1. Since common issues are involved in these writ petitions, they are heard and disposed of by a common judgment. WP(C) No.21897 of 2022 has been filed challenging Ext.P25 notice issued as per the provisions of the Land Conservancy Act for evicting the alleged encroachment made by the petitioner in respect of 1.37 ares of land in Sy.No.46/1 of Moothukunnam Village. Whereas WP(C) No.13004 of 2023 is filed challenging Ext.P34 order issued by the 1st respondent rejecting the request of the petitioner for issuance of an NOC.
2. Brief facts necessary for disposal of the writ petitions are as follows:-
Petitioner is the owner in possession of 2.41 ares of land situated in Sy.Nos.75/25-2-5, 46/1-19-4 and 46/1-59 of Moothukunnam Village obtained as per Ext.P1 sale deed executed in the year 2020. Petitioner has been paying tax in respect of the said property, as evident from Ext.P2, and Exts.P3 & P4 possession certificate and location sketch, respectively, were also issued in respect of the subject property. Petitioner submitted an application dated 15.11.2020 with all relevant documents for issuance of a No Objection Certificate to install and operate a diesel dispensation pump. The said application, produced as Ext.P5, was forwarded by the 1st respondent to the 3rd respondent for necessary enquiry and report, as per Ext.P6 letter. Accordingly, the 3rd respondent, after conducting a detailed enquiry, submitted Ext.P7 report stating that there is no puramboke in the said property. Unsatisfied with Ext.P7 report, the 1st respondent again directed the 3rd respondent to conduct a further detailed enquiry as per Ext.P8 communication, and pursuant to the same, 3rd respondent again conducted an enquiry and submitted Ext.P9 report again stating that there is no puramboke in the said property and the property is in the nature of a ‘purayidom’. The prior deeds of Ext.P1 sale deed are Ext.P10 sale deed bearing No. 1563/1994 of Paravoor SRO, and the prior deed of Ext.P10 is a pattayam bearing No. EF 53/1994 dated 21.01.1994.
3. It is submitted that out of 2.41 ares of land covered by Ext.P1, 1.33 ares of land is situated in Sy.No.75/25-5 of which Ext.P11 is the prior deed, a document executed by the managing trustee of Jan Muhammed Haji Essa Seit Trust, and since the said property was vested in the said Trust, the Kerala Wakf Board has granted permission to sell the property as per proceedings bearing No.B8/3339/RA dated 14.06.1982. It is further submitted that the prior deed of Ext.P11 is a registered will deed No.15/1119 ME of Ernakulam SRO. It is submitted that jetty license was also issued, as evident from Ext.P12 from the Port Conservator, and Ext.P13 is the site plan. Since there was an inordinate delay in considering Ext.P5 application for issuance of an NOC, petitioner approached this Court, filing WP(C) No.26379 of 2021, and during the pendency of the said writ petition, the 4th respondent conducted a survey without notice to the petitioner and submitted Ext.P14 report and sketch. On the basis of Ext.P14, the said writ petition was disposed of as per Ext.P15 judgment directing the disposal of Ext.P5 application. The 2nd respondent rejected Ext.P5 as per Ext.P16 on the ground that a portion of the property consists of ‘puramboke’. Petitioner would submit that, to the erstwhile owner of the property, a No Objection Certificate has already been issued by the 2nd respondent as Ext.P17 dated 14.06.2013, for which the 3rd respondent has issued Ext.P18 possession certificate for establishment of a diesel outlet. The prior deed of Ext.P10 which is the prior deed of Ext.P1 is Ext.P19 patta. The tandaper account of the property covered by Ext.P1 is produced as Ext.P20, and the tandaper register as Ext.P22. A perusal of Ext.P21 reveals that the total extent of property is 2.41 ares of purayidom, and Ext.P20 reveals that in respect of 1.33 ares of land situated in Sy.No.71/25-5, the petitioner is the ‘pattadar’. Aggrieved by Ext.P16, the petitioner again approached this Court, filing WP(C) No.2735 of 2022 and this Court, by Ext.P24 order set aside Ext.P16 proceedings and directed Ext.P5 application to be reconsidered in the light of Exts.P1, P2 and P3 documents also. Without even complying with the said direction, Ext.P25 notice was issued invoking the power under Section 12 of the Kerala Land Conservancy Act, 1967, directing the petitioner to appear before the 6th respondent. It is aggrieved by the same that WP(C) No.21897 of 2022 has been filed. In WP(C) No.13004 of 2023, the petitioner submits that, in the meanwhile, Ext.P34 order has been issued again rejecting the request of the petitioner for issuance of an NOC, holding that the subject property contains puramboke land also.
