1. The above writ petition is filed to call for the records relating to the proceeding No.DCKLM/14012/ 2019-L 12, dated 03.12.2021 (Ext.P18), of the 3rd respondent, taking over an extent of 4.04 Acres of land in Re.Sy.No.15 of Block No.189 of Kollam West Village, invoking the power under the Kerala Escheats and Forfeitures Act, 1964 and to quash the same. Petitioner also seeks other consequential reliefs.

2. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of the writ petition are as follows:

                  Petitioner is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and holds properties in various parts of Kerala, which are mainly rubber and tea plantations. Petitioner is the absolute owner of 4.04 Acres of land comprised in R.Sy.No.15 (Old Sy. Nos. 7450, 7453, 7454A, 7454B & 7456) of Block No.189 of Kollam West Village. The said property, along with other properties, was purchased by M/s. Harrisons and Crosfield (UK) Ltd from one Mr.Duncan Grant Cameron, by virtue of a sale deed No.2596 of 1912 of SRO, Kollam (Ext.P14). Thereafter, M/s. Harrisons and Crosfield (UK) Ltd. was in absolute possession and enjoyment of the said property after paying the Land Tax and other statutory dues to the Government. With the coming into force of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, M/s. Harrisons and Crosfield Ltd. filed a ceiling return as provided under Section 85A of the Kerala Land Reforms Act in respect of the properties held by the said Company, and the property which is the subject matter of this writ petition was one of the items of property included in the said ceiling return. The Taluk Land Board, Kollam, as per order dated 24.01.1979, held that the Company had an extent of 43.78.605 Acres of land as on 01.01.1970 and out of the said property, an extent of 24.90.484 Acres of land was liable to be exempted under the provisions contained in Section 81 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. The Taluk Land Board, as per Ext.P1 proceedings, held that the Company is entitled to retain an extent of 15 Acres, which is the ceiling limit prescribed under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 and the Company was directed to surrender an extent of 3.88.121 Acres of land in various survey numbers. Accordingly, the Company surrendered the excess land which was taken possession of by the Tahsildar, Kollam, on 17.11.1983, as per Ext.P2 proceedings dated 29.11.1983. Later, in the year 1979, all the assets and liabilities of the Company-M/s.Harrisons and Crosfield (UK) Ltd. was transferred to an Indian Company, Harrisons & Crosfield ( India) Limited, by virtue of a Scheme of Arrangement as approved by this Court as per Ext.P3 order in Company Petition No.24 of 1979. Later, M/s. Harrisons and Crosfield (India) Ltd., by virtue of the Scheme of Arrangement and Amalgamation approved by this Court as per Ext.P4 order, merged with M/s. Malayalam Plantations (India) Ltd. Thus, all the assets held by M/s Harrisons & Crosfield (India) Limited were transferred to M/s.Malayalam Plantations (India) Limited and Ext.P5, fresh certificate of incorporation consequent on change of name was issued by the Registrar of Companies, Kerala and the name of M/s. Malayalam Plantations (India) Ltd. was changed to M/s.Harrisons Malayalam Limited. In the year 1990, the Special Tahsildar (L.A.) No. II, Quilon issued Ext.P6 notice to the petitioner stating that the Survey Department proposes to survey the lands situated in Sy.Nos.7450, 7453 & 7454 of Kollam West Village in connection with the acquisition of the said land for public purposes. Later, Ext.P7 notification was issued by the Special Tahsildar (L.A.) proposing to acquire the subject property for the purpose of construction of an office complex at Pallithottam. In the said notice, it was specifically stated that the schedule properties were in the possession of the petitioner. Later, the proposal for acquisition was dropped by the Government. The petitioner has been remitting Land Tax in respect of the subject property till the year 2008. Thereafter, the Tahsildar, Kollam, refused to accept Land Tax in respect of the property. Thereupon, the petitioner has sent Ext.P8 letter along with a cheque towards remittance of land tax, to the Tahsildar, Kollam, requesting him to accept Land Tax for the period from 2008-09 to 2014-15 in respect of the subject property. Ext.P9 reply was given to the petitioner, intimating the inability to accept the land tax without getting clarification from the Government. In the year 2011, the 1st respondent Government filed O.P.(C) No.3508 of 2011 before this Court invoking Article 227 and 228 of the Constitution of India, essentially seeking for a declaration that large extent of land held by the petitioner herein is liable to be forfeited under the Kerala Escheats and Forfeitures Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act, 1964’). The said request was repelled by this Court in the judgment in Jagadeesachandran Nair K. and Others v. E.K. Mamomohanan Pandarthil and Others [2013 (4) KLT 584], declining relief of the Government. When the attempt of the 1st respondent to take possession of the land held by the petitioner failed, the Government appointed a Special Officer and Collector as per the provisions of the Kerala Land Conservancy Act, 1957, for the purpose of resuming the lands held by the petitioner in various parts of the State. The final order passed by the Special Officer ordering resumption of the lands held by the petitioner was challenged before this Court in W.P(C) No.33122 of 2014 and connected cases and a Division Bench of this Court as per the judgment dated 11.04.2018 in Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala [2018 (2) KLT 369], set aside the final order passed by the Special Officer ordering resumption of the properties held by the petitioner. Though SLPs were preferred against the said judgment as SLP Nos. 24028 - 24035 of 2018, the same were also dismissed. This Court in Harrisons Malayalam Ltd.’s case cited Supra held that the remedy, if any, available to the Government is to approach the competent Civil Court to establish its title. While so, to the utter shock and surprise of the petitioner, the 4th respondent, along with Revenue and Police officials, came to the subject property and affixed Ext.P11 notice on the Company's name board stating that an extent of 4.04 Acres of land in Re.Sy. No.15 of Block No.189 of Kollam West Village has been taken over by the Government as per the provisions contained in Section 11F of the Kerala Escheats and Forfeitures Act, 1964, based on the proceedings of the District collector, Kollam, dated 03.12.2021(Ext.P18). The petitioner submits that no copy of the proceedings issued by the District Collector has been served on the petitioner. It is aggrieved by the same that the present writ petition has been filed.

