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CDJ 2026 Ker HC 351 print Preview print print
Court : High Court of Kerala
Case No : CRL.A No. 1195 of 2019
Judges: THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE JOBIN SEBASTIAN
Parties : Noushar @ Kochumony Versus State Represented By The Public Prosecutor, High Court of Kerala, Ernakulam
Appearing Advocates : For the Appellant: A.Mohammed, Sergi Joseph Thomas, T.P. Abdul Hameed ,T.D. Jayaprakash, B.O. Issac Melvin, Advocates, Archana P.P For the Respondent: Sheeba Thomas, Public Prosecutor.
Date of Judgment : 03-03-2026
Head Note :-
Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 302, 377, 201 – Circumstantial Evidence – Last Seen Theory – Section 106 Evidence Act – Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt – Appeal against conviction for murder of minor child based solely on circumstantial evidence – Prosecution relied on “last seen” theory, alleged recovery, motive and conduct of accused – No direct evidence – Trial Court convicted accused.

Court Held Criminal Appeal Allowed – Prosecution failed to establish complete chain of circumstances – “Last seen” evidence based on solitary witness unreliable and uncorroborated – Material omissions and conduct of witness create serious doubt – Recovery and scientific evidence inconclusive – Motive not proved – Suspicion cannot substitute proof – Benefit of doubt extended and conviction set aside – Accused acquitted.

[Paras 20, 21, 26, 34, 35]

Cases Cited:
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622
Kanhaiya Lal v State of Rajasthan, (2014) 4 SCC 715
Padman Bibhar v. State of Odisha, 2025 SCC Online SC 1190

Keywords:
Circumstantial Evidence – Last Seen Theory – Section 302 IPC – Section 201 IPC – Benefit of Doubt – Weak Evidence – Failure to Prove Chain – Scientific Evidence – Motive Not Proved – Acquittal

Comparative Citation:
2026 KER 18316,
Judgment :-

Jobin Sebastian, J.

1. The judgment of conviction and the order of sentence passed against the sole accused in S.C. No.1908/2011 on the file of the Additional Sessions Court-I, Kollam, for offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code are under challenge in this appeal.

2. The prosecution allegation in brief is as follows:

The accused, who has a propensity for engaging in unnatural sexual activities, on 07.01.2006, at about 3 p.m., forcefully caused Shamsudeen, a boy child aged only 4 ½ years, to consume liquor and committed carnal intercourse against the order of nature with the said boy. Thereafter, with the intention of causing the death of the child, the accused put him in a waterlogged marshy land and murdered him. Then the accused, with an intention to cause the disappearance of evidence, threw the liquor bottle into the marshy land. Hence, the accused is alleged to have committed the offences punishable under Sections 302, 377, and 201 of the IPC.

3. On completion of the investigation, the final report was submitted before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Karunnagappally. Being satisfied that the case was one triable exclusively by the Court of Session, the learned Magistrate, after complying with all the necessary formalities, committed the case to the Sessions Court, Kollam, under Section 209 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Sessions Judge, who took cognizance of the offences, perused the records and heard both sides under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. Thereafter, a written charge was framed against the accused for offences punishable under Sections 302, 377 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code. When the charge was read over and explained to the accused, he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. After completion of the examination of thirty six prosecution witnesses, the learned Sessions Judge made over the case for trial and disposal to the Additional Sessions Court-I, Kollam.

4. During the trial, the prosecution has altogether examined 54 witnesses as PW1 to PW54, and marked Exts.P1 to P58. MO1 to MO8 were exhibited and identified. After the completion of prosecution evidence, when the accused was questioned under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., he denied all the incriminating materials brought out against him in evidence. On finding that this is not a fit case to acquit the accused under Section 232 of the Cr.P.C., the accused was called upon to enter on his defence and adduce any evidence that he may have in support thereof. From the side of the accused, DW1 to DW3 were examined.

