1. Since the issues raised in both the above-mentioned CRLMCs involve common question of fact and law, those were heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment. For the sake of convenience and effective adjudication, CRLMC No.1589 of 2025 is treated as the lead case.
2. The Petitioner, through the present CRLMC, calls in question the order dated 16.01.2023 passed by the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Bhubaneswar in T.R. Case No. 03 of 2023 arising out of Cuttack Vigilance Cell P.S. Case No. 21 of 2019, whereby cognizance was taken of offences punishable under Sections 7 and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 as amended, read with Section 120B of the IPC, against the Petitioner and another co-accused. The said proceeding arises out of allegations relating to demand and acceptance of illegal gratification in connection with the release of bills of an empaneled supplier under the Directorate of Horticulture, Odisha, at a time when the Petitioner was serving as Director of Horticulture.
I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:
3. The brief facts necessary for disposal of this CRLMC are as follows:-
(i) The present CRLMC has been filed by the petitioner, who at the relevant time was serving as Director of Horticulture, Odisha, assailing the order dated 16.01.2023 passed by the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Bhubaneswar in T.R. Case No. 03 of 2023 arising out of Cuttack Vigilance Cell P.S. Case No. 21 of 2019, by which cognizance was taken of offences under Sections 7 and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 as amended, read with Section 120B of the IPC, against the petitioner and another accused. The criminal proceeding arises out of allegations concerning demand and acceptance of illegal gratification in connection with release of bills of a supplier engaged with the Directorate of Horticulture.
(ii) The record shows that SRM Plastochem Pvt. Ltd. was an empaneled supplier of micro irrigation systems to the Directorate of Horticulture, Odisha under the Pradhan Mantri Krishi Sinchayee Yojana, and the complainant, Sri Subash Chandra Sahu, was its authorised representative. The bills relating to such supplies, after district level processing and verification, were required to be forwarded to the Directorate for approval and release of payment. At the relevant time, bills of the company were pending for payment.
(iii) On 04.09.2019, the complainant contacted the petitioner through WhatsApp and thereafter met him in office in connection with release of the pending bills. As reflected in the record, the prosecution case is that, in the course of this interaction, a demand for illegal gratification was made and the complainant was asked to remain in touch with Sri Santosh Kumar Pattanayak, Relationship Manager, Yes Bank, Bapuji Nagar Branch, Bhubaneswar. The material on record also refers to a WhatsApp message sent later on the same date by the complainant to the petitioner stating that he could make payment of only Rs.50,000/- that day.
(iv) Thereafter, on 22.10.2019, the complainant approached the Vigilance authorities and reported the matter. The record further indicates that by that stage certain payments had already been released in favour of the company and some bills had also been returned with objection. The materials collected during investigation also show that, after 22.10.2019, payments were made to the company on 24.10.2019, 31.10.2019, 19.11.2019 and 26.11.2019, and that on, 30.12.2019 an additional amount of Rs.7,07,578/- was paid to the company.
(v) On 15.11.2019, the complainant, accompanied by Vigilance officials and witnesses, again met the petitioner. The record shows that this interaction was arranged as part of the Vigilance exercise and that the conversation was recorded in a digital device. The case materials also show that during this meeting the issue of pending bills was discussed and that the petitioner instructed the concerned Executive Engineer to put up the bills after due scrutiny for approval and release of payment. A memorandum containing transcript of the conversation was thereafter prepared by the Vigilance authorities.
(vi) The prosecution record further refers to the role of Sri Pitabas Pradhan, who was working in the Directorate, and to further communication made to the complainant in relation to payment of the alleged bribe amount through Sri Santosh Kumar Pattanayak. During investigation, official records were collected regarding the position held by the petitioner in the Directorate, the employment of Sri Santosh Kumar Pattanayak in Yes Bank, and the engagement of Sri Pitabas Pradhan in the Directorate of Horticulture.
(vii) On 29.12.2019, the written complaint formed the basis for registration of the Vigilance case. On the following day, namely 30.12.2019, a trap was laid near Yes Bank, Bapuji Nagar, Bhubaneswar. In the course of the said trap, Sri Santosh Kumar Pattanayak was allegedly apprehended while receiving tainted money of Rs.1,00,000/- from the complainant. After the detection, the petitioner and the co-accused were arrested and produced before the competent court.
(viii) During the course of investigation, the Vigilance authorities examined witnesses, recorded statements under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C., collected documentary materials from the Directorate of Horticulture and other authorities, and also relied upon the recorded conversation, seizure materials, and other records gathered during investigation. On completion of investigation, charge sheet was submitted against the petitioner and the co-accused for the offences noted above, whereafter the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Bhubaneswar took cognizance by order dated 16.01.2023, which is the order under challenge in the present proceeding.
(ix) The present petition has thus been instituted seeking interference with the aforesaid order of cognizance and with the consequential criminal proceeding pending before the learned court below.
II. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
4. Learned counsel for the Petitioner/complainant earnestly made the following submissions in support of his contentions:
(i) It is submitted that the entire vigilance case, the FIR and the charge sheet are the outcome of a motivated and engineered exercise, undertaken not on the basis of any genuine material disclosing demand or acceptance of illegal gratification, but as part of a larger conspiracy to falsely implicate the petitioner. It was contended that the petitioner, being a senior IAS officer with roots in the State, had on several occasions declined to act upon illegal and irregular oral directions of certain powerful bureaucrats of the then Government, and that the present case was set in motion to wreak vengeance and tarnish his public image. According to the petitioner, the complainant was persuaded and pressurised to lodge a false complaint, the Vigilance officials conducted only a perfunctory investigation without dispassionately evaluating the material collected, and even the sanction for prosecution was procured by suppressing vital exculpatory material.