3. The essential contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel, Sri. Jayaprakash Sen, appearing for the petitioner, is that the proceedings now initiated are absolutely arbitrary and unjust and are in violation of the provisions of the Act, 1964. The learned Senior Counsel would further contend that the right to hold property is a constitutional right guaranteed under Article 300A of the Constitution of India, and the petitioner cannot be dispossessed, save by authority of law. The learned Senior Counsel, relying on Section 11A of the Act, 1964, submits that there should be a positive act by the rightful owner to abandon an immovable property to constitute a valid abandonment. It is further submitted that there is no case of abandonment by the petitioner, inasmuch as the petitioner is holding the said property based on the valid documents of titles and orders passed by this Court in the Company Petitions, and further, the 1st respondent in its various proceedings has upheld the title and possession of the petitioner over the subject property. When attempts were made by the 1st respondent to resume the property held by the petitioner in various parts of the State by filing OP(C)No.3508 of 2011, this Court repelled the said contention as per the judgment in Jagadeesachandran Nair’s case cited supra. Later, when land conservancy proceedings were initiated to recover other properties of the petitioner, this Court, as per the judgment in Harrisons Malayalam Ltd.’s case cited Supra, set aside those orders and directed the Government to prove their title before a competent Civil Court. The learned Senior Counsel would submit that since this Court has granted liberty to the Government to approach the competent Civil Court to establish their title, the petitioner has approached the Competent Civil Court at Kollam by filing Caveat O.P.No.82 of 2021, produced as Ext.P10, bringing to the notice of the Government that the petitioner Company is in possession of the subject land. Therefore, it is submitted that the 2nd respondent ought to have issued a notice to the petitioner before invoking the provisions of the Act, 1964. The action of the respondents in affixing a notice on the petitioner Company's name board stating that the subject property has been resumed by the Government, invoking the power under Section 11F of the Act, 1964, is absolutely arbitrary and unjust. The learned Senior Counsel would further submit that by Ext.P14 deed bearing No.2596/1912 of SRO, Kollam, the predecessor in interest of the petitioner was in absolute possession and enjoyment of the subject property and the absolute owner thereof. Ext.P16 tax receipts evidence the fact that the petitioner has been paying tax in respect of the subject property for the period, up to 2008-2009. The learned Senior Counsel relies on Ext.P17, which is the report submitted by the Tahsildar(LR) to the District Collector, Kollam, wherein it is reported that the petitioner, Harrisons Malayalam Ltd. has been paying tax in respect of the subject property and though it is further reported that as regards the title over the property, the Government could approach the competent Civil Court by filing a suit, the said wording in the report has been scored off and it is re-written that based on Ext.P19 report of the Village Officer, appropriate proceedings could be initiated. The learned Senior Counsel refers to the report of the Village Officer, wherein it is stated that Harrisons Malayalam Ltd. has been paying tax in respect of the subject property, and to prove the title, appropriate proceedings could be initiated before the competent Civil Court.

