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CDJ 2025 APHC 1957 print Preview print print
Court : High Court of Andhra Pradesh
Case No : Writ Appeal No. 598 of 2025
Judges: THE HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. DHIRAJ SINGH THAKUR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO
Parties : B. Narendra Kumar Versus Union of India & others
Appearing Advocates : For the Appellant: K.S. Murthy, appearing vice M.R.K. Chakravarthy, Advocates. For the Respondents: The Advocate General, P.S.P. Suresh Kumar, Spl. Public Prosecutor, GP for Home, Abdus Saleem, Advocate.
Date of Judgment : 18-12-2025
Head Note :-
Indian Penal Code - Section 302, Section 201, Section 120-B r/w Section 149 -

Comparative Citation:
2026 (1) ALT(Cri) 293,
Judgment :-

Dhiraj Singh Thakur, CJ.

1. The present Writ Appeal has been preferred against judgment and order, dated 05.05.2025, passed in W.P.No.27032 of 2024, whereby the Writ Petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed.

2. The Writ Petition was filed by the petitioner with a view to seek a Mandamus for entrusting the investigation in F.I.R. No.103 of 2024, dated 30.05.2024, registered with I Town Police Station, Dharmavaram, Sri Satya Sai District to the Central Bureau of Investigation. The F.I.R. in question was registered for offences under Sections 302, 201, 120-B, read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Section 3(2)(V) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities), Act, 1989.

3. The case of the petitioner was that he had been falsely implicated in the said crime in regard to the alleged murder of Birru Sampath Kumar.

4. The deceased Sampath Kumar was arraigned as accused No.4 in Crime No.88 of 2024, dated 11.04.2024, registered with I Town Police Station, Hindupur, for offences under Sections 448, 323, 354, 506, read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. It is stated that Sampath Kumar was arrested on 28.05.2024 and produced before the Magistrate on the same day i.e. 28.05.2024, by the police, with a request for remanding the accused to judicial custody.

5. The learned Magistrate held that the police authorities had failed to issue a notice under Section 41-A Cr.P.C., which was also violative of the Guidelines of the Apex Court’s judgment, rendered in the case of Arnesh Kumar vs. State of Bihar((2014) 8 SCC 273). A memo was also issued to the Station House Officer calling for his explanation.

                  The remand of the deceased Sampath Kumar was rejected and he was released on bail with self bond and on execution of solvent securities worth Rs.10,000/- with two sureties for like sum each.

6. The case of the petitioner was that the deceased Sampath Kumar was unable to produce the solvent securities, with a result that the police authorities kept him in their custody and was produced yet again before the Magistrate on 29.05.2024 at 6:50 PM.

                  A memo is stated to have been filed by Sampath Kumar requesting time for complying with the bail conditions.

                  The petitioners’ case further was that the learned Magistrate by virtue of the order, dated 29.05.2024, extended time, for a further period of two days.

                  It is thus stated that even on 29.05.2024, Sampath Kumar was in the custody of police at Hindupur and subsequently, it is stated that his body was discovered in the morning of 30.05.2024 and as per the narrative of the police authorities, he was murdered on 29.05.2024.

                  The case of the petitioner was that an investigation by CBI was necessary in the instant case, as the death of Sampath Kumar had occurred while he was still in police custody and that the petitioner was being falsely implicated in the case so registered.

                  The motive behind the killing of the deceased, Sampath Kumar, while in police custody is attributed to the fact that the police authorities were enraged by certain social media posts made by the deceased against police officers and their women folk.

7. The learned Single Judge called for the relevant record, including Case Diary and General Diary, maintained at Hindupur I Town Police Station from 10.05.2024 to 30.05.2024.

                  With a view to clear the air on whether the deceased was in police custody as on 29.05.2024 or out on Bail, the learned Single Judge referred to the statement of listed Witness No.6, that the deceased had attended a function at his house and had dinner along with one Clinton Moses at around 08.00 PM on 29.05.2024.

                  The learned Single Judge, on an examination of the docket order, dated 29.05.2024, came to a conclusion that the accused was present in the Court and was produced before the Court by his counsel, who had sought further time for complying with the bail conditions and therefore, returned a finding that the deceased was in fact set at liberty on 28.05.2024 itself.

8. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, Mr. K. S. Murthy, however sought to question the correctness of the order passed by the learned Single Judge by stating that till such time as the conditions for grant of bail, imposed by the learned Magistrate had not been complied with, the deceased would be deemed to be in the custody of the police.

                  It was also sought to be urged that production before the learned Magistrate on 29.05.2024 at 06:50 PM along with a memo filed, requesting for further time for complying with bail conditions, ought to be indicative of the fact that the production at that time of the hour before the learned Magistrate could have been possible only through the police and not otherwise.

9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the relevant record.

10. Learned counsel for the appellant suggests that the petitioner- appellant was being falsely implicated in the case, whereas, in fact, the death of Sampath Kumar, occurred while he was in police custody.

11. It is as can be seen from the record, that the Sampath Kumar, who was arraigned as accused No.4 in Crime No.88 of 2024, came to be arrested and produced before the learned Magistrate on 28.05.2024 and the learned Magistrate rejected the remand sought for by the police authorities on the ground that the offences alleged against the deceased were punishable below seven years and that no reasons had been mentioned in the remand report as to why Section 41-A Cr.P.C. was not complied with and notice not issued to the said Sampath Kumar(deceased).

                  Learned Magistrate also clearly recorded that the Apex Court Guidelines in Arnesh Kumar vs. State of Bihar, had been violated and therefore sought an explanation from the S.H.O. It further ordered the release of the accused Sampath Kumar with self-bond with solvent securities worth Rs.10,000/- with two sureties for the like sum each. Apart from this, the accused was directed to cooperate with the investigation whenever required by the IO.

12. From the record, it also appears that a memo was filed by the counsel for the said accused for grant of 24 hours time for satisfying the conditions of bail. This application was allowed on the same day by granting 24 hours time and the matter was then directed to be listed on 29.05.2024.

                  Another memo came to be filed by counsel for Sampath Kumar seeking two days’ time for production of sureties, on the ground that the revenue officials were unavailable, having been deputed for election duty, and that solvency certificates, thus, could not be prepared within the stipulated time. This prayer also came to be allowed by the learned Magistrate, by virtue of order, dated 29.05.2024. The learned Magistrate records as under:

                  “Accused A4 present and produced before me at 6:50 PM. Filed memo stating that the counsel for accused prays time for two days for production of sureties due to non-availability of issuing authority for obtaining counter signature as they are held in election duty. Solvency Certificates are not filed within the stipulated time. It is only bona fide but not intentional.

                  Hence, memo is allowed in the above circumstances as prayed for by the accused counsel.

                  Hence permitted.”

13. Mr. K. S. Murthy, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, would submit that the mere fact that the order passed by the learned Magistrate reflects that the accused had been produced before the Magistrate would necessarily imply that such production was effected only by the police authorities, as he continued to remain in custody.

14. We are, however, unable to persuade ourselves to accept that proposition, inasmuch as, if it was a case of Sampath Kumar still remaining in police custody, despite the order dated 28.05.2024, passed by the learned Magistrate, counsel for the Sampath Kumar would have certainly stated so, in clear terms, at least in the memo filed by the counsel on 29.05.2024.

                  The memo, on the other hand, contains no such averment and was merely an application seeking extension of time to comply with the conditions imposed for grant of bail. Moreover, the order dated 29.05.2024 also does not, anywhere, even remotely, suggest that the accused was produced in police custody.

                  The fact that the accused was present at 6:50 PM before the learned Magistrate would not suggest that the accused counsel could not have produced the accused before the learned Magistrate at 6:50 PM, when it is not uncommon for the learned Magistrates to be working overtime in the Court premises.

                  Had it been a case of the said accused being produced by the police authorities in custody, it would have certainly been observed so by the learned Magistrate in its order dated 29.05.2024. More so, when on 28.05.2024, the learned Magistrate had not only rejected the remand report but also sought explanation from the concerned police officer in regard to violation of Section 41-A of the Criminal Procedure Code.

15. It is settled principle of law that an aggrieved person can only claim that the offences he alleges be investigated properly, but has no right to claim that it be investigated by any particular agency of its choice. Reference in this regard can be made to the Apex Court judgment rendered in the case of Central Bureau of Investigation and another vs. Rajesh Gandhi and another((1996) 11 SCC 253).