5. After trial, the accused was found not guilty of the offence punishable under Section 377 of the IPC, and he was acquitted on the said charge. However, the accused was found guilty of offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 IPC, and was convicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. In default of payment of the fine, the accused was ordered to undergo simple imprisonment for six months. For the offence punishable under Section 201 of IPC, the accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand only) with a default clause to undergo simple imprisonment for three months. Challenging the said finding of guilt, conviction, and the order of sentence passed, the accused has preferred this appeal.

6. The law was set in motion in the present case on the basis of the statement given by one Noushad (PW1), stating that his cousin brother, Shamsudeen, aged only 4½ years, had gone missing. Initially, an FIR was registered at Karunagappally Police Station under Section 57 of the Kerala Police Act for man missing. Subsequently, an investigation was commenced, which culminated in the filing of a final report against the accused, alleging the commission of offences punishable under Sections 302, 377, and 201 of the IPC.

7. The initial and major part of the investigation was conducted by PW46, the Circle Inspector of Police, Karunagappally. Thereafter, the investigation was entrusted to the CBCID, and PW47, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, CBCID, HH Wing–I, Kollam, laid the final report upon completion of the investigation. However, during the course of the trial, this Court, vide order in Crl. M.C. No. 4552/2016 dated 22.09.2016, directed the Superintendent of Police, CBCID, Kollam, to conduct further investigation. Pursuant to the said order, further investigation was carried out, and a supplementary final report was submitted.

8. When the paternal cousin brother of the deceased minor boy, who gave the first information statement to the police regarding the missing of the said boy, was examined as PW1, he deposed that Shamsudeen, the deceased boy, was his paternal cousin. During the period of occurrence, the deceased boy was living with his mother and two siblings. The father of Shamsudeen was abroad. According to PW1, his house is situated on the south-western corner of Shamsudeen’s house. The accused was residing on the northern side of his house. The houses of PW2 and PW3 are situated on the eastern side of the accused’s house. On the northern side of the accused’s house, the house of Saleena (PW10) is situated. On the alleged date of the incident, at about 7:30 p.m., he received a phone call informing him that Shamsudeen, the deceased minor boy, had gone missing. On knowing about the same, he rushed to Shamsudeen’s house and found several local people gathered there. Even after an intensive search, the missing boy was not found. Hence, on the same day, at about 10 p.m., he went to the Karunagappally Police Station and gave a statement to the police. Ext. P1 is the statement so given. Even after the search conducted by the police, the missing boy was not found on the next day as well. Thereafter, on 09.01.2006, while he was reading the newspaper, one Cleatus (PW11) approached him and informed that the dead body of a minor boy had been found lying in a marshy area. He then rushed to the said place and found the dead body lying there. Thereafter, the matter was informed to the police. The police conducted an inquest on the body and shifted it to the Medical College Hospital.

9. Another crucial witness examined by the prosecution is PW2. During examination, PW2 deposed that he is a coolie labourer. He resides on the eastern side of the accused’s house. On 07.01.2006, at around 8 a.m., he went to Thodiyoor for work. As there was no work on that day, he returned home around noon. Thereafter, he had his lunch and, after consuming liquor, fell asleep. At around 3:30 p.m., his wife woke him up and told that the accused had come to his house and grabbed her with sexual intent; however, she managed to escape by pushing away his hands. His wife further told him that the accused had initially approached her asking for a beedi, and she gave him one after taking it from PW2’s pocket. Moreover, she told him that the accused was drunk and that it was after calling her husband a buffoon that the accused grabbed her. According to PW2, his wife then told the accused that she would inform the accused’s wife about the incident, upon which the accused left the house. On hearing about the said incident, he became angry with the accused and decided to question him about it. For that purpose, he went to the accused’s house, which is situated opposite his house. He then saw the accused standing on the doorstep of his house. He also saw Shamsudeen, the minor boy, rolling a tyre and entering the sit-out of the accused’s house. Thinking that the accused was physically stronger than him and that he was in an inebriated state, he decided not to confront the accused and instead returned home and went back to sleep. Considering the stigma attached to the family, he decided not to lodge a complaint against the accused. Thereafter, his wife approached him and informed that Shamsudeen, the minor boy, had gone missing. He then went to Shamsudeen’s house and, along with several others, conducted a thorough search; however, the missing child could not be found. On the next morning, he went to work. In the evening, between 7:30 and 8 p.m., the accused and his wife came to his house. The wife of the accused apologised for the incident that had occurred and requested him not to disclose it to anyone. The accused then threatened to finish them if they disclosed the matter to anyone. On 09.01.2006, the dead body of the deceased minor boy was found. He used to see Shamsudeen going to the accused’s house to play with the accused’s minor child.