4. A detailed counter affidavit has been filed by the 6th respondent in answer to the averment in WP(C) No.21897 of 2022, wherein it is submitted that though the petitioner claimed to have title and possession over 2.41 ares of land, no documents have been produced before the competent authority to prove title in respect of 1.67 ares of property. The land was measured by the Taluk Surveyor and Ext.R6(a) report was filed, wherein it is found that the petitioner has trespassed into 1.37 ares of land along with the Government land comprised in Sy.No.46/1 of Moothukunnam Village, and on finding that the petitioner has encroached upon the puramboke land Ext.P2 notice in Form C was issued. The learned Government Pleader also relied on Exts.R6(c) and R6(d) report and sketch prepared by the Taluk Surveyor, which was done pursuant to the direction issued by this Court in the judgment dated 01.10.2024 and submits that the petitioner has encroached upon Government land and therefore proceedings were initiated. The counter affidavit filed in WP(C) No.21897 of 2022 was adopted in WP(C) No.13004 of 2023.
5. Petitioner, relying on the further documents produced in WP(C) No.13004 of 2023, submits that the claim of possession and title over the subject property is beyond any dispute. Ext.P35 is the true copy of the letter issued by the Secretary, Kerala Wakf Board on 14.01.1982, whereby final sanction was granted for the sale of 38.60 ares of land comprised in Sy.No.46/1. Ext.P6 is the reply given by the State Public Information Officer, which provides that 121 cents of property in Sy.No.75/25 and 30 cents of property in Sy.No.46/1 is included in the Wakf register. Petitioner also relies on Ext.P39 site plan prior to the issuance of Ext.P17 NOC granted earlier to the erstwhile owner of the property, and the said sketch and site plan were accepted and signed by respondents 2 and 5, and were counter signed by the Tahsildar. On the basis of the same, the petitioner submits that there is no dispute with respect to the title and possession over the subject property and the claim now raised by the respondents is without any basis. Based on the above said contentions raised, the petitioner submitted an application for the issuance of an advocate commission. Taking note of the conflicting stand taken by the revenue authorities on various occassions, wherein in the earlier report it is stated that there is no puramboke land and NOC was granted to the erstwhile owners, this Court directed a fresh survey to be conducted in the subject property based on the field measurement book produced as Ext.P39 in WP(C) No.21897 of 2022 by the Head Surveyor attached to the 3rd respondent with notice to the petitioner as well as the affected parties, and an Advocate Commission was also appointed to oversee the survey to be conducted. Based on the said order, a survey was conducted, and the sketch prepared by the surveyor is produced as Annexure C1 S dated 15.12.2025, wherein encroachments were found on the Government land. But a perusal of Ext.R1(s) reveals that the said sketch has been prepared with a caveat that there is a difference in shape when compared to the litho plan, when the plan is sketched with the available measurement. Based on this, the Advocate Commission observed that the sketch now prepared by the Head Surveyor is not complete, and the same cannot be accepted. The Advocate Commission recommended that since the survey sub division and survey measurement of the property are incomplete, it should be rectified based on ground measurement, invoking the power under Rule 55 and 58 of the Kerala Survey and Boundaries Rules, 1964.
6. A detailed objection has also been filed by the respondent, objecting to the report submitted by the Advocate Commission.