(ii) It was further argued that the foundational allegation of demand is itself inherently unreliable. Counsel submitted that it was unusual and against normal official practice for the complainant, who was merely representing a supplier with pending bills, to send a WhatsApp message early in the morning on 04.09.2019 seeking permission to meet the petitioner at his residence. The petitioner, however, did not permit any such private meeting and instead asked the complainant to meet him in office at 10.30 a.m. as per official norms. At that office meeting, according to the petitioner, he merely assured the complainant that the pending dues would be processed expeditiously after due scrutiny and verification of the bills in accordance with procedure. The allegation that the petitioner then demanded one per cent of the bill amount as bribe was described as wholly false.
(iii) The petitioner also disputed the prosecution reliance on the alleged WhatsApp message stating “Could make 50 today”, contending that no such demand had been made by him, that no reply was sent by him, and that the message, even as projected, could not by itself establish any illegal demand.
(iv) Learned counsel next submitted that the subsequent conduct of the parties and the official record wholly undermine the prosecution theory. Though the complainant is said to have approached Vigilance on 22.10.2019, on the apprehension that his bills would not be cleared unless bribe was paid, the alleged trap was laid only on 15.11.2019, and this delay, according to the petitioner, remains unexplained. More importantly, even before and around that period, substantial payments had already been released to the complainant’s company without any alleged bribe whatsoever. Counsel stressed that amounts of Rs.33,00,000/- and Rs. 28,75,686/- had been cleared after due verification and credited to the company’s account, and that this by itself demolishes the suggestion that payment of bribe was a precondition for clearance of bills.
(v) It was further submitted that the complainant’s own version shows that on 15.11.2019, in his presence, the petitioner instructed Executive Engineer Sri Hota to put up the pending bills after due scrutiny for approval and release of payment, which, according to counsel, is wholly inconsistent with any corrupt demand and clearly reflects an intention to process the bills in the ordinary course. On this basis, the petitioner argued that there was absence of mens rea from the inception.
(vi) The petitioner also attacked the prosecution case regarding the alleged intermediary role of Pitabas Pradhan and Santosh Kumar Pattanayak. As regards Pitabas, it was submitted that he was only a data entry operator or contractual employee in the Directorate and had no official authority to speak on behalf of the petitioner. Any alleged conversation between him and the complainant, even if taken at face value, could not be treated as a legally attributable demand by the petitioner. As regards Santosh Kumar Pattanayak, counsel submitted that he was merely an old college friend of the petitioner from Plus Two days, but that any contact between the complainant and Santosh was entirely unknown to and independent of the petitioner.
(vii) The specific case of the petitioner was that the Vigilance team, having failed to entrap him directly, deliberately instructed the complainant to hand over Rs.1 lakh to Santosh Kumar Pattanayak so that a case could somehow be foisted against the petitioner. It was argued that if payment of bribe had truly been the condition for release of bills, there was no reason for bills amounting to nearly Rs.62 lakhs to be cleared before any such alleged payment to Santosh Kumar Pattanayak. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further submitted that on the date when the alleged bribe was said to have been handed over to Santosh, the relevant pending bills had already been cleared, yet this crucial fact was not fairly reflected by the Investigating Officer.
(viii) A major plank of the petitioner’s challenge was based on the alleged suppression of exculpatory material. Learned counsel submitted that on 24.12.2019, the complainant again met the petitioner regarding pending bills and that the conversation at that meeting was recorded in the storage device carried by the complainant under Vigilance instructions. However, according to the petitioner, the contents of that meeting were deliberately omitted from the FIR and were not properly brought on record either by the complainant or by the Investigating Officer. Counsel asserted that during that meeting the complainant repeatedly offered to pay Rs. 1 lakh, but the petitioner sternly refused and said twice, “I do not need it.” This, according to the petitioner, was exculpatory material going to the root of the matter, since it directly negatived both demand and acceptance.
(ix) It was then argued, with reliance on the decision in Ashok Kumar Aggarwal v. CBI,( (2014) 14 SCC 295) that the prosecution was under an obligation to place before the sanctioning authority all relevant material, including material favourable to the accused, and that failure to do so vitiated the sanction and tainted the entire prosecution.
(x) Counsel then submitted that the learned court below took cognizance without proper application of judicial mind and despite the absence of material constituting the ingredients of the offences under Sections 7 and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 120B IPC. The petitioner emphasised that he was not present at the place of trap, no tainted money was recovered from him, no physical acceptance by him is alleged, and there is no material showing any prior meeting of minds between him and the co-accused so as to attract conspiracy or constructive receipt through an agent. Counsel submitted that even taking the prosecution case at its highest, the material does not establish any prior arrangement between the petitioner and the co-accused for receipt of bribe on his behalf. It was also urged that the accompanying witness did not speak of any demand by the petitioner on either 15.11.2019 or 30.12.2019, and that even the co-accused, upon interrogation, did not state that he had collected any amount on the petitioner’s instructions.
(xi) It was further argued that the financial and administrative records themselves belie the prosecution story. According to the petitioner, the Directorate records show that, by 27.12.2019, approval for payment had already been granted and that by 29.12.2019 or 30.12.2019 no bill of the complainant’s company was pending at the petitioner’s level. Learned Counsel submitted that on 30.12.2019 itself a further release of Rs.1,00,08,081/- was made to various suppliers including the complainant’s company, and therefore the very basis of the allegation that Rs. 1 lakh was demanded against pending bills of Rs. 50 lakhs was factually unsustainable. It was also contended that any delay in processing was attributable not to any unlawful design on the petitioner’s part but to routine procedural issues such as scrutiny at different levels, GPS tagging, compliance with financial rules, software issues with NIC, verification at bank level and problems in uploading photographs. The petitioner thus argued that pendency of certain bills for some period could not give rise to a legal inference of corruption.