10. When the wife of PW2 was examined as PW3, she deposed almost in similar lines with PW2. She also deposed that on the alleged date of the incident, the accused, who came to her house, attempted to molest her. During cross- examination, she deposed              

11. Undisputedly, this is a case in which there is no direct evidence to establish the occurrence. The prosecution primarily relies upon circumstantial evidence to prove the charges levelled against the accused. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra [AIR 1984 SC 1622], the Hon’ble Apex Court discussed the nature, character, and essential proof required in a criminal case which rests on circumstantial evidence alone and held as under:

                  “(i) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established;

                  (ii) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty;

                  (iii) The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency;

                  (iv) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and

                  (v) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.”

12. It is no longer res integra that, in order to place reliance upon the circumstances relied on by the prosecution, each and every such circumstance must be fully and conclusively established. The circumstances so proved must form a complete chain that unerringly points to the guilt of the accused. In other words, the proved circumstances must be wholly inconsistent with the innocence of the accused and must exclude the possibility of guilt of any other person.

13. Before delving into a discussion regarding the circumstances relied on by the trial court to hold the accused guilty, it is necessary to consider the evidence of the doctor, who conducted the autopsy on the deceased minor boy, regarding the cause of death. When the said doctor was examined as PW36, after referring to the post-mortem certificate (Ext.P28) prepared by her, she deposed to have noted the following ante-mortem injuries.

                  “1. Abrasion 1x0.2 cm on right lower eyelid.

                  2. Abrasions varying in size from 0.5x0.2 cm, to 3.5x0.2 cm, twelve in number, irregular in disposition over an area 6x3 cm on the right side of face just outer to angle of mouth.

                  3. Contusion 2x0.9x0.2cm on the right angle of mouth and adjacent part of outer aspect of right side of upper lip.

                  4. Contusion 0.9x0.5x0.2 cm on the outer aspect of upper lip 1 cm to right of midline.

                  5. Contusion 3x0.9x0.2 cm on the outer aspect of lower lip 1 cm to the right of midline.

                  6. Contusion 0.9x0.5x0.2 cm on the outer aspect of lower lip 1 cm to left of midline.

                  Fracture separation of upper central incisor teeth at their roots with infiltration of blood into the soft tissues around frenulum of upper lip.

                  7. Multiple small abrasions over an area 2x1 cm on the front of chest 9 cm to right of midline and 9 cm below top of shoulder.

                  8. Graze abrasion 3x2.5 cm on the outer aspect of right thigh 7 on below top of hip bone.

                  9. Abrasion 2x0.2 cm on the front of upper part of right knee.

10. Healing wound 1x1 cm on the front of middle of right knee.”

14. According to PW36, during the course of the post- mortem examination, the viscera, sample of blood, swabs, and smears were preserved and sent for chemical analysis. PW36 further stated that, in addition thereto, water samples and tissue bits were also forwarded to the Chemical Examiner’s Laboratory for conducting a diatom test. According to PW36, after receiving the chemical analysis report, she issued Ext.P29 (the final opinion). In that final opinion, she concluded that the death was caused by the combined effect of drowning and blunt force injuries sustained to the face. Notably, PW36 further deposed that the results of the chemical analysis revealed the presence of ethyl alcohol in the viscera and blood. A conjoint reading of the testimony of PW36 and the post-mortem certificate issued by her clearly and convincingly establishes that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature.

