1. Heard Sri Jai Kishan, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Atul Dayal, learned Senior Counsel appearing along with Sri Utkarsh Birla and Ms Aarushi Birla, for the respondent.

2. The present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner–tenant assailing the order dated 22.01.2026 passed by the learned District Judge, Kasganj in Rent Appeal No.16 of 2023, whereby the amendment application preferred by the petitioner under Order VI Rule 17 CPC has been rejected.

3. The facts, as borne out from the pleadings on record, indicate that the petitioner–tenant was inducted into the disputed shop situated at Mohalla Nathuram, Laxmiganj, Kasganj in the year 1983 by the father of the respondent–landlord on a monthly rent of ₹1510/-. Since then, the1510/-. Since then, the petitioner has been carrying on the business of welding and iron work from the said premises and claims to have regularly paid rent.

4. The respondent–landlord, asserting his ownership over the premises, instituted P.A. Case No.05 of 2019 under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 seeking release of the shop on the ground of bona fide requirement, namely, for establishing his son in an independent business.

5. It is further pleaded by the respondent that the disputed shop is old and in a dilapidated condition and requires reconstruction along with an adjoining portion so as to facilitate a suitable commercial establishment for his son. The petitioner, however, contested the release application by disputing the alleged bona fide need and asserting that the respondent’s son was already engaged in gainful employment/business and that the shop in question was neither dilapidated nor required for the purpose stated.

6. The record further discloses that the Prescribed Authority, upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, allowed the release application vide judgment dated 31.07.2023, holding that the bona fide need of the landlord stood established and that the comparative hardship tilted in his favour. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner preferred Rent Appeal No. 16 of 2023 before the District Judge, Kasganj.

7. During the pendency of the said appeal, the petitioner moved an application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC seeking amendment of the written statement on the basis of certain alleged subsequent events. The principal ground taken was that the respondent had, in the meantime, let out an adjoining shop to one Sunny Qureshi for carrying on a similar business, which, according to the petitioner, negated and extinguished the plea of bona fide requirement. The petitioner also sought to incorporate allegations regarding damage to the shop and obstruction in effecting repairs.

8. The respondent opposed the amendment application by filing objections supported by affidavits, denying the existence of any such tenancy and asserting that the adjoining portion continued to remain in his possession for the purpose of reconstruction. It was further contended that the proposed amendment was belated, factually incorrect, and intended only to protract the proceedings.

9. The appellate court, upon consideration of the rival submissions, rejected the amendment application vide order dated 22.01.2026, holding that the proposed amendment was neither necessary for effective adjudication of the controversy nor supported by due diligence, and appeared to be an afterthought that would have effect of altering the nature of controversy. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

10. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the amendment sought is founded on subsequent events which have a direct and material bearing on the issue of bona fide requirement of the landlord and are, therefore, essential for an effective and complete adjudication of the dispute. It is contended that the appellate court has erred in rejecting the amendment application in a mechanical manner without due consideration of the fact that the respondent–landlord had allegedly inducted a new tenant in an adjoining shop, thereby undermining the very basis of the plea of bona fide need.

11. Placing reliance upon Adil Jamshed Frenchman v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust ( (2005) 2 SCC 476) , it is urged that though the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC circumscribes the power to allow amendments after commencement of trial, it does not impose an absolute bar. An amendment, it is submitted, may still be permitted where it is necessary for determining the real controversy between the parties and where due diligence is established.

12. It is further submitted that the petitioner, upon acquiring knowledge that the respondent–landlord had inducted one Sanni Qureshi as a tenant in the adjoining shop, promptly moved the amendment application. According to the petitioner, the said development constitutes a subsequent event which materially impacts, and indeed dislodges, the plea of bona fide requirement set up by the respondent.

13. It is lastly contended that rejection of the amendment application would result in multiplicity of proceedings and would preclude the Court from adjudicating the real controversy in its entirety, thereby causing serious prejudice to the petitioner.

14. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the amendment application has been rightly rejected as being highly belated, lacking in due diligence, and founded on incorrect and disputed facts. It is contended that the application was moved at the stage of final arguments in the appeal with the sole object of delaying the proceedings and protracting the litigation.

15. In support of the aforesaid submission, reliance has been placed upon M/s J.A. Construction v. Sardar Kuldeep Singh (2019 SCCOnline All 4844) , to contend that once trial has commenced, amendment of pleadings cannot be permitted as a matter of course and is subject to strict compliance with the requirement of due diligence, which, according to the respondent, has not been satisfied in the present case.

