(Prayer: Appeal under section ------ against orderspleased to set aside the decree and judgment passed in A.S.No.44/2015, dt. 26-09-2019 on the file of VII Additional District and Sessions Judge, Vijayawada in which the judgement and decree passed in O.S. No. 76/2012 of the file of the Second Additional Senior Civil Judge, Vijayawada was set aside and with costs and pass

IA NO: 1 OF 2020

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased pleased to Condone delay of 46 days in preferring this second appeal against judgment and decree made in A.S.No.44/2015 on the file of VII Additional District and Session Judge, Vijayawada dated 26-09-2019, in which judgment and decree passed in OS.No.76/2012 on the file of II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Vijayawada was confirmed including the execution in EP.No.7 of 2020, pending disposal of Second Appeal and pass

IA NO: 2 OF 2020

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased pleased to grant stay of all further proceedings vide judgment and decree made in A.S.No.44/2015 on the file of VII Additional District and Session Judge, Vijayawada dated 26-09-2019, in which judgment and decree passed in OS.No.76/2012 on the file of II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Vijayawada was confirmed including the execution in EP.No.7 of 2020, pending disposal of Second Appeal and pass

IA NO: 3 OF 2020

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to treat the matter as urgent and post the matter before the concerned court tomorrow in the interest of justice.

IA NO: 1 OF 2024

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased be pleased to expedite and fix an early date for hearing of the above SA.No. 91 of 2020 and to pass)

1. The defendants in the suit filed the above second appeal, aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 26.09.2019 in A.S.No.44 of 2015 on the file of learned VII Additional District and Sessions Judge, Vijayawada reversing the judgment and decree dated 20.08.2014 in O.S.No.76 of 2012 on the file of learned Second Additional Senior Civil Judge, Vijayawada.

2. For the sake of convenience and brevity, the parties herein are referred to as per their array in the suit O.S.No.76 of 2012.

3. The plaintiff filed O.S.No.76 of 2012, claiming compensation of Rs.3,40,000/- due to the death of her husband on 21.05.2011 because of contact with live electricity supply wire at Kotikalapudi Village, Ibrahimpatnam Mandal, Krishna District.

4. The averments in the plaint, in brief, are that the plaintiff’s husband, Shaik Sikinder, an agricultural labourer, went to the fields of Velgaleti Pothuraju at about 7:00 a.m. on the fateful day, to cut grass, and did not turn up. Since the plaintiff’s husband did not return, she went to the fields at about 10:30 a.m. and found her husband lying dorsally and dead due to electrocution. On hearing the cries of the plaintiff, the neighbours gathered at the spot. The junior lineman, B. Raju came to the spot and switched off the supply.

                  b) The plaintiff immediately informed the same to the Station House Officer, Ibrahimpatnam. Police registered a case in crime No.205 of 2011, for the offence punishable under Section 174 I.P.C. During the course of their investigation, an inquest was held, and thereafter postmortem was conducted. Postmortem report issued by the Government General Hospital reveals that the cause of death of the deceased was due to electrical shock.

                  c) Due to the negligence in the transformation and maintenance of live wires, a live wire had fallen in the fields and ultimately caused the sudden death of the deceased.

                  d) The deceased was earning Rs.15,000/- per month. The deceased left the plaintiff and two unmarried daughters, behind him. Despite several requests, the defendants 1 and 2 failed to pay the compensation. Hence, the plaintiff got issued a legal notice, dated 16.07.2011, to the defendants and thereafter filed the suit.

5. A written statement was filed on behalf of defendant No.1. It was contended that there was a heavy gale and rain on the night of 20.05.2011 due to which the electric wire might have snapped/cut and fallen in the fields of Potharaju, and the deceased might have come into contact with it. There was no complaint or information regarding the snapping of the wire. After receiving the death information, the staff immediately rushed to the spot and rectified the same. The department maintains the electrical lines in good condition, and they are being checked regularly. The snapping of the wire was due to a heavy gale coupled with rain, which is an unforeseen circumstance, but not due to the lack of maintenance. The said act cannot be attributed to the department. The live wire is also thick, in black colour and visible from a distance of 10 to 15 feet. The plaintiff’s husband trespassed into the fields of Pothuraju, and hence, the plaintiff is not entitled to compensation. Eventually prayed to dismiss the suit.