(xii) Reliance was also placed on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) to contend that where the uncontroverted allegations and the material collected do not disclose commission of any offence, or where the criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fides and maliciously instituted to wreak vengeance, the High Court would be justified in exercising its inherent jurisdiction to quash the proceeding. Further, citing P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P., ( (2015) 10 SCC 152) it was argued that mere allegation of demand, unaccompanied by proof of acceptance or recovery from the accused, cannot sustain prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act.
(xiii) On these premises, learned counsel submitted that continuance of the proceeding against the petitioner would amount to abuse of the process of court, would cause grave prejudice, and would result in failure of justice, and therefore the order taking cognizance as well as the consequential criminal proceeding deserves to be quashed in exercise of the inherent powers of this Court.
III. SUBMISSION OF THE OPPOSITE PARTY:
5. Per contra, learned counsel for the Opposite Party presented the following submissions in support of his contentions:
(i) It is submitted that the prayer for quashing is wholly misconceived and not sustainable either in law or on facts, inasmuch as the materials collected during investigation clearly disclose a prima facie case against the petitioner for offences under Sections 7 and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 as amended, read with Section 120B IPC.
(ii) It was contended that the FIR, the detection report, the charge sheet, and the statements of the complainant and the overhearing witness recorded under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. together make out the essential ingredients of the offences alleged. According to the Opposite Party, the complainant, being the authorised representative of SRM Plastochem Pvt. Ltd., had specifically alleged that the petitioner, while functioning as Director of Horticulture, demanded illegal gratification at the rate of 2 per cent of the company’s bill amount and instructed him to contact Sri Santosh Kumar Pattanayak, whose mobile number was furnished for that purpose. It was further submitted that the complainant thereafter contacted Sri Santosh Kumar Pattanayak, who demanded Rs.1,00,000/- as directed by the petitioner through Sri Pitabas Pradhan, and that the demand conversation had been secretly recorded in a digital voice recorder, on the basis of which the FIR came to be registered.
(iii) It was next submitted that after due observance of the pre-trap formalities, a trap was laid and the tainted bribe amount of Rs.1,00,000/- was accepted through the co-accused on behalf of the petitioner. The Opposite Party stressed that Sri Santosh Kumar Pattanayak was apprehended red-handed in presence of witnesses while receiving the tainted money, and that the detection report records the demand, acceptance and recovery.
(iv) According to the Opposite Party, the witness statements recorded during investigation supported the prosecution version in its entirety, and the investigation further yielded corroborative materials in the shape of the call detail records, recorded demand conversation, WhatsApp message, and the chemical examination report of the State Forensic Science Laboratory, all of which, according to the prosecution, clearly establish demand and constructive acceptance of bribe money by the petitioner through the co-accused persons.
(v) It is further submitted that the prosecution case is not confined to direct physical receipt by the petitioner and that the statutory framework itself covers obtaining or accepting undue advantage through another person. In that context, reliance was placed on Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act to contend that the offence is attracted even where undue advantage is obtained, accepted, or attempted to be obtained for oneself or for another person, and that it is immaterial whether such acceptance is direct or through a third party. It was specifically argued that Explanation 1 and Explanation 2(ii) to Section 7 make it clear that demand itself constitutes an offence and that acceptance through an intermediary is also legally recognised. On that basis, the Opposite Party contended that the petitioner cannot seek quashing merely because the tainted money was not recovered from his own person, when the prosecution materials disclose that the amount was allegedly received on his behalf through Sri Santosh Kumar Pattanayak with the involvement of Sri Pitabas Pradhan.
(vi) It was also submitted that after completion of investigation and upon obtaining sanction for prosecution from the competent authorities, charge sheet was submitted against the petitioner and the co-accused persons. The Opposite Party emphasized that at the stage of cognizance or quashing, the Court is only required to see whether a prima facie case is disclosed from the materials collected during investigation and not to undertake a meticulous examination of the probable defence of the accused. According to the Opposite Party, the learned trial court rightly considered the materials placed before it and passed the impugned order dated 16.01.2023, and no illegality, perversity or infirmity is made out warranting interference in exercise of inherent jurisdiction. On these premises, it was urged that the criminal proceeding should be permitted to continue and the petition for quashing be dismissed.
IV. COURT’S REASONING AND ANALYSIS:
6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the evidence on record.
7. Before adverting to the rival contentions on merits, it is apposite to first examine the scope and ambit of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Sec 528 of the BNSS (erstwhile Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.).
8. The power of the High Court under Section 528 of the BNSS, corresponding to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., is an inherent power preserved to ensure that the criminal process remains fair, lawful and subservient to the ends of justice. It is not merely a procedural residuary power, but a substantive safeguard against misuse of criminal proceedings. The provision enables the High Court to intervene in appropriate cases to give effect to the law, prevent abuse of the process of any Court, and ensure that prosecution is not permitted to continue where its basic legal foundation is absent.
9. The jurisdiction is corrective and protective in character. At this stage, the Court does not conduct a trial, weigh disputed evidence, or return findings on guilt or innocence. However, it is certainly empowered to examine whether the allegations and the materials collected disclose the essential ingredients of the offences alleged. Where the record shows that continuation of the proceeding would serve no legitimate legal purpose, or would operate as an abuse of the coercive machinery of criminal law, the High Court may exercise its inherent power to secure justice.
