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CDJ 2026 GHC 087 print Preview print print
Court : High Court Of Gujarat At Ahmedabad
Case No : R/Criminal Appeal No. 1943 of 2010
Judges: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SANJEEV J.THAKER
Parties : State Of Gujarat Versus Rajubhai Samsubhai Baria (Bhil) & Another
Appearing Advocates : For the Appellant: Yuvraj Brahmbhatt, APP. For the Respondents: -----.
Date of Judgment : 11-03-2026
Head Note :-
Indian Penal Code - Section 498(A), Section 306 & Section 114 -
Judgment :-

1. Feeling aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and order of acquittal dated 26.07.2010, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Anand, in Sessions Case No.41 of 2010 for the offences punishable under Sections 498(A), 306 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, the appellant - State of Gujarat has preferred this appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, "the Code").

2. The prosecution case as unfolded during the trial before the trial Court is that the respondent-original accused No.1 was married to the deceased. During the subsistence of the marriage, the accused allegedly subjected the deceased to continuous physical and mental cruelty, including harassment on suspicion of her character and demands for dowry. It is alleged that due to persistent torture and harassment, which crossed tolerable limits, the deceased committed suicide by hanging herself with a sari therefore, the complaint was filed against the respondent/s-accused.

3. After investigation, sufficient prima facie evidence was found against the accused person/s and therefore charge- sheet was filed in the competent criminal Court. Since the offence alleged against the accused person/s was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the learned Magistrate committed the case to the Sessions Court where it came to be registered as Sessions Case No.41 of 2010. The charge was framed against the accused person/s. The accused pleaded not guilty and came to be tried.

4. In order to bring home the charge, the prosecution has examined 8 witnesses and also produced 16 documentary evidence before the trial Court, which are described in the impugned judgment.

5. After hearing both the parties and after analysis of evidence adduced by the prosecution, the learned trial Judge acquitted the accused for the offences for which the charge was framed, by holding that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.

6. Learned APP for the appellant - State has pointed out the facts of the case and having taken this Court through both, oral and documentary evidence, recorded before the learned trial Court, would submit that the learned trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence in true sense and perspective; and that the trial Court has committed error in acquitting the accused. It is submitted that the learned trial Court ought not to have given much emphasis to the contradictions and/or omissions appearing in the evidence and ought to have given weightage to the dots that connect the accused with the offence in question. It is submitted that the learned trial Court has erroneously come to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case. It is also submitted that the learned Judge ought to have seen that the evidence produced on record is reliable and believable and it was proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had committed an offence in question. It is, therefore, submitted that this Court may allow this appeal by appreciating the evidence led before the learned trial Court.

7. Vide order dated 08.12.2025, this appeal is already abated qua respondent no.1. None appears on behalf of the respondent no.2, though served.

8. In the aforesaid background, considering the oral as well as documentary evidence on record, independently and dispassionately and considering the impugned judgment and order of the trial Court, the following aspects weighed with the Court :

          8.1. The prosecution has relied on the complaint, which is filed vide Exhibit-15 as per the said complaint the alleged incident has taken place on 23.01.2010. It is the case of the prosecution that the, deceased Sitaben before four months of the alleged incident was upset and had come to her parental house, and had alleged that the accused no.1 was doubting the character of the deceased with Natubhai Saburbhai and thereafter, father of the accused and the mother of the accused had come to take the deceased from her parental house. The entire case of the prosecution is based on the fact that there was a dispute before four months from the date of incident.

          8.2. The marriage span of the deceased with the accused no.1 was two years. The complaint has been filed by the brother of the deceased. The prosecution has examined Dr.Hasmukh P. Parekh as PW-1, who was working as Medical Officer at Ode Community Health Center and he had conducted the post-mortem of the deceased and as per the said report, which is produced vide exhibit-12, the cause of death of the deceased was due to asphyxia due to hanging and the medical certificate is produced vide exhibit-13.

          8.3. The complainant Rakesh Bhai has been examined as PW-2 vide exhibit-14 and in his cross-examination, he has admitted the fact that the deceased was of sensitive nature and before the incident, the fact of extramarital affair had come to his knowledge. The mother of the deceased has been examined vide the Exhibit-16. The relative of the deceased, Shamsubhai has been examined vide exhibit-17 as PW-4.

          8.4. If the entire evidence is taken into consideration, the witnesses of the prosecution have not proved other than the fact that, before four months from the date of incident, there was harassment by the accused on the deceased. The fact remains that the claim of extramarital affair, which is alleged from the case of the prosecution is with one Natubhai, but the fact remains that Natubhai and his wife happen to be relative of the accused and have been staying together. If the said fact was true, the accused no.1 would not be staying with said Natubhai.

