Common Order:

1. Crl.P.No.12048/2025 is filed by the Accused No.3 in Crime No.21 of 2024 on the file of CID Police Station, Mangalagiri, seeking anticipatory bail. I.A.No.1 of 2025 has been filed under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023(for short ‘BNSS’), by the Implead Petitioner/ Proposed Respondent/ Accused No.38, seeking to implead him in Criminal Petition No.12048 of 2025 as Respondent No.3. I.A.S.R.No.96274 of 2025 has been filed under Section 528 of BNSS, by the Implead Petitioner/Intervener seeking to implead him in Criminal Petition No. 12048 of 2025 as Respondent No.4.

Arguments advanced at the Bar:

2. Heard Sri Siddhartha Dave, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri T.M.K.Chaitanya and Ms.Tanisha Kaushal, learned counsel for the Implead Petitioner/Accused No.38 and Sri P. Veera Reddy, learned Senior counsel assisted by Sri P. Sashidhar Reddy, learned counsel for the Implead Petitioner/ Intervener; Sri K. Parameshwar, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Jithendra Palyam, learned counsel for Respondent/Accused No.3 and Sri Posani Venkateswarlu, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri M. Lakshmi Narayana, learned Public Prosecutor for State.

On behalf of Implead Petitioner/Accused No.38:

3. Sri Siddhartha Dave, learned Senior Counsel for the implead petitioner (Accused No.38 in Crime No.21 of 2024 on the file of CID Police Station, Mangalagiri), submitted that the Accused No.3 has not been arrested to date and has been granted undue concession to secure his ill-gotten properties. He contends that Accused Nos.,2 and 3, both public servants, are the principal accused in the alleged offences and were actively involved in handling proceeds of crime amounting to hundreds of crores of rupees, which is within the knowledge of the Special Investigation Team. It is argued that despite their central role in these serious economic offences, Accused Nos.2 and 3 have neither been arrested nor subjected to custodial interrogation, reflecting a biased investigation and selective prosecution.

4. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the petitioner/Accused No.3, an accomplice in the crime, has made inculpatory statements to falsely implicate innocent co-accused, and that the Investigating Agency is attempting to extract non-existent information to frame them. It is also submitted that Accused No.3 filed a petition before the trial Court seeking tender of pardon under Section 306 Cr.P.C., which was returned on the ground that such a petition cannot be filed by an accused who is not in custody. Finally, it is contended that if Accused No.3 is made an approver and released, there is a likelihood of tampering with evidence and influencing co-accused. The implead petitioner is therefore a proper and necessary party whose presence is required to ensure complete justice.

On behalf of the Implead Petitioner / Intervener:

5. Sri P. Veera Reddy, learned Senior Counsel would submit that, being a citizen of India and resident of State of Andhra Pradesh, implead petitioner herein is genuinely concerned about alleged connivance of the Investigating Officer with Accused Nos.2 and 3. It is further submitted that, though the implead petitioner has no personal interest or vengeance against the Accused, being part of the society and to keep the society vigilant, and to ensure that the real perpetrators are brought before the law of justice, he may be impleaded as a party to the present petition. In support of his contentions, learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Dharamaraj v. Shanmugam and others((2022) 15 SCC 136) and Amanullah and another v. State of Bihar and others.( (2016) 6 SCC 699) He also submitted that these judgments do not directly relate to the subject on hand.

