1. The present appeal came to be admitted vide order dated 27.03.2012 on the following substantial question of law:-

                   “The suit for declaration and restoration of possession as filed by the respondents on the basis of forfeiture of tenancy of the appellants under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act before the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Nagpur, whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit for possession when Special Court i.e. Small Causes Court, Nagpur is available for adjudication of the same and whether such a suit is tenable in law?”

2. In a nutshell, the dispute between the parties is that the suit property was let by late Punjabrao Vithalrao Vaidhya, predecessor of respondent No.2, to one Ramaji Poharwar, predecessor of appellant. While the tenancy was in subsistence, the tenant claimed that there was an agreement of sale with respect to the tenanted premises by the landlord in his favour and accordingly he filed a suit for specific performance of contract, being Regular Civil Suit No.71 of 19971.

3. It is not in dispute that this suit for specific performance of contract was dismissed and the dismissal had attained finality before this Court somewhere in the year 1995. After the suit was dismissed, the landlord filed a proceeding, being Miscellaneous Application No.87 of 1996, against the tenant. In this proceeding, the tenant filed reply on 19.03.1996 denying the title of landlord and claiming ownership over the suit property/tenanted premises.

4. In view of this development i.e. denial of title, the landlord issued notice of forfeiture as contemplated under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and filed a suit for possession, being Regular Civil suit No.3636 of 2001 (Old Special Civil Suit No.1061 of 1996). The suit came to be decreed by the learned 8th Joint Civil Judge Senior Division, Nagpur, vide judgment and decree dated 29.11.2005. The present appellants preferred appeal challenging the said judgment and decree, being Regular Civil Appeal No.105 of 2006, which came to be dismissed by the learned District Judge-6, Nagpur, vide judgment and decree dated 23.08.2011. These concurrent decrees for possession are subject matter of challenge in the present second appeal in which the aforesaid substantial question of law came to be framed.

5. Mr. S.P. Kshirsagar, learned Advocate for the appellants vehemently argues that the judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Court suffers from inherent lack of jurisdiction. The contention of Mr. Kshirsagar is that although the agreement of sale altered the status of parties and they did not continue to be landlord and tenant, nonetheless, the jurisdiction to decide the suit will continue to vest with the learned Small Causes Court.

6. Dr. Anjan De, learned Advocate for the respondents however supports the judgments and decrees. The learned Advocate would contend that by claiming ownership in himself, the tenant has renounced his character as a tenant and as such, the occupation ceased to be in the character of a tenant. He contends that once the tenancy is forfeited, the possession of tenant assumes the character of trespasser and therefore, the suit was rightly filed before the learned Civil Court. The learned Advocate has placed reliance on judgments of this Court in the cases of Ratanala manikchand Shah ..vs.. Chanbasappa Sanganbasappa Chincholi(1978 AIR (Bom) 216), J.C. and Sons ..vs.. Ghafrana Banobi Ahmed Ali(2007 (4) ALL MR 245) and Kashinath Gosavi Patil ..vs.. Govala Vyankanna Tatayya(1995 (1) MhLJ 861) and contends that in view of forfeiture, protection of Rent Act is not available to the tenant, since the tenant does not claim that he is a tenant. Extending the logic from the said judgments, the learned Advocate contends that when a tenant claims he is not in occupation of property as a tenant, the Civil Court alone will have jurisdiction to decide the suit for possession.

7. Mr. Kshirsagar, counters the contention by placing reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shamim Akhtar ..vs.. Iqbal Ahmad and another(AIR 2001 SC 1). Referring to Paragraph 12 of the decision, the learned advocate contends that question of title of plaintiff to the suit property, if it is an incidental question, the Small Causes Court shall continue to have jurisdiction to adjudicate the suit for eviction and possession.

8. It is not in dispute that initially the defendant’s predecessor was in possession of the suit property as a tenant. Filing of suit for specific performance and dismissal thereof is also not in dispute. It appears that after the suit for specific performance was finally dismissed, the title of the landlord was denied by the tenant vide reply dated 19.03.1996 filed in Misc. Civil Application No.87 of 1996. The tenant not only denied the title but also claimed to be owner of the tenanted premises/suit property. The tenant thus forfeited the tenancy. Upon forfeiture of tenancy by the tenant, his possession ceased to be in the character of a tenant and assume character of a trespasser. A tenant who denies title of his landlord resulting in forfeiture of tenancy, cannot claim that he continues to occupy the property as a tenant. In the case of Bhagwandas Lakshmi Lakhmsi ..vs.. Kokabai(AIR 1953 Nag 186), it is held that after determination of tenancy the position of a tenant is akin to that of a trespasser. It will also be appropriate to make a reference of judgment of this Court in the case of Kashinath Gosavi Patil ..vs.. Govala Vyankann Tatayya(1995 (1) Mh.L.J. 861) wherein this Court has held that by disclaimer of title of the landlord by the tenant, not only the contractual tenancy comes to an end but the tenant also looses protection of Rent Control Act. It is held that disclaimer of title of landlord brings an end to landlord- tenant relationship and that in such situation, the suit for landlord for possession will be outside the jurisdiction of Court of Small Causes.