10. The leading authority on the exercise of inherent jurisdiction for quashing criminal proceedings is State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (supra). In the said decision, the Supreme Court crystallised illustrative categories where the High Court may interfere under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 226 of the Constitution to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice. Though the categories are not exhaustive, they continue to serve as the governing guide for testing whether the allegations, even if accepted at face value, disclose a legally sustainable prosecution.
“8.1. In the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the following categories of cases are given by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guided myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised:
(a) where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused;
(b) where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investi- gation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code;
(c) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or ‘complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused;
(d) where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code;
(e) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;
(f) where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institu- tion and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party;
(g) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
11. While the scope of interference under the inherent jurisdiction of this Court is undoubtedly narrow, but it is equally well settled that where the material placed by the accused is of such unimpeachable character that it completely undermines the factual foundation of the prosecution, the Court would be justified in exercising its power to prevent abuse of process and to secure the ends of justice. The Supreme Court has, in Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.,( 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1947) laid down a structured test to determine when a prayer for quashing at the instance of an accused merits acceptance. The relevant principles are extracted below:
“20. The following steps should ordinarily determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:-
(i) Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the materials is of sterling and impeccable quality?
(ii) Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false.
(iii) Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant?
(iv) Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice?
If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.”
12. In the same stead, the duty of the court in cases where an accused seeks quashing of an FIR or proceedings on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous, or vexatious, or instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance was delineated by the Supreme Court in Mohammad Wajid v. State of U.P. ( 2023 SCC OnLine SC 951) The relevant excerpt is produced hereinbelow:
“34. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.”
(Emphasis supplied)
13. Therefore, the power under Section 528 BNSS, like Section 482 Cr.P.C., cannot be treated as unavailable merely because a criminal proceeding has been instituted or a charge-sheet has been filed. Unless there is an express statutory bar, the maintainability of such a petition cannot be lightly excluded. The real enquiry is whether interference is warranted on the facts and materials of the case to prevent abuse of process and to advance the ends of justice.
14. Having thus noticed the legal contours within which the power under Section 528 of the BNSS is to be exercised, this Court must now proceed to examine the present case on the touchstone of those principles. The enquiry at this stage is not into the truth or otherwise of the rival factual assertions in the manner of a full trial, but whether the materials placed before the Court disclose a case fit for continuation of criminal process, or whether the proceeding, in the facts and circumstances presented, warrants judicial interdiction in order to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice. It is in this perspective that the rival submissions now fall for consideration.
15. Now, it would neither be prudent nor appropriate for this Court to embark upon a detailed examination of the disputed facts or to test the veracity of the rival versions placed by the parties. The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C./Section 528 BNSS is discretionary in nature, and such discretion must be exercised with due regard to the stage of the proceeding and the settled limits of inherent jurisdiction. Questions relating to credibility of witnesses, the sequence of events, and truthfulness of the allegations are ordinarily matters for trial. Therefore, this Court would refrain from undertaking a fact-finding exercise and shall confine itself to the legal contentions raised, including whether the materials disclose the essential ingredients of the alleged offences and whether any procedural or jurisdictional infirmity warrants interference.
16. Now, the core submission of the petitioner is that the statutory precondition of a valid prior sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (“PC Act”) was compromised because the sanctioning authority was allegedly kept unaware of crucial exculpatory material i.e. the 24.12.2019 recording, and hence could not have applied an independent, informed mind. Where sanction is a jurisdictional gateway to cognizance, this pleaded suppression is urged to amount to “failure of justice”.
17. For the ready reference, the relevant part of sub-section (1), (3) and (4) of Section 19 are reproduced herein below:
“19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution. —
(1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under sections 7, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction save as otherwise provided in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 (1 of 2014)—
(a) in the case of a person who is employed, or as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of that Government;
(b) in the case of a person who is employed, or as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that Government;
(c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office.
(2)
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), —
(a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby;
(b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice;
(c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings.
(4) In determining under sub-section (3) whether the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice the court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings.
Explanation— For the purposes of this section,—
(a) error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction;
(b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference to any requirement that the prosecution shall be at the instance of a specified authority or with the sanction of a specified person or any requirement of a similar nature.”
(Emphasis supplied)
18. The question of sanction assumes particular significance in prosecutions under the PC Act, for it goes to the very competence of the Court to take cognizance against a public servant. Since sanction is a statutory precondition and not a mere procedural formality, its validity may be examined whenever the issue arises. The Supreme Court has clarified the legal effect of an invalid sanction in the following terms in Nanjappa v. State of Karnataka: ((2015) 14 SCC 186)
“22. The legal position regarding the importance of sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is thus much too clear to admit equivocation. The statute forbids taking of cognizance by the court against a public servant except with the previous sanction of an authority competent to grant such sanction in terms of clauses (a), (b) and (c) to Section 19(1). The question regarding validity of such sanction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The competence of the court trying the accused so much depends upon the existence of a valid sanction. In case the sanction is found to be invalid the court can discharge the accused relegating the parties to a stage where the competent authority may grant a fresh sanction for the prosecution in accordance with law. If the trial court proceeds, despite the invalidity attached to the sanction order, the same shall be deemed to be non-est in the eyes of law and shall not forbid a second trial for the same offences, upon grant of a valid sanction for such prosecution.”
23. Having said that there are two aspects which we must immediately advert to. The first relates to the effect of sub- section (3) to Section 19, which starts with a non obstante clause. Also relevant to the same aspect would be Section 465 CrPC which we have extracted earlier.