4. A detailed counter affidavit has been filed by the 3rd respondent, wherein it is stated that the District Collector after considering the status of the property, conducted an enquiry as stated in Section 11B of the Act, 1964 and in the aforesaid enquiry it is proved that the true owners of the property were British citizens and the property in question is not under the possession of the true owner and based on Ext.R3(b) report submitted by the Tahsildar(LR), proceedings were initiated and as mandated in the Act, 1964, paper publication was done, inviting objection from any interested parties as evident from Ext.R3(c) and a Gazette notification as per Ext.R3(d) was also published. Since no claim was raised in respect of the subject property, orders were issued to take over possession of the land as an abandoned property, invoking the power under Section 11F of the Act, 1964. It is further submitted that the failure on the part of the petitioner to produce document No.2596/1912 itself would show that they have no right over the property. It is further stated that, against the order issued by the District Collector, taking over the land as an abandoned property, there is an alternative remedy of filing an appeal, which has not been invoked by the petitioner, and therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable for the availability of an alternative remedy, challenging the order impugned.

5. Heard the rival contentions on both sides.

6. Going by the counter affidavit filed by the 3rd respondent, the property has been taken over, invoking the provisions of the Act, 1964, treating the property as abandoned property. Section 11 A to 11F deals with the procedure for taking over the possession of an abandoned property. Since these provisions are relevant for consideration of this case, they are extracted below:

                  “Section 11 A - Abandoned property

                  Any immovable property abandoned by the rightful owner thereof shall be abandoned property and shall belong to the Government.

                  Section 11 B - Preliminary inquiry.

                  Whenever the Collector receives information from any source that any immovable property situate within his jurisdiction has been abandoned by the rightful owner thereof, he shall cause an inquiry to be made as to whether there is any legal claimant to such property.

                  Section 11 C - Publication of notice.

                  If as a result of the inquiry under Section 11B, the Collector is satisfied that there is a prima facie case of abandonment of the property by the rightful owner thereof, he shall publish in the Gazette a notice calling upon all persons who may have any claim to such property to appear before him and to prefer their claims within six months from the date of publication of the notice.

                  Section 11 D - Investigation and decision.

                  If any claim is preferred within the period fixed under Section 11C, the Collector shall investigate the claim and decide the case after such inquiry as he deems fit to make, and issue notice of the decision to the parties concerned.

                  Section 11 E - Appeal.

                  (1) An appeal shall lie to the Board from the decision of the Collector under Section 11D within three months from the date of receipt of the notice of such decision by the parties concerned and the order of the Board on such appeal shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) and Section 11G be final.

                  (2) Any person aggrieved by the order of the Board under sub-section (1) may, within sixty days of the date of communication of the order to the parties concerned, appeal to the Government against such order, and the order of the Government on such appeal shall, subject to the provisions of Section 11G be final.

                  (3) No order under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be passed without giving all persons interested an opportunity of being heard.

                  Section 11 F - Taking Possession by Collector.

                  (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 11C, 11D and 11E, the Collector may, if satisfied after inquiry under Section 11B that any immovable property has been abandoned by the rightful owner thereof, take possession of such property, provided the property is not in the possession of any person or the person in possession does not ofier any opposition.