6. The trial Court, based on the pleadings, framed five issues. During the trial, the plaintiff herself was examined as PW1 and examined PW2. Exs.A1 to A6 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, lineman G. Raju was examined as D.W.1. However, no documents were marked on their behalf.

7. The Trial Court framed a specific issue, on the defence of the defendant, regarding the plaintiff’s husband trespassing into the fields of Pothuraju, and held the issue against the defendants.

8. The trial Court, by judgment and decree dated 20.08.2014, dismissed the suit, concluding that the incident had taken place due to the act of God, for which the defendants are not liable and held that there is no negligence on the part of the defendants. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff filed A.S.No.44 of 2015 on the file of the learned VII Additional District and Sessions Judge, Vijayawada.

9. The appellate Court being the final fact finding Court framed points for consideration as mandated under Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (C.P.C.), allowed the appeal, decreed the suit, and awarded a compensation of Rs.3,40,000/- along with simple interest at 6% per annum from the date of filing of the suit till the date of realization. Aggrieved by the same, the defendants filed the above second appeal.

10. The above second appeal was filed on 10.02.2020 with a delay of 46 days, and the delay was condoned on 11.08.2020. Thereafter, the second appeal underwent five to six adjournments. On 20.01.2021, learned counsel for the appellants/defendants submitted that the amount was deposited to the credit of the execution petition filed by the respondent/plaintiff. A coordinate Bench of this Court directed the appellants/defendants to file an affidavit to that effect and adjourned the matter. Thereafter, the second appeal underwent two or three adjournments and was finally admitted on 25.02.2021 by recording that an amount of Rs.5,08,453/- was deposited to the credit of the execution petition filed by the plaintiff. A Coordinate Bench of this Court framed the following substantial question of law:

                  “Whether the appreciation and findings of the appellate Court in reversing the judgment and decree of the trial Court is perverse?”

11. Heard Sri Abdul Hameed, learned counsel representing Sri V.V. Satish, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri Solomon Raju, learned counsel representing Sri Syed Ziauddin, learned counsel for the respondent.

12. Learned counsel for the appellants would contend that there is no negligence on the part of the appellants in maintaining the live wires, and only due to the heavy gale and rain, the wire snapped and fell in the fields of Potharaju. The plaintiff’s husband trespassed into the fields of Potharaju and came into contact with the wire, resulting in his death. He would submit that there is a discrepancy regarding the death of the plaintiff’s husband. However, the same was not properly considered by the appellate Court. Learned counsel would further submit that the appellate Court failed to consider these aspects.

13. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent would contend that in para No.3 of the plaint, it was stated that the plaintiff’s husband died at about 10:30 a.m. on 21.05.2011 due to contact with live electricity wire at Kotikalapudi Village, Ibrahimpatnam Mandal, Krishna District. Mentioning the date as 04.05.2011 in para 4 of the plaint is a typographical error. The appellate Court considered all these aspects and allowed the appeal. Learned counsel would submit that there is no substantial question of law and prayed to dismiss the second appeal. Learned counsel relied upon Nirmala Thirunavukkarasu v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board(1984 ACJ 210 (Madras)) and R. Pareetha Beevi v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board((2014) 0 Supreme 1022).

14. Based on the pleadings and contentions, apart from the substantial question of law framed at the time of admission, referred to supra, the following substantial questions of law would arise for consideration:

                  1. Whether the death of Shaik Sikinder, husband of the respondent/plaintiff, did not occur due to the negligence of the defendants in maintaining the electrical wires?

