(Prayer: This criminal appeal is filed under Section 14(a)2) of SC/ST (POA) Act read with Section 482 of BNSS, praying to set aside the order dated 06.03.2026 Passed in Crl.Misc.No.1500/2026 by the LXX Addl. City Civil and Sessions Judge and Special Judge (CCH-71) At Bengaluru and to enlarge the appellants on Anticipatory bail in Cr.No.37/2026 registered by Subramanyapura Police Station for the offences Punishable under Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) of SC/ST (POA) Act and Section 351(2), 352 and 115(2) of BNS.)

Oral Judgment:

1. This appeal is filed by the accused in Crime No.37/2026 registered before the Subramanyapura Police Station for the offences punishable under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled .Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2015 (‘SC & ST (POA) Act’ for short) and under Sections 351(2), 352 and 115(2) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 being aggrieved by the order dated 06.03.2026 passed in Crl.Misc.No.1500/2026 on the file of the LXX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge and Special Judge, Bengaluru, by which the petition filed by the appellants herein under Section 482 of BNSS has been rejected.

2. A complaint dated 06.02.2026 came to be filed by one Gopal alleging commission of aforesaid offences by the appellants herein, pursuant to which case in Crime No.37/2026 is registered. The contents of the complaint as found in the First Information Report reads as under:                         _                 _                                3. Learned counsel for the appellants submits perusal of the said complaint would not make out a case, much less, prima facie case falling within the provisions of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of SC & ST (POA) Act, inasmuch as alleged abuse was not in the public glare as envisaged under the Act. He further submits that there is a civil dispute pending between the appellants and complainant and the persons named in the complaint, who are the defendants in O.S.No.562/2026. He furnishes a memo along with a copy of the plaint in said O.S.No.562/2026 and the order sheet maintained in the said suit. He draws attention of this Court to the cause title of the plaint, wherein the complainant is arrayed as defendant No.5, while the persons named in the complaint are arrayed as defendant Nos.6, 7, 11 and 13. He submits said persons being parties to the said suit cannot be categorized as the public to bring the matter within the rigor of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC & ST (POA) Act.

4. He relies upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sohanvir @ Sohanvir Dhama and Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr. arising out of SLP (CRL) No.14100 of 2025 referring to paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the said judgment. He submits, the alleged abuse cannot be considered to have occurred within the public view.

5. He also refers to another judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala and Another reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 2249 referring to paragraphs 60 to 70 of the said judgment, he submits, even under the circumstances as envisaged in the said judgment, the case would not fall. He submits that the Trial Court has lost sight of this aspect of the matter while rejecting the application and hence, seeks for allowing of the application.

6. The learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for the State as well as the de-facto complainant, who is personally present before this Court submits that the averments and allegations made in the complaint prima-facie make out the ingredient of the offence punishable under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of SC & ST (POA) Act which has been rightly taken note of by the Trial Court. He further submits there is a statutory bar under Section 18A of the SC & ST (POA) Act for grant of anticipatory bail that there is likelihood of appellants interfering and influencing in the course of investigation if granted pre-arrest bail as sought for. Hence, seeks for rejection of the appeal.

7. Heard, perused the records.

8. The Apex Court in the case of Sohanvir (supra) at paragraphs 9 and 10 has held as under:

               ”9. In order to examine this contention, it is necessary to refer to Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, which reads as under:

               “3. Punishments for offences of atrocities. — (1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,—

               (s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view;”

                  10. The expression “any place within public view” has been interpreted by this Court in numerous decisions, most recently in Karuppudayar v. State represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi, Trichy. Relying on Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand, this Court reaffirmed that:

                 “11. It could thus be seen that, to be a place ‘within public view’, the place should be open where the members of the public can witness or hear the utterance made by the accused to the victim. If the alleged offence takes place within the four corners of the wall where members of the public are not present, then it cannot be said that it has taken place at a place within public view.”

