Suddala Chalapathi Rao, J.

1. The instant Writ Petition has been filed challenging the Order in Original No.185/2022/ADJN-CUS-ADC, dt.14.03.2023 on the file of the Addl. Commissioner Customs, GST LB Stadium i.e., the 1st respondent herein as confirmed by the common Order-in-Appeal No.HYD-CUS-000-APP1-227-228-23-24, dt.27.03.2024, on the file of the 2nd respondent (Appeals-1), and the consequential Final Order No.A/30015-30024/2025, dt.20.01.2025 passed by the 3rd respondent - Customs Excise and Excise Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, Southern Region Bench in Customs Appeals No.30748-30757 of 2024, by calling for the records and consequently set aside the original order No.185/2022-ADJN-CUS-ADC, dt.14.03.2023 passed by the 1st respondent as arbitrary contrary to the provisions of customs Act 1962 and consequent set aside the same.

2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner No.1 is a company duly incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, having its registered office at Indira Gandhi International Airport, Terminal-1D, New Delhi – 110037, India, and an additional operational office at 319, Udyog Vihar, Phase-IV, Gurgaon – 122016, Haryana. The petitioner No.1 is a well- established entity in the aviation and airline industry, carrying on diversified operations including air transportation, warehousing of goods, logistics, and allied trade services, and it has been issued with an Importer Exporter Code (IEC) bearing No.0593003667.

3. The petitioner No.1 entered into a sub-sub-lease deed dt.28.07.2021 (hereinafter referred to as the “Lease Deed”) with M/s GMR Hyderabad Aviation SEZ Limited (hereinafter referred to as “GHASL”) for the establishment of a Free Trade Warehousing Zone (FTWZ) within the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) premises. It is engaged in the business of trading and warehousing as contemplated under the terms of the Lease Deed and the leased premises were handed over to the 1st petitioner in August, 2021 and its commercial operations commenced in September, 2021. Further, as per Clause 3 of the said Lease Deed, the petitioner No.1 was permitted to allow third parties to use the premises on a license basis and Clause 3.2(a) specifically stipulates that the petitioner shall not create any lien or charge over the leased premises in favour of third parties, however, it may permit third parties to use the premises on a license basis, subject to the condition that such sub-users shall be solely responsible for compliance with all obligations under the Lease Deed, and not limited to payment obligations.

4. It is stated that prior to execution of the Lease Deed, the petitioner No.1 had obtained approval from the Government of India vide reference No.9-481/SCZ/HYD/2019/103-SE, dt.05.02.2020, for establishing a trading unit admeasuring 33,000 sq. meters on Acre 1.60 guntas of land within the FTWZ situated at GHASL, Mamidipalli Village, Shamshabad Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, Telangana, and the said approval was extended from time to time. The SEZ framework is intended to promote exports, attract foreign direct investment (FDI), and generate employment opportunities by providing a competitive, efficient, and hassle-free business environment for entities engaged in international trade.

5. It is further submitted that M/s NADFA Trading FZE dispatched 21 consignments of goods to the petitioner’s warehouse situated in the FTWZ at Plot No.8F, Survey No.99/1, GMR Aerospace and Industrial Park, GMR Hyderabad Aviation SEZ Ltd., Rajiv Gandhi International Airport, Shamshabad. Out of the said consignments, 14 consignments belonged to one entity and 7 consignments to UIEPL and that the said goods were intended for export to M/s NADFA Trading FZE, Hamriyah Free Zone, Sharjah, UAE.

6. While so, basing upon the specific intelligence, the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), Hyderabad Zonal Unit, conducted inspection and verification of the goods stored in the 1st petitioner’s premises, and found 667 cartons covered under 7 invoices pertaining to M/s UIEPL, wherein the goods declared were Leather Belts and Leather Wallets, with a total declared value of Rs.8.36 crores, however, upon examination, the DRI formed an opinion that the quality of the goods did not justify the declared value, and accordingly, the services of a Chartered Engineer, Sri N.R. Rao, were engaged, who assessed the value of the goods at Rs.1.67 crores as against the declared value of Rs.8.36 crores.

7. It is further stated that upon investigation, it was alleged that neither the goods nor the staff were present at the premises at the relevant time and that no supporting business records were available at the registered premises, and were in fact, non-existent entities. Based on the said valuation report, the Additional Commissioner of Customs called upon the petitioner to submit relevant documents for verification. The petitioner duly furnished all documents as required. Upon scrutiny, it was observed by the respondent authorities that the tax invoices issued by M/s UIEPL contained endorsements indicating an intention to claim benefits under the RODTEP scheme. However, the SEZ online system reflected that the exports were filed under duty drawback claims.