                  (2) If there is opposition in the taking possession of any property by the Collector under sub-section (1), the person in possession of the property may be left in possession thereof until the claim is finally settled under the foregoing provisions of this Chapter.

                  (3) The property taken possession of under sub-section (1) shall be managed by the Government in the manner prescribed. “

                  Though the learned Advocate General has taken a contention that the writ petition is not maintainable for the availability of an alternate remedy of filing an appeal against the impugned order as provided in Section 11E of the Act, 1964, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the proceedings now initiated under the Act, 1964 are entirely without jurisdiction in as much as the Government can resort to a summary procedure as provided under the Act, 1964 only if the jurisdictional facts for the exercise of such power are clearly established and therefore, the petitioner cannot be relegated to avail the alternative remedy available to challenge the impugned orders. The jurisdictional fact for the exercise of such power under Chapter IIA of the Act, 1964 is the satisfaction of the District Collector upon inquiry that an immovable property has been abandoned by the rightful owner and that there is no legal claimant to such property and that it is consequently abandoned. It is settled law that action could be taken under the Act, 1964 only if there is no bona fide claim thereto and the onus lies heavily upon the Government to establish that there is no claimant to a property sought to be taken by escheat, lapse or bona vacantia. The Division Bench of this Court in State of Kerala and Others v. Shree Navanagar Sadavrat Trust[ 2011 (3) KLJ 485] was dealing with Section 3 of the Act, 1964, treating a property as escheat property wherein it was held in paragraphs 14 and 17 as follows:

                  “14. We would first start with the contention as raised by the State. The first contention we would deal with is the question of alternative remedy provided by S.11 of the Act. No doubt, it is a remedy provided by the Statute. But as is well settled that where the order has been passed by an authority wholly without jurisdiction, the question of alternative remedy does not arise. It is submitted that there were no facts to justify the assumption of jurisdiction. To the contrary, the enquiry report of the Tahsildar, which formed the basis of the order of the District Collector to assume jurisdiction and initiate proceedings, would itself show that the property belonged to the trust and all taxes were being paid by Shree Navanagar Sadavarat Trust and was being maintained by the Trust. If that be so, then where is the question of the property belonging to a person who died without heirs. But the District Collector having no other materials before him, accepted the report of the Tahsildar and still choose to assume jurisdiction which he lacks in the facts aforesaid. If this be correct, then the District Collector clearly acted without jurisdiction and that being so, the alternative remedy would be no bar in entertaining the original petition and the learned Single Judge did no wrong in entertaining the original petition.

                  xxx xxx xxx

                  17. From this, two things would be clear. Firstly, merely on failure of a party to show that he is a heir or a successor does not mean that the property would automatically vest in the State on the principles of escheat and secondly, that this jurisdiction creates heavy burden on the State itself to show the facts and determine the facts. The onus is not on any person who claims property.”

                  The crucial aspect of Chapter IIA dealing with ‘abandoned property’ and the procedure for taking possession of the same is that the rightful owner has abandoned the immovable property and Collector should receive an information that any immovable property situated within his jurisdiction has been abandoned by the rightful owner and the consequent satisfaction of the District Collector that the immovable property has been abandoned by the rightful owner. These are jurisdictional facts giving power to the District Collector to take over an abandoned property as per the provisions of the Act, 1964. The Apex Court in Carona Ltd. v Parvathy Swaminathan and Sons[(2007) 8 SCC 559] was considering the jurisdiction of a Court, a Tribunal or an Authority where the existence of a jurisdictional fact is a condition precedent for invoking jurisdiction and held that the existence of a jurisdictional fact is a sine qua non or condition precedent for assumption of jurisdiction. The Court held in paragraphs 27, 28 and 36 as follows:

                  “27. Stated simply, the fact or facts upon which the jurisdiction of a Court, a Tribunal or an Authority depends can be said to be a 'jurisdictional fact'. If the jurisdictional fact exists, a Court, Tribunal or Authority has jurisdiction to decide other issues. If such fact does not exist, a Court, Tribunal or Authority cannot act. It is also well settled that a Court or a Tribunal cannot wrongly assume existence of jurisdictional fact and proceed to decide a matter. The underlying principle is that by erroneously assuming existence of a jurisdictional fact, a subordinate Court or an inferior Tribunal cannot confer upon itself jurisdiction which it otherwise does not posses.