23.1. It was argued on behalf of the State with considerable tenacity worthy of a better cause, that in terms of Section 19(3), any error, omission or irregularity in the order sanctioning prosecution of an accused was of no consequence so long as there was no failure of justice resulting from such error, omission or irregularity. It was contended that in terms of Explanation to Section 4, “error includes competence of the authority to grant sanction”. The argument is on the face of it attractive but does not, in our opinion, stand closer scrutiny.
23.2. A careful reading of sub-section (3) to Section 19 would show that the same interdicts reversal or alteration of any finding, sentence or order passed by a Special Judge, on the ground that the sanction order suffers from an error, omission or irregularity, unless of course the court before whom such finding, sentence or order is challenged in appeal or revision is of the opinion that a failure of justice has occurred by reason of such error, omission or irregularity. Sub-section (3), in other words, simply forbids interference with an order passed by the Special Judge in appeal, confirmation or revisional proceedings on the ground that the sanction is bad save and except, in cases where the appellate or revisional court finds that failure of justice has occurred by such invalidity. What is noteworthy is that sub- section (3) has no application to proceedings before the Special Judge, who is free to pass an order discharging the accused, if he is of the opinion that a valid order sanctioning prosecution of the accused had not been produced as required under Section 19(1).
23.3. Sub-section (3), in our opinion, postulates a prohibition against a higher court reversing an order passed by the Special Judge on the ground of any defect, omission or irregularity in the order of sanction. It does not forbid a Special Judge from passing an order at whatever stage of the proceedings holding that the prosecution is not maintainable for want of a valid order sanctioning the same. 23.4. The language employed in sub-section (3) is, in our opinion, clear and unambiguous. This is, in our opinion, sufficiently evident even from the language employed in sub- section (4) according to which the appellate or the revisional court shall, while examining whether the error, omission or irregularity in the sanction had occasioned in any failure of justice, have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an early stage. Suffice it to say, that a conjoint reading of sub- sections 19(3) and (4) leaves no manner of doubt that the said provisions envisage a challenge to the validity of the order of sanction or the validity of the proceedings including finding, sentence or order passed by the Special Judge in appeal or revision before a higher court and not before the Special Judge trying the accused.
23.5. The rationale underlying the provision obviously is that if the trial has proceeded to conclusion and resulted in a finding or sentence, the same should not be lightly interfered with by the appellate or the revisional court simply because there was some omission, error or irregularity in the order sanctioning the prosecution under Section 19(1). Failure of justice is, what the appellate or revisional court would in such cases look for. And while examining whether any such failure had indeed taken place, the Court concerned would also keep in mind whether the objection touching the error, omission or irregularity in the sanction could or should have been raised at an earlier stage of the proceedings meaning thereby whether the same could and should have been raised at the trial stage instead of being urged in appeal or revision.”
(Emphasis supplied)
19. The statutory architecture makes prior sanction a gateway to cognizance for PC Act offences against a public servant, and the bar is framed in mandatory terms. While Section 19(3)-(4) restrains appellate/revisional interference absent “failure of justice,” the Supreme Court has clarified that courts must meaningfully assess whether the alleged defect in sanction has caused real prejudice and whether the objection was raised at a stage when it could have been.
20. In C.B.I. v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, ((2014) 14 SCC 295) the Supreme Court examined this statutory requirement of “failure of justice”. It is well settled that where the defect is not merely technical, but has caused real prejudice to the accused by depriving him of a statutory safeguard available under criminal law, the Court must examine whether such omission has occasioned a failure of justice. The relevant principle is extracted below:
“18. ……The failure of justice would be relatable to error, omission or irregularity in the grant of sanction. However, a mere error, omission or irregularity in sanction is not considered to be fatal unless it has resulted in the failure of justice or has been occasioned thereby.
19. The court must examine whether the issue raised regarding failure of justice is actually a failure of justice in the true sense or whether it is only a camouflage argument. The expression “failure of justice” is an extremely pliable or facile an expression which can be made to fit into any case. The court must endeavour to find out the truth. There would be “failure of justice” not only by unjust conviction but also by acquittal of the guilty as a result of unjust or negligent failure to produce requisite evidence. Of course, the rights of the accused have to be kept in mind and safeguarded but they should not be overemphasised to the extent of forgetting that the victims also have certain rights. It has to be shown that the accused has suffered some disability or detriment in the protections available to him under the Indian criminal jurisprudence. “Prejudice” is incapable of being interpreted in its generic sense and applied to criminal jurisprudence. The plea of prejudice has to be in relation to investigation or trial and not matters falling beyond their scope. Once the accused is able to show that there has been serious prejudice caused to him with respect to either of these aspects, and that the same has defeated the rights available to him under legal jurisprudence, the accused can seek relief from the court.”
21. The meaning behind the text of the phrase “failure of justice” must also be understood in the context of the object behind the larger public policy on sanction for prosecution. The inter-relationship or the nexus between the act complained of and the discharge of official duties and the test to be applied has been explained in the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Rajmangal Ram, (2014 (11) SCC 388) where this Court held that:
“4. The object behind the requirement of grant of sanction to prosecute a public servant need not detain the court save and except to reiterate that the provisions in this regard either under the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 are designed as a check on frivolous, mischievous and unscrupulous attempts to prosecute an honest public servant for acts arising out of due discharge of duty and also to enable him to efficiently perform the wide range of duties cast on him by virtue of his office. The test, therefore, always is whether the act complained of has a reasonable connection with the discharge of official duties by the government or the public servant. If such connection exists and the discharge or exercise of the governmental function is, prima facie, founded on the bonafide judgment of the public servant, the requirement of sanction will be insisted upon so as to act as a filter to keep at bay any motivated, ill-founded and frivolous prosecution against the public servant. However, realising that the dividing line between an act in the discharge of official duty and an act that is not, may, at times, get blurred thereby enabling certain unjustified claims to be raised also on behalf of the public servant so as to derive undue advantage of the requirement of sanction, specific provisions have been incorporated in Section 19(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act as well as in Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which, inter alia, make it clear that any error, omission or irregularity in the grant of sanction will not affect any finding, sentence or order passed by a competent court unless in the opinion of the court a failure of justice has been occasioned. This is how the balance is sought to be struck.”