7. I have heard the rival contentions on both sides.
8. It is an admitted case that the property was purchased in 2020, and land tax was accepted as per Ext.P2 for the total 2.41 ares of land, which is also supported by Ext.P3 possession certificate and Ext.P4 location sketch. Tandaper register produced as Ext.P21 also reveals the erstwhile owner from whom the petitioner purchased Ext.P1 property had 2.41 ares of land in the particular tandaper number bearing number 10963. The issue regarding possession of puramboke land is in respect of property is comprised in Sy.No.46/1 of Moothukunnam Village, having an extent of 1.37 ares of land which is also reflected in Ext.P21 Tandaper account bearing number 10963. It is also to be seen that in respect of Ext.P5 application submitted by the petitioner, Ext.P7 report was filed by the 3rd respondent after a detailed enquiry stating that there is no ‘puramboke’ in the said property. Unsatisfied with Ext.P7, further enquiry was ordered, to which Ext.P9 report was filed, wherein also it is reported that no ‘puramboke’ included in that property and the property under enquiry appeared to be a garden land. It is also a fact that a No Objection Certificate was earlier issued in respect of the said property in favour of the prior owners as evident from Ext.P17, and later on Ext.P18 possession certificate was also issued, which reveals that the subject property was in possession of the erstwhile owners from whom the petitioner purchased his property as per Ext.P1.
9. It is also to be noted that Exts.P10 and P11 are the prior sale deeds of the property which was purchased by the petitioner. Ext.P11 deed is one executed by the Managing Trustee of Jan Muhammed Haji Essa Seit, a Wakf, who sold its property as per the permission granted by the Kerala Wakf Board. Ext.P35 is a letter given by the Wakf Board dated 14.06.1982 granting permission to sell 38.60 acres of garden land, including the property in Sy.No.46/1, which is now claimed to be ‘puramboke’ land. Based on the same, Ext.P36 is an information given as per the provisions of the Right to Information Act, by the Information Officer of the Kerala Wakf Board, which also proves that 13 cents of property comprised in Sy.No.46/1 is a Wakf property and included in the Wakf register. Ext.P37 is the Wakf register, wherein the property of Jan Muhammed Haji Essa Seit Trust is included as a Wakf property. Ext.P38 is a petition dated 12.02.1982 submitted by Jan Muhammed Haji Essa Seit Trust seeking sanction for the sale of 38.60 acres of Government land, in which 1.42 acres of land comprised in Sy.No.46/1 is also intended to be sold. So based on the same, it is the case of the petitioner that his property was part of the Wakf property and it was recognised as part of the Wakf property as early as in 1982. Therefore, I find a considerable force in the contention of the petitioner that his title and possession of the property trace back to even 1982 and has come to the hands of the petitioner by way of subsequent sale etc. which happened with the consent of the Kerala Wakf Board and that the ownership and possession of the property is established even from 1982 cannot be now interfered by issuance of a proceedings under the Land Conservancy Act. Further, it is to be noted that Exts.P7 and P9 report by the official respondents themselves will reveal that the subject property does not have any piece of puramboke land included. Further, the NOC has already been granted to the prior owners as Ext.P17 in respect of the very same property on finding that the property is in absolute title and possession of the erstwhile property owners. Even in the sketch prepared by the Taluk Surveyor based on the interim order passed by this Court is also not conclusive since the sketch has been prepared with a caveat that there is a difference in shape compared to the lithoplan and when the plan is sketched with the available measurement.
10. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner brought to my notice the judgment dated 01.07.2025 in WA No.252 of 2016 and connected cases, wherein the lands were acquired for the purpose of the Kerala State Electricity Board, but compensation amount was not paid taking a stand that the pattas issued in their favour was not issued after complying with the statutory formalities and the pattas issued were bogus pattas, and thereupon cancelled the pattas. The learned Single Judge found that the cancellation of pattas without affording the writ petitioner an opportunity of being heard is illegal and therefore set aside the order cancelling the patta, and disposed of the writ petition with various directions, including liberty granted to the respondent to take fresh proceedings for cancellation of patta after following the statutory procedures. The same was appealed against by the KSEB as well as the party respondents. The Division Bench of this Court in the said judgment held that since no action has been taken by the State for almost 30 to 40 years after the date of issuance of patta and State has accepted tax in respect of the land they are estopped from contending that they have no knowledge of the alleged act during the years and the writ petitioner would be entitled under law to defend any action by the State towards dispossessing them on the plea of adverse possession, and disposed of the appeal upholding the directions issued by the learned Single Judge and setting aside direction No.6 permitting the authorities to take fresh steps for cancellation of patta holding that this Court has held in Harrisons Malayalam Ltd. (M/s) and Another v. State of Kerala and Others [2018 (2) KHC 719] that in such circumstance the attempt of resumption of land owned by a company by invoking the power under Kerala Land Conservancy Act cannot be permitted and therefore the same was interfered with and the Court directed that if the Government is of the view that the company is in possession of the Government land, it is for the Government to establish the same before a competent Civil Court. Relevant paragraphs of the said judgment read as follows:-
“8. The statutory provisions may first be noticed. Rule 8 of the Rules reads as follows:
“8. Conditions of assignment on registry.-- [(1) Lands, granted on registry shall be heritable but alienable for a period of twenty-five years from the date of registry:
Provided that the assignee may mortgage such lands,-
(a) to the Government or Co-operative Institutions or Tea Board or the Rubber Board or any other financial institutions recognised by the Government in this behalf, as security for obtaining loan for agricultural or land improvement purposes or for growing tea or rubber; and
(b) to the Government or Co-operative Institutions as security for obtaining loans for house construction under the Village Housing Project Scheme or any other housing schemes sponsored by the Government, if such house is required for the occupation of the assignee or his family. (1A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1) In the land assigned on registry as per sub-rule (1) of Rule 7 shall be heritable and alienable.
(2) The assignee or a member of his family or his successor-ininterest shall reside in the land if it is granted as house site, or shall personally cultivate the same if it is granted for cultivation; and such resides or cultivation, as the case maybe, shall commence effectively within a period of one year, from the date of receipt of the patta or of the provisional patta in cases where a provisional patta is issued in the first instance:
Provided that-
(i) In the cases of assignment to military personnel or their dependents as the case may be, the assignee may cultivate the land by his own labourer by the labour of any member of his family and with the occasional assistants, if any of hired labour or servants on wages payable in cash or in kind but not in crop share;
(ii) the military personnel may apply for land anywhere in the State irrespective of the State to which they belong; and in the matter of assignment preference shall be given to persons belong to Kerala;
(iii) the military personal may lease for cultivation purposes the lands assigned to them whilst they are away on active service.
(3) The registry shall be liable to be cancelled for contravention of the provisions in sub-rule (1) or sub-rule (2). The registry may be cancelled also, if it found that it was grossly inequitable or was made under a mistake of facts or owing to misrepresentation of facts or in excess of the limits of the powers delegated to the assigning authority or that there was an irregularity in the procedure.
In the event of cancellation of the registry, the assignee shall not be entitled to compensation for any improvements he may have made on the land. The authority competent to order such cancellation shall be the authority which granted the registry, or one superior to it; Provided the no registry of land shall be cancelled without giving the party or parties affected thereby, a reasonable opportunity of being heard:
Provided further that no assignment of Land shall be cancelled if the annual family income of the transferee occupant does not exceed Rs.10,000 (Rupees Ten thousand only) and who does not own or possess any landed property, anywhere in the State:
Provided also that in the case of a transfer of Land covered by the above proviso the assignee shall not be eligible for further assignment of Land anywhere in the State.”
