1. By filing this writ petition, petitioner has prayed for setting aside the order dated 30.06.2011 (Annexure 7) passed in Departmental Proceeding No.26/2010 by respondent No.4 whereby and whereunder the petitioner has been dismissed from services. Petitioner has further prayed for setting aside the appellate order dated 29.10.2011 (Annexure 8) communicated by Memo No.1708 passed by respondent No.3, whereby the appeal preferred against the penalty order has been rejected by the appellate authority. Further, the petitioner has also prayed for a direction to the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service with all consequential benefits including back wages, as the petitioner has not been gainfully employed in any government service from the date of dismissal.
2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner contended that though there is a delay in filing the writ petition, but the delay can be condoned considering the fact that the petitioner has been dismissed from service. He contended that as no third party right has been created in this case, thus, delay cannot stand in the way of the petitioner in getting justice. On the merits of the case, learned counsel argued that there is no legal evidence to suggest that the petitioner is involved in handing over 160 rounds of bullets to Annex Rana as Annex Rana himself before the Departmental Enquiry Officer has denied the allegation that he had given 160 rounds of bullets to the petitioner. He has categorically stated that due to the pressure of the Post In-charge, he had implicated this petitioner and had recorded his earlier statement. In view of this specific statement in the Departmental Proceeding, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the respondents could not have punished the petitioner. He also submitted that the Enquiry Officer solely relied upon a statement in Departmental Proceeding No.24 of 2010, which was initiated against one Udesh Bagdas, which is absolutely illegal as the statement in a different Enquiry Proceeding cannot be used in the present proceeding, that too behind the back of the petitioner. He lastly argued that there are no materials against the petitioner in the Departmental Proceeding holding him guilty and his dismissal is perverse and needs to be set aside.
3. Respondents submitted that there is 10 years delay in approaching this Court. Dismissal order is dated 30.06.2011 and the appellate order is dated 29.10.2011. The petitioner slept for 10 years and has approached this Court by filing this writ petition only on 09.07.2021. The delay of 10 years is unexplained. He contended that 10 years is too long a period and after 10 years the matter cannot be reopened. On merits he contended that evidence was adduced and petitioner was found guilty. As per him, law of Evidence Act is not strictly applicable in a Departmental Proceeding. The guilt of the delinquent is based on preponderance of probability. Since the guilt has been proved, this Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India could not interfere with the order of punishment, when admittedly, there is no perversity in the findings of the Enquiry Officer and the punishment is also proportionate to the proved misconduct.
4. Petitioner is a constable posted in Jharkhand Armed Police I. The allegation against the petitioner is that while he was deputed in Raj Bhawan, on 08.05.2010, at about 08.00 hours, Hawaldar Krishna Bahadur Newar inspected the Firearms and Ammunitions. He found 180 rounds of bullets missing from the possession of Police Annex Rana. He found only one magazine filled with 20 bullets. On query Annex Rana stated that he had given those bullets to this petitioner. A preliminary enquiry was set up and after inspection, report was directed to be prepared. During enquiry, Deepesh Khetri recorded statement of Post in-Charge, Baldeo Sharki, Krishna Bahadur Newar, Wison Mall, Tapan Gurung, Sanjeev Kumar Chhetri. During enquiry, Annex Rana stated that Jawan of “I Company” gave his mobile to him and told him to communicate with this petitioner. He informed that this petitioner has taken some bullets from some police personnel, which had to be returned. Thereafter, petitioner’s wife came to petitioner’s post and had taken 160 bullets from Annex Rana. Annex Rana, when later demanded 160 bullets, this petitioner promised him to return, but he did not. Aforesaid is the sum and substance of the allegations against the petitioner.