On behalf of the Accused No.3

6. Sri K. Parameshwar, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of Accused No.3 submitted that Accused Nos.,2 and 3 cooperated with the investigation and their statements under Sections 180 and 183 of BNSS have also been recorded. He further argued that the present applications seeking impleadment in the anticipatory bail petition ought to be dismissed on the ground that these applicants do not have the requisite locus standi in the present proceedings. He further submitted that the present applications for impleadment are patently collusive, amount to a fraud on the Court, and have been filed with the intent to frustrate the present proceedings. The judgments relied on by the Implead Petitioners are not apposite to the issue in question. In support of his contentions, learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjai Tiwari v. State of U.P.,( (2021) 15 SCC 660) Subrata Roy Sahara v. Pramod Kumar Saini((2022) SCC OnLine SC 2033) and the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Sachin Kumar Saraf v. State.( (2009) SCC OnLine Del 2376)

On behalf of the State:

7. Sri Posani Venkateswarlu, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State submitted that the present impleadment applications are motivated and lack bona fides, particularly when the State itself is actively contesting the anticipatory bail petitions. It was contended that once the prosecution is diligently opposing the relief sought, there is no occasion for third parties or co-accused to intervene. It was further submitted that while victimology has witnessed significant evolution in the recent years, conferring certain participatory rights upon victims, such rights are not available to third parties or co-accused. In the present case, the charge sheet has already been filed, and therefore the apprehension of prejudice is unfounded. Even under the BNSS framework, statutory notices and participatory rights are contemplated for the victim, and not for co-accused or unrelated third parties.

Point for Determination

8. This Court has carefully considered the rival submissions and perused the material placed on record. Now, the point that arises for determination is:

                  Whether a co-accused and a third party have the locus standi to seek impleadment and oppose an application for anticipatory bail filed by another accused?

Determination by the Court

9. Crime No.21 of 2024 was registered on 23.09.2024 on the file of C.I.D. Police Station, Mangalagiri, pursuant to a memo issued by Principal Secretary, Revenue (Excise) Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh, enclosing an internal enquiry report styled as “Report on Liquor Procurement and Market Manipulation (2019–2024).” The said report pertains to alleged irregularities in liquor procurement by Andhra Pradesh State Beverages Corporation Limited during the period October 2019 to March 2024. Accused Nos., 2 and 3, who were senior public servants holding responsible positions during the relevant period, have been arrayed as accused in the said crime.

10. The applications filed by Accused Nos.,2 and 3 before the learned Special Judge for SPE & ACB Cases, Vijayawada, seeking anticipatory bail were rejected. Aggrieved thereby, they filed separate petitions before this Court seeking anticipatory bail. It has been brought to the notice of this Court that Accused No.2 has since been arrested; therefore, the petition filed by him has become infructuous and it is dismissed noting the same. In this context, in these Criminal Petitions, two impleadment applications have been filed, one by a co-accused (Accused No.38) and another by a third party claiming to be a citizen of India and the State of Andhra Pradesh.

11. The short question as has been stated is with regard to the involvement of a third party or a co-accused in anticipatory bail proceedings of a co- accused. It is relevant to refer to a few precedents on this aspect.

12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjai Tiwari (supra), while referring to Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary((1993) 1 SCC 756), reiterated that third parties have no locus standi to intervene in criminal proceedings. It was held that even if numerous questions of law arise, it is for the accused alone to raise such issues before the appropriate forum, and not for third parties under the guise of public interest litigation. It was categorically observed that a person unconnected with criminal proceedings cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to seek relief in respect of such proceedings. For ready reference, relevant portions are extracted hereunder:

                  “11. It is well settled that criminal trial where offences involved are under the Prevention of Corruption Act have to be conducted and concluded at the earliest since the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act are offences which affect not only the accused but the entire society and administration. It is also well settled that the High Court in appropriate cases can very well under Section 482 CrPC or in any other proceeding can always direct the trial court to expedite the criminal trial and issue such order as may be necessary. But the present is a case where proceeding initiated by Respondent 2 does not appear to be a bona fide proceeding. Respondent 2 is in no way connected with initiation of criminal proceeding against the appellant. Respondent 2 in the application under Section 482 CrPC in para 6 has described him as a social activist and an advocate.

