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CDJ 2026 GHC 080 print Preview print print
Court : High Court Of Gujarat At Ahmedabad
Case No : R/Criminal Appeal No. 1755 of 2012
Judges: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV J. THAKER
Parties : State of Gujarat Versus Chetankumar Nareshbhai Tarpada Koli Patel & Others
Appearing Advocates : For the Appellant: Shruti Pathak, APP, Advocate. For the Respondents: Raxit J. Dholakia(3709), Advocate.
Date of Judgment : 09-03-2026
Head Note :-
Scheduled Castes & the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act - Sections 3(1)(x) -
Judgment :-

1. Feeling aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and order of acquittal dated 07.08.2012, passed by the learned Special Judge, Bharuch, Camp at Ankleshwar, in Special (Atrocity) Case No.31 of 2011, for the offences punishable under Sections 323, 504 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, the appellant - State of Gujarat has preferred this appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, "the Code").

2. The prosecution case, as unfolded during the trial before the Sessions Court, is that 04.11.2010 at about 7:00 p.m., on the occasion of Diwali, accused No.1 ignited firecrackers in front of the house of the complainant and threw the same on the terrace of the complainant's house. Therefore, one neighbour viz., Natubhai, who was living beside the complainant's house, told the accused not to ignite firecrackers in front of the house and if he wanted to ignite the firecrackers, go away from the house. Therefore, accused No.1 - Chetanbhai got excited and gave filthy abuses and assaulted Natubhai, hence, the complainant rescued said Natubhai from accused No.1, thereafter, accused No.1 went away, but after 15-20 minutes, accused No.1 came back along with other accused persons and quarreled with the complainant and gave filthy abuses relating to her caste and all the accused persons gave kick and punch blows to the complainant and her husband. Therefore, the complaint was filed against the respondent/s-accused.

3. After investigation, sufficient prima facie evidence was found against the accused person/s and therefore charge- sheet was filed in the competent criminal Court for the offences as alleged. Since the offence alleged against the accused person/s was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the learned Magistrate committed the case to the Sessions Court where it came to be registered as Special (Atrocity) Case No.31 of 2011. The charge was framed against the accused person/s. The accused pleaded not guilty and came to be tried.

4. In order to bring home the charge, the prosecution has examined 10 witnesses and also produced 8 documentary evidence before the trial Court, which are described in the impugned judgment.

5. After hearing both the parties and after analysis of evidence adduced by the prosecution, the learned trial Judge acquitted the accused for the offences for which they were charged, by holding that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.

6. Learned APP for the appellant - State has pointed out the facts of the case and having taken this Court through both, oral and documentary evidence, recorded before the learned trial Court, would submit that the learned trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence in true sense and perspective; and that the trial Court has committed error in acquitting the accused. It is submitted that the learned trial Court ought not to have given much emphasis to the contradictions and/or omissions appearing in the evidence and ought to have given weightage to the dots that connect the accused with the offence in question. It is submitted that the learned trial Court has erroneously come to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case. It is also submitted that the learned Judge ought to have seen that the evidence produced on record is reliable and believable and it was proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had committed an offence in question. It is, therefore, submitted that this Court may allow this appeal by appreciating the evidence led before the learned trial Court.

7. As against that, learned advocate for the respondent/s would support the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court and has submitted that the learned trial Court has not committed any error in acquitting the accused. The trial Court has taken possible view as the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, it is prayed to dismiss the present appeal by confirming the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned trial Court.

8. In the aforesaid background, considering the oral as well as documentary evidence on record, independently and dispassionately and considering the impugned judgment and order of the trial Court, the following aspects weighed with the Court :

          8.1 The prosecution has relied on the complaint dated 14.11.2010, which is produced vide Exh.13, wherein the complainant - Shardaben Janakbhai Vasava has stated that on 04.11.2010 at around 7:00 p.m., as it was Diwali festival, accused No.1 was igniting the fire crackers on the terrace of the complainant and at that point of time, the other neighbour of the complainant viz., Natubhai had scolded accused No.1 for bursting fire crackers; and that as somebody will get burnt and injured, he should not burst the fire crackers in the air. At that point of time, accused No.1 started abusing said Natubhai and ran towards him and physically assaulted him. At that point of time, the complainant intervened and rescued said Natubhai from assault of accused No.1 and thereafter, after 20 minutes, the accused came and started abusing and assaulting the complainant and her husband and abused the complainant of his caste.

