stopped their salary grants without any notice to the petitioners or any order or without there being any fault on their part. It appears that the respondents noticed certain irregularities in the appointment of teaching and non-teaching staff in some of the schools in which Shalarth ID were wrongly issued and salary was released. In view thereof, respondent No.1-State of Maharashtra has constituted a Special Investigation Team, which is investigating the above mentioned irregularities. On 21/04/2025, the respondent No.5- Education Officer (Primary), Zilla Parishad, Nagpur issued a communication to some of the headmasters of private aided schools seeking verification on 22 points vis-a-vis employees who received their Shalarth ID between 31/03/2019 and 31/03/2025. On perusal of this communication, there is no indication about consequences of non-furnishing of information nor any allegation of fraud or misrepresentation. The petitioner Nos.21 and 22 i.e. schools received another letter from the respondent No.5 asking it to submit salary payment statement prepared on the Shalarth Portal to its office by 03/05/2025. On 13/05/2025, the schools were directed to submit the documents by 15/05/2025. After five months of stopping salary, the petitioners received a purported show cause notice from the respondent No.4-Deputy Director of Education levelling unscrupulous and omnibus allegations. Under the pretext of investigating the alleged irregularities, the petitioners’ salary has been withheld without assigning any reason and without issuing any order. The said undated notice (signed on 04/08/2025) received by the petitioners, a response of petitioner No.1 dated 20/08/2025 to the respondent No.4 is annexed with the petition at Annexure-X. Identical reply is filed by all the petitioners. On 04/09/2025, the respondent No.4 issued communication to all the petitioners to appear before the Enquiry Committee along with original documents on 24/09/2025. However, since certain documents were not available with the petitioners, they sought for time to place it before the Committee. Pertinently, after the said notice dated 04/09/2025, the petitioners have not received any communication from the respondent No.4. Despite waiting for seven months without any information about completion of investigation, without any salary, the petitioners were discharging their duties. There is no order for stoppage of salary supplied to the petitioners. In this background, they filed present petition.
5.3. It is contention of the petitioners that the action of the respondents in withholding salary is arbitrary, illegal and unreasonable. It amounts to punish the petitioners for no fault on their part. Being arbitrary, the impugned action is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is further contention that petitioner Nos.1 to 20 are duly qualified and appointed after following the due procedure of law and only after they met the eligibility criteria, they were granted approval orders by the respondent No.5 and Shalarth IDs were given to them, after due verification of their information. The petitioners had no role to play in issuance of Shalarth IDs and they are discharging their duties continuously. Thus, the action of denying salary to the petitioners is arbitrary and amounts to colourable exercise of power. The petitioners have no role insofar as allotment of Shalarth ID, except of supplying of information to the respondents, who are then responsible for verification of the information and allotment of Shalarth ID. Therefore, the respondents’ action of stoppage of salary to the petitioners for their own shortcomings is completely unwarranted and bad-in-law.
5.4 The Shalarth Portal being a payment system devised by the respondents, does not create any new rights and/or duties on any employee of the private aided school. That being the case, since the petitioners have been duly granted approval by the respondents, it is unjust and arbitrary on their part to deny the petitioners their rightful entitlement because of purported irregularities in the payment system. It is submitted that Shalarth ID order was never supplied to the petitioners and therefore, the respondents’ insistence on directing the petitioners to supply them a copy of the Shalarth ID order is completely misplaced and antithetical to the procedure prescribed in the GR. There is no power to unilaterally review or revise their approvals. In denying the salary to the petitioners, the respondents are attempting to review their own approval orders.
5.5. The petitioners relied on the judgment in Writ Petition No.3057 of 2017 (Nilesh Subhash Jawanjal and others v. State of Maharashtra and others), decided on 14/09/2017, in support of his contention that the Authority undertaking the review of approval orders shall keep in mind the service rendered by the concerned teaching and non-teaching employees and the effect of cancellation of approval on him and his dependents. This Court directed that the approval ought to have been cancelled only in compelling circumstances and that orders of cancellation of approval if passed, shall not be given effect for a period of four weeks, after its service on the concerned employee. This view was taken by this Court considering the plight of the employees of private schools whose approvals are sought to be reviewed by the Education Authorities after the employee has rendered considerable length of service and only on technical procedural lacunae and for which the employee cannot be faulted. This action of withholding the salary seriously prejudice the fundamental right of the petitioners to live a dignified life as guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This action of respondents also amounts to Begar under Article 23 of the Constitution of India. In purported show cause notice, which fails to specify the consequential action befalling on the petitioners, there is no whisper on the stoppage of salary grants to the petitioners. The petitioner Nos.1 to 20 have been continuously receiving their salary through Shalarth Portal until February, 2025 without any objection. Thus, this unilateral action of stoppage of salary without there being any order passed is illegal. On this ground, the petitioners seek direction to the respondents to release their withheld salary and to continue to release the same.
5.6. In Writ Petition No.5633/2025, the Petitioner No. 1 to 6 are employees of the Petitioner No. 7 School, whereas Petitioner No. 8 is the School Management. The Petitioner Nos.1 to 6 were appointed in the Petitioner No.7 School on the posts of Assistant Teacher between years 2012 and 2016, and their appointments were duly approved by the Respondent Authorities. It is submitted by the Petitioners that they have duly submitted their online proposals for the approval of Shalarth IDs however, their Shalarth Approval Orders were never issued by the Respondent Authorities to the Petitioners online draft proposals annexed with the petition.
5.7. In Writ Petition No.5464/2025, the Petitioner No. 1 to 31 are employees of the Respondent No.7 to 27 School and Management, wherein Petitioner No. 20 is working on the post of Peon and the rest of the Petitioners are working as Assistant Teachers. The Petitioner Nos. 1 to 31 were appointed in the respondent No.7 to 27 School on their respective posts between years 2012 and 2017, and their appointments were duly approved by the Respondent Authorities. It is submitted by the Petitioners that they have duly submitted their draft proposals for the approval of Shalarth IDs however, their Shalarth Approval Orders were never issued by the Respondent Authorities to the Petitioners.
5.8. In Writ Petition No. 7393/2025, the Petitioner No. 1 to 4 are employees of the Respondent No.7 to 10 School and Management, wherein Petitioner No. 3 is working on the post of Shikshan Sevak and the rest of the Petitioners are working as Assistant Teachers. The Petitioner Nos. 1 to 4 were appointed in the respondent No. 7 to 10 School on their respective posts between years 2013 and 2015, and their appointments were duly approved by the Respondent Authorities. It is submitted by the Petitioners that they have duly submitted their draft proposals for the approval of Shalarth IDs however, their Shalarth Approval Orders were never issued by the Respondent Authorities to the Petitioners.
5.9. In Writ Petition No. 5866/2025, the Petitioner No. 1 to 4 are employees of the Respondent No.8 School and Respondent No. 7 is the Management, wherein Petitioner No.4 is a Junior Clerk and Petitioner No. 1 to 3 are working on the post of Assistant Teacher. Further, Petitioner No. 5 is erstwhile employee of Respondent No. 8 and absorbed by Respondent No. 10 School and Respondent No. 9 Management. The Petitioner Nos. 1 to 5 were appointed in the respondent No.8 School on their respective posts between years 2012 and 2016, and their appointments were duly approved by the Respondent Authorities. It is submitted by the Petitioners that they have duly submitted their draft proposals for the approval of Shalarth IDs however, their Shalarth Approval Orders were never issued by the Respondent Authorities to the Petitioners.
5.10. In Writ Petition No. 6333/2025, the Petitioner No. 1 to 10 are employees of the Petitioner No. 11 School, whereas Petitioner No. 12 is the School Management, wherein Petitioner Nos. 1 to 8 are Assistant Teachers and Petitioner Nos.9 and 10 are working on the post of Peon. The Petitioner Nos. 1 to 10 were appointed in the Petitioner No. 11 School on the posts of Assistant Teacher between years 2010 and 2013, and their appointments were duly approved by the Respondent Authorities. It is submitted by the Petitioners that they have duly submitted their draft proposals for the approval of Shalarth IDs however, their Shalarth Approval Orders were never issued by the Respondent Authorities to the Petitioners.
5.11. In Writ Petition No. 4010/2025, the Petitioner No. 1 to 10 are employees of the Petitioner No.11 and 12 School, wherein Petitioner Nos. 1 to 9 are Assistant Teachers and Petitioner No. 10 are working on the post of Peon. The Petitioner Nos.1 to 10 were appointed in the Petitioner No. 11 and 12 School on the posts of Assistant Teacher between years 2013 and 2018, and their appointments were duly approved by the Respondent Authorities. It is submitted by the Petitioners have been duly issued Shalarth IDs by the Respondent Authorities consequent to the Scheme framed by the State Government on 07.11.2012.
5.12. In Writ Petition No. 6329/2025, the Petitioner No. 1 to 17 are employees of the Respondent No. 7 to 15 School, wherein Petitioner Nos. 13, 14 and 16 are working on the post of Peon, and the rest of the Petitioners are working as Assistant Teachers. The Petitioner Nos. 1 to 17 were appointed in the Respondent No.7 to 15 School on their respective posts between the years 2009 and 2016, and their appointments were duly approved by the Respondent Authorities. It is submitted by the Petitioners that they have duly submitted their draft proposals for the approval of Shalarth IDs however, their Shalarth Approval Orders were never issued by the Respondent Authorities to the Petitioners.
5.13. In Writ Petition No.6336/2025, the Petitioner No. 1 to 13 are employees of the Respondent No.7 to 16 School, wherein all the Petitioners are working as Assistant Teachers. The Petitioner Nos. 1 to 13 were appointed in the Respondent No.7 to 16 School on their respective posts between the years 2015 and 2018, and their appointments were duly approved by the Respondent Authorities. It is submitted by the Petitioners that they have duly submitted their draft proposals for the approval of Shalarth IDs however, their Shalarth Approval Orders were never issued by the Respondent Authorities to the Petitioners.
5.14. In Writ Petition No. 5179/2025, the Petitioner No. 1 to 9 are employees of the Petitioner No.10 School and Petitioner No. 11 is the Management, wherein Petitioner No. 1 is the Headmaster and the rest of the Petitioners are working as Assistant Teachers. The Petitioner Nos. 1 to 9 were appointed in the Petitioner No. 10 School on their respective posts between the years 2010 and 2011, and their appointments were duly approved by the Respondent Authorities. It is submitted by the Petitioners that they have duly submitted their draft proposals for the approval of Shalarth IDs however, their Shalarth Approval Orders were never issued by the Respondent Authorities to the Petitioners.