                  28. In Halsbury's Laws of England, (4th Edn.), Vol. 1, para 55, p.61; Reissue, Vol. 1(1), para 68, pp. 114-15, it has been stated:

                  "Where the jurisdiction of a tribunal is dependent on the existence of a particular state of afiairs, that state of afiairs may be described as preliminary to, or collateral to the merits of the issue. If, at the inception of an inquiry by an inferior tribunal, a challenge is made to its jurisdiction, the tribunal has to make up its mind whether to act or not and can give a ruling on the preliminary or collateral issue; but that ruling is not conclusive".

                  The existence of a jurisdictional fact is thus a sine qua non or condition precedent to the assumption of jurisdiction by a Court or Tribunal.

                  xxx xxx xxx

                  36. It is thus clear that for assumption of jurisdiction by a Court or a Tribunal, existence of jurisdictional fact is a condition precedent. But once such jurisdictional fact is found to exist, the Court or Tribunal has power to decide adjudicatory facts or facts in issue.”

                  The Apex Court in Arun Kumar and Others v. Union of India and others[2007 (1) SCC 732] was considering what are the jurisdictional facts, so that the Court, Tribunal or Authority could assume jurisdiction. The Court held paragraphs 74, 76 and 78 as follows:

                  “74. A "jurisdictional fact" is a fact which must exist before a Court, Tribunal or an Authority assumes jurisdiction over a particular matter. A jurisdictional fact is one on existence or non existence of which depends jurisdiction of a court, a tribunal or an authority. It is the fact upon which an administrative agency's power to act depends. If the jurisdictional fact does not exist, the court, authority or ofiicer cannot act. If a Court or authority wrongly assumes the existence of such fact, the order can be questioned by a writ of certiorari. The underlying principle is that by erroneously assuming existence of such jurisdictional fact, no authority can confer upon itself jurisdiction which it otherwise does not posses.

                  75. xxx xxx xxx

                  76. The existence of jurisdictional fact is thus sine qua non or condition precedent for the exercise of power by a court of limited jurisdiction.

                  77. xxx xxx xxx

                  78. Upholding the contention and declaring the direction of the State Government ultra vires, this Court stated:

                  "In our opinion, the condition imposed by S.17(1) is a condition upon which the jurisdiction of the State Government depends and it is obvious that by wrongly deciding the question as to the character of the land the State Government cannot give itself jurisdiction to give a direction to the Collector to take possession of the land under S.17(1) of the Act. It is well established that where the jurisdiction of an administrative authority depends upon a preliminary finding of fact the High Court is entitled, in a proceeding of writ of certiorari to determine, upon its independent judgment, whether or not that

                  finding of fact is correct”.”

                  Section 11A of the Act, 1964 defines abandoned property as any immovable property abandoned by the rightful owner, and the jurisdictional fact to be decided by the District Collector to invoke jurisdiction is as to whether the immovable property has been abandoned by the rightful owner. The Apex Court in Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Company Ltd. v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 328, was considering the meaning of the word abandoned property and held in paragraph 29 as follows:

                  “29. It remains to deal with the contention of the respondents that the impugned legislation is, in substance, one in respect of abandoned property, and that, by its very nature, it cannot be held to violate the rights of any person either under Art.19(1)(f) or Art.31 (2). That would be the correct position if the character of the legislation is what the respondents claim it to be, for it is only a person who has some interest in property that can complain that the impugned legislation invades that right whether it be under Art.19(1)(f) or Art.31 (2), and if it is abandoned property, ex hypothesis there is no one who has any interest in it. But can the impugned Act be held to be legislation with respect to abandoned property? To answer this question, it is necessary to examine the basic principles underlying such a legislation, and ascertain whether those are the principles on which the Act is framed. The expression "abandoned property" or to use the more familiar term "bona vacantia" comprises properties of two difierent kinds, those which come in by escheat and those over which no one has a claim. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Vol. 7, page 536, para 1152, it is stated that "the term bona vacantia is applied to things in which no one can claim a property and includes the residuary estate of persons dying intestate".

