Oral Order

1. Rule. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor waives service of Rule for the respondent - State.

2. By way of this application under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, "BNSS"), the applicant has prayed for anticipatory bail in the event of arrest in connection with the FIR being C.R. No. 11191036260030 of 2026, registered with Navrangpura Police Station, Ahmedabad City, for the offence punishable under Sections 109(1), 118(1), 115(2), 324(4) and 54 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for short, "BNS").

3. The learned advocate Mr. Chandrashekhar Yadav appearing on behalf of learned advocate Mr. Akshay S. Jain for the applicant would submit that the applicant has been wrongly arraigned as an accused, and arrest was apprehended, the applicant herein had filed anticipatory bail application before the learned Sessions Court, Ahmedabad, by Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.1885 of 2026, which was rejected vide order dated 25.03.2026 passed by the learned Sessions Court. Learned advocate for the applicant would submit that the allegations in the FIR reveal that on 09.03.2026, near GLS College Gate No.8, the applicant alongwith two persons allegedly came in a Fortuner vehicle carrying weapons and had attacked the complainant. It is further alleged that in the attempt the glass of the complainant's Thar vehicle was damaged, and the complainant was threatened of his life, where after the complainant allegedly ran away. That, on the plain reading of the complaint, it is apparently clear that no injury was caused by the present applicant, no treatment was taken by the complainant; the incident was at best a verbal altercation. The learned Sessions Court nevertheless rejected the application on the basis of the allegations in the FIR, the affidavit of the investigating officer asserting antecedents, pendency of investigation, and the perceived need for custodial interrogation.

          3.1. Learned advocate Mr. Yadav would further submit that the applicant is an young innocent boy and has not committed any offence as alleged in the FIR. He would further submit that learned Sessions Court failed to test the FIR allegations on the settled principle that, at the stage of anticipatory bail also, the Court is required to examine whether the essential ingredients of the alleged offences are even prima facie disclosed and whether arrest is truly warranted in the facts of the case. He would also submit that even if the allegations recorded in the impugned order are taken at their face value, the ingredients of the gravest non-bailable accusations are not made out. The allegations as reproduced do not disclose a clear, definite, or credible factual foundation to infer a real intention to cause death, which is the core requirement for an offence premised on an intention to kill. Mere use of strong words, anger, or an altercation, without corresponding injury, without medical treatment, and without any material showing a sustained or effective murderous assault, cannot be itself justify elevating the matter into an accusation carrying the element of intention to kill.

          3.2. Learned advocate would relied on the following judgments in support of his case:

          1. Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra and Others, reported in (2011) 1 SSC 694;

          2. Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Others vs. State of Punjab, reported in (1980) 2 SCC 565;

          3. Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in [2025] 10 S.C.R. 212;

          4. Shravan Kumar Chouhan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in 2022 Supreme (MP) 1452;

          5. State of M.P. v. Saleem Allias Chamaru and Another, reported in (2005) 5 SSC 554;

          6. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kanha Alias Omprakash, reported in (2019) 3 SCC 605;

          7. Jage Ram and Others v. State of Haryana, reported in (2015) 11 SCC 366;

          8. Laxman & Another v. State Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi, reported in 2013 Supreme (Del) 1286;

          3.3. He would lastly submit that the arrest of the applicant at this premature stage will cause irreversible damage to the applicant's reputation, career and family life, and therefore, the custodial investigation of the applicant is not required. Thus, argued to grant the anticipatory bail to the present applicant.

4. Per contra, learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr. Chintan Dave appearing on behalf of the respondent - State vehemently opposed grant of anticipatory bail looking to the nature and gravity of the offence. He would submit that the applicant himself has accepted the facts of driving the car alongwith main accused namely Adityasinh Dilipsinh Rathod, alongwith one another un-identified person, and therefore, it cannot be said that, merely because his name is not reflecting in the FIR, he is not involved in the alleged crime. That, there are specific allegations with regard to inflicting injuries and running behind the complainant and threatening him and inflicting with wooden log/stick, and therefore also when prima facie case against the applicant is made out, this Court should not entertain the present application, and thus, argued to reject the anticipatory bail to the present applicant.

5. Heard, the learned advocates for the respective parties. This Court has perused the papers of Investigation.

6. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the present applicant is not named in the FIR, however, Adityasinh Dilipsinh Rathod named alongwith 2 other unknown persons is clearly stated in the FIR. As far as 2 persons who are un-identified the role attributed by them is that the complainant while making efforts to save his life ran from the place of offence, at that time, all the 3 persons ran behind the complainant and also inflicted injuries with wooden log/stick, therefore, the arguments of the learned advocate that the applicant is not involved in the serious offence attracting the provision of Section 109 of the BNS does not hold good, more particularly, when the allegations are also levelled attracting the provisions of Section 118(1) read with Sections 115(2) and 54 of the BNS.