15. Now, adverting to the circumstances relied upon by the trial court to hold the accused guilty, it is evident that the main circumstance relied upon by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is that, immediately prior to the missing of the minor boy, he was allegedly seen entering the veranda of the accused’s house, at which time the accused alone was present therein. According to the prosecution, since the minor boy was last seen alive in the company of the accused, an obligation is cast upon the accused, in terms of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, to explain the circumstances under which the minor boy went missing.

16. In order to establish that the minor boy was last seen alive in the company of the accused, the prosecution relies solely on the evidence of PW2. While referring to the testimony of PW2, it appears that he deposed that on the alleged date of occurrence, after taking lunch and consuming liquor, he went to sleep in his house. According to him, at around 3:30 p.m., his wife woke him up and informed that the accused had attempted to outrage her modesty after coming to their house. PW2 further deposed that, on learning of the incident, he became infuriated and went towards the house of the accused, which is situated opposite to his house, with the intention of questioning him. However, thinking that the accused was physically stronger, he did not confront the accused and instead returned to his house. He stated, however, that while he was in front of the accused’s house, he saw the minor boy rolling a tyre and entering the verandah of the accused’s house, at which time the accused was standing at the doorstep. It is primarily on the basis of this solitary testimony of PW2 that the prosecution seeks to establish the circumstance that the minor boy was last seen alive in the company of the accused.

17. While considering whether the above-referred evidence of PW2 is sufficient to establish that the deceased minor boy was last seen alive in the company of the accused, it must first be noted that the accused was arrested in this case on 27.10.2006, i.e., nine months and twenty days after the incident. In the interim, several witnesses were examined and their statements recorded, including the statement of PW2. Moreover, PW2’s statement was recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the jurisdictional Magistrate, and the said statement was marked as Ext. P2. During cross-examination, learned counsel for the accused specifically asked PW2 whether, prior to the recording of his 164 statement, he had told the police that he saw the minor boy entering the verandah of the accused's house on the date the boy went missing. To this question, PW2 replied that he did not remember. No further attempt was made by the learned defence counsel to establish that PW2 had omitted to mention such a fact in his statement to the police before giving Ext.P2, while the investigating officer was in the witness box. In these circumstances, this Court cannot conclude that there was a material omission in PW2’s previous statement, as such omission has not been proved when the investigating officer was examined.

18. However, while considering whether the evidence of PW2 is reliable, it is pertinent to note that he came to know about the missing of the minor child at about 6:30 p.m. on the very same day. From his testimony, it is further evident that, upon learning of the missing child, he went to the child’s house and joined the family members and local residents in the search conducted to trace the boy. PW2, as well as his wife (PW3), deposed that they participated in the search along with the family members and neighbours of the minor child. Significantly, although several family members and local persons who took part in the search were examined as witnesses, none of them stated in their evidence that PW2 had told them that he saw the minor boy in the verandah of the accused's house immediately prior to the child going missing. Moreover, PW2 does not have a case that he disclosed such a vital fact to anyone at the relevant time. This omission assumes importance when assessing the credibility and reliability of his testimony.

19. More pertinently, when the wife of PW2 was examined as PW3, she categorically deposed that her husband did not tell her that he had seen the minor boy anywhere prior to his disappearance. If PW2 had in fact seen the child entering the house immediately prior to his disappearance, it is natural to expect that he would have disclosed this crucial information either to the child’s family members, to the neighbours and local residents, or at the very least to PW3, his wife, particularly when all of them were actively engaged in searching for the child on the same evening and on the following day. The failure of PW2 to disclose such a material fact at the earliest point of time casts a serious doubt on his conduct and renders his testimony suspicious.

