This is an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act 1963 filed by the appellant/petitioner praying for condonation of delay in preferring this appeal.

It is the contention of the petitioner/Appellant that she is an old lady and at present reached 82 years of age and she has been suffering from several illness due to her old age since the English Calender year 2015. It is further contended by the petitioner that the petitioner came to know long after 8 years from the Muhurar of Bankura Judges Court while she was suddenly met with the said Muhurar that she lost in the appeal before Appellate Court. The petitioner being old lady also could not visit Bankura Judges Court as she had suffered long illness due to her old age and she was under the treatment of renowned doctor. The doctor has all along advised the petitioner to take rest due to old age. The petitioner due to old age ailment also could not remember about the appeal during the long 8 years prior to meeting of the Mohurar of Bankura Judges Court and having obtained the knowledge about the fate of the Title Appeal on 13-08-2024 the petitioner instructed her son to obtain certified copy of the judgment and decree passed by the Learned Appellate Court.

The petitioner being old lady has given authority to her son to prefer the Memo of Appeal and hence 2340 days delay in filing this Appeal be condoned. It is also contended that the petitioner belongs to tribal community and residing in a remote village which is more than 300 Kilometres from Kolkata. As per advice of the Learned Advocate of Bankura Judges Court the petitioner has preferred the Memo of Appeal as the case was not adjudicated through points of Law and facts. It is submitted by the petitioner that the delay be condoned and the Appeal be heard on merits, otherwise the petitioner will suffer irreparable loss and injury.

The respondent no-1, 2, and 6 who have appeared to oppose this application have not filed any Affidavit in opposition. However Learned Advocate for the respondent no, 1, 2, and 6 submits that the appellant has not shown sufficient cause for condoning delay of 8 years. The first argument of the Learned Advocate is that the Medical Certificate of the doctor although shows that the appellant was under treatment but nowhere it states that she was advised bed rest, the second argument is that the medical certificate does not show that she was suffering from problem relating to memory. The third argument is that another person was looking after her case and she cannot claim that she had no knowledge.

Learned Advocates relies upon the following Judicial decisions:

Baxter (India) Private Limited VS Smt. Debjani Bose.

FAT. No. 33 of 2024

Esha Bhattacharjee VS Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Ors.

Reported in (2013) 12 SCC. P-649.

M/S. Vision Holidays VS Customs Exice and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal.

WP No-11898 of 2024

Learned Advocate for the Appellant submits that due to ailments and lack of knowledge of the Appellant there is delay of eight years in preferring this appeal, thus delay should be condoned.

Learned Advocate relies upon the following Judicial decision.

Bhuneshwari Bai V Gokul.

Second Appeal No. 153 of 2011. High Court of Chattisgarh

Aloke Kumar Chattopadhyay VS Chief Engineer (I) Irrigation and Waterways Directorate Reported in 2013 SCC Online Cal 6562.

Collector Land Acquisition Anantnag VS Mst Katyi and others.

Reported in AIR 1987 S.C. 1353.

In the instant case condonation is sought on the appellant being aged not remembering about the appeal and when informed by Mohurar of Bankura Court she came to know of the same. Now the point for consideration is whether in the absence of affidavit in opposition from the side of respondents showing knowledge of the appellant about result of appeal whether the contention should be believed and delay should be condoned.

It is decided in different Judicial Pronouncements that a litigant usually do not benefit in preferring an Appeal after the period of limitation, thus when the opposite party is able to show that delay in preferring the Appeal by the Appellant is mala-fide the delay cannot be condoned.

In the instant case although it is not reflected in the medical certificate about loss of memory power but considering the age of the appellant the loss of power to remember cannot be ruled out. Thus the contention of the appellant that she could not remember about filing the appeal and came to know when she was informed by the Mohurar cannot be disbelieved. The certified copies of the Judgments of the trial Court and the appeal court was applied in the month of August 2024 and it is not a case of the appellant that upon obtaining certified copies pursuant to delivery of Judgment appeal was filed at a belated stage. The application for certified copy being made in the month of August 2024 by the appellant will give the indication about knowledge with regard to dismissal of first appeal and advice for taking steps to prefer second appeal.

Now it is necessary to consider some Judicial decision on the point of Limitation as relied by the Learned Advocates.

In the case of Baxter (India) Private Limited (supra) Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court observed as follows:

                   ‘42. In Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra), upon considering its previous decisions, the Supreme Court laid down the law on condonation of delay. Paragraph No.26 of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow in the above context:

                   "26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:

                   (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;

                   (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;

                   (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;

                   (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;

                   (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;

                   (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;

                   (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and

                   (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision."

                   48. Accordingly, there cannot be any plausible reason as to why the appellant sat tight without preferring any appeal for the prolonged period of 14 ½ years even after the ex parte decree. Such delay is not only inordinate, the attempt on the part of the appellant-Company to cast baseless aspersions on its advocates who appeared after 2005 in the suit and also, conveniently, on an ex-employee who has left service long back in the year 2005 and obviously does not have an opportunity to defend himself is inexcusable.

                   49. Hence, patent mala fides can be attributed to the appellant-Company and its management, even apart from its gross negligence and inordinate delay in preferring the appeal.

