1. The revision petitioner is accused No.4 in Sessions Case No. 2284 of 2022 on the file of the Assistant Sessions Court, Neyyattinkara (Crime No. 799 of 2019 of Neyyattinkara Police Station). The offence alleged against the revision petitioner and the other accused is punishable under Section 306 read with Section 34 of IPC. The Neyyattinkara Police registered the above crime based on the statement given by the son of the deceased, late Sri.Mary John on 07.06.2019. The Police conducted investigation and submitted the final report under Section 173 Cr.PC before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Neyyattinkara on 25.03.2021 seeking prosecution of all the accused, including the revision petitioner, for having committed the offence under Section 306 read with Section 34 of IPC.

2. I have heard Sri.V.G.Arun, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor.

3. The charge against the accused as narrated in the order dated 06.07.2024 in CMP No.54/2024 in S.C No.2284/20222 reads thus:

                  “The deceased Mary John, under the impression that Neyyattinkara Police has not taken action based on complaint filed by him that accused 1 and 2 harassed his mother physically and by uttering obscene words and also due to the obstructions caused by A1 to A4 continuously by obstructing his ways and also by threatening him, due to the above mental agony after writing a suicidal note, committed suicide by hanging on 07.06.2019 at a time between 8 a.m and 5.45 p.m at his house.”(sic)

4. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that the prosecution allegations do not attract the offence under Section 306 IPC. It is submitted that the continuation of the criminal proceedings against the revision petitioner would be an abuse of the process of the court. The learned counsel submitted that the revision petitioner is entitled to discharge.

5. The learned Public Prosecutor contended that the allegations in the final report along with the materials produced by the prosecution, prima facie show that the revision petitioner had abetted the commission of suicide by Sri.Mary John. The specific contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner is that the allegations levelled against the revision petitioner in the final report do not make out the ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 306 IPC.

6. Section 306 of IPC reads thus:

                  “306. Abetment of suicide.— If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

7. Abetment is defined in Section 107 of IPC, which is extracted below:

                  “107. Abetment of a thing.- A person abets the doing of a thing, who-

                  First.- Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly.- Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or

                  Thirdly.- Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.

                  Explanation 1.— A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing.

                  Illustration

                  A, a public officer, is authorised by a warrant from a Court of Justice to apprehend Z. B, knowing that fact and also that C is not Z, wilfully represents to A that C is Z, and thereby intentionally causes A to apprehend C. Here B abets by instigation the apprehension of C.

                  Explanation 2.—Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitate the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.”

8. The Code does not define the word `suicide'. `Suicide' reflects a “species of fear”. It implies an act of self-killing. In suicide, one thinks of self-annihilation because of something which is disagreeable or intolerable or unbearable. People behave differently in the same situation. Human sensitivity differs from person to person.

9. In Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [(2009) 16 SCC 605], the Apex Court held that suicidal ideation behaviours in human beings are complex and multifaceted. Different individuals in the same situation react and behave differently because of the personal meaning they add to each event, thus accounting for individual vulnerability to suicide.

10. Instigation is a vital ingredient of abetment. Instigation is also not defined in the Code. In Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh [(2001) 9 SCC 618], the Apex Court defined the word

                  `instigation' as follows:

                  “Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do “an act”. To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation.”

11. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and the precedents on the subject make it clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC, there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide {Vide: S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan [(2010) 12 SCC 190] and M. Mohan v. State [(2011) 3 SCC 626]

12. The essential ingredients of the offence under Section 306 IPC are : (i) the abetment; (ii) the intention of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide. There should be evidence capable of suggesting that the accused intended by such act to instigate the deceased to commit suicide. Unless the ingredients of instigation/abetment to commit suicide are satisfied the accused cannot be convicted under Section 306 IPC {Vide: M. Arjunan v. State Rep. By Its Inspector of Police [(2019) 3 SCC 315]

13. In Ude Singh v. State of Haryana [(2019) 17 SCC 301], a Two- Judge Bench of the Apex Court on Section 306 IPC observed that in case of suicide, mere allegation of harassment of the deceased by another person would not suffice unless there be such action on the part of the accused which compels the person to commit suicide; and such an offending action ought to be proximate to the time of occurrence. If the accused by his acts and by his continuous course of conduct create a situation which leads the deceased perceiving no other option except to commit suicide, the case may fall within the four corners of Section 306 IPC, the Apex Court added. The principles declared in Ude Singh was reiterated by the Apex Court in Mariano Anto Bruno v. Inspector of Police (2022 SCC OnLine SC 1387).

