Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari, J.

1. The present Review Petition is filed under Order XLVII Rule 1 read with Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking review of the judgment dated 12.09.2025 in O.P. (CAT) No. 101/2025, whereby the Original Petition filed by the petitioners was dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.

2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioners approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench in O.A. No. 180/0096/2024 seeking a direction to the respondents to re-fix their pay in the scale of Rs. 330–480 for the period of the Third Pay Revision and to grant consequential revision of pay for the periods covered by subsequent pay revision orders, along with other consequential reliefs.

                  2.1 The petitioners approached the Tribunal with a delay of 14,528 days. The Tribunal dismissed the Original Application as time- barred. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioners filed an Original Petition before this Court, which was also dismissed on the ground that the delay was inordinate and huge. Being aggrieved by the same, the present Review Petition has been filed.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that both the Courts failed to consider the fact that it was only during 2024–25 that the petitioners came to know that the Department had finally implemented Annexure-A5 and extended the upgraded scale to other similarly situated Refrigerator Mechanics pursuant to the orders passed in O.A. No. 378/2023. This would clearly indicate that the order passed in the year 1983 was implemented only during 2024–25. Therefore, there is no question of delay, as the petitioners are similarly situated persons and are entitled to the same relief.

                  3.1 It is further contended that both the Courts failed to consider that the matter involves a continuing cause of action. Immediately upon knowing of the implementation, the petitioners approached the learned Tribunal, explaining the continuous representations made by them and the recent discovery of such implementation. However, both the Courts rejected the prayer for condonation of delay on the ground that the petitioners had not satisfactorily explained the delay.

                  3.2 In view of the above, it is submitted that this Review Petition deserves to be allowed, the judgment passed in the Original Petition is liable to be recalled, and thereafter, by condoning the delay, the matter may be decided on merits.

4. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents opposed the prayer and submitted that the learned Tribunal as well as this Court had rightly come to the conclusion that there was a huge and inordinate delay and had dismissed the petitions accordingly. Even in the application seeking condonation of delay, the petitioners were unable to satisfactorily explain the inordinate delay. Therefore, no grounds for review under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure are made out. Hence, it is submitted that the Review Petition deserves to be dismissed.

5. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the records.

6. Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is the substantive provision governing the power of review, provides as follows:

                  “Section 114:

                  Review:- Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved:-

                  (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred;

                  (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this Code;

                  Or

                  (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order, and the court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit.”

7. The grounds available for filing a review application against a judgment are set out in Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure in the following terms:

                  “I. Application for review of judgment (1) Any person considering himself

aggrieved –

                  (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,

                  (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or

                  (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.

                  (2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or Order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review.

                  [Explanation-The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.”

8. A perusal of the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that a review application is maintainable on any of the following grounds: (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced at the time when the decree was passed or the order was made; (ii) existence of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or (iii) for any other sufficient reason.

Judicial Pronouncements on Review:

Col. Avatar Singh Sekhon v. Union of India and Others (1980 Supp SCC 562)

9. In Col. Avatar Singh Sekhon, the Apex Court observed that a review of an earlier order cannot be undertaken unless the Court is satisfied that a material error, apparent on the face of the order, would result in a miscarriage of justice or undermine its soundness. The observations of the Court are as follows:

                  “12. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we resolved to hear Shri Kapil at length to remove any feeling that the party has been hurt without being heard. But we cannot review our earlier order unless satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. In Sow Chandra Kante and Another v. Sheikh Habib reported in (1975) 1 SCC 674, this Court observed:

                  “A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality.”

                  (emphasis added)

Parsion Devi and Others v. Sumitri Devi and Others ((1997) 8 SCC 715)

10. In Parsion Devi, the Apex Court, while stating that an error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning cannot be described as an error apparent on the face of the record for the Court to exercise its powers of review, held as follows:

                  “7. It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.6 Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P.1 reported in 1964 SCR (5) 174, this Court opined:

                  '11. What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any substantial question of law is an 'error apparent on the face of the record'. The fact that on the earlier occasion the Court held on an identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an 'error apparent on the face of the record', for there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterized as vitiated by 'error apparent'. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error.'

                  8. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury reported in (1995) 1 SCC 170, while quoting with approval a passage from Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma reported in (1979) 4 SCC 389, this Court once again held that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.

                  9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of this jurisdiction under Order 47 rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be 'reheard and corrected'. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be 'an appeal in disguise”

                  [emphasis added]

                  10.1    The error referred to under the Rule must be apparent on the face of the record and not one which has to be discovered or inferred. It is also settled law that, in exercise of review jurisdiction, the Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence to arrive at a different conclusion, even if two views are possible in the matter.