9. Further, in the case of Shajan Skaria (supra) referring to various provisions of Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 as well as SC/ST (POA) Act at paragraphs 69, 70, 72 and 80 has held as under:

               “69. What appears from the aforesaid discussion is that the expression “intent to humiliate” as it appears in Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 must necessarily be construed in the larger context in which the concept of humiliation of the marginalised groups has been understood by various scholars. It is not ordinary insult or intimidation which would amount to ‘humiliation’ that is sought to be made punishable under the Act, 1989. The Parliament, by way of different legislations, has over the years sought to target humiliation based on different grounds and identities which exist in the society. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 seeks to punish humiliation based on gender inequalities by specifically including the term ‘humiliation’ in the definition of “domestic violence”. Similarly, The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 includes treatment causing humiliation to a female employee and which may likely affect her health and safety within the definition of sexual harassment.

               70. In our considered view, it is in a similar vein that the term ‘humiliation’ as it appears in Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 must be construed, that is, in a way that it deprecates the infliction of humiliation against members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes wherein such humiliation is intricately associated with the caste identity of such members.

               72. It is clear from a plain reading of the aforesaid provision that any insult against a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe on the ground of “untouchability” was punishable with imprisonment for a maximum term of six months under the Civil Rights Act. With the passage of time, it was realised by the legislature that the Civil Rights Act was not adequately sufficient to tackle caste-based offences and the practice of “untouchability”, leading to the enactment of the Act, 1989 introducing more stringent provisions for combating such practices. Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 should, thus, be seen in the context of Section 7(1)(d) of the Civil Rights Act. Seen thus, the words “with an intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe” become inseparable from the underlying idea of “untouchability” which is sought to be remedied and punished by the Act, 1989.

               80. At the cost of repetition, the words in Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 are altogether different. Mere knowledge of the fact that the victim is a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is not sufficient to attract Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989. As discussed earlier, the offence must have been committed against the person on the ground or for the reason that such person is a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. When we are considering whether prima facie materials exist, warranting arrest of the appellant, there is nothing to indicate that the allegations/statements alleged to have been made by the appellant were for the reason that the complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste”.

10. The facts involved in the instant case are required to be seen in the light of the aforesaid position of law and the intent of legislation.

11. It is necessary to refer to the copy of the plaint in O.S.No.562/2026 produced by the appellants. The said suit is filed by the appellants herein claiming their right, title and interest over the property bearing No.20/22, Khatha No.20/22 measuring East to West 32 feet and North to South measuring 50 feet totally comprising of 1,600 square feet situated at Arehalli Taluk, Uttarahalli Hobli, Bengaluru South Taluk. Relief sought in the said suit is decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants named therein.

12. Cause-title of the said plaint is extracted here under, which clearly indicate de-facto complainant and the persons named in the complaint are arrayed as defendants in the said suit:

                       “IN THE COURT OF CITY CIVIL & SESSIONS JUDGE

                                               AT BANGALORE

                                                 O.S.No.562/2026

               BETWEEN:

            

                               

13. Copy of the daily order sheet produced along with the memo indicate that the aforesaid suit has been filed on 22.01.2026 and an ad interim ex-parte order has been granted in favour of the appellants against aforesaid persons on 24.01.2026 instant. The interim order granted by the Trial Court in the said suit reads as hereunder:

                                          “INTERIM ORDERS

               The plaintiff has filed the suit for the relief of Permanent injunction.

               The suit schedule property is property bearing No.20/22 bearing khatha No.20/22 situated at Arehalli Village.

               It is the contention of the plaintiffs that the defendants are interfering with their possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. At this stage, bifurcation and identification of the suit schedule property is not substantiated by way of documentary evidence.

               Thus, in the given circumstances it is just and necessary to direct the parties to the litigation to maintain status-quo of the suit schedule property as on this day till next date of hearing. If this is done, it will subserve justice. However, it is not a fit case to grant exparte temporary injunction.

Hence, the following:

                                                                   ORDER

               Pending consideration of I.A No.I, the plaintiffs and the defendants are hereby directed to maintain status-quo of the suit schedule property as on this day till the appearance of the defendants.

               Issue exparte order of status-quo, if order 39 Rule 3 of CPC is complied.

               Issue emergent notice on I.A No.I and suit summons to the defendants returnable by 05.03.2026”.

14. Handwritten portion of the order sheet also indicate that counsel for the plaintiffs therein, who are the appellants herein has in compliance with the requirement of Order XXXIX Rule 3 of CPC has sent the suit papers and the interim order on 27.01.2026 instant.

15. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that in response to the notices issued in the said case, defendants have already put in appearance before the Trial Court.