                  12. An application by a person who is in no way connected with the criminal proceeding or criminal trial under Section 482 CrPC cannot ordinarily be entertained by the High Court. A criminal trial of an accused is conducted in accordance with procedure as prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Code. It is the obligation of the State and the prosecution to ensure that all criminal trials are conducted expeditiously so that justice can be delivered to the accused if found guilty. The present is not a case where prosecution or even the employer of the accused have filed an application either before the trial court or in any other court seeking direction as prayed by Respondent 2 in his application under Section 482 CrPC.

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                  15. This Court in [Janata Dal vs. H.S. Chowdhury] laid down that it is for the parties in the criminal case to raise all the questions and challenge the proceedings initiated against them at appropriate time before the proper forum and not for third parties under the grab of public interest litigants.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

13. Moreover, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Subrata Roy Sahara (supra) held that proceedings under Section 438 Cr.P.C. are confined to the case of the applicant seeking anticipatory bail and must be limited to facts relevant to such applicant. The Hon’ble Supreme Court categorically observed that it is not open to the High Court to add or issue directions concerning third parties, as if exercising powers under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was held that third parties, who are neither necessary nor proper parties, cannot be impleaded in anticipatory bail proceedings, and any observations made in relation to such unrelated parties are liable to be effaced from the record. Relevant paras read as follows;

                  "5. Needless to observe that the application under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is limited to the cause of the concerned applicant, applying for grant of anticipatory bail in connection with offence already registered against him and apprehending his arrest in connection with such a case for extraneous reasons or otherwise. In such proceedings, the inquiry must be limited to the facts relevant and applicable to the concerned applicant who has come before the Court. No attempt should be made to inquire into matters pertaining to some third party much less beyond the scope of the complaint/FIR in question.

                  *****

                  12. Such a plea, if accepted, is fraught with the danger of allowing Sessions Court/High Court to transcend beyond the scope of application under Section 438 Cr. P.C. and the matters relevant to be decided by the Court.

                  13. We hold that it is not open to the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 438 Cr. P.C. to add third parties to the proceedings, as if it is invoking powers under Order 1 Rule 10 of Code of Civil Procedure much less those parties who are neither necessary nor proper parties to the application under consideration."

                  (emphasis supplied)

14. The Hon’ble Delhi High Court in Sachin Kumar Saraf (supra) held that a co-accused or a third party has no locus standi to be impleaded in bail proceedings to oppose the grant of bail to another accused. It was observed that permitting such impleadment would lead to multiplicity of proceedings and divert the Court’s attention from the core issue, namely, the entitlement of the applicant to bail. It was categorically held that a co-accused cannot be treated as a necessary or proper party in bail proceedings and dismissed the impleadment application as not maintainable. Relevant portion reads as under;

                  "13. The judgment which has been referred by the learned counsel for the intervener/applicant in J.K. International's case (supra) is thus, giving the right of hearing to the "complainant" and in a State case. This case is not applicable to the present case on account of number of reasons. This was a case where the locus of complainant is in issue and not that of a third party or a co-accused. Secondly, distinction has to be drawn between a case where prayer for quashing the FIR is made, as against the opposition to the bail by a co-accused who is in the capacity of an accomplice and hence himself is a discredited man. Not even a single case which has been cited by the learned counsel for the intervener / applicant wherein the High Court or for that matter the Supreme Court has permitted a co- accused to become an intervener/applicant to oppose the bail application of another co-accused. On the contrary there are judgments of our own High Court wherein it has been held that a stranger or the third party does not have the locus-standi to oppose the bail application.

                  14. Reliance in this regard is placed on Praveen Malhotra v. State, (1990) 41 DLT 418, Indu Bala v. State, 1991 Cri LJ (Del) 1774. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that a co-accused or even a third party cannot be permitted to oppose the bail application of any other co-accused. If this is permitted to be done, it will result in multiplicity of litigation and such applications would also result in side tracking the focus of the Court from the main issue which will be the question of grant of bail to the accused, be that anticipatory or custodial and take the Court into the field of apportionment of blame and trading of charges and counter charges between the co-accused as is sought to be done in the instant case.”

