1. This writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to issue Writ of Mandamus, to declare the Award dated 23.10.2019 in I.D.No.89 of 2009 on the file of dthe 1st respondent Court, as arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 & 19 of the Industrial Disputes Act by setting aside the same and consequently direct the respondent Nos.2 & 3 to reinstate the petitioner with all attendant benefits with backwages with interest @ 12 p.a and grant cost of the proceedings.

2. The brief facts of the case are as follows. The petitioner was appointed as a Lower Division Clerk (LDC) in the ERO Town Office of APSPDCL at Ongole on 01.06.1993 and had worked there until 03.08.2003. On 01.09.2003, the petitioner was placed under suspension by the authorities concerned for alleged misconduct. As per the proceedings dated 01.09.2003 issued by the 2nd respondent, the Divisional Engineer, Tirupati was appointed as the Enquiry Officer to conduct an enquiry into the charges. During the enquiry, charges were framed against the petitioner alleging that he collected an amount of Rs.25,700 from a consumer bearing S.C. No.045050000305 of Gamallapalem village towards non-slab bill charges but failed to account for the same. It was also alleged that he tampered with the billing records by changing the service from “bill stopped non-slab service” to “non-slab live service.” Further allegations were made that the petitioner misappropriated CC charges collected from certain consumers without issuing proper receipts in respect of some services. The petitioner submitted his explanation denying all the charges. However, based on the enquiry, a show cause notice dated 07.01.2004 was issued to him, to which he again submitted his explanation. Without properly considering his explanation, the 2nd respondent passed final orders on 15.04.2004 dismissing the petitioner from service. The petitioner filed an appeal before the Chief Engineer, but the same was rejected on 26.03.2004. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted a Mercy Petition to the Chairman and Managing Director of APSPDCL, Tirupati. By order dated 20.07.2004, the Chairman and Managing Director modified the order of punishment of dismissal to compulsory retirement and directed that the suspension period be treated as leave on duty. Challenging the order of compulsory retirement, the petitioner raised an industrial dispute in I.D. No.89 of 2009. In that dispute, the petitioner filed I.A. No.260 of 2018 before the Labour Court seeking to add the Chairman and Managing Director of APSPDCL as a necessary party. The said application was dismissed on 27.11.2018. Aggrieved by this, the petitioner filed W.P. No.8307 of 2019 before the Hon‟ble High Court, which was allowed on 24.07.2019. Thereafter, the main industrial dispute was heard and the 1st respondent passed an award on 23.10.2019 dismissing the claim of the petitioner. Aggrieved by the said award, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition.

3. During hearing, Sri M. Pitchaiah, learned counsel representing Sri C.Raghu, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order passed by the first respondent is contrary to Section 2A(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short „the Act‟). He submits that Section 2A(1) of the Act deals with the different modes by which an employee‟s service may be terminated by the employer, which would fall within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for adjudication. In the present case, the petitioner‟s services were terminated by way of compulsory retirement on the ground of alleged misconduct. According to the counsel, under Section 2A(1) of the Act, compulsory retirement would fall within the meaning of “otherwise termination.” Therefore, the rejection of the petitioner‟s claim by the first respondent is contrary to Section 2A(1) of the Act, and the order passed by the first respondent is liable to be set-aside. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the judgment of High Court of Madras in R. Egamparam vs. Deputy Chairman, Chennai Port Trust(2013 III-LLJ-161 (Mad)).

4. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader for Services-III appearing for Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 submits that the dispute was raised by the petitioner after a delay of five years from the date of termination. He also stated that an industrial dispute must normally be raised within three years as per the scheme of the Act. However, in the present case, the petitioner was terminated in 2004, but raised the dispute before the respondent only in the year 2009, after a lapse of five years. Therefore, according to him, even on that count of limitation the writ petition is not maintainable. He further submits that the award passed by the Tribunal is to be treated as a decree, and therefore the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked. Such an order can only be challenged under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In support of his contentions, he placed reliance upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court in M/s. Mitra S.P. Pvt. Ltd vs. Dhiren Kumar(W.A.Nos.615 & 617 of 2021 dated 22.03.2022).

5. Heard Sri M. Pitchaiah, learned counsel representing Sri C. Raghu, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Government Pleader for Services-III and perused the material available on record.

6. The core issue to be determined by this Court is “whether the dispute fell within the definition of Section 2A(1) of the Act or not”. It is appropriate for better understanding, Section 2A is to be extracted hereunder:

                  Dismissal, etc, of an individual workman to be deemed to be an industrial dispute.

                  (1) Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches, or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute.

                  [(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in section l0, any such workman as is specified in sub-section (1) may, make an application direct to the Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication of the dispute referred to therein after the expiry of forty-five days from the date he has made the application to the Conciliation Officer of the appropriate Government for conciliation of the dispute, and in receipt of such application the Labour Court or Tribunal shall have powers and jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute, as if it were a dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government in accordance with the provisions of this Act and all the provisions of this Act shall apply in relation to such adjudication as they apply in relation to an industrial dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government.

                  (3) The application referred to in sub-section (2) shall be made to the Labour Court or Tribunal before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-section (1).

7. On perusal of Section 2A(1) to (3) of the Act, it is clear that while explaining the modes of termination, the provision also refers to “otherwise termination of service,” i.e., termination other than discharge, dismissal, or retrenchment. Therefore, the compulsory retirement of the petitioner can be treated as another form of termination falling within the scope of Section 2A. Accordingly, the first respondent is the competent authority to adjudicate the dispute under Section 2A(1) of the Act.

8. As contended by the learned Government Pleader, it is argued that the petitioner cannot invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, since the award passed by the Tribunal is in the nature of a decree and can either be executed before the competent Court or challenged under the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Whereas, this contention is not valid and sustainable, for the reason that, in the absence of any statutory appeal provided under the Act against an award of the Tribunal, the same could not be allowed to become final, therefore, such a judicial order can be challenged by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court.

9. If an order is passed by a quasi-judicial authority without there being jurisdiction or vice versa or contrary to law and also on merits for non-consideration of facts and law the same may be interfered and to be corrected by this Court even under extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. As contended by the learned Standing Counsel, the order of the learned Tribunal would be challenged under Article 227 of the Constitution of India under the power of superintendence is not acceptable and unsustainable for the reason that, while exercising power of superintendence, this Court cannot go into the merits of the case, but it can only test the jurisdiction and competency or is there any error on the face of the record. Hence, for comprehensive adjudication this Court should exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the present case, the first respondent had rejected the petitioner‟s claim on the ground that compulsory termination does not constitute an industrial dispute and therefore does not fall within its jurisdiction, is misunderstanding of the provisions of the Act and the reason assigned by the Tribunal is contrary to Section 2A(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

10. In view of the above analysis and reasons, the impugned award passed by the Tribunal in I.D.No.89 of 2009 lacks merits and liable to be set-aside by holding that this Court can exercise extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the Award passed by the Tribunal in I.D.No.89 of 2009 is hereby set-aside and further the matter is remanded to the first respondent for adjudication on merits case afresh and pass appropriate orders on merits in accordance with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

11. Moreover, considering that the dispute was filed in the year 2009 and has been pending for a long time, this Court deems it appropriate to direct the Tribunal to restore I.A. No. 260 of 2018 and proceed with the matter on merits in accordance with law, and to dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of two years from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

12. With the above direction, writ petition is disposed of. No costs.

13. Consequently, miscellaneous applications pending if any, shall also stand dismissed.