(Emphasis supplied)
22. Following the above dictum, the issue of sanction in the present case must first be examined from the standpoint of whether the non- placement of the entire relevant material before the competent authority has occasioned, or is likely to occasion, a failure of justice. That aspect shall be considered separately in the succeeding section.
23. A closely allied principle recognised in PC law jurisprudence is that the prosecution must place before the sanctioning authority the whole of the relevant record, including material that may support the accused and may legitimately persuade the authority to decline sanction. This is not because the sanctioning authority is to undertake a judicial determination of guilt or innocence, but because the order of sanction must reflect an informed and independent exercise of discretion, and not a mechanical endorsement of the prosecuting agency’s view.
24. In Ashok Kumar Aggarwal (supra), the Supreme Court observed that sanction for prosecution is not a mere procedural formality but a substantive safeguard in favour of a public servant. Since sanction removes the legal bar against prosecution, the law requires that the competent authority must consider the entire relevant record with due application of mind before granting it. It is in this backdrop that the principles governing a valid sanction may now be noticed:
“8. In view of the above, the legal propositions can be summarised as under:
(a) The prosecution must send the entire relevant record to the sanctioning authority including the FIR, disclosure statements, statements of witnesses, recovery memos, draft charge sheet and all other relevant material. The record so sent should also contain the material/document, if any, which may tilt the balance in favour of the accused and on the basis of which, the competent authority may refuse sanction.
(b) The authority itself has to do complete and conscious scrutiny of the whole record so produced by the prosecution independently applying its mind and taking into consideration all the relevant facts before grant of sanction while discharging its duty to give or withhold the sanction.
(c) The power to grant sanction is to be exercised strictly keeping in mind the public interest and the protection available to the accused against whom the sanction is sought.
(d) The order of sanction should make it evident that the authority had been aware of all relevant facts/materials and had applied its mind to all the relevant material.
(e) In every individual case, the prosecution has to establish and satisfy the court by leading evidence that the entire relevant facts had been placed before the sanctioning authority and the authority had applied its mind on the same and that the sanction had been granted in accordance with law.”
(Emphasis supplied)
25. Thus, it is pertinent that the entire evidence and all relevant materials collected during investigation were placed before the competent authority and the prosecution must satisfy the Court that that the authority applied its mind to the same before granting sanction. Sanction is not a mere formality, for it lifts the statutory bar against prosecution of a public servant. It is a solemn safeguard meant to protect honest officials from frivolous or vexatious prosecution, though not to shield the guilty. Therefore, the sanctioning authority must have full knowledge of the material facts, including evidence bearing on both sides, before deciding whether sanction ought to be granted.
26. Proceeding on the petitioner’s own case, the challenge is that the recording dated 24.12.2019, relied upon as exculpatory material reflecting refusal and absence of demand, was withheld from the sanctioning authority. The objection, thus, is not to a mere formal irregularity in the sanction order, but to the non-placement of material which may have had a direct bearing on the decision to grant sanction. If such withholding is established, the petitioner submits, the requirement of conscious application of mind would stand vitiated, thereby rendering the very foundation for taking cognizance vulnerable; such a scenario is doctrinally aligned with the “entire record including defence-tilting material” requirement stated in the Ashok Kumar Aggarwal (supra).
27. In Dinesh Kumar v. Airport Authority of India, ((2012) 1 SCC 53) the Supreme Court also observed as following:
“10. In our view, invalidity of sanction where sanction order exists, can be raised on diverse grounds like non-availability of material before the sanctioning authority or bias of the sanctioning authority or the order of sanction having been passed by an authority not authorised or competent to grant such sanction. The above grounds are only illustrative and not exhaustive. All such grounds of invalidity or illegality of sanction would fall in the same category like the ground of invalidity of sanction on account of non- application of mind - a category carved out by this Court in Parkash Singh Badal [(2007) 1 SCC 1 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 193] , the challenge to which can always be raised in the course of trial.”
28. It is also material that the opposite party has not specifically met this contention by showing that the said material was, in fact, placed before the sanctioning authority, or that even if omitted, it was of no consequence to the decision to grant sanction. In the absence of such a response, the petitioner’s objection cannot be treated as a mere technical plea. The challenge goes to the completeness of the record placed before the competent authority and, consequently, to the validity of the satisfaction recorded while granting sanction.
29. Thus, the requirement of “failure of justice” operates in favour of the petitioner on two counts. First, the challenge is not to any mere formal defect in the sanction order, but to the grant of sanction on a materially incomplete record, which, if accepted, would defeat the statutory safeguard intended under Section 19 of the PC Act. Secondly, Section 19(4) requires the Court to consider the stage at which the objection is raised. In the present case, the petitioner has raised the objection at the threshold while seeking quashing of the order of cognizance, which is the stage recognised in Nanjappa (supra) as the appropriate and desirable stage for examining the validity of sanction.