5.15. In Writ Petition No. 6330/2025, the Petitioner No.1 to 4 are employees of the Petitioner No.5 School, wherein Petitioner No. 1 is working on the post of Junior Clerk and the Petitioner Nos. 2 to 4 are working as Assistant Teachers. The Petitioner Nos.1 to 4 were appointed in the Petitioner No.5 School on their respective posts between the years 2010 and 2012, and their appointments were duly approved by the Respondent Authorities. It is submitted by the Petitioners that they have duly submitted their draft proposals for the approval of Shalarth IDs however, their Shalarth Approval Orders were never issued by the Respondent Authorities to the Petitioners.
5.16. In Writ Petition No. 6332/2025, the Petitioner No. 1 to 19 are employees of the Petitioner No. 20 School and Petitioner No. 21 is the Management, wherein Petitioner No. 18 is working on the post of Junior Clerk, Petitioner No. 19 is working as Peon and the rest of the Petitioners are working as Assistant Teachers. The Petitioner Nos. 1 to 19 were appointed in the Petitioner No. 20 School on their respective posts between the years 2011 and 2013, and their appointments were duly approved by the Respondent Authorities. It is submitted by the Petitioners that they have duly submitted their draft proposals for the approval of Shalarth IDs however, their Shalarth Approval Orders were never issued by the Respondent Authorities to the Petitioners.
5.17. In Writ Petition No. 6331/2025, the Petitioner No. 1 to 24 are employees of the Petitioner No. 25 to 27 Schools and Petitioner No. 28 to 30 are the Management, wherein Petitioner No. 4 is working on the post of Junior Clerk, Petitioner No. 5 is working as Peon and the rest of the Petitioners are working as Assistant Teachers. The Petitioner Nos. 1 to 24 were appointed in the Petitioner No. 25 to 27 Schools on their respective posts between the years 2010 and 2015, and their appointments were duly approved by the Respondent Authorities. It is submitted by the Petitioners that they have duly submitted their draft proposals for the approval of Shalarth IDs however, their Shalarth Approval Orders were never issued by the Respondent Authorities to the Petitioners.
5.18. In Writ Petition No. 6328/2025, the Petitioner No. 1 to 3 are employees of the Petitioner No. 4 School and Petitioner No. 5 is the Management, wherein Petitioner No.1 to 3 are working as Assistant Teachers. The Petitioner Nos.1 to 3 were appointed in the Petitioner No. 4 School on the posts of Assistant Teacher in the year 2013, and their appointments were duly approved by the Respondent Authorities. It is submitted by the Petitioners that they have duly submitted their draft proposals for the approval of Shalarth IDs however, their Shalarth Approval Orders were never issued by the Respondent Authorities to the Petitioners.
5.19. In Writ Petition No. 7413/2025, the Petitioner No.1 to 6 are employees of the Respondent No. 7 Schools, wherein Petitioner No.2 is working on the post of Clerk, Petitioner No. 6 is working as Peon and the rest of the Petitioners are working as Assistant Teachers. The Petitioner Nos. 1 to 6 were appointed in the respondent No. 7 School on their respective posts between the years 2012 and 2014, and their appointments were duly approved by the Respondent Authorities. It is submitted by the Petitioners that they have duly submitted their draft proposals for the approval of Shalarth IDs however, their Shalarth Approval Orders were never issued by the Respondent Authorities to the Petitioners.
5.20. In Writ Petition No.6384/2025, the Petitioner No. 1 to 4 are employees of the Petitioner No.5 to 6 Schools and Petitioner No. 7 and 8 are the Management, wherein all the Petitioners are working as Assistant Teachers. The Petitioner Nos.1 to 4 were appointed in the Petitioner No. 5 and 6 Schools on their respective posts between the years 2012 and 2016, and their appointments were duly approved by the Respondent Authorities. It is submitted by the Petitioners that they have duly submitted their draft proposals for the approval of Shalarth IDs however, their Shalarth Approval Orders were never issued by the Respondent Authorities to the Petitioners.
5.21. In Writ Petition No. 6383/2025, the Petitioner No. 1 to 7 are employees of the Respondent No. 7 to 13 Schools, wherein all the Petitioners are working as Assistant Teachers. The Petitioner Nos. 1 to 7 were appointed in the Respondent No.7 to 13 Schools on their respective posts between the years 2014 and 2021, and their appointments were duly approved by the Respondent Authorities. It is submitted by the Petitioners that they have duly submitted their draft proposals for the approval of Shalarth IDs however, their Shalarth Approval Orders were never issued by the Respondent Authorities to the Petitioners.
5.22. In Writ Petition No. 7381/2025, the Petitioner No. 1 to 5 are employees of the Petitioner No. 6 School and Petitioner No. 7 is the Management, wherein all the Petitioners are working as Assistant Teachers. The Petitioner Nos. 1 to 5 were appointed in the Petitioner no. 6 School on the post of Assistant Teacher between the years 2012 and 2016, and their appointments were duly approved by the Respondent Authorities. It is submitted by the Petitioners that they have duly submitted their draft proposals for the approval of Shalarth IDs however, their Shalarth Approval Orders were never issued by the Respondent Authorities to the Petitioners.
5.23. In Writ Petition No. 6038/2025, the Petitioner No. 1 to 11 are employees of the Petitioner No.12 School. The Petitioner Nos.1 to 11 were appointed in the Petitioner No. 12 School on the posts of Assistant Teacher between years 2012 and 2014, and their appointments were duly approved by the Respondent Authorities. It is submitted by the Petitioners that they have duly submitted their draft proposals for the approval of Shalarth IDs however, their Shalarth Approval Orders were never issued by the Respondent Authorities to the Petitioners.
5.24. In Writ Petition No.6037/2025, the Petitioner No. 1 to 8 are employees of the Petitioner No. 9 School. The Petitioner Nos. 1 to 8 were appointed in the Petitioner No. 9 School on the posts of Assistant Teacher between years 2011 and 2012, and their appointments were duly approved by the Respondent Authorities. It is submitted by the Petitioners that they have duly submitted their draft proposals for the approval of Shalarth IDs however, their Shalarth Approval Orders were never issued by the Respondent Authorities to the Petitioners.
5.25. In Writ Petition No.6039/2025, the Petitioner No. 1 to 19 are employees of the Petitioner No. 20 School. The Petitioner Nos. 1 to 19 were appointed in the Petitioner No. 20 School on the posts of Assistant Teacher between years 2015 and 2016, and their appointments were duly approved by the Respondent Authorities. It is submitted by the Petitioners that they have duly submitted their draft proposals for the approval of Shalarth IDs however, their Shalarth Approval Orders were never issued by the Respondent Authorities to the Petitioners.
5.26. In Writ Petition No. 6040/2025, the Petitioner No. 1 to 9 are employees of the Petitioner No. 10 School. The Petitioner Nos. 1 to 9 were appointed in the Petitioner No. 10 School on the posts of Assistant Teacher between years 2012 and 2018, and their appointments were duly approved by the Respondent Authorities. It is submitted by the Petitioners that they have duly submitted their draft proposals for the approval of Shalarth IDs however, their Shalarth Approval Orders were never issued by the Respondent Authorities to the Petitioners.
5.27. In Writ Petition No. 6475/2025, the Petitioner No. 1 to 7 are employees of the Petitioner No. 8 School, wherein Petitioner No. 6 is working on the post of Peon, Petitioner No. 7 is working as Junior Clerk and the rest of the Petitioners are working as Assistant Teachers. The Petitioner Nos.1 to 7 were appointed in the Petitioner No. 8 School on their respective posts in the year 2013, and their appointments were duly approved by the Respondent Authorities. It is submitted by the Petitioners that they have duly submitted their draft proposals for the approval of Shalarth IDs however, their Shalarth Approval Orders were never issued by the Respondent Authorities to the Petitioners.
5.28. In Writ Petition No.6477/2025, the Petitioner No. 1 to 7 are employees of the Petitioner No. 8 School, wherein Petitioner No. 6 is working on the post of Peon, Petitioner No. 7 is working as Junior Clerk and the rest of the Petitioners are working as Assistant Teachers. The Petitioner Nos. 1 to 7 were appointed in the Petitioner No. 8 School on their respective posts in the year 2013, and their appointments were duly approved by the Respondent Authorities. It is submitted by the Petitioners that they have duly submitted their draft proposals for the approval of Shalarth IDs however, their Shalarth Approval Orders were never issued by the Respondent Authorities to the Petitioners.
5.29. In Writ Petition No.5855/2025, the Petitioner No. 1 to 3 are employees of the Respondent No. 3 School. The Petitioner Nos. 1 to 3 were appointed in the Respondent No. 3 School on the posts of Assistant Teacher between the years 2012 and 2013, and their appointments were duly approved by the Respondent Authorities. It is submitted by the Petitioners that they have duly submitted their draft proposals for the approval of Shalarth IDs and their respective Shalarth ID numbers were duly issued by the Respondent Authorities to the Petitioners.
5.31. In Writ Petition No.7043/2025, the Petitioner is an employee of the Urdu Primary School, IBM Road, Gattikhadan Nagpur. The Petitioner was appointed in the said School on the posts of Assistant Teacher in the year 2017, and his appointment was duly approved by the Respondent Authorities. It is submitted by the Petitioner that he has duly submitted his draft proposal for the approval of Shalarth ID and his Shalarth ID number was duly issued by the Respondent Authorities to the Petitioners.
5.32. Learned counsel Mr.Anand Parchure, Mr.R.S.Parsodkar, Mr.P.N. Shende and Mr.S.R.Narnaware for the petitioners relied on the following citations:
(i) Writ Petition No.3057 of 2017 (Nilesh Subhash Jawanjal and others v. State of Maharashtra and others) and one connected writ petition, decided on 14/09/2017.
(ii) Radha Kumari v. State of Bihar and others, 2002 SCC OnLine Pat 746.
(iii) Order of Rajasthan High Court in Writ Petition No.2003 of 2024 (Sunil Dattatrey s/o Shri G.P.Dattatrey Ram v. The State of Maharashtra and others), decided on 10/02/2025
(iv) Jagdamba Prasad Shukla v. State of U.P. and others, (2000) 7 SCC 90.
