1. This appeal is filed by the plaintiff in O.S.No.232 of 2009 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Pathanamthitta, against the dismissal of a suit filed for compensation against the respondents, as not maintainable.

2. The suit was filed by the appellant herein for realization of compensation of Rs.2,30,000/-. It was pleaded that the plaintiff, a retired English Lecturer, with 32 years of service, applied for a post of dean at the 1st defendant College. He was selected after an interview with a salary of Rs.12,000/-. The plaintiff alleges that, without any notice, his services were terminated. Thus, his appointment, which was to be till 02.05.2010, was abruptly ended on 02.02.2009.

3. The first respondent College in the written statement filed contended that it was affiliated with the Mahatma Gandhi University, formed under the provisions of the Mahatma Gandhi University Act, with the approval of AICTE. Thus, it was contended that no suit was maintainable under the provisions of the Mahatma Gandhi University Act.

4. The trial court considered the issue of maintainability, particularly with respect to Section 63 of the Mahatma Gandhi University Act 1985, which bars the civil court's jurisdiction and held in favour of the defendant.

5. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that the petitioner is not a teacher within the meaning of the Mahatma Gandhi University Act and therefore Section 63 will have no application. Consequently, Section 70 also has no application. It is argued that the claim of the petitioner cannot be held to be barred, as he was not challenging the propriety of the order of termination, but he was claiming damages as he was prevented from working till 2010. It is also argued that even assuming that the Act creates a right, it does not provide a remedy, and the petitioner cannot claim a relief of compensation from the Tribunal. The learned counsel also relies on the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in Saraswati and Others v. Lachanna (dead) through Lrs. [1994 KHC 1107] to substantiate the said contention.

6. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents contends that the very claim of compensation can be considered only if it is found that the termination is illegal, which, under the provisions of the Act, can only be considered by the Tribunal and therefore, the relief of compensation could not have been granted without first adjudicating as to whether the termination is legal or not.

7. Heard the learned counsel appearing on both sides and perused the records.

8. 'Teacher' is defined under Section 2 (29) of the Mahatma Gandhi University Act, as follows.

                  “”Teacher” means a principal, professor, associate professor, assistant professor, reader, lecturer, instructor, or such other person imparting instruction or supervising research in any of the colleges or recognised institutions and whose appointment has been approved by the University”.

9. Section 63, which deals with the disciplinary powers of the Educational Agency over teachers of private colleges, certainly enables any teacher aggrieved by an order imposing on him any of the following penalties, namely, removal from service, compulsory retirement from service or dismissal from service, to attack the said proceedings before the Appellate Tribunal. Likewise, under Section 70 of the Act, which bars the jurisdiction of civil courts, no civil court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question or to determine any matter which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with or to be determined by any authority or person under this Act.

10. A reading of the above provisions would show that the appellant cannot be considered as a teacher as his appointment was not approved by the University and consequently cannot invoke the remedy under Section 63 before the Tribunal. The bar of jurisdiction also applies only for considering the matters which are provided for under this Act, and for that short reason, the appellant cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. That apart, without deciding as to whether the appellant is a teacher, neither Section 63 nor Section 70 could have been invoked by the Civil court and the said issue as to whether the petitioner is a teacher is surely a mixed question of fact and law. Under such circumstances, recourse to the provisions of Order XIV C.P.C and considering the question of maintainability as a preliminary issue is illegal. It is also to be remembered that there is no provision under which the petitioner could obtain compensation from the Tribunal. The said remedy is not provided under the statute. Under such circumstances, the bar created under the Act will not prevent the petitioner from filing a suit under Section 9 CPC.

11. In Ganga Bai v. Vijai Kumar [AIR 1974 SC 1126], the Supreme Court held that every person has an inherent right to institute a suit of a civil nature unless expressly or impliedly barred by statute, and maintainability does not depend on the existence of an enabling provision but only on the absence of a statutory bar.

12. In Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh [AIR 1969 SC 78], it was laid down that exclusion of civil court jurisdiction is not to be readily inferred and arises only where the statute creates a special right or liability, provides an adequate and efficacious remedy before a special forum, and expressly or impliedly bars jurisdiction, while civil courts retain jurisdiction where statutory provisions are not complied with, principles of judicial procedure are violated, constitutional validity is challenged, or the statute does not provide a mechanism for granting the relief claimed.

13. The Honourable Supreme Court in the judgment in Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Munici𝕛al Cor𝕛oration of Delhi and Others [(1993) 3 SCC 161] held as follows:

                  “9. In spite of several pronouncements of this Court during the last four decades, the question as to whether the jurisdiction of the Court has been statutorily barred in respect of suits in connection with the orders passed or proceedings initiated for demolition of constructions, which have been made without sanction or by deviating from the sanctioned plans, has to be answered.

                  10. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") says that Courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature "except suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred". According to the Corporation once the jurisdiction of the Court to try a suit in which the validity of any order passed under the provisions of the Corporation Act or the notice issued thereunder has been specifically barred and an internal remedy has been provided for redressal of the grievances of the persons concerned, there is no scope for court to entertain a suit.

                  11. In the olden days the source of most of the rights and liabilities could be traced to the common law. Then statutory enactments were few. Even such enactments only created rights or liabilities but seldom provided forums for remedies. The result was that any person having a grievance that he had been wronged or his right was being affected, could approach the ordinary civil court on the principle of law that where there is a right there is a remedy - ubi jus ibi remedium. As no internal remedy had been provided in the different statutes creating rights or liabilities, the ordinary civil courts had to examine the grievances in the light of different statutes. With the concept of the welfare State, it was realised that enactments creating liabilities in respect of payment of taxes, obligations after vesting of estates and conferring rights on a class of citizens, should be complete codes by themselves. With that object in view, forums were created under the Acts themselves where grievances could be entertained on behalf of the persons aggrieved. Provisions were also made for appeals and revision to higher authorities.