14. In Abhinav Mohan Delkar v. State of Maharashtra (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1725), the Apex Court, observed thus:

                  “22. What comes out essentially from the various decisions herein before cited is that, even if there is allegation of constant harassment, continued over a long period; to bring in the ingredients of Section 306 read with Section 107, still there has to be a proximate prior act to clearly find that the suicide was the direct consequence of such continuous harassment, the last proximate incident having finally driven the subject to the extreme act of taking one's life. Figuratively, ‘the straw that broke the camel's back’; that final event, in a series, that occasioned a larger, sudden impact resulting in the unpredictable act of suicide. What drove the victim to that extreme act, often depends on individual predilections; but whether it is goaded, definitively and demonstrably, by a particular act of another, is the test to find mens rea. Merely because the victim was continuously harassed and at one point, he or she succumbed to the extreme act of taking his life cannot by itself result in finding a positive instigation constituting abetment. Mens rea cannot be gleaned merely by what goes on in the mind of the victim.

                  23. The victim may have felt that there was no alternative or option, but to take his life, because of what another person did or said; which cannot lead to a finding of mens rea and resultant abetment on that other person. What constitutes mens rea is the intention and purpose of the alleged perpetrator as discernible from the conscious acts or words and the attendant circumstances, which in all probability could lead to such an end. The real intention of the accused and whether he intended by his action to at least possibly drive the victim to suicide, is the sure test. Did the thought of goading the victim to suicide occur in the mind of the accused or whether it can be inferred from the facts and circumstances arising in the case, as the true test of mens rea would depend on the facts of each case. The social status, the community setting, the relationship between the parties and other myriad factors would distinguish one case from another. However harsh or severe the harassment, unless there is a conscious deliberate intention, mens rea, to drive another person to suicidal death, there cannot be a finding of abetment under Section 306.

                  24. We have already seen that even a rebuke to “go, kill yourself”; often a rustic expression against distasteful conduct, cannot by itself be found to have the ingredients to charge an offence of abetment to suicide. There is no uniformity in how different individuals respond and react under pressure. Many stand up, some fight back, a few runaway and certain people crumble and at times take the extreme step of suicide. To put the blame on the pressure imposed and the person responsible for it, at all times, without something more to clearly discern an intention, would not be the proper application of the penal provisions under Section 306.”

15. In Sunil Kumar V. State Of Kerala [2023 (5) KLT 839], this Court held thus:

                  17. There shall be direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide by the accused. The person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain acts to facilitate the commission of suicide. Instigation has to be gathered from the circumstances of the case. It depends upon the intention of the person who abets in order to bring forth the ingredients of the offence under Section 306 of IPC. The prosecution has to establish nexus between the alleged act of the accused and the commission of the suicide by the victim. The act of the accused must have a positive effect to drive the victim to the commission of suicide."

16. Coming to the facts of the case. In the FIS given by the son of the deceased, it is stated that there were disputes between accused No.1 and Sri.Mary John regarding an immovable property and a pathway. It is further alleged that due to the obstructions made by accused No.1 and his siblings, Mary John could not construct a compound wall and he had been suffering from mental agony due to it. The prosecution relied on a suicide note in the form of a complaint to the Dy.SP, Neyyattinkara stated to have been written by the deceased Mary John. In the complaint, the revision petitioner and the other accused are arrayed as respondents. In the body of the complaint, it is stated that a complaint was filed by the mother of the deceased on 01.06.2019 alleging destruction of a compound wall of the property of his daughter and physical harassment to the mother. It is further stated that no action was taken against the accused.

17. Charge Witness No.2 stated thus:

                  “My uncle had told me many times that those four people would often stop him on the road and threaten him, saying that if he did not withdraw the case and give additional width to the road, they would kill him, and that it would be better for him to go and die instead. Every time he told me these things, I tried to console him. My uncle had also informed relatives about these matters. It was due to the threats and instigation to commit suicide by Vijayan, Antony, Muthappan, and Vimal Devu that my uncle died by hanging.”

18. Charge Witness No.4 stated thus:

                  “My brother committed suicide as a result of the demolition of the boundary wall constructed on the property given to my elder brother’s daughter by the neighbouring residents, namely driver Vijayan, Vijayan’s elder brothers Antony and Muthappan, and Vimal Devu, acting together, as well as due to their continuous threats against my brother. My brother had informed me that all four of them repeatedly threatened him by stopping him on the road. Even when I met him two days prior to his death, my brother appeared frightened and distressed, and stated that he was in fear for his life. It was due to the continuous threats and intimidation by these four persons that my brother, Mary John, died.”