7. A perusal of Section 45 of the BNS, more particularly, Explanation 2 states that "whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act." In the facts of the present case, the present applicant alongwith the main accused Adityasinh Rathod and one other unknown person came near the complainant and were starring to the complainant, to which the complainant put a question "is there anything wrong?" to which Adityasinh Rathod answered "nothing wrong", and thereafter, left the place, and at 12:30 to 01:00 noon, Adityasinh Rathod again came with the Fortuner and present applicant along with Aditysinh Rathod and other unknown person approached with scythe and wooden log/stick tried to break the front glass of the car by scythe, and questioned the complainant, as to why did he speak in such a manner and inflicted the scythe, however, the complainant duct, therefore, the scythe dashed with the door of the car due to which the sun-wiser was broken. Since, the complainant to save his life, run away from the place of offence, all the 3 persons followed him and also tried to beat him with wooden log/stick. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that the provision of Section 54 of the BNS, read with Section 45 - Explanation 2 are not attracted. Thus, the applicant was driving the car has facilitated the commission of that act and facilitated thereby again coming back between 12:30 to 01:00 noon and also running behind the complainant, and trying to inflict injuries with wooden log/stick. Merely, because the complainant has not sustained any injuries it cannot said that the provisions of Section 109(1) read with Section 54 of the BNS were not attracted.

8. As far as the various judgments relied by the learned advocate for the applicant are concerned, this Court is bound by the law laid down in the said judgments. However, as far as the judgments relied by the learned advocate in the case Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre (supra) and Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia (supra) are concerned, the nature and gravity of the acquisition and role attributed by the present applicant cannot be brushed away lightly. It does not transpires for FIR and investigation papers that the acquisition has been only with the object of injury which has been made by the applicant. It cannot be said that, the applicant would be facing harassment after involving himself into alleged crime. Prima facie it does not appear that the case of the prosecution is frivolous, more particularly, when the complainant has no axe to grind against the present applicant, hence, the cited case laws are not applicable in the present case. As far as judgment in the case of Maniklal Sahu (supra) is concerned where the appeal was against the conviction under Section 307 of the IPC, thus, the said case cannot be considered while deciding anticipatory bail application. As far as the case of Shravan Kumar Chouhan (supra) is concerned, there anticipatory bail was granted on the facts of the said case where false implication of the applicant which was arising because of the land dispute and lack of evidence supporting the serious allegations were concerned, more particularly, there were omnibus allegations, however, injuries were simple in nature, that the facts are different and are not applicable to the facts of the case on hand. As far as the case of State of M.P. v. Saleem Allias Chamaru (supra) is also not applicable to the facts of the case, since, before the Supreme Court, the Single Judge, Madhya Pradesh High Court directed reduction of the custodial sentence for the period already undergone for the offence punishable under Sections 294, 307, 333 and 506-2 of the IPC was concerned thus it was only after the completion of trial, that the Supreme Court dealt with the case on hand, thus, the facts cannot be applied to anticipatory bail. As far as the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kanha Alias Omprakash (supra) is also after conviction, where trial court convicted the accused under Section 324, whereas the trial court had convicted under Section 304 of the IPC, the facts are different, cannot be applied to anticipatory bail. As for as the case of Jage Ram and Others (supra) also arises after conviction, thus, while granting of anticipatory bail the factual aspects of that case cannot be applied in the factual aspects of the present case. As far as the case of Laxman & Another (supra) is concerned there was a delay of 14 days in lodging of FIR and lack of satisfactory explanation leading to the benefit of doubt to the accused is concerned, the said case is also after the trial was over, and thus, said case cannot be applied to the facts of the present case, more particularly, prima facie, there does not see any delay in lodging of the FIR since alleged offence was committed between 12:30 to 01:00 noon, whereas the complainant lodged FIR in the evening at 6 O'clock on the same day. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that, prima faice case is not made out. Though the custodial interrogation can be one of the grounds to decline anticipatory bail, however, even if custodial interrogation is not required or necessitated, by itself, cannot be a ground to grant anticipatory bail, more particularly, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sumitha Pradeep v. Arun Kumar C.K. and Another, reported in (2022)17 SCC 391.

9. In view of the aforestated facts and circumstances and discussion, after considering the material placed before this Court, strong prima facie case against the present applicant in the alleged offence surfaces on record. Under the circumstances, this Court does not find any exceptional ground to exercise discretionary jurisdiction, hence, the present application stands rejected. Rule discharged.