It is apparent from a perusal of the Rules that although the Rule does not specify a period of limitation for exercising the power for cancellation of the Patta that is already issued, the power must be exercised within a reasonable time. As regards what that reasonable time is, we must look to the other provisions of the Act for guidance. Viewed thus, we find that Rule 8(1) mentions a period of 25 years for non-alienation of lands and simultaneously provides for a power to resume the assigned lands if there is a breach of any of the conditions governing the original assignment. It is through the same provision that the power to resume lands on discovery of a mistake/fraud etc. is conferred. We would think therefore that the statutory provision itself indicates that the monitoring period for the Patta is only 25 years and that if any action, for cancellation of the Patta for breach of the conditions under which it was granted, is taken, it has to be taken within that time. In the instant case, no such action was taken by the State for almost 30/40 years from the date of issuance of the Patta. That apart, the conduct of the State in accepting tax in respect of the lands covered by the Pattas would effectively estop it from contending that it had no knowledge of the alleged fraudulent acts during all these years. In fact, after the expiry of 30 years, the writ petitioners would also be entitled under law, to defend any action by the State towards dispossessing them on the plea of adverse possession.
9. It would be useful in this connection to notice the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Harrisons Malayalam Ltd. (M/s.) and Another v. State of Kerals and Others – [2018 (2) KHC 719] where an attempt at resumption of lands owned by a company, by invoking the provisions of the Kerala Land Conservancy Act, was thwarted by this Court. While examining the scope and extent of the power of resumption under the Kerala Land Conservancy Act, this Court found as follows at paragraphs 125, 126 and 127:
“125.The sine qua non for initiating a proceeding for eviction of an occupant from a land, under the KLC Act, is that the land should be either Government land or puramboke. This is the fundamental, foundational or jurisdictional fact which must exist for proceeding under the Act. But that is not to say that the authorised officer under the KLC Act can decide the title or assert title, where there can be none found, other than by adducing evidence before a proper forum in a validly instituted proceeding. Especially when, based on registered documents, payment of tax, established occupation and unhindered possession, the occupant raises a bonafide claim of title supported by various documents produced before the SO. If it were otherwise, there need not have been a saving of the civil courts powers in the context of a dispute raised on the ownership claimed by the Government. The decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court placed reliance on by both sides have to be examined in this context.
126. Thummala Krishna Rao, 1982 KHC 422 : 1982 (2) SCC 134 : AIR 1982 SC 1081 was concerned with three items (groups) of property, alleged to have been acquired by the Government of the Nizam of Hyderabad for the benefit of Osmania University, along with larger extents of lands. The University instituted a suit which was rejected, finding the plaintiff having failed to prove possession within 12 years before the filing of the suit. Later, at the instance of the University the Thahsildar took steps for summary eviction under the Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905. The resultant order of eviction passed, after being unsuccessfully challenged before the statutory authorities was before the High Court. The learned Single Judge held that the questions, whether the lands were acquired by the Government and had then been transferred to the University were not questions which could be properly decided under Article 226. The Division Bench, in appeal, held that summary proceedings under the Encroachment Act cannot be resorted to, on the facts. The Hon'ble Supreme Court accepted, with approval, the finding of the Division Bench that the summary remedy provided by S.7, cannot be availed of in cases where complicated questions of title arise for decision “unless there is an attempted encroachment or encroachment of very recent origin”
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127. It was so held in Para 8 & 9 of the cited decision:
“8. It seems to us clear from these provisions that the summary remedy for eviction which is provided for by Section 6 of the Act can be resorted to by the Government only against persons who are in unauthorised occupation of any land which is “the property of the Government”. In regard to property described in sub-sections (1) and (2) of S.2, there can be no doubt, difficulty or dispute as to the title of the Government and, therefore, in respect of such property, the Government would be free to take recourse to the summary remedy of eviction provided for in S.6. A person who occupies a part of a public road, street, bridge, the bed of the sea and the like, is in unauthorised occupation of property which is declared by Section 2 to be the property of the Government and, therefore, it is in public interest to evict him expeditiously, which can only be done by resorting to the summary remedy provided by the Act. But Section 6(1) which confers the power of summary eviction on the Government limits that power to cases in which a person is in unauthorised occupation of a land “for which he is liable to pay assessment under S.3”. S.3, in turn, refers to unauthorised occupation of any land “which is the property of the Government”. If there is a bona fide dispute regarding the title of the Government to any property, the Government cannot take a unilateral decision in its own favour that the property belongs to it, and on the basis of such decision take recourse to the summary remedy provided by S.6 for evicting the person who is in possession of the property under a bona fide claim or title. In the instant case, there is unquestionably a genuine dispute between the State Government and the respondents as to whether the three plots of land were the subject-matter of acquisition proceedings taken by the then Government of Hyderabad and whether the Osmania University, for whose benefit the plots are alleged to have been acquired, had lost title to the property by operation of the law of limitation. The suit filed by the University was dismissed on the ground of limitation, inter alia, since Nawab Habibuddin was found to have encroached on the property more than 12 years before the date of the suit and the University was not in possession of the property at any time within that period. Having failed in the suit, the University activated the Government to evict the Nawab and his transferees summarily, which seems to us impermissible. The respondents have a bona fide claim to litigate and they cannot be evicted save by the due process of law. The summary remedy prescribed by Section 6 is not the kind of legal process which is suited to an adjudication of complicated questions of title. That procedure is, therefore, not the due process of law for evicting the respondents.