30. Independently, the petitioner pleads that the cognizance order is a mechanical acceptance of the police report without adequate disclosure of judicial application of mind. While a detailed order is not invariably mandated at cognizance, the Supreme Court has consistently required “sufficient indication” of application of mind, because subjecting a person to criminal process is not a matter of routine.
31. In this context, this Court is not required to conclusively pronounce upon the truth or evidentiary value of the alleged recording dated 24.12.2019. That would be a matter of proof. However, the question presently is different. The issue is whether a material which the petitioner specifically describes as exculpatory, and which allegedly bears directly on the question of demand and refusal, was required to be placed before the sanctioning authority before sanction was granted.
32. The answer must be in the affirmative. Sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act is not intended to be an empty endorsement of the prosecution’s request. It is a statutory filter. The competent authority must be enabled to examine the entire evidence collected during investigation, including material which may support the prosecution and material which may tilt the balance in favour of the accused. If the sanctioning authority is shown only one side of the record, its satisfaction cannot be treated as informed or meaningful.
33. It was incumbent upon the Court taking cognizance to satisfy itself, at least in substance, that the statutory bar under Section 19 of the PC Act had been validly lifted before proceeding against the petitioner, a public servant. Though elaborate reasons are unnecessary at the stage of cognizance, the order must still reflect application of mind both to the prima facie materials constituting the alleged offences and to the legality of the sanction on which cognizance is founded. In the present case, the petitioner has specifically pleaded that material of alleged exculpatory value was withheld from the sanctioning authority. In such circumstances, the learned Court below ought to have examined whether the sanction had been granted upon consideration of the complete relevant record. The omission, therefore, bears directly on the validity of the sanction and, in consequence, on the legality of the cognizance taken thereon.
34. Therefore, without entering into the factual correctness of the petitioner’s defence, this Court finds that the issue relating to sanction discloses a serious procedural infirmity. Cognizance against a public servant under the PC Act is not a matter of mere form, but is conditioned upon the existence of a valid sanction granted upon due consideration by the competent authority. If essential material was in fact not placed before that authority, the defect cannot be dismissed as a mere technical lapse. It strikes at the fairness of the decision-making process underlying the sanction itself and, consequently, at the legal foundation on which cognizance has been taken.
35. This Court also cannot lose sight of the fact that the order of cognizance was passed as far back as on 16.01.2023. Despite passage of considerable time thereafter, charges have not been framed and the trial has not effectively commenced. The petitioner, therefore, continues to remain under the cloud of a prosecution without the matter progressing to the stage where the allegations may be tested in accordance with law.
36. Before adverting further, this Court considers it appropriate to observe that the issue of delay, though arising in the factual setting of the present case, is by no means confined to it. The matter at hand presents an occasion to take note of a larger and increasingly visible concern in vigilance prosecutions, namely, the protracted lapse of time at successive stages of the proceeding, beginning from investigation and continuing through submission of charge sheet, cognizance, and even framing of charge. Since such delay has a direct bearing not only on the rights of the accused but also on the credibility and efficacy of the criminal justice process itself, this Court deems it necessary to briefly examine the problem in a broader perspective.
37. It is a matter of serious concern that Courts are repeatedly being confronted with vigilance prosecutions that remain pending in a state of abnormal inertia. The delay is often not confined to one isolated stage. In many such matters, the investigation itself consumes years; the filing of charge sheet and other consequential steps consume further time; and even after cognizance is taken, the matter lingers for years before charge is framed and the trial meaningfully commences.
38. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the right to speedy trial under Article 21 extends not only to the trial proper but also to the preceding stage of investigation. In Mahendra Lal Das v. State of Bihar, (2002 (1) SCC 149) arising out of a vigilance disproportionate-assets case, the Court made it clear that even corruption cases must be dealt with swiftly, promptly and without delay. The relevant excerpt is produced hereinbelow:
“It is true that interference by the court at the investigation stage is not called for. However, it is equally true that the investigating agency cannot be given the latitude of protracting the conclusion of the investigation without any limit of time. This Court in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak & Anr, [ 1992] 1 SCC 225 while interpreting the scope of Article 21 of the Constitution held that every citizen has a right of speedy trial of the case pending against him. The speedy trial was considered also in public interest as it serves the social interest also. It is in the interest of all concerned that guilty or innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as possible in the circumstances. The right to speedy trial encompasses all the stages, namely, stage of investigation, enquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re- trial. While determining the alleged delay, the court has to decide each case on its facts having regard to all attending circumstances including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the work-load of the court concerned, prevailing local conditions, etc. Every delay may not be taken as causing prejudice to the accused but the alleged delay has to be considered in the totality of the circumstances and the general conspectus of the case. Inordinate long delay can be taken as a presentive proof of prejudice.”
(Emphasis supplied)
39. The Court ordinarily does not interdict an investigation in its early stages, such restraint cannot be understood as a licence for the investigating agency to keep the matter pending for an indefinite or unreasonable period. The constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial under Article 21 extends to the stage of investigation as well, and any allegation of delay must be assessed in the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case. At the same time, where the delay is inordinate, unexplained, and of such magnitude as to cast a shadow on the fairness of the process itself, prejudice to the accused may legitimately be presumed. The criminal process cannot be permitted to become a punishment in itself by reason of endless pendency.