Kerala State Electricity Board v. Hitech Electrothermics & Hydropower Ltd. and Others ( (2005) 6 SCC 651)

11. In Kerala State Electricity Board, the Apex Court observed as follows:

                  “10  In a review petition it is not open to this Court to reappreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible. Learned counsel for the Board at best sought to impress us that the correspondence exchanged between the parties did not support the conclusion reached by this Court. We are afraid such a submission cannot be permitted to be advanced in a review petition. The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court. If on appreciation of the evidence produced, the court records a finding of fact and reaches a conclusion, that conclusion cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin thereto. It has not been contended before us that there is any error apparent on the face of the record. To permit the review petitioner to argue on a question of appreciation of evidence would amount to converting a review petition into an appeal in disguise."

                  (emphasis added)

Jain Studios Ltd. V. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd. ((2006) 5 SCC 501)

12. Under the guise of filing a review petition, a party cannot be permitted to repeat old or already considered arguments for reopening the conclusions arrived at in a judgment. The power of review is distinct from the appellate power, which enables a superior Court to correct errors committed by a subordinate Court. This principle has been elucidated in Jain Studios Ltd. where the Court held as follows:

                  “11. So far as the grievance of the applicant on merits is concerned, the learned counsel for the opponent is right in submitting that virtually the applicant seeks the same relief which had been sought at the time of arguing the main matter and had been negatived. Once such a prayer had been refused, no review petition would lie which would convert rehearing of the original matter. It is settled law that the power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. It is not rehearing of an original matter. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. The power of review can be exercised with extreme care, caution and circumspection and only in exceptional cases.

                  12. When a prayer to appoint an arbitrator by the applicant herein had been made at the time when the arbitration petition was heard and was rejected, the same relief cannot be sought by an indirect method by filing a review petition. Such petition, in my opinion, is in the nature of 'second innings' which is impermissible and unwarranted and cannot be granted."

                  (emphasis added)

Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati and Others ((2013) 8 SCC 320)

13. After discussing a series of decisions on review jurisdiction in Kamlesh Verma, the Apex Court observed that review proceedings must be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC. As long as the point sought to be raised in the review application has already been considered and answered, parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment merely because an alternative view is possible. The principles governing the exercise of review jurisdiction were succinctly summarized in the said case as follows:

                  “20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:

                  20.1.   When the review will be maintainable:

                  (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;

                  (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;

                  (iii) Any other sufficient reason.

                  The words "any other sufficient reason" has been interpreted in Chajju Ram vs. Neki17, and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius & Ors.18 to mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule". The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. & Ors reported in (2013) 8 SCC 337,

                  20.2.   When the review will not be maintainable:

                  (i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.

                  (ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.

                  (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.

                  (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.

                  (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error.

                  (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.

                  (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.

                  (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.

                  (ix)     Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time

of arguing the main matter had been negatived.”

Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma ((1979) 4 SCC 389)

14. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma, the Apex Court examined an order  passed by      the Judicial Commissioner reviewing an earlier judgment that had gone in favour of the appellant. The review application had been filed by the respondents, who contended that the predecessor Court had overlooked two important documents showing that the respondents were in possession of the sites through which the appellant sought easementary rights to access his homestead. The said appeal was allowed by this Court with the following observations:

                  “3... It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh and Others v. State of Punjab reported in (1979) 4 SCC 389 there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and pulpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.”

                  (emphasis added)

State of West Bengal and Others v. Kamal Sengupta and Another((2008) 8 SCC 612)

15. In State of West Bengal and Others v. Kamal Sengupta and Another, the Apex Court emphasized that a review petitioner approaching the Court on the ground of discovery of a new matter or evidence must demonstrate that such matter or evidence was not within his knowledge earlier, and held as follows:

                  “21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a review is sought on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence, such matter or evidence must be relevant and must be of such a character that if the same had been produced, it might have altered the judgment. In other words, mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review ex debito justitiae. Not only this, the party seeking review has also to show that such additional matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the court earlier.”

                  (emphasis added)

                  15.1    In the captioned judgment, the term 'mistake or error apparent' has been discussed in the following words:

                  “22. The term 'mistake or error apparent' by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or Section 22(3) (f) of the Act. To put it differently an order or decision or judgment cannot be corrected merely because it is erroneous in law or on the ground that a different view could have been taken by the court/tribunal on a point of fact or law. In any case, while exercising the power of review, the court/tribunal concerned cannot sit in appeal over its judgment/decision.”

