Anil K. Narendran, J.

1. The appellant filed W.P.(C)No.10141 of 2026, invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P4 notice dated 03.03.2026 issued by the Advocate Commissioner appointed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Kottayam in M.C.No.18 of 2026, in a proceeding initiated by HDFC Bank Ltd. and its Authorised Officer, invoking the provisions under Section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act), seeking assistance of the Court to take possession of the secured asset; and a writ of mandamus commanding the respondent Authorised Officer of HDFC Bank to grant sufficient and reasonable time to the petitioner to clear off the legally outstanding overdue amount, and till such time direct the respondent to keep in abeyance all further proceedings against the secured asset having an extent of 11.30 Ares comprising of 6.75 Ares in Re.Sy.No.139/20, 3.55 Ares in Re.Sy.No.139/21 and 1 Ares in Re.Sy.No.139/66 of Re.Sy.Block No.11 of Kanjirappally Village.

2. The proceedings initiated by the bank against the secured asset are in respect of two term loans and one non- residential premise refinance availed by the appellant-petitioner for Rs.3.85 crores (Rupees 3 crores + 60 lakhs + 25 lakhs) from HDFC Bank Ltd. On account of the default committed by the petitioner, the accounts were classified as Non-Performing Asset (NPA) and the bank initiated coercive steps under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act.

3. The appellant-petitioner had earlier approached this Court in W.P.(C)No.27809 of 2024, challenging the proceedings initiated by the bank under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. That writ petition was disposed of by Ext.P1 judgment dated 30.08.2024, whereby he was granted time to pay overdue amount in 14 monthly installments, along with regular monthly installments. Paragraph 2 of that judgment reads thus;

                  “2. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the respondent I deem it appropriate to dispose of this writ petition as follows;

                  i. The petitioner shall pay a lump sum amount of Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten lakhs only) on or before 01.10.2024.

                  ii. After making a payment of Rs.10,00,000/- as directed above, the petitioner shall pay the remaining overdue in 14 monthly equal instalments along with regular installments.

                  iii. The first installment is to be paid on or before 07.11.2024, and the remaining 13 installments on or before the 7th day of each succeeding month, along with regular installments.

                  iv. After making payment of the entire overdue amount along with regular installments, the petitioner shall continue to pay the regular installments till the entire loan liabaility is discharged. v. In case of failure to make payment of the lump sum amount of ten lakhs or any installments as directed above, the respondent bank shall be free to take possession of the secured assets. The Bank shall proceed against the petitioner in accordance with the law to realize its dues.

                  vii. Till such time, all coercive proceedings against the secured assets shall be deferred.”

4. Though the loan accounts were regularised, the accounts were again classified as NPA, on account of the default committed by the appellant-petitioner. Thereafter, a fresh notice dated 19.08.2025 under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act was issued, which was followed by a possession notice. Seeking assistance of the Court to take physical possession of the secured asset, the bank moved an application before the Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Kottayam in M.C.No.18 of 2026, invoking the provisions under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act and the Advocate Commissioner appointed by the orders of the said Court issued Ext.P4 notice dated 03.08.2026.

5. On 24.03.2026, when W.P.(C)No.10141 of 2026 came up for admission, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. Paragraphs 3 to 5 and also the last paragraph of that judgment read thus;

                  “3. The learned counsel for the respondent vehemently opposed entertaining this writ petition and granting the reliefs to the petitioner since, he has an efficacious alternative remedy before the DRT.

                  4. I find considerable force in the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respondent.

                  5. The Honourable Apex Court in a catena of decisions including the decisions in Phoenix ARC Pvt. Ltd. v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir and others [2022 KHC OnLine 6040], South Indian Bank Ltd. (M/s.) v. Naveen Mathew Philip [2023 KHC OnLine 6435] and PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank [2024 KHC OnLine 6208], have categorically held that the writ petitions against SARFAESI proceedings must not be entertained since the aggrieved persons have an alternative and efficacious remedy before the DRT.

                  In such circumstances, this writ petition is dismissed without prejudice to the contentions and right of the petitioner to avail the statutory remedy.”

6. Challenging the judgment dated 24.03.2026 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.10141 of 2026, the appellant- petitioner is before this Court in this writ appeal, invoking the provisions under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958.

