(Prayer in W.P.No.3879 of 2024 : Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, to call for the records of the award passed by the I Additional Labour Court, Coimbatore in Computation Petition No.56 of 2019, dated 24.08.2023, quash the same and direct the 1st respondent to remit a sum of Rs.1,52,099/- for the period from the date of termination on 13.07.2018 to 30.11.2018 and the salaries and attendant benefits due and payable to the petitioner from the date of termination of the petitioner with interest @ 12%.

In W.P.No.3882 of 2024 : Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, to call for the records of the award passed by the I Additional Labour Court, Coimbatore in Computation Petition No.57 of 2019, dated 24.08.2023, quash the same and direct the 1st respondent to remit a sum of Rs.93,003.60 ps for the period from the date of termination on 13.07.2018 to 30.11.2018 and the salaries and attendant benefits due and payable to the petitioner from the date of termination of the petitioner till date with interest @ 12%.)

Common Order

A. The Writ Petitions:

These Writ Petitions are filed challenging the award passed by the I Additional Labour Court, Coimbatore, in Computation Petition Nos.56 and 57 of 2019, dated 24.08.2023, and to quash the same. Additionally, they seek a direction to the first respondent-management to remit a sum of Rs.1,52,099/- and Rs.93,003.60 as prayed for in the Computation Petitions from the date of termination until 30.11.2018, along with the salaries and other attendant benefits due to the petitioners from the date of their termination until the date, with further interest at the rate of 12% per annum.

B.The Claim made by the Petitioners:

2. W.P. No. 3879 of 2024 is filed by S. Manikandan, and W.P. No. 3882 of 2024 is filed by R. Velliangiri. The brief factual background, in which the Writ Petitions arise, is that the respondent-management, Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank Limited, is the Central Cooperative Bank that provides loans for various purposes, primarily agricultural ones, through the Primary Cooperative Societies attached to the jurisdiction of its various branches, for the members of those Societies. While so, K-797, Kongalnagaram Primary Agricultural Cooperative Society, was attached to the Pethappampatti branch of the management. Upon reviewing the audit reports and account reports of the Society, it was found that a total sum of Rs. 4,71,00,000/- was collected by the Society. However, Rs. 2,01,00,000/- of this amount was not accounted for and was misappropriated by the office bearers of the Society.

                     2.1. There were other charges of falsification and embezzlement concerning the said Primary Agricultural Society as well, resulting in losses to the Society and to the respondent-management. Meanwhile, regarding the petitioner in W.P.No.3879 of 2024 - S. Manikandan, a charge memorandum containing 10 charges—such as lack of supervision, wilful dereliction of duty to prevent the above illegal acts, and embezzlement—was issued. The petitioner did not submit any written explanation. Later, when an Enquiry Officer was appointed, he submitted a detailed explanation only before the Enquiry Officer on 07.06.2017. According to him, he was the Superintendent of Pethappampatti branch from 01.10.2009 to 16.10.2012 and served as Divisional Field Manager for Udumulaipettai division from 26.12.2012 to 11.11.2013.

                     2.2. He had given a detailed explanation regarding each and every charge. He also cross-examined the management witnesses in detail during the Departmental Enquiry. However, by the report dated 31.10.2017, all 10 charges were held to be proved. Based on this, a second show-cause notice was issued to him on 13.11.2017, and he submitted his reply on 22.12.2017. By an order dated 13.07.2018, he was dismissed from service. According to the petitioner, the principal trade union had raised an Industrial Dispute, and conciliation proceedings were pending. Since the petitioner was also one of the workmen involved in that dispute, the impugned order of termination was passed without permission, as required under Section 33(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or without the necessary approval under Section 33(2). Therefore, the order is void ab initio, and the petitioner should be deemed to still be in service and entitled to all emoluments during that period. Claiming this, a Computation Petition under Section 33 of the Act in C.P.No.56 of 2019 was filed, but it was dismissed by the impugned award.

                     2.3. Similarly, the petitioner in W.P.No.3882 of 2024 - R. Vellingiri, who was also employed by the respondent-management, was issued a charge memorandum on 04.06.2016 consisting of 7 charges related to lack of supervision and wilfully not reporting embezzlement and misappropriation, thereby failing to perform his duties. He also submitted his explanation to the Enquiry Officer, stating that he was working as a Supervisor at the Anaimalai branch in January 2011, as Branch Supervisor at Negamam from 16.12.2012, and at the Pethappampatti branch from 09.04.2013. He recommended the loan applications of the Society, namely, K-797, Kongalnagaram Primary Agricultural Cooperative Society, and provided explanations for each charge. The Enquiry authority followed the same procedure and found all seven charges proved in its report dated 20.07.2017. A second show-cause notice was issued on 05.08.2017, to which the petitioner replied on 18.09.2017. He was dismissed from service on 13.07.2018. Following the same procedure, he filed a Computation Petition in C.P.No.57 of 2019, alleging that the management had not obtained permission or approval under Section 33(1) or Section 33(2) of the Act. This petition was also dismissed with a separate order on the same day. Both the Computation Petitions led to the filing of these Writ Petitions.

