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CDJ 2025 Ker HC 1942 print Preview print print
Court : High Court of Kerala
Case No : RP No. 1533 of 2025
Judges: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE V.M. SYAM KUMAR
Parties : G. Sivakumar Versus State Of Kerala, Represented By The Additional Chief Secretary, Revenue Department, Secretariat, Thiruvananthapuram & Others
Appearing Advocates : For the Review Petitioner: C.B. Sreekumar, V. Sagith Kumar, S. Devapriya, Advocates. For the Respondents: ----
Date of Judgment : 18-12-2025
Head Note :-
Civil Procedure Code 1908 - Section 114 -

Comparative Citation:
2025 KER 97554,
Judgment :-

Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari, J.

1. Heard on C.M.Appl.No.1/2025. This appeal has been filed with a delay of 44 days. Having perused the reasons stated in the affidavit filed in support of the application to condone delay, we are satisfied that sufficient cause has been made out to condone the delay. Hence, C.M.Appl. No.1/2025 to condone the delay is allowed.

2. The present Review Petition has been filed under Order XLVII Rule I read with Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 alleging non-compliance of the judgment dated 23.08.2025 arisiong out of WA No.640/2025.

Facts:-

3. The brief facts of the case are that being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Single Judge who had dismissed the WP(C) No.11829/2019, the Writ Appeal was filed by the petitioner which was numbered as WA No.640/2025.

4. In the Writ Petition, the petitioner had sought the following reliefs:

                  “(i) To direct the 3rd respondent to consider and dispose of Exhibit P1 representation and complete the proceedings within a time frame fixed by this Hon’ble Court.

                  (ii) To grant such other reliefs which the petitioner may seek from time to time and this Hon’ble Court may deem fit to be granted to the circumstances.”

5. The learned Single Judge had dismissed the Writ Petition based on the Apex Court judgment in the case of M/s. South Indian Bank Ltd. & Others v. Naveen Mathew Philip & Another [2023 Livelaw SC 320], wherein the Supreme Court had depricated the practice adopted by the High Courts, where the Writ Petitions are being entertained in SARFAESI Act matters, especially against the private banks. Being aggrieved, the Writ Appeal was filed. Even the Writ Appeal got dismissed since the Writ Petition itself was not maintainable based on the Apex Court judgments. Now the petitioner has filed the Review Petition only on the issue of cost of Rs.35,000/- having been imposed by the learned Single Judge.

Petitioner’s Contentions:-

6. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner.

7. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the cost itself was uncalled for and the same deserves to be waived.

Respondents’ Contentions:-

8. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents opposed the prayer and submitted that the learned counsel for the petitioner had not been able to point out any apparent error on the face of the record, so as to interfere with the order. In any case, this Review Petition cannot be entertained since the petitioner is seeking waiver of the cost imposed in the Writ Petition and not in a Writ Appeal. The present Review Petition has been filed against the order of Writ Appeal and not the Writ Petition. On these grounds alone, the Review Petition deserves to be dismissed.

9. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.

 10. In Col. Avatar Singh Sekhon v. Union of India and Others reported in 1980 Supp SCC 562, The Apex Court observed that a review of an earlier order cannot be done unless the court is satisfied that the material error which is manifest on the face of the order, would result in miscarriage of justice or undermine its soundness. The observations made are as under:

                  “12. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we resolved to hear Shri Kapil at length to remove any feeling that the party has been hurt without being heard. But we cannot review our earlier order unless satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. In Sow Chandra Kante and Another v. Sheikh Habib reported in (1975) 1 SCC 674, this Court observed :

                  "A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality."

                  (emphasis added)

11. In Parsion Devi and Others v. Sumitri Devi and Others reported in (1997) 8 SCC 715, stating that an error that is not self-evident and the one that has to be detected by the process of reasoning, cannot be described as an error apparent on the face of the record for the Court to exercise the powers of review, the Apex Court held as under:

                  “7. It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.6 Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P.1 reported in 1964 SCR (5) 174 , this Court opined:

                  '11. What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any substantial question of law is an ‘error apparent on the face of the record’. The fact that on the earlier occasion the Court held on an identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an ‘error apparent on the face of the record’, for there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterized as vitiated by ‘error apparent’. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error.’