16. The date of filing of the complaint is 06.02.2026 which is about 10 days subsequent to passing of the interim order. Holistic reading of the aforesaid facts emanating from the records of the Courts and the provisions of law indicate, the persons named in the complaint whom the complainant is claiming to be the members of public requires to be ascertained, particularly in view of the fact that they are arrayed as defendants in the aforesaid suit having adversarial interest against the appellants, who are the plaintiffs in the said suit. Further, the alleged incident is stated to have taken place on the property being claimed by the appellants herein, therefore, whether the said place can be considered as ''the place within the public view'' as contemplated under the provisions of SC and ST (PoA) Act.

17. Though, there is a Bar under Section 18A of the SC and ST (PoA) Act, it is relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rahana Jalal Vs. State of Kerala and Another reported in (2021) 1 SCC 733, wherein at paragraph No.25, it has held as under:

               25. Thus, even in the context of legislation, such as the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, where a bar is interposed by the provisions of Section 18 and sub-section (2) of Section 18-A on the application of Section 438 CrPC, this Court has held that the bar will not apply where the complaint does not make out “a prima facie case” for the applicability of the provisions of the Act. A statutory exclusion of the right to access remedies for bail is construed strictly, for a purpose. Excluding access to bail as a remedy, impinges upon human liberty. Hence, the decision in Chauhan [Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India, (2020) 4 SCC 727 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 657] held that the exclusion will not be attracted where the complaint does not prima facie indicate a case attracting the applicability of the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

               18. Similarly in the case of Kiran Vs. Rajkumar Jivraj Jain and another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1886, wherein at paragraph Nos.6, 6.1 and 6.2 has held as under:

               6. In light of the parameters in relation to the applicability of Section 18 of the Act emanating from afore-discussed various decisions of this Court, the proposition could be summarised that as the provision of Section 18 of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes Act, 1989 with express language excludes the applicability of Section 438, Cr. P.C., it creates a bar against grant of anticipatory bail in absolute terms in relations to the arrest of a person who faces specific accusations of having committed the offence under the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe Act. The benefit of anticipatory bail for such an accused is taken off.

               6.1. The absolute nature of bar, however, could be read and has to be applied with a rider. In a given case where on the face of it the offence under Section 3 of the Act is found to have not been made out and that the accusations relating to the commission of such offence are devoid of prima facie merits, the Court has a room to exercise the discretion to grant anticipatory bail to the accused under Section 438 of the Code.

               6.2. Non-making of prima facie case about the commission of offence is perceived to be such a situation where the Court can arrive at such a conclusion in the first blush itself or by way of the first impression upon very reading of the averments in the FIR. The contents and the allegations in the FIR would be decisive in this regard. Furthermore, in reaching a conclusion as to whether a prima facie offence is made out or not, it would not be permissible for the Court to travel into the evidentiary realm or to consider other materials, nor the Court could advert to conduct a mini trial.

19. In the light of the facts involved in the matter and the law governing grant of anticipatory bail, this Court at this juncture is of the considered view that the bar contained under Section 18A of SC/ST (POA) Act cannot be strictly applied. Averments and allegations made in the complaint cannot strictly be construed to indicate, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the matter, commission of offence falling within the rigor of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of SC/ST (POA) Act. Therefore, the following:

                                                                      ORDER

               (1) The criminal appeal is allowed.

               (2) The order dated 06.03.2026 passed in Crl.Misc.No.1500/2026 on the file of the LXX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge and Special Judge, Bengaluru is set aside.

               (3) The appellants shall be released on bail, in the event of their arrest in Crime No.37/2026 for the offences punishable under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of SC/ST (POA) Act and under Sections 351(2), 352 and 115(2) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, subject to following conditions:

               (i) The appellants shall execute a bond for a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- each with two sureties each for the likesum.

               (ii) The appellants shall appear before the jurisdictional Court within 10 days from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order and obtain regular bail.

               (iii) The appellants shall appear before the jurisdictional Police Station and mark their attendance on every Sunday between 10.00 a.m. and 6.00 p.m. and co-operate with the investigation process till filing of charge-sheet.

               (iv) The appellants shall not leave the jurisdiction of the trial Court without prior permission.

               (v) The appellants shall not influence or in any manner tamper with the prosecution witnesses.