                  There is, however, this distinction between the two classes of property that while the State becomes the owner of the properties of a person who dies intestate as his ultimate heir, it merely takes possession of property which is abandoned. At common law, abandoned personal property could not be the subject of escheat. It could only be appropriated by the Sovereign as bona vacantia. Vide Holdsworth's History of English Law, Second Edition, Vol. 7, pages 495-496. In Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance co. v. Moore, (1947) 333 US 541 at p. 546: 92 Law Ed 863 at p. 869 (U), the-principle behind the law was stated to be that "the State may, more properly, be custodian and beneficiary of abandoned property than any other person." Consistently with the principle stated above, a law relating to abandoned property enacts firstly provisions for the State conserving and safeguarding for the benefit of the true owners property in respect of which no claim is made for a specified and reasonable period, and secondly, for those properties vesting in the State absolutely when no claim is made with reference thereto by the true owners within a time limited.”

                  This Court in State of Kerala v. Mondoli Hydru[1983 KLJ 402] has considered the concept of abandonment and held that the Court cannot presume in favour of abandonment, and the onus rests on the party asserting abandonment. Paragraph 30 of the said judgment reads as follows:

                  “30. We have dealt with the question of 'abandonment' above, with reference to material and evidence in the case and the interpretation judicially placed on the concept of 'abandonment'. Abandonment postulates a specific mental condition in respect of the person who abandons and the property in relation to which abandonment is alleged. The court below has referred to the observations of the Supreme Court in Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Company v. State of Bombay AIR 1958 SC 328 in its judgment while dealing with the features and efiect of 'abandonment'. It is not necessary to discuss the case law on this concept or to refer to the Law Lexicons' discussing the meaning of the term for in the very contExt.of the Board's Standing Orders in relation to the property held by a registered owner in the Madras Presidency, the question had been considered way back in 1872, in Rajagopala Ayyangar v. Collector of Chingleput and Another, 7 Madras High Court Reports 98. The following passage from that decision, according to us, lays down the correct legal position:

                  "The letting land lie fallow does not necessarily lead to the inference of abandonment, because it is susceptible of explanation in a hundred other difierent ways. And it would be very harsh to hold that a proprietor, because he exercises his right of abstaining from cultivating his land, must on that account be taken to have abandoned it." A later decision of a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court in Kanhiya Shanker v. Mahabala Sadhu, AIR 1960 Punjab 495 at p. 496 has explained the concept, according to us correctly, while it observed:

                  "The courts do not presume in favour of abandonment and the onus rests on the party asserting abandonment. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the party pleading abandonment to establish his plea. In this case, defendants No. 1, the appellants before us, who set up abandonment, have to prove the same by unequivocal and decisive evidence. 'Abandonment' means the act of intentionally and without reference to any particular person or persons. In this case it has to be a voluntary relinquishment of possession of the property by its owners with the intention of terminating their ownership but without vesting it in any other person.

                  A person abandoning his property gives up all hope, expectation or intention of recovering his property. The property, after it is abandoned, results in complete divestiture of the title of its owner and having ceased to be his property it becomes the subject of appropriation by the first taker or by its occupant who reduces it to his possession. Abandonment is not a surrender of property because the latter term connotes its relinquishment to another. It is an act whereby a person gives up his ownership without creating proprietary rights in another person.

                  There are two primary elements of abandonment, namely the intention to abandon and the external act by which efiect is given to the intention and both these elements must concur. The intention must be clear and unmistakable indicating that it is the ownership which is being relinquished and not the possession or any other subordinate right consistent with the retention of ownership. A person abandoning permanently divests himself of his title. The act of abandonment from its very nature has to be voluntary, absolute and unconditional, excluding element of coercion, and pressure of any kind.”

