(Prayer: Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased to issue a Writ or Order or Direction more particularly a writ Mandamus declaring the order dt.3-11-2016 passed by the1st respondent is illegal , arbitrary and violative of principles of natural justice and set aside the same and consequently direct the respondents to pay all other retiremental benefits of the petitioner
IA NO: 1 OF 2017(WPMP 7624 OF 2017
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased To direct the 5th respondent to pay Rs. 42,000/- towards, subsistence allowance
IA NO: 1 OF 2021
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased pleased to bring the petitioners no.2 to 4 as LRs of the 1st petitioner i.e., Rayasam Venkata Panduranga Rao in W.P.No.6220 of 2017 and pass such)
1. This Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking the following relief:
“….to issue order or orders, direction or directions, Writ or Writs, particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus, declaring the order dated 03-11-2016 passed by the 1st respondent is illegal, arbitrary and violative of principles of natural justice and set aside the same and consequently direct the respondents to pay all other retiremental benefits of the petitioner…”
2. Heard Sri Y. Koteswara Rao, learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Government Pleader for Cooperation appearing for the respondent No.4. Notices to respondents No. 1 to 3 and 5 were served, but none represented on their behalf.
3. During the pendency of the writ petition, the petitioner No.1 died and consequently his legal representatives were brought on record as petitioner Nos.2 to 4, vide orders, dated 10.10.2025 in I.A.No.1 of 2021.
Brief facts of the case:
4. According to the petitioners, petitioner No.1(deceased) was appointed as a Secretary in respondent No.5 society long back. Due to ill health of his sister-in-law, petitioner No.1 applied for Casual Leave on 05.07.2006 and 06.07.2006 and sought extension of leave on medical grounds from time to time by way of telegrams and sending letters by registered post to respondent No.5. However, his requests for leave had not acted upon by respondent No.5 authorities in view of personal ill will against the 1st petitioner. Ultimately, when petitioner No.1 approached the 5th respondent in the month of December 2006 to join duty, respondent No.5 refused to allow the petitioner by stating that he was suspended on 26.08.2006.
5. Further, respondent No.5 authorities also appointed an Enquiry Officer to cause enquiry and four charges were framed against petitioner No.1. In reply to the said charges, petitioner No.1 submitted an explanation by denying the charges with cogent reasons. Again, petitioner No.1 was removed from service by respondent No.5 authorities, vide orders, dated 18.02.2008. Challenging the said removal order, petitioner No.1 preferred an Appeal dated 03.05.2008 before respondent No.1 i.e., District Level Committee, in terms of Chapter V (8) of the Societies bye- laws.
6. As the said Appeal has not been disposed of, petitioner No.1, after prolonged litigation, filed W.P.No.16531 of 2009 before the common High Court of A.P. at Hyderabad. The said writ petition was disposed of through orders dated 08.02.2016, directing the 1st respondent to pass orders on the appeal within a period of twelve (12) weeks therefrom and also by giving liberty to petitioner No.1 to raise all contentions before the 1st respondent/appellate authority.
7. It is further stated that without adhering to the above orders dated 08.12.2016, the Chief Executive Officer of the 1st respondent addressed a communication by passing orders dated 03.11.2016 basing on the resolution dated 29.06.2016 of the District Level Committee and asked to release the gratuity amount and P.F. amount to the 1st petitioner
8. Aggrieved by the above mentioned orders dated 03.11.2016, petitioner No.1 filed the present writ petition on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice and to declare the same as illegal, arbitrary by granting all consequential benefits in his favour.
Arguments of the learned counsels:
9. Learned counsel for the petitioners summarized his arguments mainly in fivefold. Firstly, he submits that petitioner No.1 was dismissed from service by imposing major penalty by respondent No.5 Society without there being any consultation with respondent No.1, which is the competent authority under Chapter V (7) of the Societies bye-laws. Hence, he submits that the very initiation of proceedings is not sustainable on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
10. Secondly, the learned counsel raised the contention that passing of appellate orders without affording an opportunity to the 1st petitioner, is contrary to the orders dated 18.02.2016 passed by the Common High Court of A.P. at Hyderabad in W.P.No.16531 of 2009, which was filed against the very same respondents, who arrayed as parties in the instant case.
