Jobin Sebastian, J.

1. This writ petition is directed against an order of detention dated 19.12.2025 passed against one Aboobacker (herein after referred to as 'detenu'), under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (‘KAAP Act’ for brevity).

2. The records reveal that on 14.11.2025, a proposal was submitted by the District Police Chief, Palakkad, seeking initiation of proceedings against the detenu under the KAA(P) Act before the jurisdictional authority. For the purpose of initiation of the said proceedings, the detenu was classified as a 'known rowdy' as defined under Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAA(P) Act.

3. Altogether, eleven cases in which the detenu got involved have been considered by the jurisdictional authority for passing Ext.P5 detention order. Out of the said cases, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.1106/2025 of Alathur Police Station, alleging commission of the offences punishable under Sections 331(4) and 334(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS).

4. We heard Sri. Akhil Binoy, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. K.A. Anas, the learned Government Pleader.

5. Relying on the decision in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India and another, [1991 (1) SCC 128], the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in cases wherein the detenu is in judicial custody, in connection with the last prejudicial activity, a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed only on satisfaction of the triple test mentioned in the said decision by the Supreme Court. According to the counsel, as the impugned order was passed while the detenu was in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, it was incumbent upon the authority to satisfy itself that it has reason to believe, on the basis of reliable material placed before it that, there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail and that on being so released, he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity. According to the counsel, though in Ext.P5 order, it is mentioned that the detenu was undergoing judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, the possibility of the detenu being released on bail is not properly considered. The learned counsel submitted that there is unreasonable delay in mooting the proposal for initiation of proceedings under the KAA(P) Act as well as in passing the impugned order of detention, and the said delay will certainly snap the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention. On these premises, it was urged that the detention order is liable to be set aside.

6. In response, the learned Government Pleader submitted that Ext.P1 detention order was passed by the jurisdictional authority after proper application of mind and upon arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction. According to the learned Government Pleader, the detention order was passed by the competent authority upon being fully satisfied that such detention was the only effective means to prevent the detenu from repeating his criminal activities. It was further contended that while passing the detention order, the authority was fully aware of the fact that the detenu was in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. It was only upon being satisfied that there was every likelihood of the detenu being released on bail and that, if so released, he would in all probability indulge in further criminal activities, that the order of detention came to be passed. According to the learned Government Pleader, therefore, the order of detention will legally sustain irrespective of the fact that the detenu was under judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity while the impugned order was passed. The Government Pleader further submitted that there is no unreasonable delay either in mooting the proposal or in passing the detention order, and hence, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention is snapped cannot be sustained.

7. From the rival contentions raised, it is gatherable that the main question that revolves around this Writ Petition is whether an order of detention under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act can be validly passed against a person who is under judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. While answering the said question, it is to be noted that, through a series of judicial pronouncements rendered by the Supreme Court as well as by this Court, it is well settled that there is no legal impediment in passing an order of detention against a person who is under judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. However, an order of detention against a person who is in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity cannot be passed in a causal manner. Undisputedly, an order of detention under the KAA(P) Act is a drastic measure against a citizen as it heavily impacts his personal as well as fundamental rights. When an effective and alternative remedy exists to prevent a person from repeating criminal activities, resorting to preventive detention is neither warranted nor permissible. When a detenu is in jail in connection with the last prejudicial activity, obviously, there is no imminent possibility of being involved in criminal activities. Therefore, before passing a detention order in respect of a person who is in jail, the concerned authority must satisfy itself that there is a real possibility that the detenu is on bail, and further, if released on bail, the material on record reveals that he will indulge in prejudicial activity if not detained. The circumstances that necessitate the passing of such an order must be reflected in the order itself.

8. In Kamarunnissa’s case (cited supra), the Supreme Court made it clear that a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed even in the case of a person in custody (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable materials placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail and (b) that on being so released he would in probability indulged in prejudicial activity and (3) if it is essential to detain him to prevent him from doing so. If the authority passes an order after recording its satisfaction in this regard, such an order would be valid.

9. A similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Veeramani v. The State of Tamil Nadu [1994 (2) SCC 337] and in Union of India v. Paul Manickam [2003 (8) SCC 342].

10. Keeping in mind the above proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court, while reverting to the facts in the present case, it can be seen that the case registered against the detenu with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.1106/2025 of Alathur Police Station, alleging commission of the offences punishable under Sections 331(4) and 334(1) of the BNS. The incident that led to the registration of the said case occurred on 06.10.2025, and the detenu was arrested on the same day. Since then, he has been under judicial custody. The impugned order was passed on 19.12.2025, while the detenu was under judicial custody.

11. In Ext.P5 detention order, it is specifically stated that at the time of passing the said order, the detenu was under judicial custody in connection with the case registered against the detenu with respect to the last prejudicial activity. Therefore, it is decipherable that the detaining authority was fully cognizant of the fact that the detenu was in custody at the time when it passed Ext.P5 order.

12. Similarly, in Ext.P5 order, it is further recorded that although the detenu applied for bail in the said case, the same was dismissed. It is further recorded that there is a possibility of the detenu being released on bail, and if so released, he would be involved in criminal activities again. Evidently, the impugned order reflects that there is a proper application of mind and, based on the materials available on record, the detaining authority subjectively satisfied that there is a reason to believe that there is a possibility of the detenu being released on bail and that, on so released, the detenu will in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities undermining the bail conditions.

13. Now, while coming to the contention of the petitioner regarding the delay that occurred in mooting the proposal as well as in passing the detention order, first of all, it is to be noted that, as already stated, the detenu was arrested in connection with the last prejudicial activity on 06.10.2025. Subsequently, it was on 14.11.2025, the sponsoring authority mooted the proposal for action under the KAA(P) Act. Later, it was on 19.12.2025, the detention order was passed. Evidently, the proposal was forwarded, and the detention order was passed while the detenu was under judicial custody. Since the detenu was in jail, there was no basis for any apprehension regarding imminent repetition of criminal activities by him. Therefore, the minimum delay that occurred in mooting the proposal as well as in passing the order is only liable to be discarded, and it could not be said that the said delay is sufficient to snap the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention.

                  In the result, we have no hesitation in holding that the petitioner has not made out any ground for interference. Hence, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.