7. The question is as to whether there existed jurisdictional facts so that the 3rd respondent, District Collector, could assume jurisdiction to invoke the powers conferred on him as per the Act, 1964. The said question has to be considered with reference to the following facts:

                  (a) There is a duly registered sale deed dated 29.04.1912, Ext.P14, in respect of the subject properties in favour of the petitioner. As stated above, it is also not in dispute that all the assets and liabilities of the company, M/s. Harrisons and Crosfield (UK) Ltd was transferred to an Indian Company, M/s.Harrisons and Crosfield(India) Ltd. as per Ext.P3 order passed by this Court in Company Petition No.24 of 1979. Later, M/s. Harrisons and Crosfield(India) Ltd., merged with M/s. Malayalam Plantations (India) Ltd., and the said amalgamation and the Scheme of Arrangement were approved by this Court as per Ext.P4 order. Later, by virtue of Ext.P5, a fresh certificate of incorporation, consequent to the change of name, issued by the Registrar of Companies, Kerala, the name of M/s.Harrisons Plantation(India) Ltd. was changed to M/s.Harrisons Malayalam Ltd., the petitioner herein. All these transfers were carried out as per the orders of this Court and also as per the proceedings initiated by the Registrar of Companies.

                  (b) The petitioner is in possession of the said property, and the name board of the petitioner has been prominently displayed on the subject property. The said fact cannot be disputed by the respondents in as much as the notice of eviction has been affixed by the officials on the said name board, as evident from Ext.P11.

                  (c) Petitioner has been paying tax in respect of the said property till 2008. Thereafter, the authorities declined to accept the same, and Ext.P8 letter along with the cheque towards remittance of land tax for the period from 2008-09 to 2014-15 was sent to Tahsildar, Kollam, requesting to receive land tax, to which Ext.P9 reply was given, intimating inability to accept land tax without getting clarification from the Government.

                  (d) The petitioner has filed a statement as per the provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, which was adjudicated by the Taluk Land Board, Quilon, and the statement was, inter alia, in respect of the subject properties. ExtP1 proceedings were initiated by the Taluk Land Board dated 09.11.1983, directing the petitioner company to surrender the excess land and as evidenced from Ext.P2 proceedings issued by the Tahsildar, Kollam, the land was surrendered by the company.

                  (e) Further, proceedings for the acquisition of the said land were also initiated, as evident from Exts.P6 and P7, which reveal that the revenue authorities were aware that the petitioner is in ownership and possession of the said property.

                  (f) Ext.P17 is the report of the Tahsildar wherein it is stated that the petitioner company is attempting to remit tax in respect of the said property and though initially the Tahsildar LR has reported that claiming ownership of the said property, a civil case could be filed by the Government, the same is seen struck off and reported that further action could be taken. Ext.P19 is the report submitted by the Village Officer, which is referred to in Ext.P17 report of the Tahsildar (LR), wherein it is specifically reported that the petitioner company is taking steps for remitting tax in respect of the property and that, claiming ownership over the property, a civil suit could be filed by the Government. It is on the basis of the said report, Ext.P18 proceeding was issued as per the provisions of the Act, 1964, taking over the property in favour of the Government.

                  (g) The Government itself has filed O.P.C. No. 3508 of 2011, essentially seeking a declaration that a large extent of land held by the petitioner company is liable to be forfeited under the Act, 1964. The said plea was declined by this Court in Jagadeesachandran Nair’s case cited Supra. Even at the time of filing the said original petition, the State was aware that the properties were in possession of the Company.

                  (h) Since this Court in Harrisons Malayalam Ltd.’s case cited Supra has permitted the Government to file a suit to prove the title, the petitioner has filed Ext.P10 Caveat O.P.No.82/2021 before the Subordinate Judge Court, Kollam, wherein the Government – the Revenue Department, District Collector, Kollam and the Tahsildar, Kollam are arrayed as party respondents/expected applicants. Thus the filing of the caveat claiming possession on the property was aware to the authorities.