5. Chargesheet dated 30.10.2001 was served upon the petitioner. As per the Chargesheet, following were the witnesses and documents, upon which the department relied : -
Exhibits:-
1. Report dated 13.05.2010 of Hav. 1120 Krishna Bahadur Nevar
2. Office Memo No.2059/Ra. Ka. dated 03.06.2010
3. Enquiry Report dated 18.06.2010 of Chief Inspector (Arms) Witnesses:-
1. Chief Inspector (Arms) Dipeshwar Khatri, JAP-1, Ranchi.
2. Sub Inspector (Arms) Baldeo Sarki, JAP-1, Camp Ranchi.
3. Hav. 1120 Krishna Bahadur Nevar, JAP-1, Camp Ranchi.
4. Police 27 Annex Rana, JAP-1, Camp Ranchi.
6. The petitioner denied the said allegation, thus, the Departmental Proceeding was initiated. Enquiry Officer, after recording the evidence, found the charges to be proved. Accordingly, the Enquiry Report was submitted. Second show cause notice was served to the petitioner along with Enquiry Report to which the petitioner had submitted his reply. After considering his reply, the petitioner was dismissed from service on 30.06.2011. Petitioner preferred an appeal, which also stood dismissed on 29.10.2011. Petitioner, thereafter, filed this writ petition in 2021.
7. Scope of interference in Departmental Proceeding in an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is very limited. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India versus P. Gunasekaran, reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 has held as under:
“12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether:
(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;
(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.”
8. It is well settled that High Courts cannot reappraise the evidence led in the Departmental Proceeding and the scope of interference in a Departmental Proceeding and the punishment imposed, as observed, is very limited. In the case of Union of India & Others versus Subrata Nath, reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1617, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated that the Courts ought to refrain from interfering with the findings of facts recorded in a Departmental Inquiry except in circumstances where such findings are grossly incompatible with the evidence on record and has held as under:-
“21. To sum up the legal position, being fact finding authorities, both the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority are vested with the exclusive power to examine the evidence forming part of the inquiry report. On finding the evidence to be adequate and reliable during the departmental inquiry, the Disciplinary Authority has the discretion to impose appropriate punishment on the delinquent employee keeping in mind the gravity of the misconduct. However, in exercise of powers of judicial review, the High Court or for that matter, the Tribunal cannot ordinarily reappreciate the evidence to arrive at its own conclusion in respect of the penalty imposed unless and until the punishment imposed is so disproportionate to the offence that it would shock the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal or is found to be flawed for other reasons, as enumerated in P. Gunasekaran (supra). If the punishment imposed on the delinquent employee is such that shocks the conscience of the High Court or the Tribunal, then the Disciplinary/Appellate Authority may be called upon to re-consider the penalty imposed. Only in exceptional circumstances, which need to be mentioned, should the High Court/Tribunal decide to impose appropriate punishment by itself, on offering cogent reasons therefor.”
9. Further, this Court does not sit as an Appellate Authority over the findings of the Disciplinary Authority while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan versus Bhupendra Singh, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1908 has held as under:
“23. The scope of examination and interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Constitution’) in a case of the present nature, is no longer res integra. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. S Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, a 3-Judge Bench stated:
‘7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant : it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.’”
10. This Court cannot also reappraise the evidence and arrive at a different conclusion. If the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority is based on some finding, even if there are other alternatives, this Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should not reverse the findings of the Disciplinary Authority.
11. In the instant case, I find that in the Departmental Proceeding, evidences were recorded against the petitioner. Witnesses have clearly stated that 160 rounds of bullets were given by Annex Rana to this petitioner. It is true that Annex Rana in Departmental Proceeding had denied the aforesaid fact, but the fact, which cannot be lost sight of is that in his statement he has stated that he had given his earlier statement under pressure and this petitioner has not taken any bullets (ammunitions) from him. From the statement, it is clear that Annex Rana had earlier given a statement implicating this petitioner, but in the Departmental Proceeding he had backtracked. Though he has stated that he was pressurized to give his earlier statement, but there is nothing in support of his statement. It is merely a bald statement to defend himself and to save the petitioner. The allegation against the petitioner is serious that he had taken 160 bullets from Annex Rana. The Disciplinary Authority also considered the aforesaid statement and the conduct of Annex Rana. The authority has also considered the statement in Departmental Proceeding No.24 of 2011, wherein, Annex Rana had clearly stated that this petitioner was threatening him of dire consequences and that is the reason why he backtracked in the Departmental Proceeding. This also clearly suggests the conduct of this petitioner.