(v) Writ Petition No.10436 of 2025, (Shri Anil Mallappa Kanawade and others v. The State of Karnataka and others).
(vi) Letters Patent Appeal No.1244 of 2023, (Usha Kiran Sinha Wife of Sri Arvind Kumar Singh v. The State of Bihar and others) and other connected matters.
(vii) Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, (2021) 6 SCC 771.
(viii) Judgment of this Court in Writ Petition 3839 of 2025 (Hemant Baliram Deore and others v. The State of Maharashtra and others) with connected petitions, decided on 27/03/2026
(ix) Radhey Shyam Yadav and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2024) 11 SCC 770.
(x) S.L.Kapoor v. Jagmohan and others, (1980) 4 SCC 379.
(xi) Olga Tellis and others v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and others, (1985) 3 SCC 545.
(xii) Andi Mukti Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust and Ors., (1989) 2 SCC 691.
6. The respondent Nos.1 to 4 filed their common affidavit-inreply, opposed the petitions and submitted that pursuant to the news item published in daily Lokmat newspaper dated 19/06/2024 in regard to grant of approvals to teachers under the signature of Late Someshwar Naitam, the then Education Officer (Primary), Zilla Parishad, Nagpur, who had expired on 24/10/2017, the answering respondents found it necessary to order a detailed fact finding enquiry vide communication dated 28/06/2024. The enquiry conducted by the Education Officer (Primary and Secondary) categorically revealed that no such approvals were ever issued from the office of the Education Officer (Primary), Zilla Parishad, Nagpur. In view of the gravity of the allegations, separate committees were constituted of the Deputy Director of Education, Nagpur and the Director of Education (Primary) and independent enquiry officer was appointed on 23/08/2024 to conduct an initial enquiry and to examine the original record.
6.1. During the said enquiry, it was revealed that there was large scale misuse of Shalarth IDs system and that bogus Shalarth IDs were generated without any valid offline Shalarth ID orders or approval proposals issued by the Competent Authority. It was further found that approvals were not granted by the office of the Education Officer (Primary), Zilla Parishad, Nagpur-respondent No.2 and that the bogus Shalarth IDs were granted by certain person including the Superintendent, Pay Unit (Primary), Nagpur in collusion at the level of the headmaster without submission of any hard copy of proposals or verification by the office of the respondents in complete violation of prescribed procedure. Upon verification, the record pertaining to the present petitioners were found to be not available in the office of the answering respondents. The Director of Education (Scheme), Pune also initiated an independent enquiry on the basis of the records available with the answering respondents and found that the records of as many as 632 teachers and non-teaching staff were not available. Consequently, the Commissioner of Education vide communication dated 25/07/2025 directed the Divisional Deputy Director of Education being the higher authority to conduct hearing and to take a decision regarding the validity of the alleged approvals strictly in accordance with the GR dated 23/08/2017. It is further submitted that the enquiry report specifically records that approvals filed and related records of the present petitioners are not available in the office of the answering respondents.
6.2. It is further submitted that the procedure governing the appointments of every teaching and non-teaching post in aided, partially aided and unaided school is specifically prescribed under section 5 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Act, 1977 read with Rules 8 and 9 of the Rules of 1981 framed thereunder (hereinafter referred to as “MEPS Act” and “MEPS Rules” for the sake of brevity).
6.3. The GR dated 06/02/2012 laid down comprehensive guidelines, regulating recruitment, grant of personal approval, promotions and other service related matters concerning teaching and non-teaching staff of the schools. The corrigendum dated 23/08/2017 expressly mandates that where the personal approval granted to any teaching and non-teaching employee is proposed to be cancelled for any reason whatsoever, a show cause notice must be issued to the concerned employee affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing and only thereafter an appropriate decision shall be taken by the Competent Authority. This Court in Writ Petition No.10133 of 2016, held that it is not within the jurisdiction of authority to review or cancel its own earlier order. In view thereof, in order to clarify the legal position and obviate any ambiguity, it was categorically directed that where personal approval of any teaching and non-teaching staff member is sought to be cancelled, the Senior Authority next above the officer who originally granted such approval shall issue a show cause notice, grant an opportunity of hearing and thereafter pass an appropriate order in accordance with the applicable service rules and as per the corrigendum.
6.4. In view of the above, the Deputy Director of Education specifically vested with the authority to cancel approvals granted to appointments in aided educational institutions, strictly subject to compliance with statutory service rules, reservation policies, administrative scrutiny and the principles of natural justice.
6.5. The GR dated 20/03/2019 as modified and streamlined the procedure governing the generation and approval of Shalarth IDs. In pursuance to that, the State Government has expressly delegated and conferred authority upon the respective regional offices of the Education Department to scrutinize, process and decide proposals pertaining to the grant, modification or cancellation of Shalarth IDs within their respective jurisdiction. Thus, the action taken pursuant thereto are strictly in accordance with the powers so conferred. It is further submission of the respondent Nos.1 to 4 that they initiated proceedings by issuing notice of hearing and detailed hearing conducted from 16/09/2025 till 13/01/2026, wherein the petitioners as well as the concerned school management representatives are expressly informed of the scope, purpose and nature of the proceedings and are specifically called upon to produce all relevant records of approvals and the documents in support of the legality and validity of the appointments and the consequential approvals and Shalarth IDs during hearing. It is also contention of the respondent Nos.1 to 4 that the petitioners upheld full, fair and reasonable opportunity in consonance with the principles of natural justice to place on record their oral and written submissions along with the documentary evidence. After carefully examining the documents, the answering respondents arrived at a reasoned and definitive conclusion that the mandatory, statutory provisions, GRs prescribed recruitment procedures and policies had been blatantly violated. It is further submitted that the appointments in question were made on posts which were either non-sanctioned or non-existing, the appointments were deliberately projected as sanctioned posts by suppression and misrepresentation of material facts, that the approvals and Shalarth IDs were thus obtained by fraudulent means resulting in unauthorized and illegal withdrawal of salary from the Government Exchequer. Accordingly, after recording detailed finding supported by documentary evidence and legal provisions, these respondents passed a reasoned order dated 29/01/2026, 03/02/2026 and approval orders and consequential Shalarth IDs of the petitionersemployees were cancelled and thus it is claimed that the petitioners do not possess any legally enforceable statutory or vested right to claim salary through Shalarth Pranali. The generation of Shalarth IDs being founded on an illegal, unauthorized and fraudulent appointment, does not confer any legal sanctity or right upon the petitioners-employees and any salary drawn or claimed thereunder would amount to an unauthorized and fraudulent withdrawal of public funds.
6.6. The learned GP relied on the reportable judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No.4162 of 2025 (Federation of Retail Traders Welfare Associate and another v. State of Maharashtra and others ), decided on 23/02/2025 and in Dulu Deka v. State of Assam and others, (2023) 9 SCC 749.
7. The respondent No.5-Education Officer (Primary), Zilla Parishad, Nagpur adopted the reply filed by the respondent Nos.1 to 4 and he has accepted the contents of the reply of Deputy Director of Education. It is submission of the respondent No.5 that the petition has become infructuous as the final orders have passed in the matter by the respondent No.4-Deputy Director of Education and order under challenge dated 18/03/2025 has culminated into and stands merged in order of invalidity of approval.
7.1. Second objection of the respondent No.5 is that there is no privity of contract of employer and employee relation between the petitioners-employees and Education Officer. As such, any claim for grant of salary for work performed can only be made against the employer i.e. management and school and therefore, the petitions are not maintainable.
7.2. Third objection is that the petitioners are having alternative remedy of civil suit. Fourthly, there is no constitutional, fundamental and legal right to challenge or claim salary grant-in-aid given by the State Government through Education Department to management of school teachers. By its very nature government grant is given at the discretion of Government and there cannot be judicial review of wide administrative discretion either to give grant or refuse it.
7.3. Fifth objection is raised that the petitioners have not come before this Court with clean hands and not disclosed or rather suppressed that their approval orders are false, fabricated and forged and those were never issued by the Education Officer-respondent No.5. The entire petition is made with intent to defraud Exchequer. It is submitted that the claim is based on fraud. It is also contention that orders of approvals were never issued by the Education Officer (Primary), Zilla Parishad, Nagpur.
7.4. It is further submitted that UDISE+ is an electronic data of all primary and secondary schools maintained by the Department of Education and Literacy, Ministry of Education, Government of India. Search of petitioners school code shows that the petitioners claimed in para-2 of the petition that they were appointed in certain year is false as UDISE+ does not show their names. No procedure for appointment was followed in case of petitioners, as there are various disputed question of facts which can be determined only upon recording of oral evidence and affidavit evidence would be insufficient to determine forgery, fabrication and fraud and criminal intent of practitioner of fraud and therefore, the petitioners need to be directed to take that recourse. It is specific contention of the respondent No.5 that upon verification of final record, it was found that those purported approval orders were never issued from the office of the Education Officer as disclosed from inward, outward register. Approval orders filed along with this petition were verified whereupon it was revealed that the orders contained outward number which when tallied with the official outward register shown different orders and reached to the conclusion that those orders were never issued by the Education Officer
7.5. The learned counsel for the respondent No.5 relied on the following citations:
(i) St. Ulai High School and another v. Devendraprasad Jagannath Singh and another, 2007 (1) Mh.L.J. 597.
(ii) Unni Krishnan J.P.and others v. State of Andhra Prasad and others, (1993) 1 SCC 645.
(iii) Judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No.170 of 2017 (Swargiya Raghobaji Bachale v. State of Maharashtra and others) with connected petitions, decided on 20/09/2019.
(iv) Government Aided Technical Institutes Employees Welfare Board, Aurangabad v. State of Maharashtra and others, 2024 SCC OnLine 1773.
(v) Nidhi Kaim and another v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, (2017) 4 SCC 1.
(vi) Shrisht Dhawan (Smt) v. M/s Shaw Brothers, (1992) 1 SCC 534.
(vii) S.J.S.Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar and others, (2004) 7 SCC 166.
(viii) S.Partap Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 72.
(ix) University of Kashmir and others v. Dr.Mohd. Yasin and others, AIR 1974 SC 238.
(x) Lekhraj Sathramdas Lalvani v. N.M.Shah, Deputy Custodian cum Managing Officer, Bombay and others, AIR 1966 SC 334.
(xi) Union of India v. T.R.Varma, AIR 1957 SC 882.