8. Subsequently, a show-cause notice dt.01.07.2022 was issued to the 1st petitioner, to which reply dt.28.07.2022, was submitted by the petitioners. However, it is contended by the petitioners that without properly considering the said reply and without affording a reasonable opportunity of being heard, the 1st respondent passed Order-in-Original No.185/2022-ADJN-CUS- ADC, dt.14.03.2023, holding that the goods were undervalued and ordered the goods to be confiscated with an option of redemption upon payment of a fine of Rs.5 lakhs. Further, imposed penalty of Rs.1,00,00,000/- each under Section 114(iii) of the Customs Act, 1962 on Sri Mohd. Sabahuddin, M/s UIEPL, and its directors. In addition to the said penalties, separate penalty of Rs.5 lakhs each was imposed under Section 114AA on Sri Mohd. Sabahuddin, M/s UIEPL, and its directors and also a penalty of Rs.5 lakhs each under Section 114(iii) on the petitioners.

9. Aggrieved by the said Order-in-Original, the petitioners preferred appeal before the 2nd respondent in Appeal Nos.HYD- CUS-000-APP-1-227 and 228-23-24. However, the said appeals came to be dismissed by common order, dt.27.03.2024, on the ground of limitation. Thereafter, the petitioners preferred further appeals before the 3rd respondent by way of Customs Appeal Nos.30748-30757 of 2024, upon payment of the mandatory pre- deposits. The 3rd respondent, by its common Final Order, upheld the decision of the 2nd respondent.

10. It was observed by both the 2nd and 3rd respondents/appellate authorities that the Orders-in-Original, dt.14.03.2023, was served upon the petitioners on 20.03.2023 and as such the appeals ought to have been filed within the statutory period prescribed under the Customs Act, 1962, i.e., within 60 days, extendable by a further period of 30 days condonation at the discretion of the Commissioner (Appeals), however, the petitioners had filed the appeals on 03.10.2023 after the communication of the Orders-in-Original on 20.03.2023. Consequently, the 2nd respondent i.e., Commissioner (Appeals) dismissed the appeals as time-barred, without going into the merits of the case, by common order, dt.03.10.2023. On further appeal preferred there-against, the 3rd respondent held that the 2nd respondent had no power to condone delay beyond the statutory period prescribed under the Act and, therefore, found no infirmity in the order passed by the 2nd respondent, and thus, both the appellate authorities refused to entertain the appeals beyond the prescribed period of limitation as envisage under section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962.

11. It is further contended that, both the appeals were rejected solely on the ground of limitation, without a proper adjudication on merits, which deprived the petitioners of their valuable right. In the aforesaid circumstances, the petitioners were constrained to file the present writ petitions challenging the orders passed by the respondents.

12. Heard Sri Mayur Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners and Sri Domenic Fernandez, the learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents.

13. Sri Mayur Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, contended that the appeals filed under the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 ought not to have been rejected at the threshold without proper determination of the factual issues. It is submitted that the 2nd and 3rd respondents, being appellate authorities, empowered to appreciate the factual matrix of the case, ought to have entertained the appeals and adjudicated the matter on merits, as the delay was properly explained. Instead, rejected the appeals solely on the technical ground of limitation, thereby defeating the legitimate right of the petitioners to challenge the original orders.

14. The learned Senior Counsel further contended that when the statute provides a right of appeal, such right should not be rendered illusory and defeated on technical grounds. Even if the appeals were filed beyond the prescribed period, the appellate authorities erred in arriving at the conclusion that the appeals have been filed after expiry of more than six months, when in fact, the Orders-in-Original, dt.14.03.2023, was served upon the petitioners on 20.03.2023 and even as per the Order-in-Appeal No.HYD-CUS-000-APP1-227-228-23-24, dt.27.03.2024, the petitioner filed appeal on 03.10.2023, thus, after deducting the statutory period of 60 days for filing appeal, the delay that occurred in filing the appeal is about 140 days approximately and not six months as observed in the said appeal, and thus, the respondents ought to have considered whether any sufficient cause was shown for condonation of said delay and should have taken the appeals on file and decided on merits. It is thus contended that in the present case, the 2nd and 3rd respondents have erred in dismissing the appeals on the ground of limitation without considering the explanation offered by the petitioners, for such delay.

15. It is further contended that although section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962 prescribes a limitation period of 60 days for filing an appeal, with a further condonable period of 30 days by the appellate authority, the restriction placed on condonation of delay beyond the said period is over restrictive or unduly rigid, and that such restriction should not be construed in a manner so as to restrict the substantive right of appeal, more so, when the said period is not mandatory but only a procedural in nature.