                  2. Whether the defendants followed the procedure mandated under Regulation 73 of the Central Electricity Authority (Measures Relating to Safety and Electric Supply) Regulations, 2010, framed by virtue of Section 177 of the Electricity Act, 2003?

15. The undisputed facts, as seen from the pleadings, oral and documentary evidence, are that on 21.05.2011 at about 7:30 am, the husband of the plaintiff went to the fields to cut grass. When the husband failed to return, the plaintiff went to the fields and found her husband had fallen dorsally and died due to contact with a live electricity wire.

16. Whether mentioning the date of the death as 04.05.2011, instead of 21.05.2011 in the plaint is a typographical mistake or the mistake of the advocate?

17. In para 3 of the plaint, it was stated that the husband of the plaintiff died on 21.05.2011. Whereas in para 4 of the plaint, it was mentioned that the plaintiff’s husband went to the fields on 04.05.2011, at about 7:00 a.m., and thereafter he died. In fact, in the same para, it was also mentioned that F.I.R. was registered on 21.05.2011, and the documents filed along with the plaint demonstrate that the death of the deceased occurred on 21.05.2011.

18. The mention of the date of the death as 04.05.2011 in para 4 of the plaint is due to a typographical error, and the same was infact appreciated by the appellate Court. The certified copy of F.I.R. also discloses the date of registration of the crime as 21.05.2011. Inquest report, postmortem and death certificate, Exs.A3, A4 and A5 respectively demonstrate that the death of the plaintiff’s husband occurred on 21.05.2011 due to electrocution. While appreciating the said fact, the appellate Court concluded that the wrong mentioning of the date reflects the negligence of the Advocate, who issued the legal notice, Ex.A2 and drafted the plaint as well as the affidavit in lieu of chief examination.

19. It is a settled principle of law that for the fault of the Advocate, the party should not be the sufferer. In Rafiq and Another vs. Munshilal and Another(AIR 1981 SC 1400), the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows:

                  “What is the fault of the party who having done everything in his power and expected of him would suffer because of the default of his advocate. If we reject this appeal, as Mr.A.K. Sanghi invited us to do, the only one who would suffer would not be the lawyer who did not appear but the party whose interest he represented. The problem that agitates us is whether it is proper that the party should suffer for the inaction, deliberate omission, or misdemeanor of his agent. The answer obviously is in the negative. May be that the learned advocate absented himself deliberately or intentionally.”

20. In the case at hand, as noted supra, in para 3 of the plaint, it was specifically mentioned as follows:

                  “It is humbly submitted that the plaintiff is the wife of the deceased Shaik Sikinder, aged 56 years, who died on 21.05.2011 at about 10:30 hours due to contact with live electric supply wire at Kotikalapudi village. The defendant Nos.1 and 2 are representing the company supplying electricity to the various places through wires.”

21. It is also an undisputed fact that the plaintiff is marks woman. She submitted all the relevant documents to the Advocate, and the Advocate prepared the plaint. He is the same advocate who issued a legal notice prior to the filing of the suit. Applying the analogy in Rafiq’s case, this Court is also of the considered view that mentioning the date as 04.05.2011, instead of 21.05.2011, is a typographical error and it will not defeat the case of the plaintiff. The appellate court recorded a finding of fact after appreciation of the entire evidence on record in a proper perspective, which in the considered opinion of this court, is neither perverse nor without any substance.

22. Regarding the contention of the appellants that there is no negligence on their part, it is apt to have a look at Rule 91 of the Indian Electricity Rules, 1956, which provides that every overhead line, which is not being covered with insulating material and erected over any part of street or other public place or in factory or mine or any other consumers’ premises, shall be protected with a device approved by the Inspector for rendering the line electrically harmless in case it breaks.