7. Heard arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner and also the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent Authorised Officer of HDFC Bank.

8. The learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner would contend that the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition, by the impugned judgment dated 24.03.2026, without taking note of the legal and factual contentions raised by the petitioner. One of the reliefs sought for in the writ petition is for instalment facility to pay the overdue amount. The learned Single Judge ought to have granted the said relief, instead of dismissing the writ petition by relegating the petitioner to avail the statutory remedy.

9. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent would submit that the learned Single Judge rightly dismissed the writ petition, after taking note of the law on the point. The reasoning of the learned Single Judge for declining the reliefs sought for in the writ petition, cannot be said to be either perverse or patently illegal, warranting an interference in this intra-court appeal.

10. In United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon [(2010) 8 SCC 110], a Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that if the 1st respondent guarantor had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act or the action taken under Section 14, then he could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1) before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The expression ‘any person’ used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective.

11. In Satyawati Tondon [(2010) 8 SCC 110], on the facts of the case at hand, the Apex Court noted that the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. While dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves, inasmuch as, they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute.

12. In South Indian Bank Ltd. v. Naveen Mathew Philip [(2023) 17 SCC 311], in the context of the challenge made against the notices issued under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, the Apex Court reiterated the settled position of law on the interference of the High Court invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India in commercial matters, where an effective and efficacious alternative forum has been constituted through a statute. In the said decision, the Apex Court took judicial notice of the fact that certain High Courts continue to interfere in such matters, leading to a regular supply of cases before the Apex Court. The Apex Court reiterated that a writ of certiorari is to be issued over a decision when the court finds that the process does not conform to the law or the statute. In other words, courts are not expected to substitute themselves with the decision-making authority while finding fault with the process along with the reasons assigned. Such a writ is not expected to be issued to remedy all violations. When a Tribunal is constituted, it is expected to go into the issues of fact and law, including a statutory violation. A question as to whether such a violation would be over a mandatory prescription as against a discretionary one is primarily within the domain of the Tribunal. The issues governing waiver, acquiescence and estoppel are also primarily within the domain of the Tribunal. The object and reasons behind the SARFAESI Act are very clear as observed in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India [(2004) 4 SCC 311]. While it facilitates a faster and smoother mode of recovery sans any interference from the court, it does provide a fair mechanism in the form of the Tribunal being manned by a legally trained mind. The Tribunal is clothed with a wide range of powers to set aside an illegal order, and thereafter, grant consequential reliefs, including repossession and payment of compensation and costs. Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act gives an expansive meaning to the expression ‘any person’, who could approach the Tribunal.

13. In Naveen Mathew Philip [(2023) 17 SCC 311], the Apex Court noticed that, in matters under the SARFAESI Act, approaching the High Court for the consideration of an offer by the borrower is also frowned upon by the Apex Court. A writ of mandamus is a prerogative writ. The court cannot exercise the said power in the absence of any legal right. More circumspection is required in a financial transaction, particularly when one of the parties would not come within the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. When a statute prescribes a particular mode, an attempt to circumvent that mode shall not be encouraged by a writ court. A litigant cannot avoid the non- compliance of approaching the Tribunal, which requires the prescription of fees, and use the constitutional remedy as an alternative. In paragraph 17 of the decision, the Apex Court reiterated the position of law regarding the interference of the High Courts in matters pertaining to the SARFAESI Act by quoting its earlier decisions in Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas [(2003) 10 SCC 733], United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon [(2010) 8 SCC 110], State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C. [(2018) 3 SCC 85], Phoenix ARC (P) Ltd. v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir [(2022) 5 SCC 345] and Varimadugu Obi Reddy v. B. Sreenivasulu [(2023) 2 SCC 168] wherein the said practice has been deprecated while requesting the High Courts not to entertain such cases. In paragraph 18 of the said decision, the Apex Court observed that the powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are rather wide, but are required to be exercised only in extraordinary circumstances in matters pertaining to proceedings and adjudicatory scheme qua a statute, more so in commercial matters involving a lender and a borrower, when the legislature has provided for a specific mechanism for appropriate redressal.