16. Further reliance has been placed upon Mashyak Grihnirman Sahakari Sanstha Maryadit (2013 AIR (SC) 3188) v. Usman Habib Dhuka and Zamil Ahmad v. Mohd. Zeeshan (2011(1) ARC 817) to submit that amendments sought at a belated stage, without satisfactory explanation and founded on afterthoughts, are not liable to be allowed, particularly where they tend to delay adjudication or alter the nature of the controversy. It is urged that the petitioner has failed to demonstrate the due diligence mandated by the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC.

17. It is further submitted that the alleged subsequent event is factually incorrect and has been specifically denied. According to the respondent, the adjoining portion has not been let out to any third party and continues to remain in his possession for the purpose of reconstruction along with the disputed shop so as to establish the business of his son.

18. Learned counsel for the respondent has also placed reliance upon Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava ((2001) 2 SCC 604) , to contend that subsequent events cannot be permitted to defeat an already established bona fide requirement unless such events are of a nature that they wholly eclipse the need pleaded, which, it is submitted, is not the situation in the present case.

19. On the aforesaid premises, it is submitted that the amendment application has been rightly rejected by the appellate court and no interference is warranted in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

20. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record, this Court finds that the controversy in the present petition centres around the legality and propriety of the order dated 22.01.2026 passed by the appellate court rejecting the petitioner’s application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC, and the impact of the alleged subsequent events sought to be introduced by way of such amendment on the issue of bona fide requirement set up by the respondent–landlord.

21. In the aforesaid backdrop, the following questions arise for consideration: whether the appellate court was justified in rejecting the petitioner’s application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC on the ground of lack of due diligence, absence of necessity for effective adjudication of the controversy and on the premise that the proposed amendment would alter the nature of the controversy; whether the alleged subsequent event, namely, the letting out of an adjoining shop during the pendency of the appeal, can be permitted to be brought on record by way of amendment, and if so, to what extent it bears upon the issue of bona fide requirement under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972; and whether the proposed amendment, in the facts of the present case, was liable to be rejected as belated and as an attempt to delay the proceedings, or whether it constitutes a material development necessary for complete and effective adjudication.

22. The proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC postulates that once the trial has commenced, no amendment shall ordinarily be allowed unless the Court is satisfied that, despite due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before commencement of trial. The expression “due diligence” has been understood to mean such reasonable, careful and persistent effort as is expected of a prudent litigant. It casts a definite burden upon the party seeking amendment to demonstrate bona fide conduct and promptness in placing all material facts before the Court.

23. In Chander Kanta Bansal v. Rajinder Singh Anand ((2008) 5 SCC 117) , the object of the proviso was explained by holding that though the power to allow amendment is wide, the same stands circumscribed after commencement of trial so as to prevent delay and avoid surprise. It was observed that the proviso was introduced to curb belated applications and ensure expeditious disposal of cases, while still preserving the Court’s discretion to permit amendment in exceptional circumstances where due diligence is duly established. The question of due diligence, it was emphasised, is inherently a question of fact.

24. The principles were further elaborated in J. Samuel v. Gattu Mahesh ((2012) 2 SCC 300) , wherein it was held that the requirement of due diligence is mandatory and cannot be diluted. The Supreme Court observed that due diligence necessarily implies reasonable investigation and effort on the part of the litigant prior to seeking amendment, and that the party must establish that the facts sought to be introduced were not within its knowledge despite such efforts. The proviso, thus, strikes a balance between adjudication on merits and the need to prevent abuse of process and protraction of proceedings.

25. In Revajeetu Builders and Developers v. Narayanaswami and Sons ((2009) 10 SCC 84) , the Supreme Court laid down guiding factors for adjudicating amendment applications, inter alia, whether the amendment is imperative for proper adjudication, whether it is bona fide, whether it would cause prejudice to the opposite party, and whether it would fundamentally alter the nature and character of the case. It was also cautioned that amendments which are mala fide, unnecessary, or intended to delay proceedings ought not to be permitted.

26. In M. Revanna v. Anjanamma ( (2019) 4 SCC 332) , it was reiterated that after commencement of trial, the burden squarely lies upon the party seeking amendment to establish due diligence, and that amendment cannot be claimed as a matter of right. The Court further cautioned that amendments introducing a new or inconsistent case, or altering the fundamental character of the proceedings, are liable to be rejected.