20. Further, the evidence on record indicates that PW2 and PW3 may have had a motive to implicate the accused, as they alleged that immediately prior to the child’s disappearance, the accused had attempted to molest PW3. In these circumstances, the possibility of false implication cannot be entirely ruled out. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the testimony of PW2 to the effect that he saw the minor boy entering the verandah of the accused’s house immediately before the child went missing is not safe to rely upon in the absence of independent corroboration.

21. For the sake of argument, even assuming that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing that the deceased minor boy was last seen alive in the company of the accused, the “last seen” circumstance by itself is insufficient to sustain a conviction in the absence of further corroborative evidence. It is well settled, through a catena of judicial pronouncements, that the mere fact that the deceased was last seen in the company of the accused, without any other incriminating circumstances forming a complete chain of evidence, cannot by itself form the basis for conviction. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kanhaiya Lal v State of Rajasthan [(2014)4SCC 715] held that the evidence of ‘last seen together’ is a weak piece of evidence, and conviction only on the basis of ‘last seen together’ without there being any other corroborative evidence against the accused, is not sufficient to convict the accused for an offence under Section 302 IPC. In the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as hereunder:

                  “12. The circumstance of last seen together does not by itself and necessarily lead to the inference that it was the accused who committed the crime. There must be something more establishing connectivity between the accused and the crime. Mere non-explanation on the part of the appellant, in our considered opinion, by itself cannot lead to proof of guilt against the appellant.”

22. Recently, the Apex Court, in Padman Bibhar v. State of Odisha [2025 SCC Online SC 1190] held that evidence of ‘last seen together’ is a weak piece of evidence, and the conviction only on the basis of last seen together without there being any other corroborative evidence against the accused for an offence under Section 302 cannot be sustained.

23. With regard to the other circumstances relied upon by the prosecution, the evidence on record indicates that, during the relevant period, the accused was employed at a hotel by name Bharath Cafe. When the owner of the said hotel was examined as PW19, he admitted that the accused was working under him. PW19 further deposed that on the morning of the alleged date of occurrence, the accused reported for duty as usual. However, at about 11:00 a.m., the accused left the hotel, stating that he had to attend a prayer meeting arranged at his wife’s house at Kollam in connection with the death of her grandmother, and he left the premises on PW19’s motorcycle. According to PW19, the accused returned to the hotel at around 5:00 p.m. on the same day. However, when the wife of the accused was examined as PW15, she stated in her evidence that the accused had not attended any such function at her house in connection with her grandmother’s death.

24. Similarly, when the neighbour of the accused was examined as PW10, she deposed that on the alleged date of the incident, at about 8:00 a.m., the wife of the accused came to her house and entrusted her with the key to the accused’s house, stating that she was leaving to attend a function at Chandanathope. According to PW10, later, between 11:00 and 11:30 a.m., the accused came to her house, whereupon she returned the said key to him.

25. From the above-discussed evidence, it is established that the accused left the shop of PW19, stating that he wanted to attend a function at his wife’s house. However, the evidence of his wife shows that he did not attend the said function. The conduct of the accused in stating a false reason to leave the shop was seriously taken into consideration by the trial court while finding him guilty. However, while considering the above, it cannot be ignored that the attempt of the prosecution itself was to establish that the accused was a person of loose morals and that he even maintained a sexual relationship with a sex worker who was examined as PW18. Therefore, merely because the accused stated a false reason to leave the shop is not sufficient to automatically conclude that his intention was to sexually abuse the minor boy, particularly when there is no case for the prosecution that the minor boy visited his house as being lured by the accused. Moreover, it cannot be expected that the accused anticipated the arrival of the boy at that particular time. Furthermore, the evidence of PW15, the wife of the accused, shows that the minor boy was not in the habit of visiting her house.