                  8. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury reported in (1995) 1 SCC 170, while quoting with approval a passage from Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma reported in (1979) 4 SCC 389, this Court once again held that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.

                  9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of this jurisdiction under Order 47 rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be ‘reheard and corrected’. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be ‘an appeal in disguise"

                  [emphasis added]

12. The error referred to under the Rule, must be apparent on the face of the record and not one which has to be searched out. It is also settled law that in exercise of review jurisdiction, the Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence to arrive at a different conclusion even if two views are possible in a matter. In Kerala State Electricity Board v. Hitech Electrothermics & Hydropower Ltd. and Others reported in (2005) 6 SCC 651, the Apex Court observed as follows:

                  10. ....In a review petition it is not open to this Court to reappreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible. Learned counsel for the Board at best sought to impress us that the correspondence exchanged between the parties did not support the conclusion reached by this Court. We are afraid such a submission cannot be permitted to be advanced in a review petition. The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court. If on appreciation of the evidence produced, the court records a finding of fact and reaches a conclusion, that conclusion cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin thereto. It has not been contended before us that there is any error apparent on the face of the record. To permit the review petitioner to argue on a question of appreciation of evidence would amount to converting a review petition into an appeal in disguise."

                  (emphasis added)

13. Under the garb of filing a review petition, a party cannot be permitted to repeat old and overruled arguments for reopening the conclusions arrived at in a judgment. The power of review is not to be confused with the appellate power which enables the Superior Court to correct errors committed by a subordinate Court. This point has been elucidated in Jain Studios Ltd. V. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd. reported in (2006) 5 SCC 501, where it was held thus:

                  “11. So far as the grievance of the applicant on merits is concerned, the learned counsel for the opponent is right in submitting that virtually the applicant seeks the same relief which had been sought at the time of arguing the main matter and had been negatived. Once such a prayer had been refused, no review petition would lie which would convert rehearing of the original matter. It is settled law that the power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. It is not rehearing of an original matter. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. The power of review can be exercised with extreme care, caution and circumspection and only in exceptional cases.

                  12. When a prayer to appoint an arbitrator by the applicant herein had been made at the time when the arbitration petition was heard and was rejected, the same relief cannot be sought by an indirect method by filing a review petition. Such petition, in my opinion, is in the nature of 'second innings' which is impermissible and unwarranted and cannot be granted.”

                  (emphasis added)

14. After discussing a series of decisions on review jurisdiction in Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati and Others reported in (2013) 8 SCC 320, the Apex Court observed that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC. As long as the point sought to be raised in the review application has already been dealt with and answered, parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment only because an alternative view is possible. The principles for exercising review jurisdiction were succinctly summarized in the captioned case as below:

                  “20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:

                  20.1. When the review will be maintainable:

                  (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;

                  (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;

                  (iii) Any other sufficient reason.

                  The words "any other sufficient reason" has been interpreted in Chajju Ram vs. Neki, and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius & Ors. to mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule". The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. & Ors reported in (2013) 8 SCC 337,

                  20.2. When the review will not be maintainable: -

                  (i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.

                  (ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.

                  (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.

                  (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.

                  (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error.

                  (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.

                  (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.

                  (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.

                  (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.”

15. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma reported in (1979) 4 SCC 389, the Apex Court was examining an order passed by the Judicial Commissioner who was reviewing an earlier judgment that went in favour of the appellant, while deciding a review application filed by the respondents therein who took a ground that the predecessor Court had overlooked two important documents that showed that the respondents were in possession of the sites through which the appellant had sought easementary rights to access his home-stead. The said appeal was allowed by this Court with the following observations:

                  “3 …It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh and Others v. State of Punjab reported in (1979) 4 SCC 389 there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and pulpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. Apower of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.”