9. The view of the Division Bench that the summary remedy provided for by Section 6 cannot be resorted to unless the alleged encroachment is of “a very recent origin”, cannot be stretched too far. That was also the view taken by the learned Single Judge himself in another case which is reported in Meharunnissa Begum v. State of A.P. which was affirmed by a Division Bench. It is not the duration, short or long, of encroachment that is conclusive of the question whether the summary remedy prescribed by the Act can be put into operation for evicting a person. What is relevant for the decision of that question is more the nature of the property on which the encroachment is alleged to have been committed and the consideration whether the claim of the occupant is bona fide. Facts which raise a bona fide dispute of title between the Government and the occupant must be adjudicated upon by the ordinary courts of law. The Government cannot decide such questions unilaterally in its own favour and evict any person summarily on the basis of such decision. But duration of occupation is relevant in the sense that a person who is in occupation of a property openly for an appreciable length of time can be taken, prima facie, to have a bona fide claim to the property requiring an impartial adjudication according to the established procedure of law”. Ss.2,6 & 7 of the A.P Encroachment Act are in pari materia with S.3, 11 & 12 of the KLC Act and what is declared in Thummala Krishna Rao, 1982 KHC 44 : 1982 (2) SCC 134 : AIR 1982 SC 1081 applies squarely to the KLC Act and the proceedings impugned here.”
The Court quoted with approval the following statement of law by Lord Esher M.R. in The Queen v. Commissioner, 1888
(21) Q.B.D. 313:
“When an inferior Court or tribunal or body, which has to exercise the power of deciding facts, is first established by Act of Parliament, the legislature has to consider what powers it will give that tribunal or body. It may in effect say that, if a certain state of facts exists and is shown to such tribunal or body before it proceeds to do certain things, it shall have jurisdiction to do such things, but not otherwise. There it is not for them conclusively to decide whether that state of facts exists, and, if they exercise the jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may be questioned, and it will be held that they have acted without jurisdiction. But there is another state of things which may exist. The legislature may intrust the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or do something more. When the legislature are establishing such a tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider, whatever jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision for otherwise there will be none. In the second of the two cases I have mentioned it is an erroneous application of the formula to say that the tribunal cannot give themselves jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist, because the legislature gave them jurisdiction to determine all the facts, including the existence of the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends; and if they were given jurisdiction so to decide, without any appeal being given; there is no appeal from such exercise of their jurisdiction.”
10. The SLP preferred by the State against the said judgment was dismissed and hence, the said judgment has attained finality. To us, the observations extracted above would squarely apply to the facts of the instant cases to refrain the State from invoking the provisions of Rule 8(3) of the Rules to cancel the Pattas covering the lands acquired from the writ petitioners.”