16. In support of the aforesaid contentions, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mukhee Gopalan vs. Cheppilatputhanpurayial Aboobacker (1995 (5) SCC 5), Tata Steel Limited vs. Rajkumar Banerjee and others (2025 SCC Online SC 1042), National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Pranay Sethi and others ((2017) 16 SCC 680), Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) represented by Executive Engineer vs. Burse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited (2021 (6) SCC 460), along with the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka in the case of Sri Kanakadurga Developers vs. Assistant Commissioner of Service Tax and others ((2018) (359) ELT 286 (AAR)) and the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay in Navabharat Enterprises Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Customs (Import) (2015 SCC Online BOM 8592), wherein it is stated that the law of limitation would be applicable to the special statute.

17. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the law of limitation applies equally to special statutes unless expressly excluded. In terms of the principles governing limitation, the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963, would apply insofar as they are not specifically excluded by the special statute, and thus, even where the Customs Act prescribes a limited period for condonation of delay, the principles underlying the Limitation Act, 1963, would still be applicable, and therefore, if sufficient cause is shown, the appellate authorities ought to have considered the appeals even if filed beyond the prescribed period.

18. It is also contended that it is trite law that this Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can intervene in appropriate cases to prevent injustice. Thus, in the instant case, even if the appellate authorities are held to have no power to condone delay beyond the statutory period of 60 days along with the further condonable period of 30 days, this Court can exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to ensure that the parties are not subjected to undue hardship. Further, it is submitted that in the present case, there is no inordinate delay and that the reasons for the delay have been properly/satisfactorily explained.

19. The learned Senior Counsel thus submits that in the circumstances of the case, this Court can condone the delay and remit the matter to the 2nd respondent for consideration on merits, or in the alternative, adjudicate the matter in the present writ petition itself, so as to put a quietus to the dispute and afford an opportunity to the petitioners to establish their case, substantially.

20. Per contra, the learned Senior Standing Counsel, Sri Domenic Fernandez, appearing for the respondents, contended that once a statute prescribes a specific period of limitation, particularly under the Customs Act, 1962, the same is binding and must be strictly adhered to. It is further submitted that the Section 128 of the Customs Act prescribes a limitation period of 60 days, with a further condonable period of 30 days, and the 2nd respondent has only such limited power to condone delay within the said period, and thus, beyond the said period of 60 + 30 days, the appellate authority has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, and cannot invoke the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to condone the delay beyond the statutorily prescribed period, and further the delay has not been properly or satisfactorily explained.

21. In support of the above contention, learned Senior Standing Counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited V/s. Gujarat Energy Transmission Corporation Ltd., and others ((2017) 5 SCC 42), wherein it has been held that when a statute prescribes a specific period of limitation, the authorities concerned have no power to extend such period beyond what is expressly provided under the statute.

22. The learned Senior Standing Counsel further placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Assistant Commissioner (CT), LTU, Kakinada & Ors. vs. M/s. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited (2020 (19) SCC 681), wherein it has been held that the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot entertain a writ petition so as to effectively condone the delay in filing a statutory appeal, particularly when an alternate statutory remedy is available and when there is no challenge to jurisdictional error or violation of principles of natural justice, and thus, contended that the writ petition itself is not maintainable.

23. It was further contended that when an efficacious alternative remedy is available under the statute, the High Court cannot entertain a writ petition and may non-suit the petitioner on that ground alone, for the reason that, if a party approaches the Hon’ble High Court after expiry of the maximum limitation period prescribed under the statute, the Court cannot disregard such statutory limitation and entertain the petition as a matter of right.

24. The learned Senior Standing Counsel thus contended that the wide powers conferred on this Court under Article 226 cannot be exercised in a manner that defeats or overrides the legislative intent. Further, placing reliance on the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments, it is contended that permitting such writ petitions would render the statutory scheme of limitation otiose. Accordingly, it is argued that this Court has no jurisdiction, even under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to entertain the present writ petition and prayed to dismiss the writ petition.

25. Having given earnest consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on either side, perused the material on record.

26. On a perusal of the pleadings of both sides, it is evident that for the alleged violations attributed to the petitioners, the original authority initiated proceedings, which culminated in Order-in- Original No.185/2022/ADJN-CUS-ADC, dt.14.03.2023. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners preferred appeals before the 2nd respondent and 3rd respondent, which were dismissed. However, it is not in dispute that there was a delay in filing the said appeals before the 2nd respondent.

27. Under the provisions of Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962, an appeal is required to be filed within a period of 60 days from the date of communication of the Order-in-Original, with a further condonable period of 30 days by the appellate authority at its discretion. Thus, the total permissible period for entertaining an appeal is 60 + 30 days and beyond the said period, the appellate authority does not have jurisdiction to condone the delay or entertain the appeal.