          8.5. Therefore, the entire case which has been stated by the complainant is that the dispute was that the accused was harassing the deceased, for having illicit relation with Natubhai, but the same has not been proved by the prosecution. The other fact which has been taken into consideration by the sessions Court is that the deceased had come to Devarampura village just before five days from the date of alleged incident, but the prosecution has failed to prove that what was the quarrel between the deceased and the accused which had taken place over there. The prosecution has also not been able to prove that there was any role of the accused in instigating the deceased for committing suicide.

          8.6. The prosecution has also not been able to prove the instigating act which was immediate in close proximity to prove the offence against the accused. With respect to the illicit relation of the deceased with Natubhai, the prosecution has also not examined Natubhai and/ or his wife to prove the said fact.

          8.7. Moreover, the place where the deceased was working was a poultry farm, and the prosecution has not examined any of the labourers or the owner or the contractor of the said poultry farm to prove the fact of harassment by the accused on the deceased.

          8.8. The prosecution has also not proved the offence of demand of dowry by the accused. If the evidence of the police officers who have been examined vide exhibit-31, Police Constable Mahendrabhai Vala, the P.S.O.-Basirkhan Aiyubkhan Pathan, who has been examined vide exhibit-32, and the P.S.I. Ajaysinh Hardaysinh Rajput, who has been examined vide exhibit-35, the prosecution has not been able to prove from the said evidence, the offence against the accused.

          8.9. Moreover, according to the complainant, about four months prior to the incident, Sitaben had a quarrel with her husband (the accused Rajubhai) and Surataben, who is the sister-in-law of the deceased. The accused Rajubhai used to harbour a false suspicion that his wife, Sitaben, had an illicit relationship with Natubhai. When Sitaben had come to her parental home about four months before the incident, she had informed her mother, elder uncle, and father about the same. She had stated that she did not wish to return to her matrimonial home; however, in order to prevent the marital life from being disrupted, when the parents of accused Rajubhai came to take Sitaben back, she was sent with them to her matrimonial home.

          8.10. From the date of marriage until the conversation that took place four months prior to the incident, there is nothing on record to indicate that the deceased had ever complained either to the complainant or to her parental family about any form of harassment by the accused. If in fact the deceased had been subjected to such unbearable cruelty that she was unwilling to return, then unless and until some assurance or undertaking had been given from the matrimonial side that she would be treated properly and not subjected to any harassment, neither the complainant nor his family members would have chosen to send Sitaben back to her matrimonial home. On the one hand, the complainant states that the police had called him to come to the hospital; on the other hand, he states that he himself had gone to the police station, made inquiries there, and thereafter gone to the hospital. These versions of the sequence of events do not appear to be consistent and seem contradictory. He has stated that he had seen the dead body of the deceased; however, he has not clarified who informed him, when, and under what circumstances, that she had hanged herself and committed suicide. He does not state that he personally noticed any injuries on the body, nor does he mention having made any inquiry with anyone regarding the incident. He has narrated the details of the quarrel and alleged harassment between his sister and the accused as having occurred four months prior to the incident. However, despite the deceased having thereafter resumed cohabitation with the accused, there is nothing on record to indicate that she was subjected to any form of harassment during the subsequent four-month period.

          8.11. It has come on record that the accused, the deceased, and Natubhai were working at a poultry farm; however, none of the other labourers, the owner, or the contractor of the said poultry farm have been examined by the police during the course of investigation. At the place where the deceased had been working for a considerable period along with other persons, not a single individual from that workplace has been brought before the Court to provide any direct or prima facie evidence regarding the alleged harassment or quarrel. The prosecution has based the allegation of harassment solely on the statement said to have been made by the deceased to her brother about four months prior to the incident. Apart from that, no independent or corroborative evidence regarding harassment, which could have been easily brought on record, has been produced. Therefore, upon overall appreciation of the evidence, it does not stand proved that the accused subjected the deceased to cruelty or that they instigated or abetted her to take the extreme step of ending her life.

          8.12 At Exhibit 16, the evidence of the deceased's mother, Saburiben, has been recorded. She has stated that her daughter committed suicide due to harassment by her husband; however, she has not clarified for what reasons, in what manner, or at what point of time such harassment was allegedly inflicted.

          8.13. At Exhibit 17, the evidence of Samusubhai has been recorded. Upon evaluation of his testimony, it appears that he has no personal knowledge regarding the allegations made in the present case. His evidence is purely hearsay in nature and does not advance the prosecution case.

          8.14. The prosecution has examined the police officer as Prosecution Witness No.5, namely DySP Rajesh Kumar Pathak, and his evidence has been recorded accordingly. In cross-examination, he has admitted that one Rameshbhai had informed him that a woman had hanged herself. He has further admitted that both the accused and Natubhai had gone to the spot, seen the dead body, and brought it down. Thus, Natubhai would be material witness to the incident, which fact is also acknowledged by the Investigating Officer. He has also admitted that the statements of the contractor Rameshbhai, the accused's other sister Kali, and Natubhai's wife Ramilaben were not recorded during the course of investigation. Even though these important witnesses were available, their statements were not recorded, and therefore they could not be considered or relied upon as supporting witnesses.