8. The above-stated factual details regarding ownership and possession of the property in favour of the petitioner were very much aware by the revenue officials, including the District Collector and in the light of the above facts, the Collector could never have formed an honest opinion that the subject properties were abandoned by a foreign national or there was no legal claimant to them, in as much as the jurisdictional facts were not available to the third respondent District Collector for assumption of jurisdiction so as to proceed as per the provisions of the Act, 1964.

9. Yet another aspect to be noted is that proceedings have now been initiated treating the property as an abandoned property and not as an escheat. Different procedures have been prescribed as per the Act, 1964 for proceeding against a property which is treated as an escheat and as an abandoned property. Section 5 deals with the publication of notice in the gazette calling for objections. The gazette notification dated 09.02.2021, Ext.R3 (d) and paper publication, Ext.R3 (c) produced along with the counter affidavit revealed that the said notices have been issued invoking Section 5 of the Act, 1964, which are proceedings in relation to ‘escheats’ as defined in Section 3 of the Act, 1964. But Ext.P18 order was issued treating the said property as an abandoned property under Section 11A of the Act, 1964, which as per the Act, should be preceded with notice under Section 11C. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that the impugned order, being unsupported by a notice under Section 11C, is entirely without jurisdiction. Moreover, as the notice has been issued under Section 5 and not under Section 11C, it is clear that no satisfaction was even alleged to have been formed that the subject properties were abandoned, and on this count also, the jurisdictional prerequisite for the exercise of power under Chapter IIA of the Act, 1964 dealing with abandoned property is clearly not satisfied.

10. Another aspect to be noted is that as evident from Ext.P11 the notice of eviction has been affixed on the name board put in by the petitioner company and that the watchman and the security guards have objected to the same and going by Sub Section 2 of Section 11F, if there is any opposition in taking possession of any property by the Collector under Sub section 1, the person in possession of the person may be left in possession thereof until the claim is finally settled under the foregoing provisions of Chapter IIA of the Act, 1964. The said mandate of the Act is also violated in the present case.

11. In view of the above, I am unable to accept the contention of the learned Advocate General that the writ petition is not maintainable due to the availability of other alternative remedies for the petitioner as provided under Section 11E to file an appeal or to file a suit as provided in Section 11G, since I have already found that Ext.P18 order has been issued without jurisdictional facts being available to invoke the jurisdiction and the invocation of the said power was without any legal foundation. The Apex Court in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai and Others[(1998) 8 SCC 1] considered the extent to which the writ jurisdiction could be invoked when an alternative remedy is available and held in paragraph 20 as follows:

                  “20. Much water has since flown beneath the bridge, but there has been no corrosive efiect on these decisions which, though old, continue to hold the field with the result that law as to the jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining a writ petition under Art.226 of the Constitution, in spite of the alternative statutory remedies, is not afiected, specially in a case where the authority against whom the writ is filed is shown to have had no jurisdiction or had purported to usurp jurisdiction without any legal foundation.”

                  A similar issue was considered by the Apex Court in Dr. (Smt.) Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur (U.P.)[1987 (4) SCC 525] and held in paragraph 12 as follows:

                  “12.The nExt.question that falls for our consideration is whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the writ petition of the appellant on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy. It is true that there was an alternative remedy for challenging the impugned order by referring the question to the Chancellor under S.68 of the U. P. State Universities Act. It is well established that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition. When an authority has acted wholly without jurisdiction, the High Court should not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy. In the instant case, the Vice Chancellor had no power of review and the exercise of such a power by her was absolutely without jurisdiction. Indeed, the order passed by the Vice Chancellor on review was a nullity; such an order could surely be challenged before the High Court by a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution and, in our opinion, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petition on the ground that an alternative remedy was available to the appellant under S.68 of the U. P. State Universities Act.”

                  In the light of the above, the contention of the learned Advocate General regarding maintainability of the writ petition relying on Indian Timber and Plywood Corporation Ltd and Others v. State of Kerala and Others, 1994 KHC 612 is rejected.

                  In the light of the above, the proceedings now initiated by the District Collector invoking the power under the Act, 1964 is liable to be interfered with. Accordingly, Ext.P18 order dated 03.12.2021 of the District Collector is set aside, and the writ petition is allowed as above.