                  (emphasis added)

16. In State of West Bengal and Others v. Kamal Sengupta and Another reported in (2008) 8 SCC 612, the Apex Court emphasized the requirement of the review petitioner who approaches a Court on the ground of discovery of a new matter or evidence, to demonstrate that the same was not within his knowledge and held thus:

                  “21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a review is sought on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence, such matter or evidence must be relevant and must be of such a character that if the same had been produced, it might have altered the judgment. In other words, mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review ex debito justitiae. Not only this, the party seeking review has also to show that such additional matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the court earlier.”

                  (emphasis added)

 17. In the captioned judgment, the term ‘mistake or error apparent’ has been discussed in the following words:

                  “22. The term ‘mistake or error apparent’ by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or Section 22(3) (f) of the Act. To put it differently an order or decision or judgment cannot be corrected merely because it is erroneous in law or on the ground that a different view could have been taken by the court/tribunal on a point of fact or law. In any case, while exercising the power of review, the court/tribunal concerned cannot sit in appeal over its judgment/decision”.

                  (emphasis added)

18. In S. Nagaraj and Others v. State of Karnataka and Another reported in 1993 Supp (4) SCC 595, the Apex Court explained as to when a review jurisdiction could be treated as statutory or inherent and held thus :

                  “18. Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers. Neither the rules of procedure nor technicalities of law can stand in its way. The order of the court should not be prejudicial to anyone. Rule of stare decisis is adhered for consistency but it is not as inflexible in Administrative Law as in Public Law. Even the law bends before justice.

 Entire concept of writ jurisdiction exercised by the higher courts is founded on equity and fairness. If the court finds that the order was passed under a mistake and it would not have exercised the jurisdiction but for the erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice then it cannot on any principle be precluded from rectifying the error. Mistake is accepted as valid reason to recall an order. Difference lies in the nature of mistake and scope of rectification, depending on if it is of fact or law. But the root from which the power flows is the anxiety to avoid injustice. It is either statutory or inherent. The latter is available where the mistake is of the Court”.

                  (emphasis added)

19. In Patel Narshi Thakershi and Others v. Shri Pradyuman Singhji Arjunsinghji reported in (1971) 3 SCC 844, the Apex Court held as follows:

                  “4….. It is well settled that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. No provision in the Act was brought to notice from which it could be gathered that the Government had power to review its own order. If the Government had no power to review its own order, it is obvious that its delegate could not have reviewed its order.……”

                  (emphasis added)

20. In Ram Sahu (Dead) Through LRs and Others v. Vinod Kumar Rawat and Others reported in (2020) SCC Online SC 896, citing previous decisions and expounding on the scope and ambit of Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1, the Apex Court has observed that Section 114 CPC does not lay any conditions precedent for exercising the power of review; and nor does the Section prohibit the Court from exercising its power to review a decision. However, an order can be reviewed by the Court only on the grounds prescribed in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. The said power cannot be exercised as an inherent power and nor can appellate power be exercised in the guise of exercising the power of review.

21. In our considered opinion, none of the grounds available for successfully seeking review as recognized by Order 47 Rule 1 CPC are made out in the present case. The Apex Court in the case of S. Bhagirathi Amaal Vs. Palani Roman (2009) 10 SCC 464 has held that in order to seek review, it has to be demonstrated that the order suffers from an error contemplated under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC which is apparent on the face of record and not an error which is to be fished out and searched. A decision or order cannot be reviewed merely because it is erroneous.

22. In another case, the Apex Court in case of State of West Bengal Vs. Kamal Sengupta (2008) 8 SCC 612 has held that "a party cannot be permitted to argue de novo in the garb of review."

23. On perusal of the record and in the light of the judgments passed in the case of S. Bhagirathi Amaal and State of West Bengal (supra), there is no error apparent on the face of record warranting interference in the order impugned.

24. The review petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed.

 
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