          8.15. Vide exhibit 35, the evidence of PSI Rajput has been recorded. He has admitted that the accused were arrested before the final opinion regarding the cause of death was received. He further stated that the saree with which the deceased had hanged herself was not seized, and that he had not gone to Sudiya village where in-laws of deceased were residing.

          8.16. If the evidence of the Police Officers are taken into consideration, the prosecution has failed to prove the direct proximity i.e. live link between the accused action and the victim's death. Moreover, the prosecution has also failed to prove the act of alleged instigation was near the time of suicide. The prosecution has also not been able to prove any evidence of positive, direct act that forced a deceased into a situation with no other option but to take her life. The prosecution has not been able to prove a specific incident and or a recent and direct act of the accused that triggered the immediate suicide.

          8.17. Moreover, it has also come on record that the saree with which the deceased had hanged herself was also not recovered by the prosecution. The prosecution has also not made any investigation near the matrimonial home of the deceased.

          9.1 The evidence on record and the glaring omission on the prosecution as pointed out above leaves no room of doubt that the order passed by the trial Court is as per law. The trial Court has rightly held that there was no positive evidence on record to prove that the accused by way of the conduct or spoken words, overtly or covertly, actually aided and abetted or instigated the deceased in such a manner that it leaves no other option for the deceased but to commit suicide. In the present case, the prosecution has also not been able to prove the clear motive of the accused to commit offence of abatement. There is also no close connection between the accused's action and the deceased's choice to commit suicide. In view of the said fact, the prosecution has not been able to prove that the accused have stimulated the deceased to commit suicide.

          9.2 The prosecution has not proved that there was a clear motive to commit the offence of abatement. The prosecution has also not proved that the accused proceeded to encourage and/or irritate the deceased through words or insults and that the accused intended to urge the deceased to end it all by committing suicide. The prosecution has also not been able to prove the direct connection between the incitement and committal of suicide. The prosecution has also not been able to prove direct or indirect act of incitement to the commitment of suicide. The prosecution has also not been able to prove by accusation of harassment without any positive action on the part of the accused close to the time of occurrence that led and forced the deceased to commit suicide.

          9.3 The present matter turns on whether the conduct attributed to the accused satisfies the legal threshold of abetment of suicide. Therefore, read as a whole, it can be said that mere occurrence of a suicide does not automatically trigger rigours of the Section. The penal consequences under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code arise when the prosecution is able to establish that the accused abetted and had a role in provoking or facilitating that suicide. Therefore, this twin test distinction is required to be borne in mind. 9.4 Abetment, as understood in criminal jurisprudence, is not a broad moral expression but a term of precise statutory meaning. Section 107 IPC delineates its contours:

          instigation, conspiracy, or intentional aiding. Each of these modes presupposes active involvement. The law does not punish omission except in some cases, it punishes intentional encouragement or positive facilitation of a prohibited act. 9.5 It is therefore not sufficient to show that the deceased was unhappy, distressed, or subjected to unpleasant treatment. The jurisprudence developed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently underscored that routine domestic disagreements, suspicion between spouses, or episodes of harassment do not ipso facto amount to instigation. Rigours of this Section intervene only where there is clear evidence of mens rea and a direct causal link between the accused's conduct and the decision of the deceased to commit suicide.

          9.6 The concept of instigation demands something more than mere reproach or accusation. It connotes an active suggestion, an incitement, or conduct of such intensity that it operates upon the mind of the victim and pushes him or her toward this drastic and unfortunate step. The prosecution therefore, must demonstrate either a deliberate intention to drive the deceased to suicide or knowledge that the conduct in question was likely to produce that consequence. Equally indispensable is the requirement of proximity. The law insists on a live and immediate nexus between the acts complained of and the suicide. A remote or generalized allegation is insufficient. There must be evidence showing that the accused engaged in conduct so closely connected in time and effect with the suicide that it can reasonably be said to have triggered the fatal act.

          9.7 No material has been brought on record demonstrating any proximate act immediately preceding the suicide which could be construed as instigation. Nor is there evidence of a positive act amounting to intentional aid. The essential ingredients of abetment -namely, culpable mental state coupled with active or proximate conduct-are not established.

          9.8 On an overall assessment of the evidence, the prosecution has failed to demonstrate the existence of the foundational elements necessary to sustain a conviction under Section 306 IPC.

10. In the case of Mahendra K.C. v. State of Karnataka and another, [(2022) 2 SCC 129], it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the essence of abetment lies in instigating a person to do a thing or the intentional doing of that thing by an act or illegal omission. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do "an act". To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation.