27. Similarly, in Vijay Hathising Shah v. Gitaben Parshottamdas Mukhi ((2019) 9 SCC 1) , it was held that an amendment application filed at a highly belated stage, particularly when the matter is fixed for final arguments, deserves rejection if it is not necessary for determining the real issues in controversy. It was observed that where the lis can be effectively adjudicated without the proposed amendment, the same ought not to be allowed, especially when it would result in delay of the proceedings.

28. A distinct yet equally significant issue arising for consideration in the present case pertains to the effect of alleged subsequent events on the bona fide requirement of the landlord, which constitutes the substratum of the release application. The petitioner seeks to introduce such developments by way of amendment with the object of demonstrating that the need set up by the respondent–landlord no longer subsists. It, therefore, becomes necessary to examine the legal principles governing the relevance and impact of subsequent events in rent control proceedings.

29. The law relating to consideration of subsequent events is well settled. In Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders ((1975) 1 SCC 770) , the Supreme Court authoritatively held that though the right to relief is ordinarily to be adjudged on the date of institution of proceedings, courts are not precluded from taking note of subsequent developments which have a fundamental impact on the relief claimed. It was emphasised that procedure is a handmaid of justice and cannot be applied in a rigid manner so as to defeat substantive rights. At the same time, such power is conditioned upon the requirement that the subsequent event must be brought on record with due diligence and must have a direct and material bearing on the entitlement to relief.

30. The aforesaid principle also recognises that an appellate court, being vested with the jurisdiction of re-hearing, is equally competent to take into account subsequent developments for the purpose of moulding relief, provided that such exercise is consistent with fairness to both parties and does not result in prejudice.

31. A similar exposition is discernible from Patterson v. State of Alabama ( 294 US 600 (1935)) , wherein it was observed that an appellate court is not confined merely to correcting errors in the judgment under challenge but is empowered to mould the relief in a manner that subserves the ends of justice. For this purpose, the Court may take into consideration supervening changes in fact or law having a bearing on the ultimate outcome, while ensuring that procedural rules are not applied in a rigid or mechanical manner so as to defeat justice.

32. In the context of eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement, the principle has been further clarified in Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad ( (1981) 3 SCC 103) , wherein it was held that the requirement pleaded by the landlord must not only exist on the date of institution of the proceedings but must also subsist till the final decree. It was further held that if, during the pendency of proceedings, events occur which wholly satisfy or completely eclipse the landlord’s requirement, the Court would be justified in taking note of such developments.

33. The general rule, along with its exception, was succinctly reiterated in Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram (1992 Supp (2) SCC 623) , wherein it was held that while rights are ordinarily determined with reference to the commencement of the lis, the Court is not precluded from taking “cautious cognizance” of subsequent events which have a material bearing on the entitlement to relief or the manner of moulding it.

34. The cumulative effect of the aforesaid authorities is that though subsequent events may be taken into consideration, such power is circumscribed and must be exercised with caution. Only those developments which have a direct, material, and decisive bearing on the relief claimed, and which are brought on record with due diligence, can be considered.

35. Insofar as determination of bona fide requirement is concerned, it is well settled that the crucial date for adjudging such need is the date of institution of the eviction proceedings. In Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava ((2001) 2 SCC 604) , the Supreme Court held that if every subsequent development during the pendency of litigation were to be taken into account, there would be no finality to such proceedings, particularly in view of inherent delays in the judicial process.

36. The Court further cautioned that during the prolonged pendency of litigation, it would be unrealistic to expect the landlord or his family members to remain idle. Any temporary arrangement or engagement undertaken during such period cannot be construed as extinguishing the original need. The Court, in a felicitous expression, observed that the need may gather “dust” or “patina” over time, yet it does not cease to exist.

37. The Supreme Court also highlighted that permitting subsequent events to defeat an otherwise valid cause of action, particularly where delay is systemic, would undermine the confidence of litigants in the judicial process and render the remedy illusory.

38. The legal position that thus emerges is that while bona fide requirement is to be assessed with reference to the date of institution of proceedings, it must also subsist till final adjudication. However, subsequent events can be taken into consideration only when they are of such a conclusive and decisive nature as to wholly satisfy or completely eclipse the original need. In the absence of such circumstances, the original requirement cannot be permitted to be defeated on the basis of developments which are merely incidental, temporary, or inconclusive.