11. Similar view was taken by the Division Bench of this Court in WA No.2227 of 2019 which was disposed of on 17.07.2025. It was a case challenging the proceedings initiated under the Kerala Land Conservancy Rules for eviction of encroachment, wherein also this Court finding that the property is in possession of the petitioners for almost three decades and no steps have been taken for resumption of the land held that the summary power of resumption of land allegedly under the unauthorised occupation of the writ petitioners therein cannot be exercised after a considerable length of time without the Government first establishing before the Civil Court the jurisdictional fact of the land in question being a Government land for the purpose of the Act and Rules and held that the writ petitioners therein would also be entitled under law to defend any action of the State towards dispossessing them on the plea of adverse possession. Relevant paragraphs of the said judgment read as follows:-
“10. The bona fide dispute referred to above can be inferred in many ways. For instance, the persons in actual possession of the land may admit that the land in question is Government land but contend that they have been in possession pursuant to a valid permission for possession, as was the case in Banerjee Memorial Club (supra) and Shahul Hassan Musaliyar (supra). On the other hand, the person in actual possession could claim that he had a valid title over the property and that his actual possession merged with legal possession, as in the case of Harrisons Malayalam Ltd. (M/s.) and Another v. State of Kerala and Others – [2018 (2) KHC 719]. It is only in the absence of any material on record that provides a justification for the occupation of the land in question that the Government can exercise its power of resumption in terms of the Act and Rules. This aspect was reiterated by a Division Bench of this Court in Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. and Another v. State of Kerala and Others – [2018 KHC 481].
11. On the facts of the instant cases, we find that while the writ petitioners, who were in actual possession of their lands, claimed to be in possession of Government land consequent to a permission granted to them, as evidenced by the “punja chits” issued for cultivation of the lands, or by virtue of fixity of tenure obtained under Land Reforms Legislation that was in force during the relevant time, their continued possession of the lands after the coming into force of the States Reorganisation Act in 1956, and the abolition of the concessions/privileges granted prior thereto as contended by the learned senior Government Pleader, clothed them with certain rights, depending on the duration of their possession over such lands. It is also an admitted position that no proceedings for resumption of land were taken against the writ petitioners for over three decades. Under such circumstances, we cannot, but agree with the findings of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C).No.731 of 2019 [the judgment impugned in W.A.No.2227 of 2019] that the nature of the rights accruing to the writ petitioners had to be examined by a Civil Court before permitting the State to unilaterally exercise its powers of resumption under the Act and Rules. As a matter of fact, we would think that after expiry of thirty years, the writ petitioners would also be entitled under law to defend any action by the State towards dispossessing them, on the plea of adverse possession.
12. In this context, we might also refer to our own judgment dated 01.07.2025 in W.A.No.252 of 2016 and connected cases, where, in the context of the exercise of a summary power for cancellation of the registry under Rule 8(3) of the Kerala Land Assignment Rules, we found as follows:
“It is apparent from a perusal of the Rules that although the Rule does not specify a period of limitation for exercising the power for cancellation of the Patta that is already issued, the power must be exercised within a reasonable time. As regards what that reasonable time is, we must look to the other provisions of the Act for guidance. Viewed thus, we find that Rule 8(1) mentions a period of 25 years for non-alienation of lands and simultaneously provides for a power to resume the assigned lands if there is a breach of any of the conditions governing the original assignment. It is through the same provision that the power to resume lands on discovery of a mistake/fraud etc. is conferred. We would think therefore that the statutory provision itself indicates that the monitoring period for the Patta is only 25 years and that if any action, for cancellation of the Patta for breach of the conditions under which it was granted, is taken, it has to be taken within that time. In the instant case, no such action was taken by the State for almost 30/40 years from the date of issuance of the Patta. That apart, the conduct of the State in accepting tax in respect of the lands covered by the Pattas would effectively estop it from contending that it had no knowledge of the alleged fraudulent acts during all these years.”
13. The upshot of the above discussion, therefore, is that we do not deem it necessary to interfere with those findings of the learned Single Judge in the judgment impugned in W.A.No.2227 of 2019, to the extent impugned therein. We are of the view that the summary power for resumption of lands, allegedly under the unauthorized occupation of the writ petitioners in these cases, cannot be exercised after a considerable length of time [in these cases over thirty years] without the Government first establishing before a Civil Court, the jurisdictional fact of the lands in question being Government lands for the purposes of the Act and Rules.