(xii) D.L.F. Housing Construction (P) Ltd. v. Delhi Municipal Corpn. and others, AIR 1976 SC 386.
(xiii) Arya Vyasa Sabha etc. v. The Commissioner of Hindu Charitable and Religious Institutions and Endowments, Hyderabad and another, AIR 1976 SC 475.
(xiv) P. Radhakrishana Naidu and others v. Govt.of A.P.and others, AIR 1977 SC 854.
8. We have considered the contentions of the learned counsel for the respective parties. The petitioners in these petitions placed on record copies of approval orders. However, it is specific contention that Shalarth IDs approval orders were never supplied to the petitioners though online proposals were forwarded. From the various GRs issued by the respondents-State, it is very much clear that there was delay in issuing Shalarth IDs by the office of the Director of Education. There was huge pendency of the proposals for issuance of Shalarth IDs. As it was brought to the notice of the Government about delay in issuance of Shalarth IDs and to dispose of the same, a Special Action Committee came to be constituted vide GR dated 28/02/2018 (Annexure-IV), consisting of five persons, they were directed to take decision on the proposals by 15/03/2018. Similarly, they were also directed to take decision on new proposals submitted to the Director of Education, Pune. As this task was over by 2019, a new GR dated 20/03/2019 (Annexure-V) came to be issued, whereby the Special Action Committee came to be dissolved. The Divisional Deputy Director of Education is directed to take decision whether to include the name in Shalarth Pranali after approval by the Education Officer/Superintendent of Education. After the decision of Divisional Deputy Director of Education, the Divisional President, Maharashtra State Secondary and Higher Secondary Technical Education Board, can take a decision in respect of inclusion of name in Shalarth Pranali. The teacher/employee, who is appointed through Pavitra Portal, the concerned Education Officer/ Superintendent of Education of the said district will include their names in Shalarth Pranali. Though there is omnibus denial that approvals were not issued by the office of the Education Officer (Primary), nothing is placed on record to show that the outward number mentioned in the collective annexures is not issued by the office of the Education Officer. From the above referred GRs, it also appears that there was pendency of proposals, therefore what is submitted by the petitioners that they were not issued with the Shalarth ID order and therefore insistence on behalf of the respondents for Shalarth IDs is concerned, is not justified.
9. The learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the judgment in Nilesh Jawanjal v. State of Maharashtra and others (supra), wherein this Court observed that proper website and due diligence, a full-proof approval/permission to recruit can be given. This is possible as vacancies are well known in advance and existing staff is also within knowledge. Hence, roster point is pre-fixed. Grant of permission to recruit contingent upon verification of roster point, availability of surplus teacher or then the strength of students and the procedure so far followed and operating, has created a mess in which ultimately a teacher is made to suffer. Such teacher is not a party to permission granted to recruit and in view of circular dated 23/08/2017, the impugned orders cancelling the approvals were quashed and set aside. This Court observed in para-8 as under:
“8. Insofar as request of Mrs. Joshi, learned Additional Government Pleader to permit the Competent Authority to verify the cases again is concerned, in the wake of above observations, we will permit such review or re-verification only if facts so justify. Authority undertaking review shall keep in mind the service put in by the concerned teacher /non-teaching employee and effect of cancellation of approval on him and his dependents. Only in compelling situation, such orders of cancellation shall be passed. Such orders of cancellation, if passed, shall not be given effect for a period of four weeks after its service upon concerned teacher / non-teaching employee.” (Emphasis supplied)
In the present petition the orders are filed along with reply.
9.1. The learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment in Radha Kumari v. State of Bihar (supra), wherein the Court analyzed the maintainability of the writ petition in light of the availability of an efficacious alternative remedy under the GST Act, wherein appeal mechanism is provided. It is emphasized that where a statute provides a complete and effective remedy, the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is discretionary and should not ordinarily be exercised to bypass the statutory remedy. However, where there are certain exceptions to writ jurisdiction may be exercised, such as violation of fundamental rights, breach of natural justice, orders passed without jurisdiction, or defiance of judicial procedure. The Hon’ble Apex Court held in para- 17 held as under:
“17. The position of course would be different if there were statutory provision under which such enquiry is to be held. In that case the question of salary etc. would abide by the terms of the statutory provisions. But as seen above there is no rule on the point under which the enquiry is being held. If that is so, while enquiry may proceed in the meantime, salary cannot be withheld, indeed, non-payment of salary would place an employee in much worse position than an employee who is facing regular departmental proceeding on charge of in-service misconduct. If an employee facing regular departmental proceeding is entitled to subsistence allowance as per the rules applicable to him and nonpayment thereof is likely to vitiate the departmental proceeding itself as held in Capt. M. Paul Anthoney's case (supra), it is beyond my comprehension as to how during pendency of an enquiry relating to pre-appointment conduct of the employee, his salary could be withheld.” (Emphasis supplied)
9.2. In addition to above citation, the learned counsel also relied on the decision in Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh (supra), wherein it is held that an alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law. Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged.
9.3. The learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment of Rajasthan High Court in Sunil Dattatrey s/o Shri G.P.Dattatrey Ram v. The State of Maharashtra and others (supra). In the said matter, the Rajasthan High Court held that non-payment of salary to an employee amounts to depriving him from his livelihood. Such person cannot be allowed to starve at the hands of the authorities without any justified reason. Article 21 of the Constitution of India guarantees right to life, which includes the right to livelihood. The right to life cannot be subjected to individual fancies of the persons in authority. The sweep of the right to life conferred by Article 21 of Constitution of India is wide and far reaching. An important facet of that right is right to livelihood, because no person can live without the means of living. The Rajasthan High Court held in paras-6 and 12 as under:
“6. The right to livelihood is an integral part of the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The respondent-authorities on the one hand availing the services of the petitioner and on the other hand, declining the salary to him. Such exploitation amounts to depriving the petitioner of his right to livelihood. Hence, the respondent's act of withholding the salary of the petitioner for the period during which he discharged the services cannot be approved. Till date, the respondents have continued to utilize the services of the petitioner without paying salary to him.”
“12. 'Begar' has been prohibited by Article 23 of the Constitution of India and the said Article makes it punishable in accordance with law made by the Parliament. 'Begar' means labour or service exacted by Government or a person in power without giving remuneration for it. For the purpose of constituting the offence of 'Begar' under Article 23 of the Constitution, it is not necessary that there should be a complete denial of the wages or salary which may be payable to the person from whom work is exacted. In order to ensure that the fundamental right under Article 23 of the Constitution may not be frustrated, the expression 'Begar' will have to be liberally construed and if there is deliberate denial of substantial part of salary and wages to which a person is entitled for, offence of 'Begar' may be committed, if there is no other just cause for denying the salary or wages to the worker. To allow the respondents to deny salary and wages to the petitioner would amount to allowing the respondents to contravene the provisions of Article 23 of the Constitution. It is impermissible.” (Emphasis supplied)
9.4. It is contention of the petitioners that purported show cause notice is not at all specific, nor any charges of irregularity, or fraud alleged to have been committed while granting approval to the petitioners-employees. Nothing is placed nor record along with reply that there are different order for the outward number mentioned in the letter of approval granted to the petitioners.
9.5. The learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on Jagdamba Prasad Shukla v. State of U.P.and others (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held that non-payment of subsistence allowance to a suspended employee during departmental enquiry amounts to denial of reasonable opportunity, thereby violating principles of natural justice. The Court ruled that conducting an enquiry in such circumstances is unfair, and any punishment (like dismissal) based on it is vitiated and invalid, as the employee was not given a real chance to defend himself. In para 8 of the said judgment the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under:
“8. The payment of subsistence allowance, in accordance with the Rules, to an employee under suspension is not a bounty. It is a right. An employee is entitled to be paid the subsistence allowance. No justifiable ground has been made out for non-payment of the subsistence allowance all through the period of suspension i.e. from suspension till removal. One of the reasons for not appearing in inquiry as intimated to the authorities was the financial crunch on account of non-payment of subsistence allowance and the other was the illness of the appellant. The appellant in reply to the show-cause notice stated that even if he was to appear in inquiry against medical advice, he was unable to appear for want of funds on account of non-payment of subsistence allowance. It is a clear case of breach of principles of natural justice on account of the denial of reasonable opportunity to the appellant to defend himself in the departmental enquiry. Thus, the departmental enquiry and the consequent order of removal from service are quashed.”
9.6. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that here the petitioners-employees are in more worst condition that without there being any order, their salary came to be stopped and no proper opportunity of hearing was granted. It is further contention of the petitioners that the petitioners-employees have been made to work without salary. Thus, the State has practised begar by nonpayment of salary to these petitioners for more than one year. The petitioners relied on the judgment in Anil Mallappa Kanawade and others v. The State of Karnataka and others (supra), wherein the Karanataka High Court observed in para-11 as under:
11. If the elucidation of the law and Article 23 of the Constitution of India is noticed qua the facts obtaining in the case at hand, what would unmistakably emerge is, that the State has practised begar by non-payment of salary to these petitioners for over 19 months, as the teachers have been made to work without salary. The State's defence, resting solely on the pendency of the writ proceedings, is wholly untenable and bereft of any legal justification. It is trite that no individual engaged in any form by anyone, much less in public service, can be driven to work, under the yoke of unpaid labour.”
9.7. The learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on Usha Kiran Sinha v. State of Bihar (supra) in support of his contention that teachers were not having any role in issuance of Shalarth IDs or in grant of approvals, nor there is any allegation incapacity to discharge their duties. It is held in para-13 as under:
“13. We additionally observe that the allegations raised in the Enquiry Report of the CBI was that, an advertisement was not issued, candidates were not sourced from the Employment Exchange, reservation roster was not followed, sanction of the Competent authority was not obtained and there was no interview; in the appointment of the teachers who were proceeded with. These are allegations against the government officers who appointed the teachers and not necessarily a misconduct committed by the newly appointed teachers. Indisputably all the teachers who had service had an unblemished record and there was nothing revealed in their service regarding their incapacity to discharge their duties or disentitlement to be so appointed.” (Emphasis supplied).