          8.2 The complainant viz., Shardaben Janakbhai Vasava has been examined as P.W.1, vide Exh.12. In her deposition, she has stated that she had gone on the next day of the alleged incident to the Sajod Police Chowky to register a complaint, but the said police station was locked. Thereafter, after two days, she had called Head Constable Gadhvi, who was at Sajod Out Police Chowki and he had informed that he was travelling and thereafter, informed the complainant to come after two days to register the complaint and thereafter, she had gone after two days to Sajod Out Police Chowki to register a complaint, but at that point of time, there was no police person and therefore, she had again called Head Constable Gadhvi, who had informed that he will come in the evening and therefore, she had filed a complaint at Ankleshwar Rural Police Station, but the said complaint was not taken there. Therefore, she contacted a social worker - Bhogilal and said Bhogilal had taken the complainant to the office of the D.S.P. and the complaint was filed at the office of D.S.P., which is produced vide Exh.13. 8.3 The prosecution has examined the husband of the complainant viz., Janaksinh Sataliyabhai Vasava, as P.W.2, vide Exh.15.

          The Medical Officer - Dr.VinodBrijnandan Upadhyay has been examined as P.W.3, vide Exh.16, who had examined the complainant and the certificate was issued by the said doctor is produced vide Exh.17.

          The other factor which the Sessions Court has taken into consideration is that the medical treatment, that the complainant had taken, was taken on 10.11.2010 for the alleged injury that had taken place on 04.11.2010.

          8.4 The complainant had also not provided the police yadi, while getting treatment from the said doctor. Moreover, it transpires that in the certificate, the names of the accused were also not given by the complainant.

          Further, it is the case of the complainant in the complaint that the entire dispute is allegedly started, because the accused were trying to assault P.W.4 - Natvarbhai (Natubhai) Patel and since the complainant and her husband were trying to intervene and to protect said Natvarbhai (Natubhai) Patel.

          If the deposition of said Natvarbhai Patel - P.W.4, who has been examined vide Exh.18, is taken into consideration, he has turned hostile and not supported the case of the prosecution. He has totally denied the incident that had taken place. He has denied the fact that he had scolded the accused for bursting the fire crackers on the terrace of the complainant. He has stated that no such incident of the accused abusing him had taken place.

          8.5 The prosecution has examined P.W.5 - P.S.O. - Ramdas Bhanabhai, who was the A.S.I. at Ankleshwar Rural Police Station vide Exh.19. He had only registered the complaint and other than registering the said complaint, he had not done any other investigation.

          8.6 The panchanama of scene of offence is produced vide Exh.24 and the panch of said panchanama viz., Hiteshbhai Hirabhai has been examined as P.W.6, vide Exh.23 and the other witness viz., Jayeshbhai Ganpatbhai Raval has been examined as P.W.7, vide Exh.25. Both have turned hostile and have not supported the case of the prosecution.

          8.7 The prosecution has also examined P.W.8 - Ranjanben Dineshbhai Patel vide Exh.26. It also transpires from her cross-examination that the said witness's daughter was having an affair with accused No.1.

          8.8 The P.S.I. - Pravinbhai Arjunbhai Valvi has been examined as P.W.9, vide Exh.29. He had only taken the complaint. Other than that, he had not made any investigation.

          The Dy.S.P. - Mayurdwajsinh Natvarsinh Chauhan has been examined as P.W.10, vide Exh.31. 8.9 If the entire case of the prosecution is taken into consideration, the prosecution has failed to justify the delay in filing the complaint and/or delay in taking the medical treatment. The other factor, that has also been taken into consideration by the learned Sessions Court, is that though it has been stated that delay in filing the complaint was due to the fact that the police officer Gadhvi had informed the complainant to come at a later point of time to file a complaint, but the fact remains that the said officer Gadhvi has not been examined by the prosecution nor the social worker Bhogilal has been examined by the prosecution. Though it has been stated that because of the alleged incident, the husband of the complainant was also injured, the prosecution has failed to prove any medical document that the husband of the complainant was also treated for the alleged injury that had taken place on 40.11.2010.