40. In Pankaj Kumar v. State of Maharashtra, (AIR 2008 SC 3077) the Supreme Court reiterated that prolonged and unexplained investigation can itself amount to violation of Article 21. The court observed as following:
“17. It is, therefore, well settled that the right to speedy trial in all criminal persecutions is an inalienable right under Article 21 of the Constitution. This right is applicable not only to the actual proceedings in court but also includes within its sweep the preceding police investigations as well. The right to speedy trial extends equally to all criminal persecutions and is not confined to any particular category of cases. In every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the court has to perform the balancing act upon taking into consideration all the attendant circumstances, enumerated above, and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. Where the court comes to the conclusion that the right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed, the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, may be quashed unless the court feels that having regard to the nature of offence and other relevant circumstances, quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a situation, it is open to the court to make an appropriate order as it may deem just and equitable including fixation of time for conclusion of trial.”
41. More recently, in Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu v. State of Bihar, (2025 INSC 1339) the Supreme Court observed that investigations cannot continue endlessly, that unexplained delay in filing the culminating charge sheet must be accounted for, and that the Court taking cognizance must seek an explanation where there is a large and unjustified gap between the FIR and the charge sheet. The relevant excerpt is produced hereinbelow:
“19. Coming back to the present case, why the investigation in this case took more than a decade to be completed is lost on us. Apparently, it was found that the licenses issued by the appellant were also issued to a fictitious person even at the time when the order for further investigation was taken. Out of the 16 accused persons one person stood charge-sheeted in terms of the first chargesheet and the remaining, excluding the appellant and one Abhishek, were charge-sheeted by way of the second chargesheet. When only the actions of the appellant were subject matter of investigation by the time permission was taken as above - 11 years is quite obviously a timeline afflicted by delay. No reason is forthcoming for this extended period either in the chargesheet or at the instance of the Court having taken cognizance of such chargesheet. In other words, the appellant has had the cloud of a criminal investigation hanging over him for all these years. The judgments above referred to supra hold unequivocally that investigation is covered under the right to speedy trial and it is also held therein, that violation of this right can strike at the root of the investigation itself, leading it to be quashed. At the same time, it must be said that timelines cannot be set in stone for an investigation to be completed nor can outer limit be prescribed within which necessarily, an investigation must be drawn to a close. This is evidenced by the fact that further investigation or rather permission therefore, can be granted even after commencement of trial. [See: Rampal Gautam v The State] Where though, Article 21 would be impacted would be a situation where, like in the present matter, no reason justifiable in nature, can be understood from record for the investigation having taken a large amount of time. The accused cannot be made to suffer endlessly with this threat of continuing investigation and eventual trial proceedings bearing over their everyday existence.”
(Emphasis supplied)
42. Delay, by itself, may not in every case furnish a ground for quashing. However, where such delay is coupled with a serious procedural infirmity touching the validity of sanction and the legality of cognizance, the prejudice assumes a more concrete character. A criminal prosecution, particularly one involving a public servant and allegations under the PC Act, carries grave civil, professional and reputational consequences. The process itself cannot be permitted to become punitive when the foundational statutory safeguard is under serious doubt.
43. A vigilance prosecution, by its very nature, carries a burden far heavier than the ordinary weight of a criminal case. Long before guilt is adjudicated, it places the accused under a public shadow of moral suspicion. Reputation is bruised, professional standing is shaken, relationships suffer, and the individual is made to live for years under the constant humiliation of unresolved accusation. In that sense, a vigilance trial can itself become a punishment, not by sentence of law, but by the slow violence of pendency. When such a prosecution is then allowed to drift endlessly through delayed investigation, belated charge sheet, and stalled trial, the injury is not merely procedural; it becomes deeply human. Delay eats into pride, self-respect, and human dignity. It wears down the mind, unsettles the family, and, for many, strikes even at their sense of personhood and self-worth.
44. The law does not permit punishment before conviction, yet inordinate delay produces precisely that result by converting accusation into an enduring ordeal. A justice system that allows such proceedings to remain suspended for years risks turning process into penalty and stigma into substitute for proof. That is why delay in vigilance matters is not a routine lapse of administration. It is a grave assault on fairness, dignity, and the constitutional promise that no person shall be subjected to a procedure that is oppressive in its operation and endless in its duration. When time itself is allowed to become an instrument of suffering, the trial ceases to be a search for truth and begins to resemble punishment without judgment.
45. In the present case, the delay is not being considered in isolation. It reinforces the petitioner’s principal objection that the prosecution has proceeded on a questionable sanction and a cognizance order which does not reflect due engagement with the statutory preconditions. Where the trial has not even begun after such lapse of time, allowing the proceeding to continue despite the unresolved defect in sanction would only prolong a prosecution whose very initiation, qua the petitioner, is procedurally vulnerable.
V. CONCLUSION:
46. This Court finds that the objection raised by the petitioner is neither premature nor technical, but goes to the foundational legality of the prosecution itself. The issue is not one of mere irregularity, but of a possible failure of the statutory safeguard embedded in Section 19 of the PC Act. Where sanction is alleged to have been granted on an incomplete record, and the Court taking cognizance has not meaningfully examined whether the statutory bar stood validly lifted, the resultant cognizance cannot be treated as immune from scrutiny.
47. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 16.01.2023 passed by the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Bhubaneswar in T.R. Case No. 03 of 2023 is set aside so far as it relates to the present petitioner. The consequential proceeding against the petitioner shall also stand quashed.
48. It is, however, made clear that this order shall not preclude the competent authority from considering the question of sanction afresh, in accordance with law, upon being placed in possession of the complete relevant materials.
49. In light of the foregoing, this CRLMC is allowed and disposed of in terms of the aforesaid observations.
50. Consequently, the CRLMC No.3441 of 2025 is also disposed of in terms of the order passed in CRLMC No.1589 of 2025.
 |
This Product is Licensed to , |