                   In the case of Esha Bhattacharya the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows:

                   “20. In B. Madhuri Goud v. B. Damodar Reddy[21], the Court referring to earlier decisions reversed the decision of the learned single Judge who had condoned delay of 1236 days as the explanation given in the application for condonation of delay was absolutely fanciful.

                   21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:

                   21.1 (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

                   21.2 (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation.

                   21.3 (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

                   21.4 (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.”

                   In the case of Bhuneshwari Bai (supra) the Hon’ble Court while quoting the observations made in the case of Esha Bhattachariya (supra) observed as follows:

                   “11. Keeping in view the principles of law laid down in the above stated cases, reverting to the facts of the present case, it is quite vivid that the plaintiffs are legally illiterate women and the members of the Scheduled Caste and the resident of remote village Mudpar, District Janigir Champa and though they were duly represented by their counsel in the civil suit bur according to them they did not get the information from their counsel about the dismissal of the suit. In the application it is clearly stated that as soon as their names were omitted from the revenue records at the instance of defendants it was informed to them by the Patwari that their names were omitted on 23.10.2009, which they came to know on 03.03.2010 and obtained the certified copy and filed the appeal, Though the reply has been filed denying the averments made in the application but it has not been specifically denied that they are not the legally illiterate person/women and they deliberately avoided filing of the appeal right in time.

                   12. It is well settled that ignorance of law is not an excuse but there is no presumption that every person knows law. Since, the plaintiffs are legally illiterate women of the Scheduled Caste and their counsel did not inform them about their right to file an appeal, they preferred the appeal when their names were deleted from the revenue records and they came to know about the deleting their names from the Patwari. In my considered opinion this constitutes sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.”

                   It is also necessary to consider two Judicial decisions not relied upon by the parties.

                   In the case of Keshab Shaw VS Kanchana Mukhopadhyay reported in AIR-2025 Cal-P-341 the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court observed as follows:

                   “31. Hence, although we do not defy the established principle that under normal circum- stances ignorance of law is not a proper de-fence, we read some lenience and compassion into the said maxim in the circumstances of the present case where the original appellant has met his demise and his heirs, who have stepped into his shoes and are conducting the appeal, have come to the court through legal aid, which itself is a sufficient indicator that they hail from the marginalized sections of society.

                   32. Taking into account such circumstances, we do not find any reason why the appellants should be shut out from the corridors of justice merely because their predecessor-in-interest was not learned in law.

                   33. Even otherwise, since the application is construed to be one under Order XLI, Rule 3-A of the Code of Civil Procedure and we apply Article 137 of the Limitation Act thereto, we also invoke our powers under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay in preferring the application as well as the ap- peal, in view of the factual considerations as indicated above.”

                   In the case of Pyare Lal Vs Kamala Devi and Anr. reported in 2011 H.P. P-45 the Hon’ble Court observed as follows:

                   6. The Court is of the considered view that the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act must be construed liberally. The appellant has shown sufficient cause. The hypertechnical approach in this case is to be avoided and that the conduct of the party is also required to be seen. There can be no straitjacket formula to come to the conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Improvement Trust, Ludhiana V. Ujagar Singh and others, (2010) 6 SCC 786 have held that it is the duty of the Court to see it that justice should be done between the parties. Their Lordships have further held that unless mala fides are writ large on the conduct of the party, generally as a normal rule, delay should be condoned. In the legal arena, an attempt should always be made to allow the matter to be contested on merits rather than to throw it on such technicalities. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have held as under (Paras 16, 19 to 22):-

                   “While considering the application for condonation of delay no straitjacket formula is prescribed to come to the conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not. Each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which the party acts and behaves. From the conduct, behavior and attitude of the appellant it cannot be said that it had been absolutely callous and negligent in prosecuting the matter.

                   In our opinion, the ends of justice would be met by setting aside the impugned orders and the matter is remitted to the executing Court to consider and dispose of the appellant’s objections filed under Order 21, Rule 90, CPC on merits and in accordance with law, at an early date. It is pertinent to point out that unless mala fides are writ large on the conduct of the party, generally as a normal rule, delay should be condoned. In the legal arena, an attempt should always be made to allow the matter to be contested on merits rather than to throw it out on such technicalities.

                   Apart from the above, the appellant would not have gained in any manner whatsoever by not filing the appeal within the period of limitation. It is also worth noticing that delay was also not that huge, which could not have been condoned, without putting the respondents to harm or prejudice. It is the duty of the Court to see to it that justice should be done between the parties.

                   For the aforesaid reasons the impugned orders passed by the appellate Court, and the order passed by the High Court, are hereby set aside and quashed. As a consequence, the matter stands remitted to the executing court for deciding the appellant’s application filed under Order 21, Rule 90 CPC at an early date on merits. Since there are only two contesting parties to the litigation that is to say the appellant and Respondent 5, both would appear before the executing Court on 20-7-2010. Being an old case an endeavour would be made by the executing Court to take up the case as far as possible, on day-to-day basis and no party would seek an undue adjournment in the matter. We make it clear that we have expressed no opinion on the merits of the matter and any observation made herein would not be construed as an expression of opinion on merits.