9.8. The learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently submitted that the petitioners were bona fide applicants from the open market. The State approved their appointments and the approval orders were valid. In the matter of Radhey Shyam Yadav and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (supra), the appellants were appointed on 25/06/1999 after due selection, their salaries abruptly stopped from October 2005 on ground that Management in collusion with appellants showed that three posts of Assistant Teachers were sanctioned, while order dated 26-12-1997 sanctioned only two posts of Assistant Teachers. There is no evidence produced to demonstrate as to how appellants, who were applicants from open market were guilty of collusion in manipulation. Rather, report of enquiry initiated pursuant to direction of High Court indicating that Manager of School in collusion with erstwhile District Basic Education Officer and his office had changed number of posts from 2 to 3 in order dated 26-12-1997. The Hon’ble Apex court held in para-23 as under:
“23. Assuming the case of the State to be true and taking it at its highest, the factual position would come to this, namely, that while the State sanctioned two vacancies, the School went ahead and recruited three. The State has no proof of commission of any malpractice by the appellants. The State approved their appointments, and the approval order till date has not been cancelled. The appointments have not been terminated. No action has been taken against the School and the School continues to receive the aid.” (Emphasis supplied)
“32. The situation of the appellants in the present case is no different from the individuals whose appointments were protected in the cases cited hereinabove. They had no blameworthy conduct. They were bona fide applicants from the open market. The alleged mischief, even according to the State, was at the end of the School and its Manager. It will be a travesty of justice if relief is denied to the appellants. Enormous prejudice would also occur to them.” (Emphasis supplied)
10. In Writ Petition No.6083/2025 and other connected matters, the Learned Counsel for Petitioner Shri. R.S. Parsodkar has relied on S.L.Kapoor v Jagmohan (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the order of disqualification passed without granting an opportunity of hearing, is vitiated due to lack of adherence to principles of natural justice. This stand of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is further reiterated in Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation (supra), where the Court reasoned that the right to life includes the right to live with dignity and pursue livelihood.
10.1. Learned Counsel Shri R.S.Parsodkar further relied on Judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Andi Mukti Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust and Ors. (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the academic staff under law were entitled to terminal benefits which ought to have been paid simultaneously while being removed.
11. As against this, the learned counsel for the respondent No.5 relied on St.Ulai High School and others v. Devendraprasad Jagannath Singh (supra) in support of his contention that the matter concerning grant of approval is between the management and the Education Officer and is relevant only for the release of grant by the State Government to the management. Therefore, the school Tribunal to decide the nature of appointment of respondent No.1 on the basis of appointment order, advertisement, etc. and not on the basis of the approval granted by the Education Officer.
However, the learned Senior Counsel drew our attention to Clause 1.1, wherein reference before the Full Bench raises principally, the issue as to whether a suit is maintainable in a Civil Court in respect of matters set out in section 9 of the MEPS Act and Rule 12 of the Rules framed thereunder. The substantial question of law raised before the Bench in second appeal was “That the Civil Suit under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in respect of matters set out in section 9 of the MEPS Act and Rule 12 thereof are impliedly barred.” In second appeal, the learned Judge found that he was not agreed to the view taken by to other Division Benches on the question of the necessity for approval of an appointment either as a condition to the validity of the appointment or for conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal. Therefore, the matter was referred to the Full Bench. The issues before the Court broadly are as under:
“2.2 Broadly speaking these issues fall into three heads. Issues (1) and (2) deal with the question as to whether a suit can be maintained before the Civil Court in respect of those subjects on which an appeal has been provided to the Tribunal by section 9 of the Act. Issues (3) and (4) explore whether a decision taken by the Education Officer on a question of seniority under Rule 12 can be challenged in an appeal under section 9 of the Act before the Tribunal and whether a suit in a Civil Court could be maintainable to impugn the decision of the Education Officer. The third head of issues consisting of Issues (5), (6) and (7) investigates into the question as to whether an appeal before the Tribunal can be maintainable where the appointment of an employee has not been approved by the Education Department of the State. The Court under the third head has to explore the nature and basis of the requirement of obtaining approval and the interrelationship, if any, between the want of approval and the maintainability of an appeal before the Tribunal.”
This Court after considering various provisions of MEPS Act, held in paras 10.10 and 10.11 as under:
“10.10 Where the management has proceeded to terminate the services of an employee on the ground of non-approval by the Education Department, the employee aggrieved by the act of termination is entitled to file an appeal before the Tribunal under section 9. In such an appeal, the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to decide incidental and ancillary questions. …………………..”
“10.11 We have already held that the disbursal of grant-in-aid or any dispute in regard to a breach of a condition of aid by the management constitutes a lis between the management and the Government. We, however, wish to clarify that in an appropriate case where the non-approval of the services of a teacher by the Education Department affects a right of the teacher such as in regard to the disbursal of the pensionary benefits or a declaration of a teacher as a surplus employee, the right to challenge an order of non-approval in appropriate proceedings would be preserved.”
It is held that Neither the MEPS Act, 1977, nor the Rules framed thereunder mandate the grant of approval by the Education Officer as a condition precedent to a valid order of appointment. The requirement of approval which relates to the disbursal of grant in aid is a matter between the management and the State and want of approval will not invalidate an order of appointment.
The judgments of the Division Benches of this Court in Anna Manikrao Pethe vs. Presiding Officer, and Shailaja Ashokrao Walse vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) to the extent that they hold that an appeal is not maintainable before the Tribunal at the behest of an employee whose appointment has not been approved do not reflect the correct position in law and are overruled.
As such, this Court answered the reference and held that the legislature having provided for a remedy before the Tribunal only in respect of the subject spelt out in clause A and B of sub-section (1) of Section 9. In those cases, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is impliedly barred. Thus, the ratio laid down in this citation is not relevant in the present set of facts, as there is no termination on the ground of non-approval, in fact, copies of approval orders are on record and the respondents have not placed anything on record to show that the said outward numbers in order of approval are not available with the office of the Education Officer and different orders other than the approval to the respective petitioners are there on the said outward numbers.
11.1. The learned counsel for the respondent No.5 also placed reliance on judgment in Unni Krishnan J.P. and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra) in support of his contention that a citizen of this country may have a right to establish an educational institution but no citizen, person or institution has a right much less a fundamental right, to affiliation or recognition, or to grant-in-aid from the State. The issue before the Hon’ble Apex Court was in respect of growing commercialization of education and to curb that, the Hon’ble Apex Court made it clear that education is not just a business. It is observed that running private aided, unaided, recognized affiliated educational institution conducting professional courses such as medical, engineering courses, its admission and charging of capitation fees in such institution are subject to conditions and regulations of the State. The learned counsel relied on para-3A of the said judgment which reads as under:
“3.A citizen of this country may have a right to establish an educational institution but no citizen, person or institution has a right much less a fundamental right, to affiliation or recognition, or to grant-in-aid b from the State, The recognition and/or affiliation shall be given by the State subject only to the conditions set out in, and only in accordance with the scheme contained in Part III of this Judgment. No Government/University or authority shall be competent to grant recognition or affiliation except in accordance with the said scheme. The said scheme shall constitute a condition of such recognition or affiliation, as the case may be, in addition to such other conditions and terms which such Government, University or other authority may choose to impose. Those receiving aid shall, however, be subject to all such terms and conditions, as the aid giving authority may impose in the interest of general public.”
The facts involved in the said matter are totally different. Here there is no issue of recognition or grant-in-aid. The said recognition and grant-in-aid is already extended to the petitionerinstitution. Once it is admitted for grant, it cannot be stopped abruptly without granting proper opportunity of hearing.
11.2. The learned counsel for the respondent No.5 placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Swargiya Raghobaji Bachale v. State of Maharashtra and others (supra). The reliance placed on this judgment is misplaced. In the said matter, school challenged the State’s decision to let them operate as self-financed business to run the schools and colleges on self financed basis and denied the grantin- aid from the State Government. In view of this specific challenge, this Court held that the grant-in-aid is neither a fundamental right, nor a statutory right and it depends upon the economic capacity of the State. In the present matter, there is no such a ground for stoppage of salary.
11.3. The learned counsel for the respondent No.5 placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Government Aided Technical Institutes Employees Welfare Board Aurangabad v. State of Maharashtra and others (supra). This Court considered whether employees of government-aided technical institutes could demand certain financial or service benefits from the State as a matter of right. The petitioner-Board seeking release of 100% salary and allowances to its members through HTE-Sevarth Pranali and also assailed Clause 10 of the GR stipulates to disburse 90% of salary through HTESevarth Pranali leaving balance 10% to be disbursed at level of institutions. The State cannot be put to an obligation to release grantin- aid in addition to 90% maintenance grant. In view of this background, the petition came to be dismissed. It is held in para-24 as under:
“24. …………………. It is, therefore, clear that it is the duty of the management to arrange for the funds to discharge their statutory obligation to ensure 100% salary in tune with the prescribed pay scales. The employees cannot be deprived of their statutory entitlement. However, to meet out such deficit, the State Government cannot be put to an obligation to release grant-in-aid in addition to 90% maintenance grants provided under the Scheme of 1978. In that view of the matter, we do not find any substance in the first prayer of the petitioner by which Clause No. 10 of the Government Resolution dated 21-8- 2015 has been impugned.” (Emphasis supplied)
However, in our considered opinion, the above referred judgment is of no use to the respondent No.5. Once school is admitted for 100% grant-in-aid basis, it’s State obligation to pay 100% grant to the petitioner-institution. In the matter referred above those schools were admitted for 90% grant-in-aid basis, the petitioner was asking for 100%. In the present matter, there is no such issue involved.
11.4. The learned counsel for the respondent No.5 placed reliance on the judgment in Nidhi Kaim and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt with fallout of the Vyapam Scam, where large-scale irregularities were found in medical entrance examinations. The key issue was whether admissions obtained through such a tainted process should be cancelled, even if some students claimed innocence. The Court took a strict stance, holding that when the entire selection process is vitiated by fraud, individual claims of innocence cannot override the need to maintain the integrity of the system. As a result, admissions of candidates found to be beneficiaries of the irregularities were cancelled, emphasizing that fraud in public examinations cannot be tolerated. The learned counsel placed reliance on para-50 of the said judgment, wherein submissions of the appellant is reproduced by the Hon’ble Apex Court. Similarly, the question was, whether the consequences of established fraud, as repeatedly declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court can be ignored to do complete justice in a matter in exercise of jurisdiction in the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution? Whether the consequences of fraud can be overlooked in the facts and circumstances of this case, in order to render complete justice to the appellant? The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it would not be proper to legitimize the admission of the appellant to the MBBS Course in exercise of the jurisdiction vested with the Hon’ble Apex Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.