          8.10 Therefore, the prosecution has not proved the case against the accused for the offence as alleged. Moreover, as per the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sajan Sakhariya Vs. State of Kerala and others reported in AIR 2024 SC 4557, every insult or intimidation would not amount to an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, unless such insult or intimidation is started at a victim because he is a member of a particular Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. Therefore, from the allegations made in the complaint, the prosecution has not proved that the accused is guilty of an offence under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

          8.11 The trial Court, while considering the evidences in detail, has observed that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. While discussing the evidence in detail, the trial court has found that the only allegation against the accused is of speaking indecent words against the caste of the complainant. The trial Court has gone into the evidence in detail and has come to the conclusion that the accused are not guilty of the alleged offence.

9. Further, learned APP is not in a position to show any evidence to take a contrary view in the matter or that the approach of the Court below is vitiated by some manifest illegality or that the decision is perverse or that the Court below has ignored the material evidence on record. In above view of the matter, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Court below was completely justified in passing impugned judgment and order.

10. Considering the impugned judgment, the trial Court has recorded that there was no direct evidence connecting the accused with the incident and there are contradictions in the depositions of the prosecution witnesses. In absence of the direct evidence, it cannot be proved that the accused are involved in the offence. Further, the motive of the accused behind the incident is not established. The trial Court has rightly considered all the evidence on record and passed the impugned judgment. The trial Court has rightly evaluated the facts and the evidence on record.

11. It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeal, the appellate court is not required to re-write the judgment or to give fresh reasoning, when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. Such principle is down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. Hemareddy, reported in AIR 1981 SC 1417 wherein it is held as under:

          "... This court has observed in Girija Nandini Devi V. Bigendra Nandini Chaudhary (1967)1 SCR 93: (AIR 1967 SC 1124) that it is not the duty of the appellate court when it agrees with the view of the trial court on the evidence to repeat the narration of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial court expression of general agreement with the reasons given by the Court the decision of which is under appeal, will ordinarily suffice."

12. Thus, in case the appellate court agrees with the reasons and the opinion given by the lower court, then the discussion of evidence at length is not necessary.

13. In the case of Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana, reported in AIR 1995 SC 280, Supreme Court has held as under:

          "The powers of the High Court in an appeal from order of acquittal to reassess the evidence and reach its own conclusions under Sections 378 and 379, Cr.P.C. are as extensive as in any appeal against the order of conviction. But as a rule of prudence, it is desirable that the High Court should give proper weight and consideration to the view of the Trial Court with regard to the credibility of the witness, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt and the slowness of appellate Court in justifying a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witness. It is settled law that if the main grounds on which the lower Court has based its order acquitting the accused are reasonable and plausible, and the same cannot entirely and effectively be dislodged or demolished, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal."

14. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Singh & Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2011) 11 SCC 444 and in the case of Bhaiyamiyan Alias Jardar Khan and Another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2011) 6 SCC 394, while dealing with the judgment of acquittal, unless reasoning by the trial Court is found to be perverse, the acquittal cannot be upset. It is further observed that High Court's interference in such appeal in somewhat circumscribed and if the view taken by the trial Court is possible on the evidence, the High Court should stay its hands and not interfere in the matter in the belief that if it had been the trial Court, it might have taken a different view.

15. In the case of Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under:

          "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:

          (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

          (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.

          (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

          (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused.

          Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

          (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court."

16. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in a recent decision, in the case of Constable 907 Surendra Singh and Another V/s State of Uttarakhand reported in (2025) 5 SCC 433, has held in paragraph 24 as under:

          "24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record."

17. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the scope of appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 no case is made out to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of acquittal.

18. In view of above facts and circumstances of the case, on my careful re-appreciation of the entire evidence, I found that there is no infirmity or irregularity in the findings of fact recorded by learned trial Court and under the circumstances, the learned trial Court has rightly acquitted the respondent/s - accused for the elaborate reasons stated in the impugned judgment and I also endorse the view/finding of the learned trial Court leading to the acquittal.

19. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present Criminal Appeal fails and the same deserves to be dismissed and is dismissed, accordingly. Record & Proceedings be remitted to the concerned trial Court forthwith.

 
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