C.Submissions of the Petitioners:

3. Mr.Sundar Narayan, the learned counsel representing the petitioners, would submit the following:

                     (i)The award of the Labour Court dismissing the claim petitions on the ground that the petitioners should only file an appeal under the Tamil Nadu Co- operative Societies Act, 1983, is illegal. The appeal remedy is not available to the petitioners. What is available is only filing of a Revision under the Act. Simultaneously, remedies under the ID Act as well as under certain circumstances under the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishment Act, 1947, are all available. When multiple remedies are available to a workman, he can elect to avail any one of those remedies. The law in this regard has been settled; therefore, the award of the Labour Court cannot be sustained;

                     (ii) The petitioners are workmen within the definition of Section 2 (s) of the ID Act. As a matter of fact, the management itself has recognised them as workmen, and even their salary and other benefits were all fixed and revised only as per the settlements under Section 12 (3) of the ID Act. The question has already been settled with reference to the very same management of Coimbatore District Central Co-operative Bank Limited in the earlier judgment in W.A.No.1727 of 2011 and W.P.No.33342 of 2013. Further, merely because they are termed as Field Supervisors, etc., they cannot be deemed part of the management; they are very much workmen, subject to the supervision and control of their higher authorities. As Field Supervisors, Assistant Managers, etc., they have to perform inspections, verify applications, etc., and their decisions are not final. Therefore, at best, their employment can only be regarded as skilled in nature, and both petitioners are workmen within the definition under Section 2 (s) of the ID Act;

                     (iii) Once they are workmen, then when a dispute raised by the primary trade union is pending adjudication and the workmen were also involved in the said dispute, without following the mandate under Section 33 of the ID Act, in obtaining the prior permission or approval as the case may be from the Industrial Tribunal, when the impugned punishment order is passed dismissing them from service, then as per the dictum of the Constitution Bench Judgment in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd., Vs. Ramgopal Sharma and Others((2002) 2 SCC 244), the same is void ab initio. Once the punishment is void ab initio, then it is further settled law that no dispute need be raised to set aside the punishment and therefore, the application for computation has rightly been filed under Section 33 (C) (2) of the ID Act and therefore, the Labour Court ought to have allowed the same. The learned counsel would also rely upon the Judgment in P.Eswaramoorthy and Others Vs. RJB Leoraj and Others((2008) 6 CTC 770).

D.Submissions made by the Management:

4. Per contra, Mr.Anand Gopalan, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent management, would submit that the petitioners are not workmen; their functions are essentially supervisory and managerial. This has been established on record through cross-examination. Merely because the cadre is mentioned in the settlement under Section 12 (3) of the ID Act, it does not mean they are treated as workmen. In fact, even the cadres above them, up to the level of General Manager, are mentioned in the 12 (3) settlement. Procedurally, when individual co-operative societies entered into wage revisions, even concerning those in management, the same was recorded in the 12 (3) settlement. Even if this is deemed erroneous, it cannot be conclusive evidence of a person being a workman. If that were the case, even the General Manager of the society would be considered a workman. The learned counsel alternatively contends that, even for a violation of Section 33 of the ID Act, when there is a remedy to file a complaint under Section 33- A, the wording of Section 33 -A indicates that the merits of the order must also be considered in such complaints. Consequently, the action of workmen in directly approaching the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) of the ID Act cannot be accepted. While it is true that in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd., (cited supra) it was held to be null and void, a careful review of subsequent judgments indicates that the evolving legal principle is that, for a violation of Section 33, filing a complaint under Section 33-A is the proper remedy, rather than under Section 33-C(2). To support his arguments, the learned counsel relies on the following judgments,

                     a. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Another Vs. Satya Prakash((2013) 9 SCC 232),

                     b. Management of Karur Vysya Bank Limited Vs. S.Balakrishnan((2016) 12 SCC 221),

                     c. Bombay Chemical Industries Vs. Deputy Labour Commissioner and Another((2022) 5 SCC 629),

                     d. Managing Director, North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation Vs. Shivasharanappa((2017) 16 SCC 540)

E.Consideration and Findings:

5. I have considered the rival submissions made on either side and perused the material records of the case.

                     5.1. First, the contextual background should be noted. In this case, charges were levelled against the petitioners, encompassing numerous subheads of allegations. It is observed that the petitioner, being the Field Supervisor and the Assistant Manager-in-charge, were responsible for one of the primary cooperative societies, the Kongalnagaram Primary Agricultural Cooperative Society. The staff of this society were under the supervision and control of the petitioners, who engaged in significant misfeasance and malfeasance, including misappropriation and falsification of accounts, leading to the misappropriation of sums through various methods, resulting in a loss of over Rs.8 crores to the society and potentially causing losses to the respondent management, which is the Central Cooperative Bank providing funds to the Primary Cooperative Societies.