In the judgment referred above, the fraud was established, whereas, in the present matter without granting any opportunity of hearing or without there being any contention of fraud in the show cause notice, the salary was stopped since March, 2025.
11.5. The learned counsel for the respondent No.5 also placed reliance on Shrisht Dhawan (Smt) v. M/s. Shaw Brothers (supra). However, it pertains to short term tenancy under section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. In fact though learned counsel for the respondent No.5 relied on this judgment, in support of his contention that fraud is essentially a question of fact, the burden to prove which is upon him who alleges it. In the present matter, it is not established that the petitioners have committed any fraud. What is held in para- 10 of the said judgment is as under:
“10. Fraud is essentially a question of fact, the burden to prove which is upon him who alleges it. He who alleges fraud must do so promptly. There is a presumption of legality in favour of a statutory order. The Controller’s order under Section 21 is presumed to be valid until proved to be vitiated by fraud or mala fide. If his order was obtained by the fraud a party seeking it or if he made a ‘mindless order’ in the sense of acting mala fide by illegitimate exercise of power owing to non-application of his mind to the strict requirements of the section, then the special mechanism of the section would not operate.”
11.6. The learned counsel for the respondent No.5 placed reliance on S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar and others (supra). In the said matter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt with two main issues—suppression of facts in writ petitions and fairness in State action. It held that merely not disclosing a fact (like filing a prior civil suit) does not automatically kill a writ petition unless that fact is material and affects the merits of the case. Since the suit had already been withdrawn and the writ was otherwise maintainable, it was held that the High Court was wrong to dismiss it only on that ground. In fact, this judgment supports the contention of the petitioners on merits, the Court found that the State Financial Corporation had acted unfairly and in undue haste while selling the appellant’s property—giving almost no time for bids, conducting the process suspiciously, and failing to ensure a fair price. The Court emphasized that State authorities must act reasonably, transparently, and in good faith, especially in public sales. Because the process was clearly flawed, the sale was set aside.
11.7. The learned counsel for the respondent No.5 placed reliance on the judgment in S. Partap Singh v. State of Punjab (supra). The Hon’ble Apex Court held that the Doctrine of Pleasure under Article 310 is not absolute, and the State cannot force an employee to continue in service beyond the prescribed term or retirement. It also ruled that any administrative action obtained through fraud is invalid.
There is no dispute over this proposition. However, it is a matter of fact that no FIR against the employees nor there is any specific allegation of fraud or misrepresentation against the petitioners-employees.
11.8. The learned counsel for the respondent No.5 relied on the judgment in University of Kashmir and others v. Dr.Mohd. Yasin and others (supra). In the said matter, the Hon’ble Apex Court dealt with the issue whether actions of a university, though not strictly a government department can be challenged under writ jurisdiction. The Court held that when a body like a university performs public functions and exercises powers affecting rights (like employment or academic decisions), its actions are subject to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It emphasized that public authorities must act fairly and not arbitrarily, and if their actions violate principles of natural justice or are unreasonable, courts can intervene.
In the present matter, we do not see any opportunity was granted to the petitioners-employees nor any show cause notice specifically pointing out what fraud the petitioners-employees have committed is issued. It is clear that no principles of natural justice were followed.
11.9. The learned counsel for the respondent No.5 also placed reliance on the judgment in Lekhraj Sathramdas Lalvani v. N. M. Shah, Deputy Custodian cum Managing Officer, Bombay and others (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court was dealing with action of authorities under the Evacuee Property laws. The question before the Hon’ble Apex court was that whether such action could be challenged through writ jurisdiction. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that when a statute provides a complete machinery of remedies (like appeals and revisions), parties are generally expected to follow that route rather than directly approaching the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, it also clarified that writ jurisdiction is not completely barred—it can still be used in exceptional cases such as lack of jurisdiction, violation of natural justice, or clear illegality. It is held that a writ of mandamus is granted only in a case where there is a statutory duty imposed upon the officer concerned and there is a failure on the part of that officer to discharge that statutory obligation. The chief function of the writ is to compel the performance of public duties prescribed by statute and to keep the subordinate tribunals and officers exercising public functions within the limits of their jurisdictions. Before Mandamus can be issued to a public servant it must, therefore, be shown that a duty towards the applicant has been imposed upon the public servant by statute so that he can be charged thereon, and independently of any duty which as servant he may owe to his principal.
11.10. The learned counsel also placed reliance on the judgment in Union of India v. T. R. Varma (supra). However, in our considered opinion, it is not relevant for the facts of the present case. It is on the point of alternate remedy if available whether what is the scope of writ jurisdiction in service matters. It is held that although the existence of an alternative remedy (like a departmental appeal) is not an absolute bar to approaching the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Court generally refused to interfere when such remedy is exhausted. In the present matter, we do not found any efficacious remedy. In fact, there is no order issued by the respondents authorities before stopping the salary. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that exception would apply particularly where there is a violation of principles of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction or patent illegality.
11.11. The learned counsel for the respondent No.5 relied on the judgment in D.L.F. Housing Construction (P) Ltd. v. Delhi Municipal Corpn.and others (supra) in support of his contention that contractual disputes without any public law element are generally not entertained under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is clarified by the Hon’ble Apex Court that even when a dispute arises out of a contract with a public authority, its action can still be subjected to judicial review, if they are arbitrary, unreasonable, or in violation of statutory provisions.
11.12. The learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment in Arya Vyasa Sabha etc. v. The Commissioner of Hindu Charitable and Religious Institutions and Endowments, Hyderabad and another (supra). However, in our considered opinion, it is not relevant to the present set of facts.
11.13. The learned counsel also placed reliance P. Radhakrishana Naidu and others v. Govt.of A.P.and others (supra). The Hon’ble Apex Court examined the validity of State action affecting rights of individuals and reiterated that government decisions must be fair, reasonable, and non-arbitrary. It emphasized that even when the State exercises administrative or statutory powers, such actions are open to judicial review if they violate constitutional principles, particularly equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Court made it clear that arbitrariness in State action is itself a ground for invalidity, and any decision lacking fairness or rational basis can be struck down.
11.14. It is contention of the respondent No.5 that several petitioners have combined as petitioners. Their causes of action are separate and independent. Each is alleged to be an instance of individual assertion of constitutional right in regard to facts and circumstances of each case. In the present matter, we do not see any such necessity to file individual matter as cause of action is same.
12. Learned GP Shri D. V. Chauhan placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Federation of Retail Traders Welfare Associate and another v. State of Maharashtra and others (supra). In the said judgment this Court relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in DN Jeevaraj v. Chief Secretary, Government of Karanataka and others, 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 4811 and held in para 3 as under:
“3. In DN Jeevaraj (supra), the Supreme Court put it like this:
"37. In such cases, that might not strictly fall in the category of public interest litigation and for which other remedies are available, insofar as the issuance of a writ of mandamus is concerned, this Court held in Union of India v. S.B. Vohra [ (2004) 2 SCC 150: 2004 SCC (L&S) 363] that: (SCC p. 160, paras 12-13)
"12. Mandamus literally means a command. The essence of mandamus in England was that it was a royal command issued by the King's Bench (now Queen's Bench) directing performance of a public legal duty.
13. A writ of mandamus is issued in favour of a person who establishes a legal right in himself. A writ of mandamus is issued against a person who has a legal duty to perform but has failed and/or neglected to do so. Such a legal duty emanates from either in discharge of a public duty or by operation of law. The writ of mandamus is of a most extensive remedial nature. The object of mandamus is to prevent disorder from a failure of justice and is required to be granted in all cases where law has established no specific remedy and whether justice despite demanded has not been granted."
38. A salutary principle or a well-recognised rule that needs to be kept in mind before issuing a writ of mandamus was stated in Saraswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd. v. Union of India [(1974) 2 SCC 630] in the following words: (SCC pp. 641-42, paras 24-25)
"24. ... The powers of the High Court under Article 226 are not strictly confined to the limits to which proceedings for prerogative writs are subject in English practice. Nevertheless, the well-recognised rule that no writ or order in the nature of a mandamus would issue when there is no failure to perform a mandatory duty applies in this country as well. Even in cases of alleged breaches of mandatory duties, the salutary general rule, which is subject to certain exceptions, applied by us, as it is in England, when a writ of mandamus is asked for, could be stated as we find it set out in Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn.), Vol. 11, p. 106:
'198. Demand for performance must precede application. - As a general rule the order will not be granted unless the party complained of has known what it was he was required to do, so that he had the means of considering whether or not he should comply, and it must be shown by evidence that there was a distinct demand of that which the party seeking the mandamus desires to enforce, and that that demand was met by a refusal.'
25. In the cases before us there was no such demand or refusal. Thus, no ground whatsoever is shown here for the issue of any writ, order, or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution.”
12.1. The learned GP also placed reliance on Dulu Deka v. State of Assam and others (supra), wherein appellant’s appointment, along with 509 others, was declared illegal and void ab initio as it was made against non-existent posts and without any proper selection process. She did not challenge the cancellation order. The Court held that she had no right to continue in service or claim salary thereafter, especially given the lack of evidence, jurisdictional inconsistencies, and delay in approaching the court. The Hon’ble Apex Court held in para-10 as under:
“10. Once the appointment of the appellant had been declared illegal and void ab initio, and was cancelled by the Director of Elementary Education, Assam vide Order dated 18-10-2001, the appellant could not legally continue in service thereafter, unless that cancellation order was set aside. It has been noticed by the High Court that the Order dated 18-10-2001 was never challenged by the appellant. Thus, the appellant had no legal right to continue in service, especially when there is no order or letter placed on record by the appellant that she was allowed to continue beyond 31-3-2002. No claim for payment of salary could be made for any period. Even otherwise, it is difficult to believe that a person has been working for two decades without any salary, Even the writ petition was filed by her in the High Court in the year 2008, claiming salary from 12-3-2001 onwards i.e. seven years later.” (Emphasis supplied)
13. The facts involved in the above referred citation are totally distinguishable from the facts involved in the present matters. There was no claim by the appellant before the Hon’ble Apex Court challenging her cancellation of appointment or claim for any salary for near about two decades. Here, the present petitioners were receiving salary till February, 2025. Even their services are approved by the Education Officer long back. Though it is contended that these orders of approvals are not issued by the office of the Education Officer, there is no material placed on record to show that there is any different order other than approval with regard to the outward number mentioned in approval order. The respondents ought to have placed on record which is the letter/order in respect of outward number in each individual order of approval.