11. Thirdly, learned counsel submits that the 1st respondent, quasi- judicial authority, while passing the impugned orders dated 03.11.2016 had not dealt with the contentions raised in the appeal, and the same suffer from lack of reasoning. Hence, the same is liable to be set aside.
12. Fourthly, the learned counsel submits that keeping in view the nature of charges and punishments imposed, dismissal of the petitioner from the service is highly excessive. Therefore, the dismissal orders dated 18.02.2008 of the 5th respondent Society, as well as the impugned communication/orders dated 03.11.2016 of the 1st respondent Society, are hit by the doctrine of proportionality.
13. Fifthly and lastly, learned counsel submits that after the dismissal of service punishment, the family of the 1st petitioner faced multifarious problems, i.e., physically, physiologically and fiscally, after his death.
14. To support his assertions, the learned counsel relied on the dictum held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Basudev Dutta Vs. State of West Bengal & Ors.( 2024 Law Suit (SC) 1092) and Bhagat Ram Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Others(AIR 1983 SC 454).
15. Conversely, a close reading of the docket orders of the present lis, clearly reveals that despite service of notices to respondents Nos.1 to 5, they have not chosen to file any counter-affidavits from the year 2017 to date. It further reveals that this Court granted multiple opportunities and adjourned the matter seven times on one-fold or another right from 10.10.2025 onwards to 23.01.2026. The last docket order dated 23.01.2026 is extracted hereunder:
“Learned counsel for the petitioners is present and expresses urgency in the lis. He also submits that the respondent on one fold or another seeking time.
However, considering the request of learned Assistant Government Pleader for Cooperation as a last chance, post next week.”
16. Today also, when the matter was called in the morning session, the learned Assistant Government Pleader for Cooperation sought for pass over and accordingly, the same was passed over. After the lunch session, Sri B. Ramakrishna Naik, learned Government Pleader for Cooperation, High Court of A.P. appearing for the 4th respondent, is present and submits that his client, the District Collector/respondent No.4, is not an answering Respondent in the lis. Hence, in view of the same, this Court is going ahead with the material available on record to put quietus to this litigation.
Point:
17. In the light of the above rival submissions and facts involved in the lis, the following point arises for consideration:-
“Whether the impugned communication/orders dated 03.11.2016 passed by the 1st respondent and dismissal orders dated 18.02.2008 of the 5th respondent Society, are legally sustainable or not?”
Consideration of the Court:
18. It is pertinent to note that Section 116-AA of the Andhra Pradesh Co- operative Societies Act, 1964, (hereinafter referred to as ‘Societies Act’) abolished centralized services for certain posts of employees and further obligates the Registrar of Co-operative Societies to allot such decaderised employees to such Primary Agricultural Cooperative Society (PACS), as it may consider fit, consequent to the process of decaderised employees. Section 116-AA of Societies Act and Rule 72 (3) of the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Rules, 1964, formulated guidelines for decaderisation of the posts of secretaries and adopted by the societies are amenable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as held by the Erstwhile High Court of A.P. at Hyderabad in Pinapatruni Nagabhushanam Vs. Govt. of A.P., Co-operation Department & Ors(2002 (6) ALT 693).
19. In this backdrop, three member committee for the purpose of framing bye-laws in respect of service conditions of the employees of PACS has submitted its report. The commissioner for Cooperation and Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Government of A.P. vide Rc.No.31811/2005/116(C)/2 dated 03.10.2005, communicated to all the District Cooperative Officers of the State, including the 5th respondent. The said bye-laws were also adopted by the 5th respondent Society and in proof of same, learned counsel for the petitioners placed a copy of the 5th respondent Society bye-laws along with synopsis, which was made as part of the record.
20. In order to arrive at comprehensive adjudication of the lis, it is proper to examine extract the relevant portion of the bye-laws of the Agricultural Co-operative Credit Societies (in short ‘Societies’). Chapter II (9), (14) & (20) of the said Societies bye-laws defined the Secretary as under:
“1)………….