                     5.2. A careful review of the charges reveals that, for instance, in charge No. 2, the daily collections from loans were recorded in the appropriate ledgers. When the total collection was Rs. 4,71,00,000/-, only Rs. 2, 70, 00, 000/- was shown in the general register and inspection report as the collection, thereby failing to account for the balance amount collected, which was Rs. 2,01,00,000/-. Similarly, there have been instances of misappropriation of funds through falsification of accounts, where amounts were fraudulently shown as disbursed under gold loan transactions. The charge against the petitioners is that, although they were duty-bound to conduct fortnightly inspections and submit reports verifying at least 10% of the transactions, they failed even to briefly verify the total gold available with the society. Had they done so, the entire scam could have been uncovered. The petitioners contend that one of them was the whistleblower, who exposed the scam. Their second argument is that several outstanding amounts were later recovered. The third contention is that additional safeguards, such as periodic inspections by Co- operative Department auditors, were also in place. Therefore, since these mechanisms did not reveal the alleged scam- especially considering the Secretary’s admission of clandestine acts- the respondents should not be held responsible. Several charges, each supported by multiple statements of misconduct, were examined.

                     5.3. After a detailed disciplinary enquiry, during which the petitioners presented their explanations, cross- examined management witnesses, and after considering the enquiry report and evidence, the Enquiry Officer found the petitioners guilty of the charges. Even with reference to the charges of collusion and connivance, a finding was returned that the entire episode would not have happened without the active connivance of the petitioners. Subsequently, a second show- cause notice was issued, and the penalty of dismissal was imposed. The petitioners immediately filed an application under Section 33(c) (2), claiming that the punishment was null and void because a dispute was already pending and the order was made without approval or permission from the appropriate Court before which the industrial dispute was pending. In this context, the present question is considered.

                     5.4. Before deciding the other issues, the first step is to consider whether the petitioners are workmen within the definition under Section 2 (s) of the ID Act. At the outset, there can be no doubt about the legal principles that designation alone is not conclusive. Instead, the primary factor is the nature of the employees’ day-to-day duties. After considering the predominant aspect of day-to-day activities, if the employee is only supervisory and earning beyond the threshold pay, or if they mainly perform managerial functions, they will be excluded from the definition. It is also clear that this is a question of fact to be decided on the specific evidence of each case. No rigid formula or universal rule can be applied universally. A useful reference in this regard is the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in S.K.Maini Vs. Caroa Sahu Company Limited and others((1994) 3 SCC 510)

                     5.5. Furthermore, regarding the determinative factor, which is whether the main duty is supervisory or not, supervision is understood to mean directing and controlling the persons working under the employee. Mere power to check or inspect alone does not constitute a supervisory role. It inherently presupposes the existence of subordinates, authority to assign work, duty rosters, issuing instructions, correcting work, granting or recommending leave, appraising or initiating performance reviews, suggesting disciplinary actions, etc. Functional powers such as signing, certifying work completion, countersigning registers, and granting quality clearances, when combined with directing staff, cannot be considered merely ministerial or check-related; rather, they amount to supervisory work. Relevant references include S.K.Maini’s case (stated supra) and also Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distribution Company of India Ltd., Vs. Burma Shell Management Staff and Association and Others((1970) 3 SCC 378).

                     5.6. Considering the legal position that was outlined above, while it is true that entering into a 12 (3) settlement would also indicate that the persons involved are workmen, this alone would not be a conclusive factor. In the present case, the copy of the 12 (3) settlement clearly shows not only the cadre of Assistant Manager, but also includes wage revisions for the cadres of Manager, Assistant General Manager, and up to General Manager. Therefore, when co-operative societies carry out wage revisions, they seek permission from the Registrar of Co-operative Societies periodically and revise wages. They also use this opportunity to revise the wages of the executive/managerial staff, even though they are mentioned alongside the workmen in the 12 (3) settlement. Hence, this cannot be considered conclusive.