14. The learned counsel for the petitioners drew our attention to the GR dated 10/06/2022, wherein earlier GRs were considered and procedure for grant of individual approval as well as inclusion of the names of teaching and non-teaching staff in Shalarth Pranali is provided. There is timeline given by the GR. As per this GR, the Management required to submit proposal of the employee within a period of one month from the date of appointment to the Deputy Director of Education. For secondary school and junior colleges proposal is to be forwarded to the Divisional President or Divisional Examination Board. Thereafter, within a period of one month after receipt of proposal, the concerned Deputy Director of Education would take steps to complete the process of inclusion of the name of the candidate in Shalarth Pranali. If there are any appointment prior to the date of GR dated 10/06/2022, duty casted on the Education Officer/Education Inspector to intimate to the concerned educational institution to forward their proposal within a period of three months for individual approval. The concerned institution whose proposals for individual approval are pending, are directed to submit within three months to the Education Officer/Education Inspector/Divisional Deputy Director of Education. The concerned Education Officer/ Education Inspector/Divisional Deputy Director of Education shall take a decision within a period of three months. If the above referred procedure is not followed by any of the Authority, the Director of Education may direct departmental enquiry. The said authorities are bound to submit a proposal for inclusion of name of employee in Shalarth Pranali to Divisional Examination Board within a period of one month from the decision and thereafter, the concerned Education Officer/Education Inspector/Divisional Deputy Director of Education and Divisional Examination Board to complete the process of inclusion of name in Shalarth Pranali.
15. It is specifically mentioned in Clause 2.5 that if the procedure prescribed in the GR dated 06/02/2012 and also the present GR dated 10/06/2022 was not followed, the Deputy Director of Education while granting individual approval, if it is revealed to him that without following procedure as per GR dated 06/02/2012 or present GR dated 10/06/2022 the approvals were granted, then the concerned Authorities are liable for departmental enquiry and any loss to the Government due to such individual approval, the same will be made good from the salary of the concerned officer. If it is found that recruitment is made and individual approvals are granted contrary to the procedure, the Commissioner of Education take a final decision after granting due opportunity to the educational institution/ management. The Commissioner of Education, was entrusted with the power to cancel recognition of the school or any other severe punishment.
16. It is mandatory as per Clause 3.1 that if there is prima facie opinion of the Deputy Director of Education that after considering the proposal and documents along with that, the individual approval granted was illegal, faulty and improper, he has to issue interim order necessarily. There is detailed procedure mentioned in this clause. It was directed that the said interim order must include on what basis the individual approval is incorrect or illegal. The reasons for coming to prima facie opinion, it is also necessary to mention therein that detailed enquiry in the matter will be conducted. It is also directed that in such matters, for detailed enquiry the concerned employee, the concerned school management/educational institution as well as the officer, who has granted individual approvals were all may notice and after hearing them, it is mandatory to pass detailed order. If it is found that the individual approval was granted rightly, the name of the concerned employee be included in Shalarth Pranali. Thus, it can be seen that there is duty casted on the authority before including the name of the candidate in Shalarth Pranali. It is also reveals from the GR issued by the respondents from time to time that there was a huge pendency of the proposals for inclusion of the names of the candidates in Shalarth Pranali and to overcome this difficulty, the State of Maharashtra constituted a “Special Action Committee” consisting of four members including Commissioner of Education, two Superintendent of Education and one nominee of employees’ association. This Committee was directed to take decision till 15/03/2018 and also the subsequent proposals which would be submitted to the Special Action Committee. The said Committee was dissolved by GR dated 28/03/2019 and the Divisional Deputy Director of Education directed to take the decision. The Divisional President of Maharashtra State Secondary and Higher Secondary Technical Education Board would take decision of inclusion of name in Shalarth Pranali.
17. Thus, it can be seen that though proposals were approved by the Education Officer, many of the employees started receiving salary through grants, but they were not supplied with the copies of the Shalarth IDs for the reasons stated above. During the pendency of these petitions, there is recent judgment passed by the Principal Seat in Hemant Baliram Deore and others v. The State of Maharashtra and others (supra) and relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The facts involved in the said petition are identical to the facts involved in the present petitions. We fully agree with the findings recorded by the Principal Seat in the above referred judgment in Hemant Baliram Deore and others v. The State of Maharashtra and others (supra), wherein the Principal Seat of this Court formulated 5 issues and recorded their answered accordingly, which are reproduced as under:
12. We find that there are five issues to be considered in these cases, which are as under:
(a) Whether the show-cause notices contained specific instances of irregularities, to enable the employees as well as the Management to respond to the specific allegations?
(b) Whether there is a large passage of time between the closing of the matters and the date of the passing of the impugned orders?
(c) Whether the hearings conducted by the Competent Authority, by calling 150 employees along with their Management and Headmasters, on a single day and collecting their written submissions filled into the prescribed formats appended to the show-cause notice, can be said to be appropriate hearings?
(d) Whether the deficiencies noticed by the Competent Authorities in the appointments of the employees, amount to illegalities or irregularities, and whether any of such irregularities were condonable?
(e) Whether there are any allegations of fraud or misrepresentation in the show-cause notices or conclusions against the Employees?”
“13. With regard to the first issue, we find from the show cause notices issued to the Petitioner employees, that there are hardly any details worth mentioning in the notice in order to enable the noticees to understand or gather as to what are the reasons or grounds on which the notices have been issued for the purpose of cancellation of approvals. If the Marathi paragraph in the notice is to be translated in English, it would make out the following meaning:
Taking into account Reference Serial No. 2. (Corrigendum), an officer who is one level senior shall conduct the hearing with regard to Reference Serial Nos. 3 to 5 pertaining to irregularities in the approvals granted. The hearing is scheduled as per the following programme, and the Education Officer (Secondary), the then Education Officer (Secondary), the President/Secretary. Headmaster of the school, and the Petitioner employees, shall show cause as to why the approval granted to the employees should not be the cancelled. If any of the parties fail to appear in the matter, an ex parte decision would be arrived at. Hearing Date: 07/05/2025
Time: 10:30 to 5:00
Venue: Naurasji Wadia College, Pune 411001.
14. It does not require any debate that the above show cause notice does not even whisper of any specific charge of irregularity, much less, point out any particular illegality or fraud alleged to have been committed while granting approval to the Petitioner employees.”
Relying on the judgment in Commissioner of Central Excise Bangalore v. Brindavan Beverages (P) Ltd. and others, (2007) 5 SCC 388, wherein Hon’ble Apex Court held that the show cause notice is the foundation on which the department has to built up its case. If the allegation in the show cause notice are not specific and are contrary, vague, lack details and/or unintelligible that is sufficient to hold that the noticee was not given proper opportunity to meet the allegations indicated in the show-cause notice. In the matter before the Hon’ble Apex Court the appellant has tried to highlight of the alleged connection between the various concerns. It is held by Hon’ble Apex Court that it is not sufficient to proceed against the respondents unless it is shown that they were parties to the arrangements, if any. The Principal Seat of this Court observed in paras-16 and 17 as under:
“16. We also find from the impugned order that batches of 150 employees were given time between 10:30 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on a particular day to address the authority. Each of these noticees was permitted to tender their explanation by filling up the cyclostyled format attached to the show cause notice. Not a single teacher was granted a hearing in the proceeding, save and except, the liberty of tendering the filled-in form, which was in the nature of a questionnaire.”
“17. So also, it appears that the incumbent Education Officer, as well as the then Education Officers, who are alleged to have resorted to illegalities and irregularities, were absent, since they were attending a similar proceeding being conducted by another nominated officer who had published the schedule for a particular institution and employees, under the same Zilla Parishad. These officers, therefore, could not be present at two places at the same time and on the same day.”
and held that the Court find fault with the show cause notices issued to these petitioners and those cannot be sustained. It is also held by this Court in answer to second issue as under:
“21. Considering that four pages of the impugned order contain copying of the replies of the parties, and 3/4th of the last page contains cryptic analysis and conclusion, we find that, probably because of the passage of 7 to 8 months, the entire material placed before the authority has not been considered in a proper perspective. Proper consideration of the material available and reasons to support the conclusion, are the factors which indicate application of mind. Assigning reasons for justifying the conclusions, is a Sine-Quo-Non while passing the impugned order. The impugned order would, therefore, be faulted on this count as well. Hence, our answer to issue no. 2.”
In answer to issue No.3, the Principal Seat observed as under:
“23. It is anybody's guess that if 150 employees are to enter the venue and tender their filled-in forms/written submissions, as also by the Management and Head Master, and none of them was allowed to express any view, but, had to leave the venue, such a hearing cannot be said to be an appropriate hearing. More so, when the nominated authority was considering cancellation of the approvals of the teachers, cancellation of their Shalarth-IDs, and which would result in their termination from employment. Termination from service amounts to civil death. We, therefore, express our serious displeasure for the manner in which the hearing has been conducted.
24. Taking into account that these Petitioner teachers were working for between 10 to 15 years, there was no reason for the nominated authority to resort to such a 'undue-haste' procedure of conducting the hearings, which clearly appears to be a farce or an eye-wash. When these teachers were working for more than a decade and half, proper hearings should have been conducted. keeping in view that termination from service would amount to a civil death for such teachers. We, therefore, disapprove of the manner of conducting the hearing. The hearing is, therefore, faulty and cannot be sustained. Hence, our answer to issue no.3.” (Emphasis supplied)
In answer to issue Nos.4 and 5 (d & e), it is held as under:
“29. The learned Advocate for the Petitioners is right in contending that if the show cause notice had indicated the grounds on which the Petitioner was called upon to show cause, the Petitioner would at least have come to know the reasons for which the show cause notice was issued. Neither the employee, the Management, nor the Head Master was aware of why the show cause notice had been issued. No fraud or illegality has been alleged.”
“31. This Court has, therefore, concluded that the approvals granted cannot be interfered with and cannot be set aside, save and except for the reason that a fraud has been committed. Even if the Education Officer granted approval erroneously, the same cannot be made a ground to recall the approval order and pass a cancellation order, unless a case of fraud, misrepresentation, or suppression is established. The length of service of the Petitioners, beyond a decade, was also considered by the Court.”