23. The Indian Electricity Rules, 1956, were framed in exercise of powers conferred under Section 37 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910. Thereafter, the Electricity Act, 2003 was promulgated, and the said Act came into force on 10.06.2003. As per Section 185 of the Indian Electricity Act, 2003, the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (9 of 1910), the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and the Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act, 1998 are repealed. Section 185(2)(c), which is relevant, is extracted hereunder:

                  “The Indian Electricity Rules, 1956 made under section 37 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (9 of 1910) as it stood before such repeal shall continue to be in force till the regulations under section 53 of this Act are made.”

24. Thereafter, the Regulations, 2010 were framed and gazetted on 20.09.2010. Regulation 73(1) of the Regulations is in pari materia with Rule 91 of the Electricity Rules, 1956. For better appreciation, Regulation 73 is extracted hereunder:

                  “73. Safety and protective devices.-

                  (1) Every overhead line which is not being suspended from a dead bearer wire, not being covered with insulating material and not being a trolley-wire, is erected over any part of a street or other public place or in any factory or mine or on any consumer's premises shall be protected with earth gaurding for rendering the line electrically harmless in case it breaks.

                  (2) An Electrical Inspector may, by notice in writing, require the owner of any such overhead line, wherever it may be erected, to protect it in the manner specified in sub-regulation (1).

                  (3) -------

25. While considering Rule 91 of the Rules, where death occurred due to electrocution, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board vs. Sahil Kumari and Ors.( AIR 2002 SC 551), held as under:

                  7. It is an admitted fact that the responsibility to supply electric energy in the particular locality was statutorily conferred on the Board. If the energy so transmitted causes injury or death of a human being, who gets unknowingly trapped into it the primary liability to compensate the sufferer is that of the supplier of the electric energy. So long as the voltage of electricity transmitted through the wires is potentially of dangerous dimension the managers of its supply have the added duty to take all safety measures to prevent escape of such energy or to see that the wire snapped would not remain live on the road as users of such road would be under peril. It is no defence on the part of the management of the Board that somebody committed mischief by siphoning such energy to his private property and that the electrocution was from such diverted line. It is the lookout of the managers of the supply system to prevent such pilferage by installing necessary devices. At any rate, if any live wire got snapped and fell on the public road the electric current thereon should automatically have been disrupted. Authorities manning such dangerous commodities have extra duty to chalk out measures to prevent such mishaps.

                  8. Even assuming that all such measures have been adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is liable under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any other person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertakings. The basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. The liability cast on such person is known, in law, as “strict liability”. It differs from the liability which arises on account of the negligence or fault in this way i.e. the concept of negligence comprehends that the foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking reasonable precautions. If the defendant did all that which could be done for avoiding the harm he cannot be held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed. But such consideration is not relevant in cases of strict liability where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions.

26. The requirements of tort or negligence have been summarised in Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, 15th Edn., 1982, Sweet and Maxwell, which is extracted hereunder:

                  "The tort is committed when damage, which is not too remote, is caused by the breach of a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. In traditional terminology the ingredients of liability are a duty of care, breach and damage; but for reasons that will become apparent, each of these terms is so ambiguous that unnecessary confusion results. Between them they yield an irreducible minimum of six requirements namely,

                  (i) the existence in law of a duty of care situation, i.e. one in which the law attaches liability to carelessness. There has to be recognition by lay that the careless infliction of the kind of damage in suit on the type of person to which the plaintiff belongs by the type of person to which the defendant belongs is actionable .... (2) Careless behaviour by the defendant, i.e. it failed to measure up to the standard and scope set by law. (3) Foreseeabilty that such conduct would have inflicted damage on the plaintiff and of the kind of which he complains. (This is what is implied in the statement that the duty of care has to be "owed" to the plaintiff). (4) A causal connection between the defendant's carelessness and the damage. When these four requirements are satisfied, the defendant is liable in negligence. The and only then do the next two considerations arise, namely, (5) The extent of the damage attributable to the defendant; and (6) The monetary estimate of that extent of damage. There is no magic in the order as set out, nor should it be supposed that Courts proceed from points (1) to (6) in sequence."