12. It is well settled that even if the evidence in the Departmental Proceeding is not convincing, the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot go deep into the same and substitute its own decision. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Singh v. Khacheru, (2025) 3 SCC 266 while placing reliance on the case of Shamshad Ahmad versus Tilak Raj Bajaj, (2008) 9 SCC 1, held as under:
“18. The abovesaid proposition of law was reiterated in Shamshad Ahmad v. Tilak Raj Bajaj [Shamshad Ahmad v. Tilak Raj Bajaj, (2008) 9 SCC 1] , wherein it was observed that : (SCC pp. 10-11, para 38)
“38. Though powers of a High Court under Articles 226 and 227 are very wide and extensive over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, such powers must be exercised within the limits of law. The power is supervisory in nature. The High Court does not act as a court of appeal or a court of error. It can neither review nor reappreciate, nor reweigh the evidence upon which determination of a subordinate court or inferior tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of fact or even of law and to substitute its own decision for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The powers are required to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts and inferior tribunals within the limits of law.””
13. After considering all the relevant materials, the respondents have dismissed the petitioner from service. The Appellate Authority has also considered these aspects and has affirmed the findings and the punishment order passed by the Disciplinary Authority.
14. The punishment, which has been imposed in this case is dismissal, which cannot be said to be disproportionate to the proved misconduct. Proved misconduct is of illegally taking 160 rounds of bullets, which is very grave. Since the said misconduct is proved, the punishment of dismissal from service commensurate with the said proved misconduct.
15. It was also argued by the counsel for the petitioner that his previous conduct cannot be a ground of charge in the instant case as for such charge petitioner has already been punished. After going through the records, I find that the said argument of the petitioner is not correct inasmuch as the earlier misconducts were considered in this proceeding only for awarding punishment in this case. It is pertinent to mention herein that the petitioner was appointed in 2001 and was removed in 2011 and during this tenure of 10 years, he was awarded 8 major punishments and 3 minor punishments. In 2010, itself, he was awarded 4 major punishments, which includes taking money from others in the name of giving employment in police force. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab versus C. Satpal Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1848 has held that previous misconduct can very well be considered for the purpose of deciding the quantum of punishment. At paragraph 24 of C. Satpal Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while taking note of earlier decisions in the cases of Union of India versus Bishamber Das Dogra [(2009) 13 SCC 102] and State of Mysore versus K. Manche Gowda [1963 SCC OnLine SC 50], has quoted the observations as under: -
“24. This Court in Bishamber Das Dogra's case (supra), has examined a similar issue and, after taking into consideration the judgment of this Court rendered in K. Manche Gowda's case (supra) held as under:—
“24. In State of Mysore v. K. Manche Gowda, this Court held that the disciplinary authority should inform the delinquent employee that it is likely to take into consideration the past conduct of the employee while imposing the punishment unless the proved charge against the delinquent is so grave that it may independently warrant the proposed punishment. Though his previous record may not be the subject-matter of the charge at the first instance.
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30. In view of the above, it is evident that it is desirable that the delinquent employee may be informed by the disciplinary authority that his past conduct would be taken into consideration while imposing the punishment. But in case of misconduct of grave nature or indiscipline, even in the absence of statutory rules, the authority may take into consideration the indisputable past conduct/service record of the employee for adding the weight to the decision of imposing the punishment if the facts of the case so require.”
16. So far as ground of delay is concerned, I find that punishment order was passed on 30.06.2011 and the appellate order was passed on 29.10.2011. Petitioner has approached this Court by filing this writ petition in 2021. Petitioner did not take any steps for about 10 years. He conveniently slept over the matter and challenged this order belatedly. Even if it does not create any third party right, it will lead to the conclusion that he had accepted the same for these 10 years. The petitioner cannot be allowed to wake up one fine morning and approach this Court challenging an order, which was passed 10 years ago. Ten years is too long a time, even if no third party right is created.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case Mrinmoy Maity versus Chhanda Koley, (2024) 15 SCC 215 has held as under:
“9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that the writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words the writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or laches is one of the factors which should be borne in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action.”
16. Further, there is no whisper in the writ petition explaining this long inordinate delay of 10 years. Thus, on this ground also I am not inclined to entertain this writ petition. This writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
Pending interlocutory applications, if any, stand disposed of.
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