“32. A glance at the impugned orders makes it clear that there is no conclusion by the nominated authority that the Petitioner employees or the Management have indulged in a fraud or misrepresentation. The grounds for quashing the approvals are that the roster reservation was not properly followed, that a candidate did not have the TET qualification, or that prior permission from the Education Department for carrying out recruitment was not taken.”
“33. It must be borne in mind that when these Petitioners were appointed more than a decade ago, the Pavitra Portal Pranali was not in vogue; it was brought into effect pursuant to a judgment of this Court. There is no conclusion by the nominated authority that fraud or misrepresentation has been indulged in, either by the Management or by the teachers.”
“34. A glance at the impugned order gives us a prima facie view that the reasons mentioned for cancellation of approval,actually turn upon the conduct of the Management. It was the Management which can be alleged to have not followed the roster reservation. It is the Management which can be alleged to have indulged in an irregularity of not seeking prior permission of the Education Authority. It could be the Management which can be alleged to have indulged in an irregularity of publishing the advertisement in unknown or less circulated news papers, if that be the case. The Management should have been called upon to explain its conduct.”
18. This Court observed that nominated authority has not uttered a word against such a Management. The resultant effect of cancellation of the approval and Shalarth-ID, is like a death knell to the employees who are not at fault. They are likely to lose their employment due to purported irregularities committed by the Management. This Court noted that the irregularities were condonable. As this Court held that the notices are unsustainable and if the Authorities desired to take a proper hearing in these matters, they are at liberty to issue appropriate show cause notices afresh mentioning the specific ground in each case of the teachers or management as being ground only towards indicating fraud or misrepresentation. Any issue touching an irregularity can also be confronted but only with the management and if is is noticed that the management had indulged in such irregularities, the authority would be at liberty to pass orders penalizing the management by any appropriate mode or by imposing heavy costs to be deposited in the State Exchequer. Unless a fraud or misrepresentation is noticed and the teachers can be held to be party to such acts, the approval orders of the petitioners shall not be questioned.
19. In fact, after putting service for more than 10 to 15 years in such hasty manner, the enquiry is concluded without granting proper opportunity is itself violation of principles of natural justice. It is a matter of record that the schools were being inspected every year and none of the Authorities raised any objection about the approvals or any other irregularity or illegality since 10 to 15 years of petitionersemployees’ appointments. Even if it is presumed that there is any irregularity and if timely action would have been taken, the petitioners-employees would have opportunity to opt for any other job. However, after 10 to 15 years of service, after granting due approval, after payment of salary years together, their approvals were cancelled without granting proper opportunity of hearing rendering them without income. Many of them might have crossed age to secure any alternative job.
20. Moreover, the communication dated 21/04/2025 called upon the headmaster of the school to submit information of the teachers, who were allotted Shalarth IDs during the period of 31/03/2019 to 31/03/2025. In view thereof, the petitionersemployees who were appointed long back prior 10 to 15 years before the date of 31/03/2019 which is mentioned in notice, for want of their information stopping of their salary is totally illegal. As such, what information is sought for is not pertaining to the teachers, who were receiving salary from the grants. As alleged by the petitionersemployees, the copies of Shalarth IDs were not supplied to some of the schools though granted. Though as per the scheme provided in GR dated 07/11/2012, the details of the petitioners were uploaded on the Shalarth Portal. It is contended that except for uploading those details, the management or the petitioners-employees had no role to play in issuance of Shalarth IDs.
21. As referred above, the Principal Seat in Hemant Baliram Deore and others v. The State of Maharashtra and others (supra) held that the show cause notice does not even whisper of any specific charge or irregularity, much less point out any particular illegality or fraud/misrepresentation alleged to have been committed while granting approval to the petitioners-employees. At the foundation itself that is show cause notice is vague, not specific, lack details and/or unintelligible that is sufficient to hold that the noticee was not given proper opportunity of hearing to meet the allegations indicated in the show cause notice. The Principal Seat also observed that the undue haste and no proper opportunity was granted to the petitioners. It is also rightly observed that the incumbent Education Officer as well as the then Education Officer, who are alleged to have resorted to illegalities and irregularities were absent. In the present matters also, the same procedure/modus operandi adopted by the Enquiry Officer. As seen from the GR dated 10/06/2022, in Clause 3.1, it is specifically directed to the Deputy Director of Education that if it revealed that the earlier approval was granted irregularly or illegally and it is prima facie opinion of the Deputy Director of Education, in that circumstances, it is necessary to pass interim orders along with reasons for coming to the prima facie opinion and informing to the concerned that detail enquiry would be conducted. Until completion of detail enquiry, the proposal for inclusion of new name would remain in abeyance. It is specifically mentioned that if detail enquiry has to be conducted, the concerned employee, the concerned Management, educational institution so also the officer, who have issued individual approval, were required to be noticed and after hearing them, detailed reasoned order shall be passed. Thus, it is clear that in absence of officer, who has issued the approval orders, the enquiry is not as per the provisions or as per the GR and in complete violation of GR. Moreover, no personal hearing was granted to any of the petitioners as observed by the Principal Seat, as they were directed to fill up the form on 22 points and no personal hearing was granted. Even in some matters though petitioners were present, they were shown as absent.
22. It is held by this judgment that the said purported show cause notices issued to these petitioners cannot be sustained. The final order passed by the enquiry officer is also held as faulty and without application of mind. Assigning reasons for justifying the conclusions is a sine quo non while passing the order which is lacking. It is held that around 150 employees along with their Management and headmasters on a single day collecting their written submissions filed in prescribed format appended to the show cause notice cannot be said to be an appropriate hearing. None of them was allowed to express their view. It is observed by the Court that taking into account that these petitioners-teachers were working for more than 10 to 15 years, there was no reason for the nominated authority to resort such ‘undue haste’ procedure of conducting the hearings, which clearly appears to be a farce or an eyewash. It is held that the hearing is therefore, faulty and cannot be sustained. Moreover, the Principal Seat also observed that even if there are some irregularities, those are condonable and not attributable to the employees, who are serving since last more than 10 to 15 years. There are no allegations of fraud or misrepresentation in the show cause notice or any conclusion against the petitioners-employees. Relying on the decision in Shivanee Prasanna Deshpande v. State of Maharashtra and others, (Writ Petition No.10133 of 2016, decided on 01/08/2017), this Court held that approvals granted cannot be interfered with and cannot be set aside, save and except for the reason that a fraud has been committed. Even if the Education Officer granted approval erroneously, the same cannot be made ground to recall the approval order and pass a cancellation order, unless a case of fraud, misrepresentation, or suppression is established. The facts involved in the present matters are identical, even show cause notices, the hearing granted also revealed that the procedure adopted by the enquiry officer on the basis of show cause notice, which is not specific and which is vague, is unsustainable and therefore, the subsequent actions based on the above referred purported show cause notices are also unsustainable. We fully agreed with the judgment passed in Hemant Baliram Deore (supra). Even if there are some instances noticed by the Department, it does not give such power to take such arbitrary action against all the employees. It is admitted fact that Pavitra Portal though installed not functioning for many years. Even there was huge pendency of proposals for Shalarth IDs. UDISE+ is also not updated and many institutions requested for correction in the said Portal. Thus, for the flaws in the system the teachers/staff cannot be blamed specifically when they are having no role to play. We are of the firm opinion that the office of respondents are not in order and they are blaming the teachers/staff.
23. By way of additional affidavit, the petitioners claimed that during the pendency of these petitions, the respondent-Deputy Director of Education, Nagpur issued notices to the petitioners directing them to be present for a hearing without specifying any charges, allegations, grounds and consequences. No effective opportunity of hearing was granted. Even some of the petitionersemployees were marked as absent, though they were present for hearing. It is further submitted that the respondent-Deputy Director of Education, Nagpur vide their reply to the respective petition informed the petitioners that their approvals have been cancelled. These cancellation of approval orders were never supplied to the petitioners and were simply annexed to the reply filed by them.
24. The learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.11748 of 2025 (Ravi Oraon v. State of Jharkhand and ors.), decided on 09/10/2025 in support of his contention that no employee can be dismissed or penalized on a charge that was never mentioned in the show cause notice. In the absence of any allegation of fraud against the teachers, their salaries cannot be stopped. The petitioners placed reliance on Radhey Shyam Yadav v. State of U.P. (supra). He also placed reliance on Hemant Baliram Deore and another v. State of Maharashtra and others (supra).
25. As such, the action on the part of the respondents of stopping salary without order is patently illegal, erroneous, defeats fundamental rights of the petitioners enshrined under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. In fact, stoppage of salary without order, without granting any opportunity of hearing amounts to violation of principles of natural justice. It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners that even after stoppage of salary, the work is exacted by the Department and the teachers are performing their duties, schools were running, moreover, the election duties as well as census duties were directed to be performed to the petitioners-employees in many matters, without giving remuneration for it till February, 2026. ‘Begar’ is defined under Article 23 of the Constitution of India. The Government is prohibited from exacting work without remuneration. This act of the respondents-Authorities is nothing but practicing ‘Begar’ which is offence.
26. In view of above observations, the writ petitions are partly allowed.
27. The impugned purported show cause notices and the impugned cancellation orders pursuant to the purported show cause notices are hereby quashed and set aside as are unsustainable.
28. If the Authorities desire to conduct a proper hearing in these matters, they are at liberty to issue appropriate show cause notices afresh, mentioning the specific ground in each case of the petitioners-employees or Management, as being grounds only towards indicating fraud or misrepresentation. Any issue touching an irregularity can also be confronted, but only with the Management and if it is noticed that the Management as well as the concerned officer has committed irregularities or not followed the procedure prescribed by the GR dated 10/06/2022, the respondents-Authorities are at liberty to make loss good from the concerned officer or by imposing penalty on the Management. However, unless a fraud or misrepresentation is noticed and the petitioners-employees are held to be parties to such acts, the Shalarth IDs, approval orders of the petitioners-employees shall not be questioned as held in view of law laid down in Mrs.Shivanee Prasanna Deshpande v. State of Maharashtra and others (supra) and the same are restored.
29. The petitioners-employees are entitled to their salary, which is stopped from March, 2025, as they have been working without a break in service and respondents-Authorities to continue to pay the same.
30. Rule is made partly absolute in the above terms. No costs.
At this juncture, the learned Additional Government Pleader has requested for keeping this judgment in abeyance for one week. We do not see any ground to grant such relief as already the petitioners-employees are without salary from one year.
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