                     5.7. It is true that the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.1727 of 2011 has held that the very same cadre, concerning the same management, is regarded as workmen. However, the following is the finding of the Hon’ble Division Bench, and it is necessary to quote paragraph No.14, which reads as follows:-

                     “14.Besides, in the cross examination, M.W.1 had clearly admitted that respondents 2 to 18 do not have the power of signing cheques; they do not have power to take disciplinary action against the subordinates; they are not entitled to enter into any settlement on behalf of the Bank; and they cannot sue on behalf of the Bank. It is also further admitted that though they are entitled to grant ordinary leave viz., casual leave, with reference of other leave, they have only power to make recommendation. They are considered as Managers only for name sake, but in reality, they were doing the clerical work for the Bank. These admissions of M.W.1 would not be impeached. Therefore, the controversy raised by the appellant that respondents 2 to 18 being the Managers and Assistant managers, are not workmen and hence, they are not entitled to approach the Labour Court, cannot be accepted, since M.W.1/Subramanian in his evidence clearly admits that Ex.W.1 Settlement is applicable to the petitioners, namely, the contesting respondents herein. Since the binding effect of the settlement has to continue to bind the parties by way of contractual obligations, the contention of the appellant that the contesting respondents before us are not coming within the purview of workman as defined under Section 2(s) of the Act is not legally sustainable.”

                     (Emphasis supplied)

                     5.8. The further judgment that is relied upon in W.P. No. 33342 of 2003 is also based solely on the applicability of the settlement and also relies on the same Division Bench judgment. The aforementioned judgments are sub-silentio with reference to the fact that all the executive, managerial and higher officials of the management up to the cadre of General Manager were also mentioned for revision of pay in the 12(3) settlement, and as such, it cannot be held that those judgments definitively decide that the cadre in which these petitioners are working belongs to workmen. As stated above, it has to be decided by considering the predominant day-to-day duties and then evaluating whether they are supervisory or not.

                     5.9. In this regard, both employees were cross-examined in detail by the management. W.W.1 – Vellingiri admits that he has been on duty as a Field Supervisor for the past four years. He states that his primary responsibilities involve reviewing and scrutinising loan applications and recommending approvals. Consequently, it is evident that the primary agricultural co-operative societies rely on his recommendations when granting or denying loans. He also confirms that his duties include supervising primary agricultural co-operative societies and certifying and signing certificates. The subsequent answers given by W.W.1 must also be considered.



                     5.10. He had further answered as follows:-





                     5.11. Regarding the control and further directions, W.W.1. answered as under:-



                     5.12. When it was specifically suggested to him that his duties were mainly supervisory, his response was:-



                     5.13. Similarly, during the cross-examination of the other employee, S. Manikandan (examined as W. W. 2), he admitted that he was functioning as the Manager in charge of the Udumalai Branch. He further admitted that personnel were working under his supervision in the said branch and that he possessed the authority to sanction loans. The following admissions are relevant and are extracted hereunder:



                     5.14. The following answers relating to power to sanction leave has to be taken into account,



                     5.15. Similarly, he also admits recommending medical leave with reference to one of the subordinates, the following was the answers,



                     5.16. With reference to his day-to-day activities, the following answer is given,



                     5.17. He was specifically cross examined with reference to 12 (3) settlement and the following are the answers,



                     5.18. It has further been elicited in the course of cross-examination that employees up to the level of General Manager are covered under the settlement, and the following answer has to be taken into account,



                                        5.19. He was also questioned as to his duty as the Branch Manager and he answered as follows,



                     5.20. Thus, upon careful consideration of the evidence on record, it appears that the functions are primarily supervisory in nature. The powers included checking, recommending, issuing directions, and overseeing the Secretaries and officials of the primary co-operative Societies Act. These coemployees in their branch, were under their supervision. The powers also encompassed sanctioning loans, issuing directives to Secretaries, and granting various administrative sanctions. Therefore, I cannot accept the learned counsel for the petitioners' claim that the primary duties of the petitioners are merely skilled in nature. Instead, the duties are mainly supervisory. It is admitted that the petitioners’ salaries exceeded the threshold limit; thus, I find that the petitioners, viz., S. Manikandan and R. Vellingiri, do not fall under the category of ‘workmen’ as defined in Section 2(s) of the ID Act.

                     5.21. Once it is established that the petitioners are not ‘workmen,’ the Writ Petitions must fail, even though, as rightly argued by the learned counsel, the Labour Court’s reasoning contravenes the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in P.Eswaramoorthy’s case (cited supra). In any event, if only the petitioners are considered ‘workmen,’ they could seek relief under Section 33 of the ID Act for violations and calculation under Section 33C(2). Consequently, the relief prayed for in the Writ Petitions cannot be granted, and the ultimate decision of the Labour Court dismissing the computation petitions cannot be interfered with.

F.The Result:

6. Accordingly, having found no merits, these Writ Petitions are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.