14. In Indian Bank v. D. Visalakshi [(2019) 20 SCC 47], a Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court considered the question as to whether ‘the Chief Judicial Magistrate’ is competent to deal with the request of the secured creditor to take possession of the secured asset under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act as can be done by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in metropolitan areas and the District Magistrate in non-metropolitan areas. The Apex Court noted that the Chief Judicial Magistrate is equated with the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate for the purposes referred to in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, and those expressions are used interchangeably, being synonymous with each other. Approving the view taken by this Court in Muhammed Ashraf v. Union of India [2008 (3) KHC 935] and Radhakrishnan V.N. v. State of Kerala [2008 (4) KHC 989], by the Karnataka High Court in Kaveri Marketing v. Saraswathi Cooperative Bank Ltd. [2013 SCC OnLine Kar 18], by the Allahabad High Court in Abhishek Mishra v. State of U.P. [AIR 2016 All 210] and by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in T.R. Jewellery v. State Bank of India [AIR 2016 Hyd 125], the Apex Court held that the Chief Judicial Magistrate is equally competent to deal with the application moved by the secured creditor under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act.

15. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Satyawati Tondon [(2010) 8 SCC 110] and reiterated in Naveen Mathew Philip [(2023) 17 SCC 311], if the appellant-petitioner has any grievance against the proceedings initiated by the secured creditor under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, he could have availed the statutory remedy by filing an application under Section 17 of the said Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal.

16. When the remedy available to an aggrieved person under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act is both expeditious and effective, as held by the Apex Court in Satyawati Tondon [(2010) 8 SCC 110], the borrower, the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken by the secured creditor under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act have to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal availing the statutory remedy provided under Section 17 of the said Act, instead of invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

17. In Authorised Officer, State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C. [2018 (1) KLT 784], the Apex Court held that no writ petition would lie against the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, in view of the statutory remedy available under the said Act.

18. In Phoenix ARC (P) Ltd. v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir [(2022) 5 SCC 345] the Apex Court was dealing with a case in which Phoenix ARC (P) Ltd. (for brevity ‘ARC’), which is a private financial institution, proposed to take action under the SARFAESI Act to recover the borrowed amount as a secured creditor. The Apex Court held that ARC as such cannot be said to be performing public functions which are normally expected to be performed by State authorities. During the course of a commercial transaction and under the contract, the bank/ARC lends money to the borrowers and the said activity of the bank/ARC cannot be said to be as performing a public function, which is normally expected to be performed by the State authorities. If proceedings are initiated under the SARFAESI Act and/or any proposed action is to be taken, and the borrower is aggrieved by any of the actions of the private bank/bank/ARC, he has to avail the remedy under the SARFESI Act, and no writ petition would lie and/or is maintainable and/or entertainable.

19. In Sobha S. v. Muthoot Finance Limited [2025 (2) KHC 229], the Apex Court considered the question of maintainability of writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against a private non-banking financial company and also a private company carrying on banking business as a Scheduled Bank. In the said case, the Apex Court held that a private company carrying on banking business as a Scheduled Bank cannot be termed as a company carrying on any public function or public duty. Merely because a Statute or a rule having the force of a statute requires a company or some other body to do a particular thing, it does not possess the attribute of a statutory body.

20. In the instant case, one of the reliefs sought for by the appellant-petitioner in W.P.(C)No.10141 of 2026 was a writ of mandamus commanding the respondent Authorised Officer of the HDFC Bank Ltd. to grant sufficient and reasonable time to the petitioner to clear off the legally outstanding overdue amount and till such time direct the bank to keep in abeyance all further proceedings against the secured asset. Admittedly, HDFC Bank Ltd. is a private company carrying on banking business as a Scheduled Bank. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Phoenix ARC (P) Ltd. [(2022) 5 SCC 345] and Sobha S. [2025 (2) KHC 229], during the course of a commercial transaction and under the contract, HDFC Bank Ltd. lend money to the borrowers and the said activity of the bank cannot be said to be as performing a public function, which is normally expected to be performed by the State authorities. If proceedings are initiated by the said bank under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act and the borrower or the guarantor or any other person is affected by the action taken by the bank, he has to avail the statutory remedy provided under Section 17 of the SARFESI Act, and no writ petition would lie, maintainable or entertainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

21. In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, we find no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment dated 24.03.2026 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.10141 of 2026, whereby the reliefs sought for in that writ petition were declined.

                  In the result, this writ appeal fails and the same is accordingly dismissed.