9. It will be appropriate to refer to judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Abdulla Bin Ali and others ..vs.. Galappa and others(AIR 1985 SC 577). In the said case, the tenant had denied the title of his landlord. The landlord accordingly filed suit for possession against the tenant treating him to be a trespasser. The suit was filed before the Civil Court. Maintainability of the suit before the learned Civil Court was questioned on the ground that suit for possession by landlord against tenant will lie before Small Causes Court and that jurisdiction of Civil Court will be barred. Rejecting the said contention, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the judgment as under :-

                   “5. There is no denying the fact that the allegations made in the plaint decide the forum. The jurisdiction does not depend upon the defence taken by the defendants in the written statement. On a reading of the plaint as a whole it is evident that the plaintiffs- appellants had filed the suit giving rise to the present appeal treating the defendants as trespassers as they denied the title of the plaintiffs-appellants. Now a suit against the trespasser would lie only in the civil court and not in the revenue court. The High Court, however, took the view that the plaintiffs-appellants had not claimed a declaration of title over the disputed plots and all that has been set up by them in the plaint is the relationship of landlord and tenant.

                   6. In our opinion the High Court was not quite correct in observing that the suit was filed by the plaintiffs-appellants on the basis of relationship of landlord and tenant. Indeed, when the defendants denied the title of the plaintiffs and the tenancy the plaintiffs filed the present suit treating them to be trespassers and the suit is not on the basis of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. It is no doubt true that the plaintiffs had alleged that the defendant No. 2 was a tenant but on the denial of the tenancy and the title of the plaintiffs-appellants they filed a suit treating the defendant to be a trespasser and a suit against a trespasser would lie only in the civil court and not in the revenue court.”

10. The facts of the present case bear a very close resemblance with the said judgment. In the present case also defendant was admittedly a tenant of the plaintiff. Tenancy was disputed by denying title of plaintiff. In this backdrop, the plaintiff filed suit for possession before the Civil Court. The plaintiff has categorically stated that possession of the defendant over the suit property was rendered illegal in view of his stand taken by him denying title of plaintiff/landlord. The suit for possession is filed on the basis of ownership. In such situation, Small Causes Court will not have jurisdiction to decide the suit, since the tenant claims ownership in himself. The suit is rightly filed before the learned Civil Court.

11. The substantial question of law framed in the appeal is therefore decided against the appellants/defendants and in favour of the plaintiffs/respondents.

12. Apart from the aforesaid substantial question of law, Mr. Kshirsagar also contended that the suit was barred by limitation and a substantial question of law in that regard needs to be framed. The aspect of limitation is properly dealt with by both the learned Courts. The learned Courts have found that while the suit for specific performance of contract was pending, the appellants/tenants did not deny the title of the respondents/landlords. It is only after dismissal of the second appeal which was in the year 1995, that the appellants/tenants denied the title of respondents/landlords vide reply dated 19.03.1996, filed in Misc. Civil Application No.87 of 1996. Thus, cause of action for seeking possession on the basis of forfeiture arose for the first time on 19.03.1996. Limitation for filing suit by landlord against tenant or by owner against trespasser is of 12 years. The starting point of limitation under Article 65 or even Article 67 would be 19.03.1996, when the respondents/tenants claimed ownership in themselves. The suit is filed on 21.08.1996. The suit is thus clearly within limitation. The contention of Mr. Kshirsagar that filing of the suit for specific performance of contract in the year 1971 itself indicates that the title of respondents/landlords was disputed, cannot be accepted. The fact that the appellants were seeking decree for specific performance of contract against the respondents means that ownership of respondents was not disputed. Ownership was disputed for the first time on 19.03.1996.

13. In view of the aforesaid, substantial question of law does not arise for consideration on the point of limitation. Second Appeal is therefore dismissed with no order as to costs.