28. In the present case, the petitioners, admittedly, filed the appeals before the 2nd respondent on 03.10.2023 after the communication of the Orders-in-Original on 20.03.2023, and in view of the statutory limitation, the 2nd respondent declined to entertain the appeals as it lacked jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the prescribed period. The 3rd respondent, upon further appeal, examined the issue within its limited scope and upheld the decision of the 2nd respondent, holding that the rejection of the appeals on the ground of limitation was in accordance with law.

29. In view of the above, it stands established that both the appellate authorities have acted strictly in accordance with the statutory scheme of limitation, and the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that the appellate authorities ought to have entertained the appeals despite the delay cannot be accepted in view of the express provisions of the Customs Act, 1962.

30. At this juncture, it is apposite to consider the judicial precedents relied upon by both parties. The learned Senior Standing Counsel for the respondents has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited’s case (supra), wherein it was held that when a statute prescribes a specific period of limitation along with a limited power of condonation, the authorities cannot extend such period beyond what is expressly provided. The said principle squarely applies to the present case insofar as the 2nd respondent is concerned, as the authority is bound by the statutory limitation and cannot invoke any inherent or equitable powers to condone delay beyond the prescribed period.

31. Further reliance has been placed on M/s Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited’s case(supra), wherein it has been held that the High Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should not ordinarily entertain writ petitions so as to circumvent statutory remedies, particularly when the delay in availing such remedies is beyond the condonable period. The said judgment emphasizes judicial restraint and adherence to legislative intent in matters of limitation.

32. It is not in dispute that the ratio laid down in the aforesaid judgments is fully applicable to the extent that the appellate authorities were justified in rejecting the appeals as time-barred.

33. However, the applicability of the said judgments is required to be understood in the context in which they were rendered. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the above decisions, did not lay down an absolute bar on the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in all cases involving delay. The said decisions primarily caution against routine interference and emphasize that statutory timelines should not be lightly disregarded.

34. On the other hand, the various judgments relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, as noted in the earlier paragraphs, would show that procedural laws, including limitation, are intended to advance justice and not defeat substantive rights. While those judgments lay down general principles favoring a liberal approach in appropriate cases, they cannot be construed as enabling statutory authorities to act beyond the limitation prescribed under special enactments like the Customs Act, 1962. To that extent, their direct applicability is limited.

35. Nevertheless, the broader principle emerging from the said precedents, that technicalities should not defeat substantive justice, remains relevant while exercising constitutional jurisdiction under Article 226.

36. The principal grievance of the petitioners is that they have been deprived of an opportunity to have their case examined on merits by the appellate authority, particularly when the statute provides a right of appeal, and denial of such right has resulted in failure of substantive justice, as the issues involved require proper appreciation of facts and evidence.

37. It is well-settled legal position that when a statute prescribes a specific period of limitation along with a limited power of condonation, the authorities constituted under the statute are bound by such limitation and cannot travel beyond it. At the same time, it is equally settled that the procedural prescriptions relating to limitation are intended to regulate the exercise of rights and not to extinguish substantive rights, especially where the consequences of non-adjudication on merits would result in apparent injustice.

38. Though the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, would automatically extend the period of limitation under the Customs Act, 1962, is not accepted, we are of the considered view that, in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court can intervene in appropriate cases to ensure that technicalities do not defeat the ends of justice.

39. In the instant case, though the delay exceeds the statutorily condonable period, is not of such a nature as to indicate deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides. On the contrary, the petitioners have pursued the matter by availing the appellate remedies, albeit belatedly, raising issues which require factual adjudication and which have not been examined at all by the appellate authority on merits. In such circumstances, denial of such opportunity would result in foreclosing the petitioners’ statutory remedy of appeal without any adjudication on the substantive issues involved and a grave injustice would cause to the petitioners, while right of appeal is provided by the statute for fair justice.

40. Accordingly, while not interfering with the legal position governing limitation under the Customs Act, 1962, and in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in the facts and circumstances of the present case, we set aside the order in appeal No.HYD-CUS-000-ATP1-227-228 dt.27.03.2024, on the file of the 2nd respondent (Appeals-1), and the consequential final order No.A/30015-30024/2025, dt.20.01.2025 passed by the 3rd respondent, insofar as the Order in Original No.185/2022/ADJN-CUS-ADC, dt.14.03.2023, is concerned, by condoning the delay occurred in filing the appeal before the 2nd respondent, subject to the condition of the petitioners paying a sum of Rs.25,000/-(Rupees Twenty Five thousand) to the Telangana State Legal Services Authority, within a period of two (02) weeks from today.

41. Upon such payment, the petitioners shall approach the 2nd respondent and file an appropriate memo enclosing proof of payment and, on such compliance, the 2nd respondent shall restore the appeal No.HYD-CUS-000-ATP1-227-228 to its file and adjudicate the same afresh on merits, after affording reasonable opportunity to both parties, strictly in accordance with law.

42. With the above directions, the Writ Petition is partly allowed.

As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.