          10.1 In the case of Mahendra Awase v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 (1) Crimes 347 (SC), the observations are made with regard to abetment of suicide. It has been held that in order to bring a case within purview of Section 306 IPC, there must be a case of suicide and in commission of said offence, person who is said to have abetted commission of suicide must have played active role by act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate commission of suicide. It has been further observed that the act of abetment by person charged with said offence must be proved and established by prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC. It is further observed that to satisfy requirement of instigation, accused by his act or omission or by a continued course of conduct should have created such circumstances that deceased was left with no other option, except to commit suicide.

          10.2 In the case of Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu versus State of West Bengal, (2010) 1 SCC 707, it has been held that in a case of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be proof of direct or indirect act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the deceased to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC would not be sustainable. 10.3 In the case of Rajesh v. State of Haryana, (2020) 15 SCC 359, after considering the provisions of Sections 306 and 107 of IPC, the Court held that conviction under Section 306 IPC is not sustainable on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide. 10.4 In the case of Amudha v. State, 2024 INSC 244, it was held that there has to be an act of incitement on the part of the accused proximate to the date on which the deceased committed suicide. The act attributed should not only be proximate to the time of suicide but should also be of such a nature that the deceased was left with no alternative but to take the drastic step of committing suicide.

11. Further, learned APP is not in a position to show any evidence to take a contrary view in the matter or that the approach of the Court below is vitiated by some manifest illegality or that the decision is perverse or that the Court below has ignored the material evidence on record. In above view of the matter, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Court below was completely justified in passing impugned judgment and order.

12. Considering the impugned judgment, the trial Court has recorded that there was no direct evidence connecting the accused with the incident and there are contradictions in the depositions of the prosecution witnesses. In absence of the direct evidence, it cannot be proved that the accused are involved in the offence. Further, the motive of the accused behind the incident is not established. The trial Court has rightly considered all the evidence on record and passed the impugned judgment. The trial Court has rightly evaluated the facts and the evidence on record.

13. It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeal, the appellate court is not required to re-write the judgment or to give fresh reasoning, when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. Such principle is down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. Hemareddy, reported in AIR 1981 SC 1417 wherein it is held as under:

          "... This court has observed in Girija Nandini Devi V. Bigendra Nandini Chaudhary (1967)1 SCR 93: (AIR 1967 SC 1124) that it is not the duty of the appellate court when it agrees with the view of the trial court on the evidence to repeat the narration of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial court expression of general agreement with the reasons given by the Court the decision of which is under appeal, will ordinarily suffice."

14. Thus, in case the appellate court agrees with the reasons and the opinion given by the lower court, then the discussion of evidence at length is not necessary.

15. In the case of Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana, reported in AIR 1995 SC 280, Supreme Court has held as under:

          "The powers of the High Court in an appeal from order of acquittal to reassess the evidence and reach its own conclusions under Sections 378 and 379, Cr.P.C. are as extensive as in any appeal against the order of conviction. But as a rule of prudence, it is desirable that the High Court should give proper weight and consideration to the view of the Trial Court with regard to the credibility of the witness, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt and the slowness of appellate Court in justifying a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witness. It is settled law that if the main grounds on which the lower Court has based its order acquitting the accused are reasonable and plausible, and the same cannot entirely and effectively be dislodged or demolished, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal."

16. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Singh & Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2011) 11 SCC 444 and in the case of Bhaiyamiyan Alias Jardar Khan and Another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2011) 6 SCC 394, while dealing with the judgment of acquittal, unless reasoning by the trial Court is found to be perverse, the acquittal cannot be upset. It is further observed that High Court's interference in such appeal in somewhat circumscribed and if the view taken by the trial Court is possible on the evidence, the High Court should stay its hands and not interfere in the matter in the belief that if it had been the trial Court, it might have taken a different view.

17. In the case of Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under:

          "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:

          (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

          (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.

          (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

          (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused.

          Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

          (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court."

18. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in a recent decision, in the case of Constable 907 Surendra Singh and Another V/s State of Uttarakhand reported in (2025) 5 SCC 433, has held in paragraph 24 as under:

          "24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record."

19. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the scope of appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 no case is made out to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of acquittal.

20. In view of above facts and circumstances of the case, on my careful re-appreciation of the entire evidence, I found that there is no infirmity or irregularity in the findings of fact recorded by learned trial Court and under the circumstances, the learned trial Court has rightly acquitted the respondent/s - accused for the elaborate reasons stated in the impugned judgment and I also endorse the view/finding of the learned trial Court leading to the acquittal.

21. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present Criminal Appeal fails and the same deserves to be dismissed and is dismissed, accordingly. Record & Proceedings be remitted to the concerned trial Court forthwith.

 
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