39. In the facts of the present case, it is evident that the amendment application has been filed at the appellate stage when the matter was ripe for final arguments. The petitioner seeks to introduce certain alleged subsequent events; however, no satisfactory explanation has been furnished to demonstrate that, despite due diligence, such facts could not have been brought on record earlier. A bald assertion of subsequent knowledge, without disclosing the circumstances in which such knowledge was acquired or the steps taken thereafter, falls short of the requirement of “due diligence” as mandated under the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC.

40. Moreover, the proposed amendment seeks to introduce disputed questions of fact relating to the alleged conduct of the respondent and the subsistence of bona fide need. These facts are neither admitted nor self-evident. Permitting such an amendment would necessarily entail reopening of issues and leading of further evidence, thereby enlarging the scope of the lis and fundamentally altering the character of the proceedings. This course is impermissible in law.

41. The timing of the application—at the stage of final arguments—further lends credence to the conclusion that the amendment is an afterthought intended to delay the proceedings. Belated amendments of this nature, when not indispensable for determining the real controversy, are liable to be rejected.

42. Even otherwise, the alleged subsequent event, namely, the induction of a tenant in an adjoining shop, is a seriously disputed fact and does not, on its face, constitute a development of such a conclusive or determinative nature as to wholly eclipse the bona fide requirement set up by the landlord. The law, as noticed hereinabove, permits consideration of subsequent events only when they are clear, unimpeachable, and of such magnitude as to completely satisfy or extinguish the original need. The plea raised by the petitioner falls short of this threshold.

43. It must also be borne in mind that if every alleged or disputed development during the pendency of proceedings is permitted to be introduced at a belated stage, it would render the adjudicatory process interminable and defeat the very objective of finality. Such an approach would enable a party to defeat a legitimate claim by prolonging the lis and introducing shifting stands, which the law does not countenance.

44. From the foregoing discussion, the following legal principles emerge governing the consideration of an application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC seeking to bring on record subsequent developments in a rent control proceeding founded on the ground of bona fide requirement:

                  44.1. Subsequent developments may be permitted to be brought on record by way of amendment only where such events have a direct, material, and determinative bearing on the subsistence or continuance of the bona fide requirement pleaded by the landlord, and are necessary for effective adjudication of the real controversy.

                  44.2. Where such an application is filed after commencement of trial, the party seeking amendment must satisfy the mandatory requirement of “due diligence” by demonstrating that, despite reasonable and bona fide efforts, the facts now sought to be introduced, affecting the landlord’s need, could not have been pleaded earlier.

                  44.3. The stage at which the amendment is sought assumes particular significance; amendments moved at a highly belated stage, especially when the matter is ripe for final arguments, are to be viewed with circumspection, as they have the potential to unsettle findings already recorded on bona fide need, and are ordinarily liable to be declined in the absence of compelling justification.

                  44.4. Subsequent events cannot be permitted to be introduced where they rest on disputed or unverified assertions regarding the conduct of the landlord, or on developments which are inconclusive and do not substantially or decisively impinge upon the genuineness of the need pleaded.

                  44.5. Only those subsequent developments which are of such a conclusive and decisive character as to wholly satisfy, eclipse, or extinguish the bona fide requirement originally set up can be taken into consideration; incidental, temporary, or ambiguous developments are insufficient for this purpose.

                  44.6. The Court must ensure that permitting such amendment does not result in reopening of issues already adjudicated on bona fide requirement, or in enlarging the scope of the lis by introducing fresh factual controversies requiring additional evidence, thereby delaying final adjudication.

                  44.7. The power to take note of subsequent developments affecting bona fide need is essentially discretionary and must be exercised with caution, so as to balance the need to render a just and realistic decision with the imperative of preventing abuse of process by raising shifting or belated pleas.

45. Applying the aforesaid principles, this Court finds that the subsequent event sought to be introduced by the petitioner, namely, the alleged letting out of an adjoining shop to a third party, even if assumed arguendo, does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that the bona fide requirement of the landlord stands extinguished. The respondent has specifically controverted the said allegation and asserted that no such tenancy has been created and that the adjoining portion is intended to be amalgamated with the disputed premises for establishing a composite commercial unit for his son’s business.

46. The amendment sought is governed by Order VI Rule 17 CPC, which, though enabling amendment at any stage, stands significantly curtailed by its proviso once the trial has commenced. In such a situation, the party seeking amendment must satisfy the mandatory requirement of “due diligence.”