26. Another important aspect which cannot be ignored is that the prosecution had put forward a definite case that the accused had sexually abused the minor boy and had carnal intercourse against the order of nature with him. Consequently, the trial Court framed a charge against the accused for the offence punishable under Section 377 of the IPC as well. However, the prosecution has miserably failed to adduce any evidence to substantiate the said charge. Though swabs and smears were collected during the post-mortem examination and sent for chemical analysis, nothing incriminating was detected in the chemical analysis. Likewise, the autopsy examination did not reveal any signs of sexual abuse. Therefore, the alleged motive for the commission of the offence also remains unestablished. It is trite that in a case resting on circumstantial evidence, proof of motive assumes significance, as it constitutes an important link in the chain of circumstances. Nevertheless, it is equally well settled that proof of motive is not a sine qua non for conviction in a case based on circumstantial evidence, particularly when the other circumstances established by the prosecution are cogent, convincing, and form a complete chain pointing to the guilt of the accused.

27. Another circumstance relied upon by the prosecution to establish the complicity of the accused is the seizure of the tyre allegedly used by the victim boy for playing, from the compound of the accused’s house. While appreciating this circumstance, it is pertinent to note that the tyre was seized only on 13.09.2006, that is, more than eight months after the date of the incident. The Circle Inspector of Police, who effected the seizure, deposed that the tyre was recovered from the premises of the accused’s house. It is not in dispute that the seizure was not effected pursuant to any disclosure statement made by the accused under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. Further, the mere recovery of a tyre from the courtyard of the accused’s house, particularly after a lapse of eight and a half months from the date of occurrence, cannot be treated as a circumstance unerringly pointing to the guilt of the accused. The evidence on record indicates that the house of the accused and that of the deceased minor boy were situated in close proximity to several other houses in the locality. In such circumstances, the recovery of the tyre from an open place near the accused’s house does not carry much evidentiary value in establishing his involvement in the offence. Moreover, it is difficult to believe that, if the accused was indeed the perpetrator of the offence, he would have allowed such an incriminating object to remain in his compound for more than eight months after the incident. Hence, this circumstance, by itself, does not materially improve the prosecution case.

28. As we have already noted, the scientific examination of the viscera and blood of the deceased minor boy detected the presence of ethyl alcohol. The prosecution, in its attempt to establish that it was the accused who forcefully administered liquor to the minor boy, examined a witness (PW28) to show that, on the alleged date of the incident, the accused had purchased a full bottle of Contessa XXX Rum. It is true that when PW28, the salesman at the outlet of the Beverages Corporation, Karunagappally, was examined, he deposed that the accused is a regular customer at the said shop and used to purchase liquor from it, and that the brand of liquor he used to purchase was Contessa XXX Rum. He further stated that on the alleged date of the incident, the accused came to the shop in the morning and purchased a 375 ml bottle of Contessa XXX Rum in a glass bottle. Moreover, he deposed that thousands of people used to visit the shop daily.

29. A holistic reading of the evidence of PW28 shows that his evidence cannot be believed as such without further corroboration. As already stated, he categorically deposed that thousands of customers visit his shop daily. Therefore, it is doubtful how PW28 could identify the accused as one among them, as well as the brand of liquor he purchased. Moreover, from the evidence, it is established that PW28 is a close friend of PW1, a relative of the missing boy. Although friendship is not a criterion to discard evidence, when the testimony itself is suspicious, such friendship adds further suspicion to that evidence. Moreover, even if it is believed that the accused had purchased liquor as deposed by PW28, the same will not ipso facto lead to an automatic conclusion that it was the accused who administered liquor to the minor boy. Therefore, this feeble circumstance will in no way help the prosecution to connect the accused with the incident in this case.