19. The statements of the other witnesses also go in this line. The complaint submitted before the Dy.SP, which was treated as suicide note, is extracted below:

                  “My mother had filed a complaint on 01.06.2019 regarding the demolition of the wall of my daughter's property and the assault on my mother. But till date no action has been taken against the opposite parties. The opposite parties continue to threaten me. They say they will stop me on the road and kill me. In this situation, my mental anguish has increased. I am not able to live peacefully. Therefore, I am committing suicide. I request that legal action be taken against the opposite parties who is responsible for my suicide.”

20. From the materials placed before the Court, this Court finds no positive act on the part of the revision petitioner that instigated or abetted Mary John to commit suicide. The prosecution also failed to place on record anything that points to the existence of any positive act on the part of the revision petitioner proximate to the time of occurrence.

21. Sections 239 and 240 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deal with discharge and framing of charge.

22. The obligation to discharge the accused under Section 239 Cr.P.C. arises when “the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless.”

23. The primary consideration at the stage of framing charge is the test of the existence of a prima facie case. The probative value of the materials on record is not to be gone into at this stage.

24. Section 239 envisages a careful and objective consideration of the question whether the charge against the accused is groundless or whether there is ground for presuming that he has committed an offence. What Section 239 prescribes is not, therefore, an empty or routine formality. It is a valuable provision to the advantage of the accused, and its breach is not permissible under the law. But if the Judge, upon considering the record, including the examination, if any, and the hearing, is of the opinion that there is "ground for presuming" that the accused has committed the offence triable under the chapter, he is required by Section 240 to frame in writing a charge against the accused. The order for the framing of the charge is also not an empty or routine formality. It is of a far-reaching nature, and it amounts to a decision that the accused is not entitled to discharge under Section 239, that there is, on the other hand, ground for presuming that he has committed an offence triable under Chapter XIX and that he should be called upon to plead guilty to it and be convicted and sentenced on that plea, or face the trial. {See: V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI (AIR 1980 SC 962)

25. At the stage of framing charge even a very strong suspicion founded upon materials before the Trial Court, which leads him to form presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged, may justify the framing of charge. In Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi, Advocate v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya and Others [(1990) 4 SCC 76] the Apex Court held thus:

                  “From the above discussion it seems well settled that at the Sections 227-228 stage the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. The court may for this limited purpose sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.”

26. In V.C.Shukla v. State through C.B.I. (1980 SCC (Cri) 695), the Apex Court held thus:

                  “8. There can be no doubt that the stage of framing of the charges is an important stage and the court before framing the charge has to apply its mind judicially to the evidence or the material placed before it in order to make up its mind whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. But this case is not an authority for the proposition that once the court, after considering the materials, passes an order framing the charges, the order is a final order which could be revised and would not be barred under Section 397(2) of the Code which, however, did not exist at the time when the decision was given. It follows therefore that an order framing a charge was clearly revisable by the High Court under Sections 435 and 439 of the Code of 1898. We may, however, point out that we are in complete agreement with the principle, involved in the cases discussed above, that an order framing charges against an accused undoubtedly decides an important aspect of the trial and it is the duty of the court to apply its judicial mind to the materials and come to a clear conclusion that a prima facie case has been made out on the basis of which it would be justified in framing charges.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

27. The materials placed before the Court lead this Court to the conclusion that the charge against the revision petitioner is found to be groundless, in the sense, there is no legal evidence. The materials placed by the prosecution are such that no offence is made out against the revision petitioner.

28. If the materials in the final report before the Trial Court are taken at the face value and accepted in their entirety, they do not constitute the offence for which accused No.4 has been charged. There is no legal evidence against the revision petitioner or the facts are such that no offence is made out against him. The materials produced before the Court give rise to a suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion as against the revision petitioner.

29. What I have undertaken is not a roving inquiry but a simple and necessary inquiry for a proper adjudication of an application for discharge. The Trial Court was bound to conduct a similar inquiry for coming to a conclusion that a prima facie case was made out for the revision petitioner to stand trial. The Trial Court has not exercised its jurisdiction to see as to whether there is any basis for charging the revision petitioner. This Court is of the firm view that the charge against the revision petitioner is groundless. There is patent error in the exercise of the jurisdiction by the Trial Court.

30. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge has not considered these aspects. The order impugned is untenable in law and is grossly and glaringly unreasonable.

31. In the result, the impugned order as against the revision petitioner/accused No.4 is set aside. C.M.P No.54/2024 in S.C No.2284/2022 is allowed. Accused No.4 in S.C No.2284/2022 is discharged of the offence alleged.

32. It is made clear that the observations made in this order are restricted to the revision petitioner before this Court and the learned trial Judge may not be influenced by the observations made above and may proceed with the case qua the other accused persons independently on its own merits in accordance with law.

                  The Criminal Revision Petition is allowed as above.