47. In the present case, the amendment application has admittedly been filed at a highly belated stage when the appeal was ripe for final arguments. The petitioner has failed to furnish any cogent or satisfactory explanation as to why the alleged facts could not have been brought on record earlier. A mere assertion of subsequent knowledge, unaccompanied by particulars of when and how such knowledge was acquired or what steps were taken thereafter, does not meet the threshold of due diligence contemplated under the proviso.

48. The timing of the application further reinforces the inference that the amendment is an afterthought intended to delay the proceedings. It is a cardinal principle that amendments at the appellate stage, particularly when the matter is at the stage of final hearing, are not to be permitted as a matter of course and must be supported by compelling reasons, which are conspicuously absent in the present case.

49. The proposed amendment seeks to introduce disputed and contested questions of fact relating to the alleged conduct of the respondent and the subsistence of his bona fide need. Such pleas are neither admitted nor self-evident and would necessarily require reopening of issues and leading of additional evidence. This would not only enlarge the scope of the lis but also fundamentally alter the character of the proceedings, which is impermissible at this stage.

50. It is equally pertinent that the appeal essentially calls for examination of the correctness of the findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority on the issues of bona fide requirement and comparative hardship. The proposed amendment is not indispensable for adjudication of these issues and, therefore, does not satisfy the test of necessity for determining the real controversy.

51. Even otherwise, the law does not envisage that every alleged or disputed subsequent development should be permitted to unsettle a finding of bona fide need. Only such events which are clear, conclusive, and of such magnitude as to wholly eclipse the original requirement can be taken into consideration. The plea raised by the petitioner falls far short of this standard.

52. The contention that temporary or partial utilisation of some adjoining space would negate the bona fide need is equally untenable. It is well settled that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement and is entitled to seek premises suitable for his intended purpose. A makeshift or inadequate arrangement cannot be equated with availability of suitable alternative accommodation.

53. This Court also cannot lose sight of the principle that tenants cannot be permitted to take advantage of delays inherent in the judicial process by relying upon intervening events to defeat an otherwise established bona fide requirement. Permitting such a course would not only defeat substantive justice but also encourage dilatory tactics.

54. In the considered view of this Court, the alleged subsequent events, even if taken at their highest, neither eclipse the subsisting requirement nor render the original cause of action infructuous. Consequently, the plea founded on such developments does not merit acceptance, nor does it justify the belated amendment sought.

55. The reliance placed by the petitioner on Adil Jamshed Frenchman v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust ( (2005) 2 SCC 476) is misplaced, as the said decision arose in the context of Order XLI Rule 27 CPC and does not advance the petitioner’s case in the present factual matrix.

56. The submission regarding avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings also does not commend acceptance. While the said consideration is relevant, it cannot be invoked to permit amendments which are otherwise belated, lacking in due diligence, and liable to protract the proceedings.

57. An amendment under Order VI Rule 17 CPC, sought at the appellate stage on the basis of alleged subsequent events in a rent control proceeding founded on bona fide requirement, cannot be permitted as a matter of course. Once trial has commenced, the party seeking amendment must satisfy the mandatory requirement of due diligence by demonstrating that the facts could not have been brought on record earlier despite reasonable efforts. Further, subsequent developments can be taken into consideration only when they are clear, conclusive, and of such magnitude as to wholly displace or render non-existent the original need; disputed or inconclusive facts do not meet this threshold. In essence, a belated amendment on disputed subsequent events, sans due diligence, cannot reopen the lis or defeat the bona fide need unless it eclipses or extinguishes the same. An amendment introducing such belated and contested pleas, particularly when the matter is ripe for final arguments, and which would enlarge the scope of the lis or necessitate reopening of issues, is liable to be rejected. The refusal of the appellate court, therefore, reflects a sound and judicious exercise of discretion, calling for no interference.

58. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the proposed amendment fails to satisfy the mandatory requirement of due diligence and does not meet the test of necessity for effective adjudication. The appellate court has exercised its discretion in consonance with settled legal principles, and no error, much less any jurisdictional infirmity, is made out warranting interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

59. In view of the foregoing discussion, the petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed.

60. The order dated 22.01.2026 passed by the learned District Judge, Kasganj in Rent Appeal No. 16 of 2023 is hereby affirmed.

61. The appellate court is directed to proceed with and decide the appeal expeditiously, in accordance with law, preferably within a period of three months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order, without granting unnecessary adjournments to either party, and without being influenced by any observations made herein, which shall be construed as confined to the adjudication of the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and shall not affect the merits of the appeal.