30. Another circumstance relied upon by the prosecution is the recovery of two liquor bottles from the waterlogged area near the house of the accused, where the dead body of the minor boy was found. While considering the said recovery, it is to be noted that the said bottles were recovered from the waterlogged area immediately after the detection of the dead body from there. Moreover, the same was detected much prior to the arrest of the accused, and at that time, the accused was not under any shadow of doubt. Significantly, from the evidence of PW46, the investigating officer, it is established that the marshy land from where the liquor bottle was recovered is lying open and accessible to anyone. Therefore, even assuming that the liquor bottles were recovered from that area, such recovery, by itself, does not establish that it was the accused who had administered liquor to the minor boy, particularly since the said recovery was not effected at the instance of the accused.

31. Notably, when the Circle Inspector of Police, Karunnagappally, who conducted the major part of the investigation, was examined as PW46, he deposed that as part of the investigation, he conducted a search in the house of the accused after preparing and sending Ext.P35 search memorandum to the jurisdictional court. According to PW46, a scientific assistant(PW33) also accompanied him in the search. A tyre found in the premises of the accused’s house was taken into custody by PW46, and he identified the same as MO2.

32. Likewise, when the scientific expert, who accompanied PW46, was examined as PW33, he deposed that on 13.09.2006, while he was working as a scientific assistant, he examined the suspected scene of crime in the presence of the investigating officer, and he detected trace of blood on the metallic handle and metallic latch of the northern door of the kitchen. According to PW33, he also detected blood in the bedroom situated on the southern side of the house and collected the same in cotton. Ext.P24 is the collection report. The items collected by the scientific expert from the house of the accused were also taken into custody by PW46 after describing in Ext.P22 search list and produced the same before the court. Notably, all these items were collected more than eight months after the alleged date of the incident.

33. Subsequently, on 27.10.2006, the accused was arrested. Virtually, the arrest of the accused was effected after more than nine months from the date of the alleged incident. Thereafter, the accused was interrogated after obtaining him in Police custody, and based on a statement allegedly made by the accused, a dhoti (MO1), said to have been worn by the accused at the time of the commission of the offence, was recovered from the family house of the accused. Ext.P11 is the mahazar by which MO1 was recovered. The relevant portion of the disclosure statement given by the accused, which allegedly led to the recovery of MO1, was deposed by the investigating officer at the time when he was examined.

34. The FSL report received after the examination of the materials collected in this case is marked as Ext.P46 through PW52, the Assistant Director, Serology, Thiruvananthapuram. A conjoint reading of the evidence of PW52 and Ext.P46 FSL report reveals that MO1 dhoti was subjected to chemical examination as item No.5, and on examination, although blood was detected, the origin of the blood could not be determined due to insufficiency of blood. Likewise, the origin of the blood collected by the scientific assistant from the house of the accused could not be determined due to the same reason. In the absence of proof regarding the origin of the blood, the scientific evidence will not improve the prosecution's case. The blood stains could equally be of human or nonhuman origin, including that of animals or birds. Consequently, the said evidence does not assist the prosecution in proving the complicity of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

35. The upshot of the above discussion is that, though the prosecution highlighted and attempted to establish several circumstances to connect the accused with the offence alleged in this case, almost all such circumstances have remained unproven. Likewise, even assuming that some of the circumstances stand proved, they do not have a definite tendency pointing exclusively to the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, nor are they inconsistent with his innocence. On the contrary, the circumstances so proved are too feeble and inconclusive to form the basis of a conviction. In other words, the prosecution has failed to establish a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances, without missing links, which would lead only to the irresistible conclusion that the accused alone committed the offence. In the absence of such a cogent and complete chain of circumstantial evidence, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt.

                  In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence in S.C. No.1908/2011 on the file of the Additional Sessions Court-I, Kollam, passed against the appellant is set aside, and he is acquitted. He shall be set at liberty forthwith from the prison concerned, if his continued detention is not required in connection with any other case. The Registry shall communicate this judgment forthwith to the Jail Superintendent concerned, where the appellant is undergoing incarceration.

 
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