……………
……………
……………
……………
9) ‘Secretary’ means the Chief Executive Officer of the Society.
…………….
…………….
…………….
14) ‘Competent Authority’ means the authority empowered to deal with any matter as prescribed in these regulations and byelaws of the Society.
…………………
…………………
………………….
20) ‘Dist. Level Committee’ means the Committee constituted by the Government.”
21. Whereas, Chapter V of the above said bye-laws deals with the conduct and disciplinary action on appeals. The same is extracted as under:
CHAPTER-V: CONDUCT – DISCIPLINARY ACTION AND
APPEALS: wherein specifically described what constitutes minor, major misconduct and its nature of punishments also.
2. MINOR MISCONDUCT: The following acts of commission of omission shall be treated as minor misconduct on the part of an employee.
a) Absence without leave for over staying sanctioned leave.
b) Irregular attendance.
c) Negligence in performing entrusted duties.
d) Disrespect to customers and Officials.
e) Willful avoiding or slowing down in the performance of the work, or Abetment or instigation so to do.
3. PUNISHMENTS FOR MINOR MISCONDUCT: Any of the following punishments may be imposed against an employee who is found guilty.
a) Warning or censure.
b) Fine up to Rs. 500/-.
c) Recovery from salary of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused by employee of the Society.
d) Non-payment of salary for the unauthorized absence.
4. MAJOR MISCONDUCT: The following acts of commission of omission shall be treated as minor misconduct on the part of an employee.
a) Suppression of facts, Furnishing false information.
b) Engaging directly or indirectly in any trade, business or any other employment.
c) Disobedience of lawful orders.
d) Willful damage or attempt to cause damage to the society's goodwill.
e) Misappropriation and embezzlement of society's funds.
f) Taking bride or illegal gratification from any customer or any other person
g) Tampering of records or causing loss of record.
h) Issue of false certificate.
i) Habitual commission of any lapse normally treated as minor misconduct.
j) Conviction in any Court of law for an offence treated as minor misconduct.
k) Diversion / Withdrawal of recoveries without passing on to Financing Bank.
5. PUNISHMENTS FOR MAJOR MISCONDUCT: Any of the following punishments may be imposed for duly established major misconduct.
a) Reduction in pay.
b) Withholding of promotion.
c) Reversion to the lower category of posts.
d) Removal/dismissal.
22. Chapter V (7) of the Societies’ bye-laws prescribes the competent authorities, who can inflict the punishments basing upon the cadre of person and nature of punishments as under:
Authorities to inflict punishments
| Sl.No. | Class of employees | Censure/ stoppage | Suspension/ reversion | Removal or dismissal |
| 1. | Secretary | President | Managing Committee in consultationwith the | Managing Committee in consultationwith the |
| District Level Committee | District Level Committee | |||
| 2. | - | - | - | - |
| 3. | - | - | - | - |
Appellate authority
| Sl.No. | Class of employees | Nature of punishment | Appellate Authority |
| 1. | Secretary |
| Managing committeeDist. Level CommitteeDist. Level Committee |
| 2. | - | - | - |
| 3. | - | - | - |
25. After going through the removal orders dated 18.02.2008 passed by the 5th respondent, it is discerned that the same was issued taking into consideration the irregularities of petitioner No.1 and also stated that the explanation submitted by him was not satisfactory. Nevertheless, as mandated under Chapter V (7) of the Societies bye-laws, the 5th respondent Managing Committee should have consulted the 1st respondent i.e., District Level Committee, instead, it has straight away imposed the major punishment of dismissal from service against the 1st petitioner. The said action of the 5th respondent Society is contrary to the its own Societies bye-laws.
26. In this context, it is apt to note the dictum of the Apex Court in the case of Shripal & Anr. Vs. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad(2025 SCC OnLine SC 221), wherein it was categorically held that, without prior approval from the appropriate authority, the very termination of service would amount to an attempt to circumvent the established procedure. The relevant para of the said judgment is extracted hereunder:
“ 9. On a plain reading of this section, we can deduce that any unilateral alteration in service conditions, including termination, is impermissible during the pendency of such proceedings unless prior approval is obtained from the appropriate authority. The record in the present case does not indicate that the Respondent Employer ever sought or was granted the requisite approval. Prima facie, therefore, this conduct reflects a deliberate attempt to circumvent the lawful claims of the workmen, particularly when their dispute over regularization and wages remained sub judice.”