                  12. Then a question arose as to where a particular Act had created a right or liability and had also provided a forum for enforcement of such right or for protection from enforcement of a liability without any authority in law, whether a citizen could approach a court. It may be pointed out that many statutes have created certain rights or liabilities and have also provided the remedial measures in respect thereof. But such statutes have not touched the common law rights of the citizen. But there are some statutes, which in public interest affect even the common law rights or liabilities of the citizen, which were in the nature of existing rights. The distinction between the two types of rights or liabilities is subtle in nature but at the same time very vital.

                  13. In one of the earliest case of Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford, (1859) 6 CB NS 336 : 141 ER 283, Willes, J, said:

                  "There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established founded upon a statute. One is, where there was a liability existing at common law, and that liability is affirmed by a statute which gives a special and peculiar form of remedy different from the remedy which existed at common law : there, unless the statute contains words which expressly or by necessary implication exclude the common-law remedy, and the party suing has his election to pursue either that or the statutory remedy. The second class of cases is, where the statute gives the right to sue merely, but provides no particular form of remedy : there, the party can only proceed by action at common law. But there is a third class, viz. where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it. The present case falls within this latter class, if any liability at all exists. The remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class."

                  14. The same view was reiterated by the House of Lords in Neville v. London "Express" Newspaper Ltd., (1919) AC 368 : (1918-19) All ER Rep 61. In Barraclough v. Brown, (1897) AC 615 : (1895-99) All ER Rep 239, 241-I, it was said:

                  "I do not think the appellant can claim to recover by virtue of the statute, and at the same time insist upon doing so by means other than those prescribed by the statute which alone confers the right."

                  15. It has further pointed out "the right and the remedy are given uno flatu, and the one cannot be dissociated from the other."

                  16. In the well-known case of Secretary of State v. Mask & Co., AIR 1940 PC 105 : 67 IA 222 : (1940) 2 MLJ 140, this question was considered in connection with Sea Customs Act (1878). It was said:

                  "It is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil courts is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. It is also well settled that even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the civil courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principle of judicial procedure."

                  But having enunciated the general principle in respect of ouster of the jurisdiction of the civil court it was said:-

                  "But, in their Lordships' opinion, neither Section 32 nor the principle involved in the decision in the case of Secretary of State for India in Council v. Moment, (1912) 40 IA 48 : ILR (1913) 40 Cal 391, affect the validity of an Act of the Indian Legislature which creates an obligation and provides an exclusive Code for its determination; such an obligation is not covered by sub-section (2) of Section 32."

                  17. In connection with the imposition of Terminal Tax on salt under the Punjab Municipal Act, in Firm Seth Radha Kishan v. Administrator, Municipal committee. Ludhiana, AIR 1963 SC 1547 : (1964) 2 SCR 273 : 65 Punj LR 912, it was said that where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, party aggrieved should pursue the remedy provided under the Act. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Firm of Illuri Subbaya Chetty and Sons v. State of A.P, AIR 1964 SC 322 : (1964) 1 SCR 752 : (1963) 50 ITR 93, considered the provisions of Madras General Sales Tax Act and the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court. It was pointed out that there was an express and unambiguous prohibition and no suit could be entertained by a civil court. In connection with the Bombay Sales Tax Act the same view was reiterated by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Kamala Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay, AIR 1965 SC 1942 : (1966) 1 SCR 64 : 57 ITR 643. In Ram Swarup v. Shikar Chand, AIR 1966 SC 893 : (1966) 2 SCR 553, a Constitution Bench examined the bar on the jurisdiction of the civil court in connection with the House and Tenants - U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, and came to the conclusion that a special statute had excluded the jurisdiction in clear and unambiguous words and it had provided an adequate and satisfactory alternative remedy to a party, that may be aggrieved by the relevant order and as such the jurisdiction of the civil court had been ousted. This very question was examined in State of Kerala v. N. Ramaswami Iyer and Sons, AIR 1966 SC 1738 : (1966) 3 SCR 582 : (1966) 61 ITR 187, in connection with the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Act and it was held that the jurisdiction of the civil court would be deemed to have been excluded because the legislature had set up a special tribunal to determine the question relating to rights or liabilities which had been created by the statute. Again in connection with the provisions of the Evacuee Property Act, in Ram Gopal Reddy, v. Additional Custodian Evacuee Property, Hyderabad, [1966] 3 SCR 214 : AIR 1966 SC 1438, and Custodian of Evacuee Property Punjab v. Jafran Begum, [1967] 3 SCR 736 : AIR 1968 SC 169, it was held that complete machinery for adjudication of all claims had been provided under the Act and there being a bar on the jurisdiction of any court, the Act overrides other laws, including Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure and there was no scope for the civil court to entertain any suit.”

14. Given the above principles, the finding of the trial court that the civil court lacks jurisdiction to try the case is clearly an error of law. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and the decree will stand set aside. There will be a direction to the Subordinate Judge's court, Pathanamthitta, to consider and dispose of O.S.No.232/2009 in accordance with the law. The parties shall appear before the trial court on 28.05.2026.

                  The regular first appeal is allowed as above.