27. In Nirmala Thirunavukkarasu v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (referred to supra), it was held as under:

                  "overhead electric wires carrying heavy load of electric energy are highly dangerous and if any human being or animal comes into contact with the same, the consequences are fatal. Hence, great care and caution are expected of the Electricity Board in laying, installing and maintaining overhead wires and generally these wires do not snap and fall down. If therefore, such a thing happens, a prima facie inference can be drawn that there has been carelessness or negligence on the part of the Electricity Board in transmitting electric energy or in maintaining the transmission lines. The Electricity Board has also to take precaution against dangers of live wires snapping and falling down under unforeseen circumstances, by providing for automatic disconnection of supply of electric energy".

28. In fact, the learned Single Judge of Madras High Court in R. Pareetha Beevi v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (referred to supra), awarded compensation to the petitioners therein since their father died due to electrocution. It was observed as follows, regarding the quantum of compensation:

                  10. There is no codified law for arriving at the quantum of compensation in cases of this type. The enactments like Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Workmen Compensation Act, 1948; and Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 may be applied for arriving at the just compensation. In the decision reported in C.K. Subramania Iyer and Others Vs. T. Kunhikuttan Nair and Others, the Supreme Court held that there is no exact uniform rule for measuring the value of human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at precisely. In the decision reported in M.S. Grewal and Another Vs. Deep Chand Sood and Others, the Supreme Court held that multiplier method may be adopted to arrive at the just compensation. The age of the deceased can also be taken for arriving at a correct multiplier as per the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in P.S. Somanathan and Others Vs. District Insurance Officer and Another.

                  11. How the Court should decide the cases of this nature is emphasised by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Ibrahim Vs. Raju and Others. In para. 9 it is held thus, "9. This Court has time and again emphasised that the officers, who preside over the Tribunals adopt a proactive approach and ensure that the claims filed under the Act are disposed of with required urgency and compensation is awarded to the victims of the accident and/or their legal representatives in adequate measure keeping in view the relevant factors. Unfortunately, despite repeated pronouncements of this Court in which guiding principles have been laid down for determination of the compensation payable to the victims of road accidents and/or their families, the Tribunals and even the High Courts do not pay serious attention to the imperative of awarding just compensation to the claimants."

29. In the case at hand, even going by the version of the defendants, due to the gale and heavy rain, the wire snapped. However, the precautions mandated under Rule 91 of the Rules, 1956 or Regulation 73 of the Regulations were not adhered to. In fact, after the occurrence of the death, the lineman came to the spot and switched off the power supply. Thus, this court holds that the appellant is negligent in maintaining the lines, which resulted in the death of the husband of the respondent. The appellant also failed to adhere to the regulations. The appellate Court also applied the strict liability and held that the appellants/defendants must pay compensation. Thus, the compensation awarded by the appellate Court is proper, and this Court does not find any irregularity or illegality. In fact, the appellate Court applied strict liability and awarded compensation.

30. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Shail Kumari’s case held as under:

                  9. The doctrine of strict liability has its origin in English common law when it was propounded in the celebrated case of Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) 3 HL 330 : (1861-73) All ER Rep 1] . Blackburn, J., the author of the said rule had observed thus in the said decision: (All ER p. 7E-F)

                  “The true rule of law is that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land, and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril, and, if he does not do so, he is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.”

                  10. There are seven exceptions formulated by means of case-law to the doctrine of strict liability. It is unnecessary to enumerate those exceptions barring one which is this: “Act of stranger i.e. if the escape was caused by the unforeseeable act of a stranger, the rule does not apply.” (Vide p. 535, Winfield on Tort, 15th Edn.)