27. It may be stated that as per the bye-laws of the Societies, a specific procedure of consultation of the District Level Committee by the 5th respondent Society Managing Committee for passing order of removal/dismissal of petitioner No.1, who was working as Secretary, is prerequisite.
28. In that regard, it is relevant to note the well settled legal principle that if a law prescribes a thing to be done in a particular manner, the same must be done in the same manner without any retractions at all as held by the Apex Court way back in the year 1959 in Baru Ram Vs. Prasanni(AIR 1959 SC 93) and Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai Vs. Anjum M.H.Ghaswala((2002) 1 SCC 633)
29. Coming to the second plea of the petitioner that the 1st respondent has not disposed of the appeal and has ignored the specific orders dated 18.02.2016 of the Common High Court of A.P. at Hyderabad in W.P.No.16531 of 2009. Evidently, the 1st petitioner against the dismissal orders passed by the 5th respondent, preferred an appeal dated 03.05.2008 (Ex.P.2 annexed to the writ petition) before the 1st respondent/ District Level Committee, by pointing out multiple contentions i.e., violation of procedural aspects, etc and subsequently, petitioner No.1 also filed W.P.No.16531 of 2009 before the Common High Court of A.P. at Hyderabad, arraying the very same respondents herein as party respondents therein. The said writ petition was disposed of vide orders dated 08.02.2016, whereby and whereunder, directing the 1st respondent to pass orders on the appeal filed by the petitioner by giving liberty to him to submit any other information or further explanation by raising all contentions before the 1st respondent /District Level Committee and the said orders dated 08.02.2016 made in W.P.No.16531 of 2009 attained finality. For the sake of comprehensive view, the relevant portion of the orders dated 08.02.2016 made in W.P.No.16531 of 2009 read as under:-
“…..It is not being disputed by both the parties now that in the light of the bye-laws relating to the service conditions for the employees of PACS, framed by the Government, the appellate authority is the District Level Committee. As it is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the appeal filed by the petitioner is not disposed of so far, the interest of justice would be served if a direction is issued to the 1st respondent to pass orders on the appeal filed by the petitioner within a period of 12 weeks from the date of receipt of this order, if the same is already not been disposed of. It is needless to mention if the petitioner seeks an opportunity of hearing the same shall be provided. Petitioner also is at liberty to submit any other information or further explanation raising all contentions before the District Level Committee.
Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.”
30. As per the procedure enunciated in Chapter V (8) of the Societies’ bye-laws only, the 1st petitioner had filed an appeal before the 1st respondent authority. It is clearly defined in Chapter II (20) that the District Level Committee is constituted by the Government.
31. On a perusal of the said appeal filed by the 1st petitioner, it appears that he raised various contentions and sought to set aside his dismissal orders. Surprisingly, the 1st respondent authority, instead of adhering to the Clause V (8) of the Societies bye-laws, clearly stated supra and also not taking into consideration specific/categorical directions dated 08.02.2016 by the High Court in W.P. No. 16531 of 2009, passed the orders dated 29.06.2016 in its meeting without affording the liberty to submit information nor considering the appeal in right perspective, which is also clearly transgression of the Societies bye-laws. Hence, the dismissal orders dated 18.08.2018 and orders under challenge dated 03.11.2016 are not sustainable.
32. Apropos to the third submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the appeal dated 03.05.2008 filed by petitioner No.1 had not been redressed comprehensively by the 1st respondent District Level Committee/appellate authority. Apparently, as per Chapter V of the Societies bye-laws, it is provided that a remedy of appeal lies to the 1st respondent appellate authority, so as to challenge the removal/dismissal orders dated 18.02.2008 passed by the 5th respondent Society, as such, petitioner No.1 herein availed his right of appeal before the 1st respondent/ District Level Committee (appellate authority) by way of appeal dated 03.05.2008 (marked as Ex.P.2 in the material page Nos.13 to 15), wherein, he raised various contentions to set-aside his removal orders dated 18.02.2008.