                   We are conscious of the fact the respondent 5 has been put to inconvenience and harassment as admittedly it had deposited a huge amount of Rs. 22,65,000 in the year 1992 but has not been able to get any fruits thereof till date. Therefore, the appellant’s appeal is allowed subject to payment of Rs. 50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand) to Respondent 5 within three weeks hereof. Payment of costs is a condition precedent, without which the appellant would not be allowed to prosecute its objections. The appeal therefore stands allowed to the aforesaid extent. The appellant to bear the costs throughout.”

                   7. Similarly, their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and another, (2010) 5 SCC 459 : (AIR 2010 SC (Supp) 697) while construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act have held as under (Paras 14 and 15) :-

                   “We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time.

                   The expression “sufficient cause” employed in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. Although, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justify lably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate Collector (L.A.) v. Katiji, N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy and Vedabai v.Shantaram Baburao Patil.”

                   In the case of Ram Kumar Goyel and ors. VS. Bhuwan Sing Pradhan reported in AIR-2007 Sikkim- 39 the Hon’ble Court observed as follows:

                   “24. One more decision cited on the point by Mr. Banerjee, the learned Senior Counsel is a Division Bench decision of this Court rendered in Principal Secretary, Transport Department, Government of Sikkim, Gnagtok v. Smt Narmaya Das, Civil Misc. Application No. 6 of 2004 decided on 7th June,2005(Reported in 2006(1)ACJ 150). In this case, a Division Bench of this Court, relying on several decisions of the Apex Court and High Courts held that, in considering application for condonation of delay, merits of the Appeal can be looked into keeping in view the object underlying Sec 5 of the Limitation Act which is to enable the court to do substantial justice. Paragraph 12 of the said order which is relied on by the Learned counsel is as follows:

                   “12. Further, it also becomes clear from the above that where arguable points of facts and law are involved the explanation furnished should not be brushed aside taking hyper technical view of the matter. It is indeed well established that merits of the case may also be taken into consideration in excusing the delay…..””

                   In the case of Collector Land Acquisition Anantnag (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows:

                   3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 “Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of 0. XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.” Of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on ‘merits’. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters, instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:-

                   1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

                   2. Refusing to condones delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

                   3. “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.

                   4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.

                   5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.

                   6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

The decisions relied upon by Learned Advocate for the respondents being the case of Baxter (India) Private Limited (supra) and Esha Bhattacharyjee (supra) cannot be applied in the instant case. In the said cases the Hon’ble Court refused to accept the explanation with regard to lack of knowledge as it showed lack of bona-fide of the applicants. Moreover in the case of Esha Bhattacharya the applicant whose condonation of delay was not granted was managing committee of an Educational Institution, and in the case of Baxter (India) Private Limited it is a business establishment Moreover in the case of Baxter (India) Private Limited the delay was 14 ½ years. In the instant case the Applicant/Appellant is an illiterate tribal lady who being 82 years old, suffering from ailments and lack of memory problem had to rely upon information and Legal advice of lawyer. The case indicates that there was lack of information and advice for which the appellant could not prefer the Appeal in time. When a litigant has to pursue litigation for several years in trial Court and thereafter due to old age and ailments loses memory power about litigation his application for condonation of delay may be considered sympathetically.

The Legislature has framed the Limitation Act and has prescribed period of limitation for suits, appeals and applications. Now so far suit is concerned legislature has not conferred power upon Court to condone delay if barred by limitation, but on the other hand Courts have been conferred with the Power to condone delay in case of appeal and application. Further if the Schedule to the Limitation Act is perused it will appear that Limitation Period of suits vary from one year to twelve years, on the other hand limitation period of appeal or application varies from one month to three months. Thus a litigant gets a vast opportunity to institute suit within Limitation period from the date of cause of action. On the other hand the period of Limitation of Appeal or Application ordinarily ranges from one month to three months. A litigant after pursuing a litigation for a long period in trial Court being exhausted usually requires time to get ready to prefer Appeal if he looses before trial Court. During the long period of legal battle he may become aged or suffer from ailments or become financially week to start another litigation to prefer appeal. Thus Courts are conferred with the discretion to take all relevant factors into consideration and condone delay in preferring Appeal or making application. In the instant case the Appellant who is a tribal lady had to pursue her right over some lands when there was threat of dispossession from the said lands. She had to pursue the case before the Trial Court for eight years and when she lost in the Trial Court she had to move the Appeal Court and pursue the appeal for another eight years. As she has succeeded in Appeal in part with regard to her landed property, considering her age which is 82, years period spent in litigation, the ground of lack of knowledge about result of first appeal and her ailments her case should be considered sympathetically and delay should be condoned subject to the payment of costs.

Thus this application for condonation of delay stands allowed subject to the payment of costs of Rs. 6,000/- to the respondents nos. 1, 2, and 6 and Rs. 2,000/- to the High Court Legal Service Committee on or before 15/01/2026. In the event the cost is not paid this Order shall stand recalled and petition dismissed.

Fix 16/01/2026 for report regarding payment.