                  (emphasis added)

S. Nagaraj and Others v. State of Karnataka and Another (1993 Supp (4) SCC 595)

16. In S. Nagaraj and Others, the Apex Court explained the circumstances under which review jurisdiction may be treated as statutory or inherent, and held as follows:

                  “18. Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers. Neither the rules of procedure nor technicalities of law can stand in its way. The order of the court should not be prejudicial to anyone. Rule of stare decisis is adhered for consistency but it is not as inflexible in Administrative Law as in Public Law. Even the law bends before justice. Entire concept of writ jurisdiction exercised by the higher courts is founded on equity and fairness. If the court finds that the order was passed under a mistake and it would not have exercised the jurisdiction but for the erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice then it cannot on any principle be precluded from rectifying the error. Mistake is accepted as valid reason to recall an order. Difference lies in the nature of mistake and scope of rectification, depending on if it is of fact or law. But the root from which the power flows is the anxiety to avoid injustice. It is either statutory or inherent. The latter is available where the mistake is of the Court.”

(emphasis added)

Patel Narshi Thakershi and Others v. Shri Pradyuman Singhji Arjunsinghji ((1971) 3 SCC 844)

17. In Patel Narshi Thakershi, the Apex Court held as follows:

                  “4. It is well settled that the power to review is not an inherent power.

                  It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. No provision in the Act was brought to notice from which it could be gathered that the Government had power to review its own order. If the Government had no power to review its own order, it is obvious that its delegate could not have reviewed its order. ”

                  (emphasis added)

Ram Sahu (Dead) Through LRs and Others v. Vinod Kumar Rawat and Others ((2020) SCC OnLine SC 896)

18. In Ram Sahu (Dead) Through LRs and Others, the Apex Court, while citing previous decisions and expounding on the scope and ambit of Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, observed that Section 114 CPC does not lay down any conditions precedent for the exercise of the power of review, nor does it prohibit the Court from exercising such power. However, an order can be reviewed by the Court only on the grounds prescribed under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. The said power cannot be exercised as an inherent power, nor can appellate power be invoked under the guise of review jurisdiction.

19. In our considered opinion, none of the grounds available for successfully seeking review as recognized by Order 47 Rule 1 CPC are made out in the present case. The Apex Court in the case of S. Bhagirathi Amaal Vs. Palani Roman ((2009) 10 SCC 464) has held that in order to seek view, it has to be demonstrated that the order suffers from an error contemplated under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC which is apparent on the face of record and not an error which is to be fished out and searched. A decision or order cannot be reviewed merely because it is erroneous.

Judicial Pronouncements on delay:

20. The Supreme Court has, on several occasions, dealt with the issue of delay and rendered judgments, which are reproduced below:

Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. v. K. Thangappan ((2006) 4 SCC 322)

                  21.1    The learned Supreme Court in Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. held as under:

                  6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports . Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.”

                  M.P. Ram Mohan Raja v. State of Tamil Nadu ((2007) 9 SCC 78)

                  21.2    The Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Ram Mohan Raja has held as under:

                  “11. So far as the question of delay is concerned, no hard and fast rule can be laid down and it will depend on the facts of each case. In the present case, the facts stare at the face of it that on 8-10-1996 an order was passed by the Collector in pursuance of the order passed by the High Court, rejecting the application of the writ petitioner for consideration of the grant of mining lease. The writ petitioner sat tight over the matter and did not challenge the same up to 2003. This on the face of it appears to be very serious. A person who can sit tight for such a long time for no justifiable reason, cannot be given any benefit.”

Nadia Distt. Primary School Council v. Sristidhar Biswas ((2007) 12 SCC 779)

                  21.3    The Supreme Court in the case of Nadia Distt. Primary School Council held as under:

                  “11. In the present case, the panel was prepared in 1980 and the petitioners approached the court in 1989 after the decision in Dibakar Pal. Such persons should not be given any benefit by the court when they allowed more than nine years to elapse. Delay is very significant in matters of granting relief and courts cannot come to the rescue of the persons who are not vigilant of their rights. Therefore, the view taken by the High Court condoning the delay of nine years cannot be countenanced.”

Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana ((1997) 6 SCC 538)

21.4 The Supreme Court in Jagdish Lal held as under:

                  “18. That apart, as this Court has repeatedly held, the delay disentitles the party to the discretionary relief under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution.”

Shiv Dass Vs. Union of India ((2007) 9 SCC 274)

                  21.5 The Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Dass has held as under:

                  “6. Normally, in the case of belated approach writ petition has to be dismissed. Delay or laches is one of the factors to be borne in mind by the High Courts when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.”

Mrinmary Maity v. Chhanda Koley (2024 SCC OnLine 551)

22. The Supreme Court in its latest judgment in the case of Mrinmary Maity in paragraph 11 has held thus:

                  “11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal and others v. State of West Benchal – (2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the following effect:

                  "56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.”

23. Upon perusal of the record and in light of the various judgments passed by the Apex Court, there is no error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference with the impugned judgment. We also find no justification to grant any indulgence to the review petitioners, as no plausible explanation has been put forth for the condonation of delay.

                  The review petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. All interlocutory applications pertaining to interim matters stand closed.