33. However, for the reasons best known to the 1st respondent who is an appellate authority under Societies bye-laws had not at all dealt with appeal contentions in logical way and simply by mentioning the writ petition No.16531 of 2009 of the Common High Court of A.P. at Hyderabad and seems to have passed cryptic orders. For the sake of clarity, the same is extracted hereunder:
“…..The District Level Committee has carefully considered and examined in detail the appeal filed by Sri Rayasam Venkata Panduranga Rao, Secretary (Dismissed) for condoning the punishment of Dismissal in view of the order dt. 08.02.2016 of the Hon'ble High Court of AP in WP No.16531/2009. The appeal is considered and advised the President, Kuchipudi PACS to pay Sri Rayasam Venkata Panduranga Rao the Gratuity amount and Provident fund amount deposited in Movva Branch in the name of Sri Rayasam Venkata Panduranga Rao"
As such, we advise the President of Kuchipudi PACS to pay the Gratuity amount of Rs 1,00,000/-and the amount in the PF account of Sri R.V. Panduranga Rao at Mova Branch to Sri R.V Panduranga Rao and report compliance…..”
34. A bare perusal of the above communication/orders dated 03.11.2016 against the 1st petitioner, ex-facie passed without recording reasons and the appellate authority arrived at its conclusion grossly by failing to perform its statutory duty to dispose of the appeal with a reasoned and logical conclusion by addressing all the contentions raised in the appeal by the 1st petitioner.
35. In the arena of ‘Service Jurisprudence’, reasoning is the most important aspect and also the backbone of meaningful propositions of order/judgment. Therefore, any judicial or quasi-judicial authorities must issue reasoned and speaking orders to ensure justice is delivered efficiently and transparently. Whereas cryptic orders suffer from the lack of holistic and reasoned approach, leads to multi prolonged litigation, which is not letter and spirit of our Constitutional ethos as well as contrary to the settled legal principles detailed infra.
36. The Constitutional Bench (Five Judge) in Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala and Ors.( 1961 SCC OnLine SC 38) explained the pivotal role and the importance of decision by relying upon the authoritative pronouncement of the Constitutional Dictum in Province of Bombay Vs. Khushaldas S. Advani((1950) SCC 551). Therefore, the above Constitutional judgments crystal clear that reasoned, speaking orders are fundamental pre- requisites for any order to sustain.
37. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Kranthi Associates Private Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan and Ors.( (2010) 9 SCC 496) by referring to various authoritative pronouncements in the stream of administrative and quasi-judicial jurisprudence, providentially summarised the principles in the following way:
“ 47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds:
(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.
(b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions.
(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well.
(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi- judicial or even administrative power.
(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations.
(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.
(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts.
(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice.
(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system.
(j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency.
(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism.
(l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or “rubber-stamp reasons” is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process.
(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731-37] .)
(n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain [(1994) 19 EHRR 553] EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford [2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA)] , wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires,
“adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions”.
(o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of “due process”.”
38. In Basudev Datta v. State of West Bengal(2024 SCC Online 3616), the Apex Court reiterated the above principles and held that the reasoning serves as a vital check which enables effective scrutiny by superior courts, and assures the affected party that the decision is founded on rational and fair consideration. Further, it had held that an order lacking such reasoning is unsustainable in law.
39. Another facet involved in the lis is that in the enquiry report dated 26.10.2006 issued by the Domestic Enquiry Officer of the 5th respondent Society, discloses that total four charges were framed against the petitioner No.1. So far as the first charge is concerned, the petitioner No.1 has not attended his duties regularly since the constitution of the new committee. The second allegation is that the petitioner No.1 has not shown any interest in developing the business of society. Petitioner No.1 had failed to take up the construction of the compound wall of the society building, which is the third charge levelled against him. Fourth and last allegation is that the petitioner did not cooperate with the audit and acted in a negligent manner.