                  [emphasis supplied]

15. In light of the settled principles laid down in the judgments referred to above, it is evident that in an application for anticipatory bail filed by a co- accused, neither another co-accused nor any third party has locus standi to oppose such application. The power to grant anticipatory bail is extraordinary one and is in the judicious discretion of the Court depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is well settled that a necessary party is one in whose absence no effective adjudication can be made, while a proper party is one whose presence is required for a complete and effective decision. In an anticipatory bail, the adjudication is confined to the applicant’s entitlement to protection from arrest. The right of audience in such matters is primarily vested in the prosecution, and not in strangers to such proceedings.

16. Further, on careful comparison of pleadings in both the impleadment applications, this Court finds a striking similarity in language, tenor and content. Several material paragraphs are virtually identical, indicating that the applications are not independent in origin but appear to have been prepared in a coordinated manner. The substantial reproduction of the same averments demonstrates that these applications are product of collective action rather than separate initiatives. The manner in which the pleadings are drafted also discloses that Dasari Suvarna Raju, though portraying himself as a third party, is not acting as a bona fide or disinterested intervener. The mechanical replication of pleadings strongly suggests collusion with the co-accused, rather than an independent effort to assist the Court.

17. In the opinion of this Court, the reliance placed by the learned Senior Counsel for Implead Petitioner on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Dharamaraj (supra) is of no avail, as it is inapplicable to the facts of the present case. In the said decision, the applicant seeking impleadment was a candidate who had participated in the recruitment process and specifically contended that he was denied selection on account of corrupt practices. Thus, he fell within the statutory definition of a “victim” under Section 2(w) of the Cr.P.C., having suffered a direct and personal injury. The recognition of locus in that case was founded upon his status as a victim with a concrete and subsisting personal stake in the criminal proceedings, and not on any remote, generalized, or collateral interest. Further, the proceedings in the said case arose in the context of an appeal challenging an order of quashing under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The scope and nature of adjudication therein were materially different from the present proceedings. In the case on hand, the question of locus is sought to be canvassed in the context of opposing a petition for anticipatory bail, which stands on a distinct legal footing. Therefore, the said judgment does not advance the case of Implead Petitioner.

18. Similarly, the judgment in Amanullah (supra), relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the implead petitioner is also not applicable to the facts of the present case. The said decision arose out of a murder prosecution wherein the High Court had exercised its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the order taking cognizance against the accused therein. The appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was preferred by the appellants whose locus standi was recognized solely on account of their direct and specific nexus with criminal proceedings. In that case, one of the appellants had been threatened by the informant, while the other appellant was falsely implicated in the very same murder case. Thus, their right to be heard was founded upon their immediate and personal involvement in the subject crime. In contrast, the implead petitioner herein has not shown any such direct, personal, or legally cognizable interest in the present proceedings. Therefore, this judgment also does not help.

19. When this Court posed a query as to whether the grievance of the implead petitioners was against the grant of anticipatory bail or against a possible tender of pardon, learned Senior Counsel for the Implead Petitioner submitted that it was the latter which would affect them. In such circumstances, assuming the tender of pardon even before such an event occurred is clearly premature. A grievance must be founded on an existing cause. If and when any such action is taken, it is always open to the petitioners to avail appropriate remedies in accordance with law. Even assuming that their grievance is to be impleaded, it remains unclear what specific relief they seek in the present proceedings. In a petition for anticipatory bail, this Court’s consideration is confined to assessing whether the applicant is entitled to protection from arrest based on the settled parameters governing such relief. The intervention of the implead petitioners does not and cannot expand this limited zone of consideration. Their apprehensions relating to a possible tender of pardon or any other speculative future event do not alter the framework within which anticipatory bail has to be decided. The scope of inquiry cannot be widened to accommodate collateral issues that fall outside the question of entitlement to an anticipatory bail.

20. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the applications filed by Accused No.38, who is a co-accused in the present crime, as well as by the third party to the proceedings, are not maintainable.

21. In result, both the I.As stand dismissed.