We therefore dismiss W.A.No.2227 of 2019, close W.A.No.1435 of 2020 based on the submission of the learned senior Government Pleader that the proposal for acquisition of the land for a Medical College has since been dropped, and allow W.P.(C).No.19498 of 2018 by quashing Ext.P14 order impugned therein and maintaining the directions of the learned Single Judge in the judgment in W.P.(C).No.731 of 2019 with regard to the necessity of the State proving its title over the property in question in proceedings initiated before the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. In the light of our findings above, we also direct the State Government to forthwith, and at any rate, within a month from today, restore possession of the properties resumed from the petitioners in W.P.(C).No.731 of 2019.”
12. It is also worthwhile to refer to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in WA No.148 of 2019, which was a case where the property came into possession of the writ petitioner after a series of transfers and in the resurvey it was found that certain extent of land is thodu puramboke, and the District Collector held that in view of the above facts it is not possible to assign the thodu puramboke of the Government or change the type or character of the land. The said stand was challenged before the learned Single Judge and the learned Single Judge took a stand that there is no illegality or complexity on the part of the petitioner in issuance of patta and since the patta was of the year 1977 and no objection has been raised from any quarter to set aside the order of the District Collector rejecting the claim of the petitioner for assignment of the land and directed the District Collector to record changes of nature of land in the Revenue records. An appeal was preferred against the same. The Division Bench of this Court held that since the patta is of the year 1977 and land was in possession of the writ petitioner and his predecessor in interest for last so many years without any objection from any corner, to question the correctness of patta at this distance of time is not only legally sustainable but is also highly inequitable so far as the patta holder is concerned. Accordingly, the Division Bench declined to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. Relevant paragraph of the said judgment reads as follows:-
“6. On the above contention, what is required to be observed is that the Ext.P1 patta was issued in the year 1977 and the land in question was in possession of the writ petitioner and his predecessor in interest, for the last so many years, without any objection from any quarter. To question the correctness of the patta at this distance of time apart from being legally unsustainable, would also be highly inequitable, so far as the patta holder is concerned.”
13. In the present case also, property is stated to be in possession of the erstwhile owners, including the trust registered under the Wakf, which at least relates back to 1982. Further Exts.P7 and P9 reports of the revenue authorities, which itself will reveal that there is no puramboke land included in the subject property, and further that in respect of the very same land for the previous owners, Ext.P17 No Objection Certificate has already been issued. In the light of the above, I am of the view that the petitioner is entitled to succeed. Ext.P25 notice impugned in WP(C) No.21897 of 2022 is set aside. Likewise, Ext.P34 order impugned in WP(C) No.13004 of 2023 is also set aside with a consequential direction to the 1st respondent to consider Ext.P5 application and grant No Objection Certificate in respect of the property. It is made clear that if the Government has a case that any portion of the Government land is in unauthorised possession of the petitioner, it is for the Government to establish the same before a competent Civil Court, wherein the petitioner would be entitled to raise all pleas, including the plea of adverse possession. Another aspect to be noted is that the request for issuance of NOC was earlier declined as per Ext.P16 and subsequently by Ext.P34 in W.P.(C)No.13004 of 2023. Ext.P16 as well as Ext.P34 order refers to a complaint filed by one Appukuttan, Kalathil Veedu, regarding the establishment of the storage tank, which is just 4 metres away from his house. A perusal of Ext.P16 indicates that since the proposed petrol pump is very close to the river, necessary clearance from the CRZ authority and the town planner has to be obtained. In the light of the above facts and circumstances, it is made clear that, this Court has considered only the objection raised by respondents that a No Objection Certificate cannot be granted for the reason that a portion of the property is a puramboke land. All other objections as discernible from Exts.P16 and P34 are left open. An appropriate decision could be made by the authorities while issuing the No Objection Certificate in respect of the subject property.
The writ petitions are disposed of as above of.
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