40. A close reading of the above four charges, as well as keeping in view the parameters enunciated in Chapter V (2) of the Societies’ bye- laws i.e., ‘Minor Misconduct Punishments’, the 5th respondent Society inflicting the punishment by removing petitioner No.1 from service, would come under the ambit of ‘Major Misconduct Punishments’. Thus, the orders dated 03.05.2016 are hit by the ‘doctrine of proportionality’.
41. It is important to mention here that the doctrine of proportionality originated from the German jurisprudence and the same was acceded by the Indian jurisprudence.
42. The Apex Court of India in Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank Vs. Employees Assn.( (2007) 4 SCC 669) had lucidly explained the term of proportionality in the following way:
18. “Proportionality” is a principle where the court is concerned with the process, method or manner in which the decision-maker has ordered his priorities, reached a conclusion or arrived at a decision. The very essence of decision-making consists in the attribution of relative importance to the factors and considerations in the case. The doctrine of proportionality thus steps in focus true nature of exercise—the elaboration of a rule of permissible priorities.
19. de Smith states that “proportionality” involves “balancing test” and “necessity test”. Whereas the former (balancing test) permits scrutiny of excessive onerous penalties or infringement of rights or interests and a manifest imbalance of relevant considerations, the latter (necessity test) requires infringement of human rights to the least restrictive alternative. [Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1995), pp. 601-05, para 13.085; see also Wade & Forsyth: Administrative Law (2005), p. 366.]
20. In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn.), Reissue, Vol. 1(1), pp. 144- 45, para 78, it is stated:
‘The court will quash exercise of discretionary powers in which there is no reasonable relationship between the objective which is sought to be achieved and the means used to that end, or where punishments imposed by administrative bodies or inferior courts are wholly out of proportion to the relevant misconduct. The principle of proportionality is well established in European law, and will be applied by English courts where European law is enforceable in the domestic courts. The principle of proportionality is still at a stage of development in English law; lack of proportionality is not usually treated as a separate ground for review in English law, but is regarded as one indication of manifest unreasonableness.”
43. Very recently, in the case of ABCI Infrastructure Private Limited v. Union of India and Others.( 2025 (6) SCC 813), the three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the above principle of ‘Doctrine of Proportionality’.
44. The above facts and circumstances transpire that undisputedly, petitioner No.1 was removed from service on 08.02.2008 by the 5th respondent Society as clearly stated supra without taking prior approval from the 1st respondent as mandated under the 5th respondent Societies’ bye-laws. Right from the dismissal of service, petitioner No.1 agitated his rights in one forum or another. In that process, petitioner No.1 ran on an endless treadmill by filing multiple litigations to come out of his grief and at the age of 66 years, he was constrained to file the present writ petition in the year 2017 to come out of trauma and stigmatisation attributed against him by the respondent authorities, with a fond hope of justice, but unfortunately, without any logical conclusion, he succumbed to death on 23.05.2021, during the pendency of the present case.
Conclusion:
45. In the aforesaid circumstances and taking into consideration the matter in its entirety, this Court is of the view that the impugned order dated 03.11.2016, as well as dismissal orders dated 18.02.2008 of the 5th respondent Society against petitioner No.1, suffer from arbitrariness and lack of legal justification. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed with the following terms:-
i. The impugned order dated 03.11.2016, as well as dismissal orders dated 18.02.2008 of the 5th respondent Society against the petitioner No.1 (deceased) are hereby set-aside.
ii. The 2nd petitioner is directed to furnish the bank account details, identity proofs, before the respondent Nos.1 to 5 authorities, within a period of (4) four weeks, from the date of receipt of copy of this Order.
iii. In that event, the respondent Nos.1 to 5 are directed to pay the salary of the petitioner No.1, right from his dismissal from service i.e., 18.02.2008, along with all the consequential benefits after deducting the amounts, if any, already paid to the 1st petitioner by placing authenticated proofs, as expeditiously as possible, not exceeding (3) three months, from the date of receipt of relevant particulars from the 2nd petitioner.
As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.