                  Equally settled is the principle as held in State of West Bengal vs. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal((2010) 3 SCC 571) that while powers under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution of India were very wide, the same has to be exercised with great caution. The Apex Court Observed thus:

                  “70……In so far as the question of issuing a direction to the CBI to conduct investigation in a case is concerned, although no inflexible guidelines can be laid down to decide whether or not such power should be exercised but time and again it has been reiterated that such an order is not to be passed as a matter of routine or merely because a party has levelled some allegations against the local police. This extra-ordinary power must be exercised sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional situations where it becomes necessary to provide credibility and instil confidence in investigations or where the incident may have national and international ramifications or where such an order may be necessary for doing complete justice and enforcing the fundamental rights. Otherwise the CBI would be flooded with a large number of cases and with limited resources, may find it difficult to properly investigate even serious cases and in the process lose its credibility and purpose with unsatisfactory investigations.”

                  In Sanjiv Rajendra Bhatt v. Union of India((2016) 1 SCC 1), the Apex Court observed thus:

                  “67. …It is not for the petitioner to choose the investigating machinery as held by this Court in Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. [(2008) 2 SCC 409] thus :

                  “10. It has been held by this Court in CBI v. Rajesh Gandhi [(1996) 11 SCC 253](vide para 8) that no one can insist that an offence be investigated by a particular agency. We fully agree with the view in the aforesaid decision. An aggrieved person can only claim that the offence he alleges be investigated properly, but he has no right to claim that it be investigated by any particular agency of his choice.”

                  68. The accused has no right with reference to the manner of investigation or mode of prosecution. Similar is the law laid down by this Court in Union of India v. W.N. Chadha [1993 Supp (4) SCC 260], Mayawati v. Union of India [(2012) 8 SCC 106], Dinubhai Boghabhai Solanki v. State of Gujarat [(2014) 4 SCC 626], CBI v. Rajesh Gandhi [(1996) 11 SCC 253], Competition Commission of India v. SAIL [(2010) 10 SCC 744] and Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1991) 3 SCC 756] .”

                  The issue was yet again considered and reiterated in Romila Thapar and others v. Union of India and others((2018) 10 SCC 753). One of the questions framed for consideration by the Apex Court was whether the investigating agency could be changed at the behest of one of the accused. While placing reliance upon its own judgment in Narmada Bai v. State of Gujarat and others((2011) 5 SCC 79), the Apex Court held:

                  “23. After having given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions and upon perusing the pleadings and documents produced by both the sides, coupled with the fact that now four named accused have approached this Court and have asked for being transposed as writ petitioners, the following broad points may arise for our consideration:

                  23.1. (i) Should the investigating agency be changed at the behest of the named five accused?

                  23.2. (ii) If the answer to Point (i) is in the negative, can a prayer of the same nature be entertained at the behest of the next friend of the accused or in the garb of PIL?

                  23.3. (iii) If the answer to Questions (i) and/or (ii) above, is in the affirmative, have the petitioners made out a case for the relief of appointing Special Investigating Team or directing the court- monitored investigation by an independent investigating agency?

                  23.4. (iv) Can the accused person be released merely on the basis of the perception of his next friend (writ petitioners) that he is an innocent and law abiding person?

                  24. Turning to the first point, we are of the considered opinion that the issue is no more res integra. In Narmada Bai v. State of Gujarat [Narmada Bai v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 5 SCC 79], in para 64, this Court restated that it is trite law that the accused persons do not have a say in the matter of appointment of investigating agency. Further, the accused persons cannot choose as to which investigating agency must investigate the offence committed by them. Para 64 of this decision reads thus: (SCC p. 100)

                  “64. … It is trite law that the accused persons do not have a say in the matter of appointment of an investigating agency. The accused persons cannot choose as to which investigating agency must investigate the alleged offence committed by them.”(emphasis supplied)

16. The learned Single Judge has elaborately and succinctly dealt with and referred to the judgments on the subject, which were, in our opinion, squarely applicable to the facts of the present case.

17. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the facts of the present case, as also the law laid down, we are of the opinion that the view expressed by the learned Single Judge, warrants no interference.

18. The present Writ Appeal is found to be without merit and is accordingly dismissed.

No costs. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, in this case, shall stand closed.

 
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