                  11. The rule of strict liability has been approved and followed in many subsequent decisions in England. A recent decision in recognition of the said doctrine is rendered by the House of Lords in Cambridge Water Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Counties Leather plc. [(1994) 1 All ER 53 (HL)] The said principle gained approval in India, and decisions of the High Courts are a legion to that effect. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India [(1990) 1 SCC 613] and a Division Bench in Gujarat SRTC v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai [(1987) 3 SCC 234 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 482] had followed with approval the principle in Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) 3 HL 330 : (1861-73) All ER Rep 1] . By referring to the above two decisions a two-Judge Bench of this Court has reiterated the same principle in Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. [(2001) 2 SCC 9 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 268]

                  12. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India [(1987) 1 SCC 395 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 37] this Court has gone even beyond the rule of strict liability by holding that: (SCC p. 421, para 31)

                  Where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm is caused on anyone on account of the accident in the operation of such activity, the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate those who are affected by the accident; such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions to the principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) 3 HL 330 : (1861-73) All ER Rep 1] .

31. The compensation awarded in these cases must be just compensation. This Court is conscious that the compensation required to be determined is just, and the same should not be a windfall; unjust enrichment should be discouraged. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the compensation awarded by the appellate Court due to the death of the plaintiff’s husband is just.

32. Dealing with the scope of Section 100 of CPC, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Chandrabhan Vs. Saraswati((2022) 20 SCC 199 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1273), considered the scope of Section100 CPC and held thus:

32. The principles relating to Section 100CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus:

                  32.1. ---

                  32.2. The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents and involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law.

                  32.3. The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere with findings of facts arrived at by the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to “decision based on no evidence”, it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.”

33. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Jaichand (Dead) through LRs and Others Vs. Sahnulal and Another(2024 SCC OnLine SC 3864), considered the scope of Section100 CPC and held thus:

                  24. In Navaneethammal v. Arjuna Chetty, (1996) 6 SCC 166 : AIR 1996 SC 3521, it was held by this Court that the High Court should not reappreciate the evidence to reach another possible view in order to set aside the findings of fact arrived at by the first appellate Court.

                  25. In Kshitisn Chandra Purkait v. Santhosh Kumar Purkait, (1997) 5 SCC 438), this Court held that in the Second Appeal, the High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law and not mere question of law.

                  26. In Dnyanoba Bhaurao Shemade v. Maroti Bhaurao Marnor, (1999) 2 SCC 471, this Court held:—

                  “Keeping in view the amendment made in 1976, the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Section 100, CPC only on the basis of substantial questions of law which are to be framed at the time of admission of the Second Appeal and the Second Appeal has to be heard and decided only on the basis of such duly framed substantial questions of law. A judgment rendered by the High Court under Section 100 CPC without following the aforesaid procedure cannot be sustained.”

                  27. This Court in Kondira Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, (1999) 3 SCC 722 : AIR 1999 SC 2213 held:—

                  “The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first appellate Court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate Court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence.”

                  28. It is thus clear that under Section 100, CPC, the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the first Appellate Court which is the final Court of facts except in such cases where such findings were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law, or its settled position on the basis of the pronouncement made by the Apex Court or based upon inadmissible evidence or without evidence.

34. A conspectus of judgments referred to supra on the scope of interference by the High Court in second appeal, this Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of CPC, must confine itself to the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. This Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and interfere with the concurrent findings of the Court below, where the Courts below have exercised the discretion judicially. Further, the existence of a substantial question of law is the sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction. This Court cannot substantiate its own opinion unless the finding of the Court is manifestly perverse and contrary to the evidence on record. If the findings are based on inadmissible evidence or failure to consider relevant evidence High Court, under Section 100 of CPC can interfere.

35. However, in the case at hand, the findings of fact recorded by the appellate Court, being the final fact-finding Court, are based on an appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, and it does not call for any interference of this Court as per Section 100 of CPC. This Court finds no question of law, much less substantial questions of law, involved in the present second appeal. Hence, the second appeal fails and is liable to be dismissed.

36. Accordingly, the Second Appeal is Dismissed No order as to costs.

As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.